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FOREWORD
No power in history has matched the global reach
and influence of the United States. Yet coordinating
and integrating the various elements of national power
through the interagency process remains the essential
challenge of American statesmen. The challenge will be
even greater in the 21st century as strategists, civilian
and military alike, grapple with a geopolitical context
that will require fluency in meshing all the levers and
instruments of power. The authors of this compendium
join in a common effort to shed light on how the
interagency works with respect to national security.
In their respective chapters, they are particularly
sensitive to matters of institutional culture and to
the human and institutional proclivities that go into
making and implementing decisions in the complex
national security system of the U.S. Government.
Along the way, they make prudent recommendations
for improving the process.
The findings and insights are those of seasoned
practitioners, of scholar diplomats of the arts of
statecraft, and of accomplished academics. This book
will be invaluable for national security professionals
who will work in the complex interagency system in
Washington, DC, or in the field. The Strategic Studies
Institute is very pleased to publish this volume. It is
a rich contribution to the ongoing efforts to improve
how the interagency works and to the education of our
future leaders.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERAGENCY
PROCESS:
THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION
Gabriel Marcella1
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and
actions of others. Power derives from strength and will.
Strength comes from the transformation of resources
into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve.
Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear
with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to
magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility
of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and
applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts
of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of
these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.2
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.

Introduction.
The war colleges of the United States are a unique
national asset. They are centers of academic excellence
for preparing military and civilian officers for higher
positions in the national security system. They are also
living laboratories for studying how to use power for
strategic purposes. The authors of this book joined in
a common mission convinced that there was a critical
piece missing in such study: the vast area known as the
interagency, the process that makes the development
and implementation of policy and strategy possible
in a pluralistic decisionmaking system. This book is
the result of a multiyear effort among scholars and
statesmen who came together to develop a series of
papers that analyze various parts of the interagency,
1

recommend improvements, and add to the literature so
that scholars and statesmen will be wiser in performing
their responsibilities. Common to all the chapters is a
passion to improve what is perceived to be a system
that needs repair. But repair will not be possible unless
we understand how it works, and what its strengths
and weaknesses are.
The succeeding chapters present a remarkable set of
perspectives by seasoned professionals. Each one is a
rich case study that combines recent history, theory,
international relations, and profound reflections from
up close by diplomats, civil servants, and military
officers who have spent careers working abroad and
in various agencies in Washington, DC. They literally
carried the banner for learning and adaptation for
their departments and agencies, working to improve
strategic integration. Their papers have priceless
insights that cannot be easily replicated. Moreover,
the various chapters lend themselves well to use in
classes dealing with the integration of the instruments
of national power.
The Imperative of Strategic Integration.
The United States is the only fully equipped,
globally deployed, interagency superpower. It is the
indispensable anchor of international order. Nothing
quite like it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers
as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France
achieved extraordinary sophistication, enormous
institutional and cultural influence, and longevity, but
they never achieved the full articulation of America’s
global reach. Today the United States deploys some
250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies,
consulates, special missions, and membership in
international organizations. It possesses a unified
2

military command system that covers all regions of
the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It
is the leader of an interlocking set of alliances and
agreements that promotes peace; open trade; and the
principles of democracy, human rights, and protection
of the environment. American capital, technology,
and culture influence the globe. American power
and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All
instruments are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic
integration, of bringing the instruments into calculated
effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national
security staffs strive to achieve coherence, with varying
levels of success through the “interagency process.”
The interagency decisionmaking process is uniquely
American in character, size, and complexity. The
process also reflects the constant tension between the
reality of global commitments and the constraints
imposed by America’s lofty values and its imperfect
institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers
and enshrined in the system of checks and balances.
Given ever expanding responsibilities, it is imperative
that national security professionals master it to work
effectively within it. The complex challenges to national
security in the 21st century will require intelligent
integration of resources and unity of effort within the
government.
At the doorstep of the 21st century, there is a widely
held consensus that our institutions of government
need to be updated, reformed, and restructured.
The failures of American intelligence and policy
coordination evidenced by the disaster of September
11, 2001 (9/11), the failure to plan effectively for and the
frustrations with the post-conflict phase of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, the Katrina Hurricane disaster in
New Orleans in 2006, as well as other events since
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the 1990s, have called into question the efficacy of the
process for handling national and international crises,
from peace to war.
There has been a veritable cornucopia of writing
that advocates reforming the interagency, whose
foundation was the National Security Act of 1947 for
a simpler time, for an emerging bipolar world, to meet
challenges of a different order than those of today.
Some have advocated a Goldwater-Nichols type of
reform of the national security system, taking a cue
from the creation of military jointness by Congress
in 1986.3 But, because of the dispersal of authority,
resources, expertise, and personnel among competing
departments and because they are civilian, rather than
military, the analogy to jointness is not appropriate to
the rest of the government, which was designed by the
founding fathers with the fear of concentrating power
in the executive.4 Another proposal for improving
performance in national security is Joseph S. Nye’s and
Richard L. Armitage’s “smart power,” the “ability to
combine the hard power of coercion or payment with
soft power of attraction into a successful strategy.”5
Still others, arguing that the president does not have
a command and control structure over the government,
advocate placing greater authority in the National
Security Council, an organization which works directly
for the president.6 There have been, to be sure, countless
important successes thanks to the interagency process.
For example, U.S. policy with respect to Colombia
(counternarcotics,
counterterrorism,
democracy
building) since the creation of Plan Colombia in 1999
is an excellent case study in getting it right, in getting
all the agencies in Washington, DC, and in the field
to work relatively well in integrating their respective
contributions. Resolving the Central American crisis
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of the 1980s was another success story. But when all
is said and done, the current interagency process is
inadequate.
Learning and Adaptation.
How the nation and the government learn from
experience and adapt their institutions for the future
are keys to understanding the interagency process.
The large and complex interagency system is a recent
innovation, with war being the most important
stimulant to its growth, especially World War II. Indeed,
many of the recent proposals for interagency reform
originate from the defense community, which has seen
its commitments multiply globally. The United States
first faced the challenge of strategic integration in an
embryonic interagency process during World War II.
Mobilizing the nation, the government, and the armed
forces for war and winning the peace highlighted the
importance of resources and budgets, of integrating
diplomacy with military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting
joint and combined military operations, and managing
coalition strategies and balancing competing regional
priorities, for example, the European versus the
Pacific theater in national strategy. From World War
II and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of
institutional and policy innovations. Among them: the
modern Department of State, Department of Defense
(DoD) (from the old War and Navy Departments), a
centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan
for European reconstruction, the unified military
command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of the
Agency for International Development (Point Four), the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other
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alliances, military assistance pacts, military advisory
groups, and the U.S. Information Agency. In essence,
an extensive national security system emerged, whose
complexity and size would grow.
There is no period in American history like the
late 1940s and early 1950s that is so full of national
and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls it
“purposeful adaptation.” He defines it as “the need
to develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are
sensitive to national needs and aspirations and to
the realities of a changing world environment.”7 The
evolution of the interagency process parallels America’s
purposeful adaptation to changing global realities of
the last 6 decades. But it is not an orderly evolution
because of structural and cultural impediments, such
as discontinuities from one administration to another
and poor institutional memory.8 Prominent historical
markers along the path of learning and adaptation
include such documents as National Security Council
(NSC) 68, the intellectual framework for the containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Though not a
policy document, the Weinberger Doctrine articulated
criteria for the use of military power that dramatically
influenced the shape of American strategy in the 1980s
and 1990s.
There are countless examples of how American
statesmen codify in writing the patterns of “purposeful
adaptation.” The tragic events of September 11, 2001,
had such an impact on American national security
that the George W. Bush administration, urged by
Congress, created the Department for Homeland
Security. It also published a series of strategy documents
on counterterrorism, homeland security, military
strategy, cyber security, and infrastructure security.
Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) dramatically
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redefined the philosophical underpinnings of the
U.S. role in the world. Because the attacks of 9/11
represented an assault on international order and
exposed U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric warfare
by nonstate actors, the NSS of September 17, 2002,
spoke of the need to redefine the Westphalian concept
of sovereignty for the purpose of reestablishing order
and security in the international system, to include
preemptive war.9
When the United States reluctantly inherited global
responsibilities in 1945, its statesmen faced three
challenges: forging a system of collective security,
promoting decolonization, and building a stable
international financial order. These and the next 4
decades of intense threat from the other superpower had
a decisive impact on shaping the interagency process.
With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical
conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda has been
captured by globalization, free trade, democratization,
subnational ethnic and religious conflict, failing and
failed states, humanitarian contingencies, climate
change and ecological deterioration, diseases,
terrorism, ungoverned space, contraband, trafficking
in humans, international organized crime, drug
trafficking, proliferation of small weapons, as well as
the technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and homeland security. The interagency process has
not caught up to the extraordinary demands put on
policy by this vast agenda of global challenges.
National Security Council.
To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities of
the emerging superpower, the National Security Act
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of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC).
Though the NSC will be treated extensively in the
next two chapters, it is important to set it within the
larger framework of the interagency. The statutory
members are the President, the Vice President, and
the Secretaries of State and Defense. By statute, the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors. Other advisors,
including additional cabinet members, may be invited.
The President chairs the meeting; but the Council
need not convene formally to function. Formal NSC
meetings are rare. There are alternatives to formal
meetings, such as the ABC luncheons of Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Sandy Berger, or the Deputies’
breakfasts and lunches. The President himself may at
any time meet informally with members of his cabinet.
In recent years, teleconferencing facilitates such senior
level consultations.
The “NSC system” of policy coordination and
integration across the departments and agencies
operates 24 hours a day. Today, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs typically directs
the staff. The emergence of the modern “operational
presidency”10 brought to the NSC greater authority
over the development and implementation of policy,
thus creating a new power center close to the president
in the Old Executive Office Building that competes
for jurisdiction with the Departments of State and
Defense.
The NSC staff does the daily coordination and
policy integration with all the departments. The
Clinton NSC staff of 2000 had 100 policy professionals
covering regional and functional responsibilities. The
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Bush staff of 2008 grew back to 109 after an initial cut
of 30 percent in 2001. Staffers are detailed from the
diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the civil
service, the military services, academia, and the private
sector. The staffing procedures are personalized to
the president’s style and comfort level. The structure
of the staff, its internal and external functioning,
and the degree of control of policy by the president
varies. Under President Bill Clinton, the day-to-day
policy coordination and integration was done by the
NSC staff, divided into the functional and geographic
directorates depicted in Figure 1.
Dramatic changes came with the election of George
W. Bush. Comfortable with a corporate style of
leadership and surrounding himself with experienced
statesmen like Secretary of State Colin Powell (former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and White
House Fellow), Vice President Richard Cheney
(former Congressman, Secretary of Defense, and White
House Chief of Staff), and Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to
NATO, and Congressman), President Bush centralized
policy authority by establishing new structures and
procedures.11

9
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Near East and South Asian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Inter-American Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Public Affairs Special Assistant to the
President Deputy Press Secretary
and Senior Director
NATO Summit Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
Legislative Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
International Economic Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
International Health and Environmental
Affairs Directors

Multilateral Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Transitional Threats
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Legal Advisor
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Advisor

Nonproliferation & Export Controls
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Defense Policy & Arms Control
Special Assistant to the President
and Counselor

Asian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Russian/Ukrainian/Eurasian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Figure 1. Clinton’s National Security Council Staff.

European Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Speechwriting
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Intelligence Programs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

African Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Geographic Directorates

Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Central & Eastern Europe
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Record & Access Management Senior Drector

Situation Room/Systems & Technical
Planning Director

Functional Directorates

Deputy Executive Secretary

Deputy Executive Secretary and Senior
Director for Administration

Executive Secretary

Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

National Security Council Staff

The process began with new nomenclature for presidential directives.12 National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1), dated February 13, 2001, established
six regional Policy Coordinating Committees
(PCCs) and 11 (later 14) PCCs to handle functional
responsibilities.13 In 2005 they were as follows:
Regional PCCs:
• Europe
• Western Hemisphere
• East Asia
• South Asia
• Near East and North Africa
• Africa

	Functional PCCs (with department responsible in
parentheses)
• Democracy, Human Rights, and International
Operations (NSC)
• International Development and Humanitarian
Assistance (State)
• Global Environment (NSC and National
Economic Council [NEC])
• International Finance (Treasury)
• Transnational Economic Issues (NEC)
• Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness
(NSC)
• Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
(Defense)
• Arms Control (NSC)
• Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
• Records Access and Information Security (NSC)
• International Organized Crime (NSC)
• Contingency Planning (NSC)
• Space (NSC)
• HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State,
Health and Human Services)
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Figure 2. Bush Administration Interagency Process.
The NSC Staff of mid 2008 had the following members and offices, with number of personnel in
parentheses:
• Assistant to the President/National Security
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Advisor (APNSA) (1)
Assistant to the President/Deputy National
Security Advisor (DNSA) (1)
Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and
Institutional Reform (1)
Special Advisor for Policy Implementation and
Execution (1)
Senior Directors for: Speech (1), Legal Affairs/
White House Counsel (3), Legislative Affairs (3),
Intelligence Programs and Reform (5)
NSC Spokesman (1)
Assistant to the President (AP)/Deputy
National Security Advisor (DNSA) for Iraq and
Afghanistan (14)
Special Assistant to the President (SAP) for Iraq
and Afghanistan (1)
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deputy Assistant to the President (DAP)/DNSA
for Strategic Communication and Outreach (6)
AP/DNSA for International Economics (10)
DAP/NSA for Democracy Strategy (1)
DAP/NSA for Combating Terrorism (9)
DNSA for Regional Affairs (1)
Senior Assistant to the President and Director for
International Trade and Economics (1)
Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights,
and International Organizations (4)
Senior Director for Combating Terrorism (1)
Special Assistant (SAP) to the President and
Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy
(7)
SAP/Senior Director for Counter-proliferation (6)
SAP/Senior Director for African Affairs (4)
SAP/Senior Director for European Affairs (6)
SAP/Senior Director for Russia (2)
SAP/Senior Director for South and Central Asian
Affairs (3)
SAP/Senior Director for Western Hemisphere
Affairs (5)
SAP/Senior Director for East Asian Affairs (6).

Upon taking office in January 2001, the existing
interagency working groups (IWG) that existed under
Clinton were abolished by NSPD1. The activities of
IWGs were transferred to the new PCCs. The PCCs
were the most important structural changes made by
the Bush administration. According to NSPD1, they
were the “Day-to-day fora for interagency coordination
of national security policy. They shall provide policy
analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses
to decisions made by the president.”14 The centralization of authority over national security matters reached
levels not seen for many years. In spring 2003, a senior
13

national security careerist who was intimately involved
with policymaking referred to interagency relations
as “the worst in 20 years.” An experienced foreign
policy hand commented: “The interagency system is
broken” and averred that “instead of centralization of
authority, there is fragmentation.”15 Explanations for
this state of affairs varied. They included the intrusion
of group think dynamics among senior decisionmakers,
the role of strong personalities, the bypassing of
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Condoleezza Rice, as well as the deliberate isolation of
the Department of State.16 Others pointed to President
Bush’s management style, and the unique power
vested in Vice President Dick Cheney.
Another important interagency reorganization
made by the Bush administration was the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and a unified military command, the Northern
Command. The creation of DHS involved the transfer
of responsibilities, people, and resources from existing
agencies and departments to the new entity. DHS has
over 170,000 employees and a budget of over 40 billion
dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the
U.S. Government since the creation of the Defense
Department. DHS combined 22 agencies “specializing
in various disciplines,” such as law enforcement,
border security, immigration, biological research,
computer security, transportation security, disaster
mitigation, and port security.17 Though it is a national
security department, it will not be involved in power
projection. Yet, it will use many skills and resources
that reside across the agencies: military, diplomatic,
law enforcement, intelligence, and logistics. Homeland
security also involves the concept of federalism,
whereby some 87,000 state and local jurisdictions share
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power with federal institutions. The challenge that
integrating federalism injects into national security
planning will be immense. The poor performance of
federal, state, and local authorities during the Katrina
disaster verified this. The creation of the Department
of Homeland Security has also spawned the Homeland
Security Council, the analog to the National Security
Council.
The NSC staff does the daily and long-term
coordination and integration of foreign policy and
national security across the government. There is
a natural tension between the policy coordination
function and policymaking. President Jimmy Carter’s
Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert
Pastor, argues that:
. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part
from the former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s
control of implementation. State Department officials
tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and
the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might
not implement the President’s decisions or might do so
in a way that would make decisions State disapproved
of appear ineffective and wrong.18

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body, but it
oscillates between the poles, taking policy control over
some issues while allowing State, Defense, Justice,
Commerce, or Homeland Security to be the lead
agency on most national security and foreign policy
issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis
of 1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy control
from State. Similarly, policy towards Cuba and Haiti in
1993-95 was handled directly out of the White House
because of domestic constituencies. As we have seen
above in the 2008 NSC staff, the primacy of Iraq and
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Afghanistan policy, as well as counterterrorism, made
it imperative to nest these coordinating capacities in
the George W. Bush NSC staff. In virtually all cases,
however, major policy decisions must be cleared
through the NSC staff and the National Security
Advisor. In general, the clearance process involves a
review by the appropriate NSC staff director to assure
that the new policy initiative is consistent with the
president’s overall policy in that functional or regional
area, that it has been coordinated with all appropriate
departments, and that political risks associated with the
new initiative have been identified and assessed. This
process makes the relevant departments stakeholders
in the final policy. The Oliver North Iran-Contra
caper created an autonomous operational entity in the
NSC staff, an aberration that does not invalidate the
general rule. The salient point is that proximity to the
president gives the NSC staff clout in the interagency
process. Such clout must be used sparingly lest it
cause resentment and resistance or overlook the policy
wisdom available across the executive departments.
A Theory of the Interagency: The President
Mobilizes the Government.
The interagency is a process involving human
beings and complex organizations with different
cultures, and different outlooks on what is good for
the national interest and what is the best policy—all
driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf.
The process is political because at stake is power—
personal and institutional—branch of government, and
party. The “power game” involves the push and pull
of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives,
the hammering out of compromises, and the normal
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human and institutional propensity to resist change.19
Regardless of the style of the president and the
structures developed for the management of national
security policy, the interagency process performs
the same basic functions: identifies policy issues and
questions, formulates options, raises issues to the
appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions, and
oversees their implementation.
Policy exists at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting, implementation,
and post-implementation analysis and feedback.
Conceptualization involves the intellectual task of
policy development, such as a presidential directive.
Articulation is the public declaration of policy that the
president or subordinates make.
Budgeting involves testimony and the give and take
before Congress and its committees to justify policy
goals and to request funding. Implementation is the
programmed application of resources to achieve the
policy objectives. Post-implementation analysis and
feedback is a continuous effort to assess the effectiveness
of policy and to make appropriate adjustments. It is
conducted by all the agencies in the field. The General
Accounting Office of the Congress makes extensive
evaluations of policy effectiveness. Hearings and visits
to the field by congressional delegations and staffers
also make evaluations.
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John Lovell’s ideal system (Figure 3) has perfect
goal setting, complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive analysis and selection of the best options,
clear articulation of policy and its rationale, effective
execution, thorough and continuous assessment of the
effects, and perfect learning from experience and the
ability to recall relevant experience and information.

Figure 3. Ideal Foreign Policy Process.20
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Such perfection is impossible. The reality is:
TASKS

CONSTRAINTS

Goal Setting

National interests are subject
to competing claims; goals
estabilshed through political
struggle.

Intelligence

Always incomplete, susceptible to
overload, delays, and distortions
caused by biases and ambiguity in
interpretation.

Option Formulation

Limited search for options,
comparisons made in general
terms according to predispositions
rather than cost-benefit analysis.

Plans, Programs, and Decisions

Choices made in accordance with
prevailing mind sets, influenced
by groupthink and political
compromise

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradictions and
confusion, self-serving concern
for personal image and feeding the
appetite of the media.

Execution

Breakdowns in communication,
fuzzy lines of authority,
organizational parochialism,
bureaucratic politics, and delays.

Monitoring and Appraisal

Gaps, vague standards, rigidities
in adaptation, and feedback
failures.

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, selective
learning, and application of
lessons.

Table 1. Policy in Practice.21
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Effective policy requires control, resources, and
a system of accountability. The most compelling
challenge for the executive is to retain policy control.
Since presidents do not have the time or expertise
to oversee policymaking in detail, they delegate
responsibility. But “nobody is in charge” is an oftenheard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating
responsibility, control becomes diffused. Moreover,
the quest for resources brings in another stakeholder,
Congress, which has the constitutional responsibility to
scrutinize policy initiatives and vote monies for foreign
affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora’s
box of players and expectations opens. Congressional
committees and their talented staffs have enormous
impact on national security and foreign policy.
The president begins mobilizing the government
immediately upon election. A transition team works
closely with the outgoing administration. The cabinet,
which must be confirmed by the Senate, must be
nominated. Additionally, some 6,000 presidential level
appointees will fill the subcabinet positions, staff the
White House and the NSC, take up ambassadorships
(though many are retained, serving ambassadors
submit their resignation when the occupant of the
White House changes), as well as second, third, and
fourth level positions in the executive departments.
The purpose of these nominations is to gain control
and establish accountability to the president and his
agenda. President Clinton faced difficulties because he
never finished staffing his first administration.
Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of
new talent and energy—at times inexperienced but
equipped with new ideas—at the top echelons of
American government every time the occupant of the
White House changes. Continuity of government re-
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sides in the nonpartisan professionals of the civil service, the diplomatic service, the military, and the intelligence community. The transition to a new administration is a period of great anticipation about the direction
of policy. Consequently, the entire interagency produces
transition papers to assist and inform the newcomers,
and to also protect the institutional interests of the
various departments from unfriendly encroachment.
The first months of a new administration are a
period of learning. Newly appointed people must
familiarize themselves with the structure and process of
policymaking, including getting to know the essential
people around town. This necessity invariably leads
to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the
passing of the mantle, think tanks and the foreign policy
and defense communities prepare for the transition
by writing papers recommending the rationale for
policy. These will inform the new administration
about the central commitments of U.S. policy and
allow departments and agencies to stake a claim for
resources. The new administration will also mandate
policy reviews.
Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines
is another way for the president to mobilize the
government. The National Security Strategy (NSS)
document, which bears the president’s signature and is
supposed to be produced annually, is eagerly awaited,
though not with equal intensity across departments,
as an indicator of an administration’s direction in
national security and foreign policy. The NSS is eagerly
awaited for another reason; it is the best example of
“purposeful adaptation” by the American government
to changing global realities and responsibilities. It
expresses strategic vision, what the United States stands
for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how
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the instruments of national power—the diplomatic,
economic, and military—will be arrayed. Since it is
truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to
discipline the interagency system to understand the
president’s agenda and priorities and to develop a
common language that gives coherence to policy.
The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat.
The George H. Bush administration expanded it by
including regional strategies, economic policy, arms
control, transnational issues, and the environment.
The Clinton document of 1994 proposed “engagement
and enlargement,” promoting democracy, economic
prosperity, and security through strength. The 1995
version added criteria on when and how military
forces would be used. By 1997, the integrating concepts
of “shape,” “prepare,” and “respond” for the national
military strategy came into prominence. To the core
objectives of enhancing security and promoting
prosperity and democracy were added fighting
terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking,
along with managing the international financial crisis.
Homeland defense against the threat of mass casualty
attacks and regional strategies completed the agenda.
Another instrument is the national security directives
process. Administrations have titled these documents
differently, and they have produced them in greater
and lesser quantity. The two Clinton administrations
produced 73 Presidential Decision Directives (PDD),
and the George W. Bush administration issued 59
National Security Presidential Directives and 24
Homeland Security Policy Directives by June 2008.
Other totals and titles are: George H. Bush, 79 National
Security Decision Directives; Reagan, 325 National
Security Decision Memoranda; Carter, 63 Presidential
Directives; Nixon-Ford, 348 National Security Decision
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Memoranda; and Kennedy-Johnson, 372 National
Security Action Memoranda. Each administration
will try to put its own stamp on national security and
foreign policy, though there is great continuity with
previous administrations. Whereas Reagan emphasized
restoring the preeminence of American military power
and rolling back the “evil empire,” Clinton focused
on strengthening the American economy, open trade,
democratization, conflict resolution, humanitarian
assistance, fighting drug trafficking and consumption,
counterterrorism and nonproliferation. A national
defense priority was imposed on the George W. Bush
administration by the events of 9/11. In response,
the Bush administration—in addition to the NSPDs
mentioned above—created a new category of
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD).
Some policy documents serve jointly as NSPDs and
HSPDs. For example, NSPD 43 on Domestic Nuclear
Detection is also HSPD 14.22
National security directives are macro level
documents, often classified, that take much deliberate
planning to develop. The process begins with a
presidential directive to review policy that tasks
the relevant agencies to develop a new policy based
on broad guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14
for counternarcotics emphasized greater balance
between supply and demand strategies. Because of the
many constraints placed on the use of economic and
military assistance to fight the “war on drugs” and to
help Colombia, PDD 14 evolved into the Colombiaspecific PDD 73. This, in turn, was superseded in
the Bush administration by NSPD 18, which, thanks
to 9/11 and the terrorism in Colombia, went further
and provided support for both counternarcotics and
counterterrorism activities in Colombia. The evolution

23

of policy documents over nearly 10 years nurtured
the growth of significant institutional memory in the
interagency with respect to the Colombian conflict.
The learning went both ways because Colombian
officials had to adapt to the Washington policy process,
while Washington had to learn Bogotá’s. Because of
the global reach of American power and influence,
such adaptation is becoming more necessary as the
United States must learn to deal with very different
“interministerial” arrangements in foreign countries.
Clinton’s celebrated PDD 25 set down an elaborate set of
guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations. It
became so effective as a planning device that the United
Nations (UN), as well as nations that conduct peace
operations, adopted it in modified form for planning
its own peace operations. This is an excellent example
of the international transfer of American purposeful
adaptation. Other nations also used the organizing
principles for their strategic and operational planning
in peacekeeping.
Another instructive example is Clinton’s Latin
American PDD 21. Effective on December 27, 1993,
it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade.
It was addressed to more than 20 departments and
agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary
of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney
General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor,
Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
U.S. Trade Representative, Representative of the
United States to the UN, Chief of Staff to the President,
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair of
the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the
President for National Economic Policy, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency
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for International Development, Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of
the U.S. Information Agency.
Functional Interdependence: The Iron Law of the
Interagency.
The point of listing departments and agencies is to
identify the interagency stakeholders, though the size
of the stake will vary greatly among them according
to the particular issue. The stakeholders are related
by functional interdependence; they have different
resources, personnel, and expertise that must be
integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of
the interagency that no national security or international
affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone. For
example, the DoD needs the diplomatic process that
the Department of State masters to deploy forces
abroad, build coalitions, negotiate solutions to conflict,
conduct noncombatant evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in difficult circumstances abroad,
and administer security assistance. The Department of
State in turn depends on the logistical capabilities of the
DoD to deploy personnel and materials abroad during
crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support militaryto-military contacts, and give substance to alliances
and defense relationships. The Office of National Drug
Control Policy, a new cabinet level position created
under the Clinton administration in 1997, must rely on
a range of agencies to reduce the supply abroad and
consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require
intelligence input to make sound decisions.
The pattern of functional interdependence, whereby
departments stayed within their jurisdictions, began to
fray in the George W. Bush administration. Press reports
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in the spring of 2003 focused on the Bush “policy team
at war with itself.”23 Accordingly, there was a “tectonic
shift” of decisionmaking power from the Department
of State to Defense because of the strong personalities
and neo-conservative ideology of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and subordinates, principally Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. The shift was facilitated by
the military emphasis put on the “war on terrorism,”
and the marginalization of the Department of State. The
prospect of the DoD dominating raised concerns about
the militarization of foreign policy and the standing of
the United States in the world. Inattention to functional
interdependence was a contributing factor to the
ineffectiveness of postwar reconstruction planning for
Iraq in 2003.24 In October 2003 President Bush attempted
to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by placing
his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, in
charge. Earlier in the year the president had (via NSPD
24) given authority over the Iraq reconstruction to the
Defense Department, thereby weakening the hand of
State. 25
The problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq led to an upsurge of recommendations on how to improve the system for the future.
The remarkable point about this upsurge was that
there was a similar era of codifying lessons learned
in post-conflict reconstruction: the early to mid-1990s.
This time the House of Representatives and the Senate
proposed the “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” which
created within the Department of State the Coordinator
of Reconstruction and Stabilization. A comprehensive
study published in November 2003 by Hans Binnendijk
and Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University
advocated transforming military institutions to perform
“stabilization and reconstruction” operations. It also
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recommended harnessing interagency capabilities
via the creation of a rapidly deployable National
Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group to meet
the need of a national level group to plan and coordinate
post-conflict operations.26 In July 2004 the Office of
Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization took
form in the Department of State under the leadership of
Ambassador Carlos Pascual. Yet, 1 year later the office
was still understaffed and underbudget, an example of
an unfunded mandate. The Congress, which legislated
the office, by July 2005 had not provided funding for
the Office to do its job properly.27 By December 2005, a
new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44)
would give the Department of State the responsibility
to manage interagency efforts to conduct reconstruction
and stabilization.
Ideally in response to the promulgation of a
presidential directive all agencies will energize their
staffs and develop the elements that shape the policy
programs. But this takes time and seldom creates
optimum results, in part because of competing
priorities on policymakers, limited time, constrained
resources, and congressional input. For example, the
Haiti crisis of 1992-94 and congressional passage of the
North America Free Trade Act consumed most of the
energy of the Clinton administration’s NSC staff and
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department
of State during 1993-94 to the detriment of other Latin
American policy. The Central American crisis of the
1980s also crowded out the broader agenda for Latin
American policy. The war in Iraq similarly engaged
resources and energies after 2003.
In theory, once the policy elements are put together,
they are costed out and submitted to Congress for
approval and funding. The reality is that a presidential
directive is not a permanent guide to the actions of
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agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. The culture
of the various executive departments will modify
how directives are interpreted. For example, for the
military oriented Defense Department, a directive is
an order to be carried out. For State, a directive may be
interpreted as the general direction a policy should take.
Presidential policy can be overtaken by new priorities,
new administrations, and by the departure of senior
officials who had the stakes, the personal relationships,
know how, and institutional memory to make it work.
A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard,
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, remarked
in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a
directive from a previous administration was still
in force because the government does not maintain
a consolidated list of these documents for security
reasons. Moreover, directives and other presidential
documents are removed to presidential libraries and
the National Archives when administrations change.
A senior DoD official stated that directives are rarely
referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken by
events soon after publication, and are rarely updated.
In this respect the interagency evaluation of PDD 56’s
effectiveness published in May 1997 is instructive: “PDD
56 no longer has senior level ownership. The Assistant
Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC
officials who initiated the document have moved on to
new positions.”28 The loss of institutional memory is not
necessarily fatal. The permanent government retains
much of the wisdom for the continuity of policy.
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From PDD 56 to NSPD 44: Ephemeral or Purposeful
Adaptation?
PDD 56, promulgated in 1997, was developed as
a tool to improve the interagency process. Directives
normally deal with the external world of foreign policy
and national security. PDD 56 was radically different,
for it went beyond that and attempted to generate a
cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government
prepares and organizes to deal with these issues. PDD
56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing
Complex Contingency Operations, is a superb example
of codifying lessons of “purposeful adaptation” after
fitful efforts by American civilian and military officials
in the aftermath of problematic interventions in
Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (199495). It tried to institutionalize:
• An Executive Committee chaired by the
Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries)
• An integrated, interagency Political-Military
Implementation Plan
• Interagency Rehearsal
• Interagency After-Action Review
• Training.
The philosophy was that interagency planning
could make or break an operation. Moreover, early
involvement in planning could accelerate contributions
from civilian agencies that are often excluded from
or are culturally averse to strategic and operational
planning. An excellent Handbook for Interagency
Management of Complex Contingency Operations
issued in August 1998 contains in easy digestible form
much wisdom about how to do it right. PDD 56 was
applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies,
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such as Eastern Slavonia (1995-98), Bosnia from 1995,
Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the EthiopiaEritrea conflict after 1998, and the Kosovo contingency
of 1998-99. A March 1999 review commented: “PDD
56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package
of complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since
its issuance in 1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as
intended. Three major issues must be addressed to
improve the utility of PDD 56.” It recommended:
•	Greater authority and leadership to promote
PDD 56
•	More flexible and less detailed political-military
planning
•	Dedicated training resources and greater outreach.
Reflected in the three recommendations were
the recurring problems of the interagency: the need
for decisive authority, contrasting approaches and
institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus
military) with respect to planning, and the lack of
incentives across the government to create professionals
expert in interagency work. PDD 56 was a noble effort
to promote greater effectiveness. In late 1999, the PDD
56 planning requirement was embedded as an annex to
contingency plans. Bush’s February 2001 NSPD1 tried
to provide some life support to PDD56 by stating: “The
oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/
NSC-56 . . . will be performed by the appropriate . . .
PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups
to provide coordination for ongoing operations.” The
failures in post-conflict planning and reconstruction
for Iraq underlined the importance of taking PDD-56
seriously.
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As a result of the purposeful adaptation engendered by the Iraq experience, the Bush administration
promulgated National Security Presidential Directive
44, on December 7, 2005: “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.”
It speaks eloquently of the need for a coordinated
U.S. Government effort for harmonizing interagency
responses across the spectrum of conflict: complex
contingencies, peacekeeping, failed and failing states,
political transitions, and other military interventions.
NSPD 44 states:
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated
United States Government efforts, involving all U.S.
Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities,
to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall
coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense
to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing
U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.
Support relationships among elements of the United
States Government will depend on the particular
situation being addressed.29

The document closes with the statement: “This
directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/
NSC 56, May 20, 1997, ‘Managing Complex Contingency Operations’.” A companion to NSPD 44 is the
DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations,” promulgated in late 2005.
The Operational Level: Ambassador, Country Team,
and Combatant Commanders.
We have discussed the national strategic level
of the interagency process, that is, what occurs in
Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans
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three levels: the national strategic, the operational,
and the tactical. These can be visualized as three gears
spinning simultaneously in an integrated way. In
the field, policy is implemented by ambassadors and
their country teams, often working with the regional
combatant commanders (COCOMs) if the issue is
principally security or political-military in nature.
Ambassadors and combatant commanders are not
only implementers, they frequently shape policy via
their reporting to Washington through a continuous
flow of cables, after action reports, and proposals for
new policy initiatives, as well as personal consultations
in Washington with senior officials and members of
Congress.
There is a permanent conversation between the
embassy and the respective regional bureau in
Washington, which includes a broad distribution of
the cable traffic to such agencies as the White House,
DoD, the regional combatant command, Department of
Treasury, Commerce, the Joint Staff, and the intelligence
community, as well as other organizations, such as the
Coast Guard, when there is a “need to know.” The “need
to know” almost always includes other embassies in
the region, or major embassies in other regions, and
even at times, for example, the American Embassy to
the Vatican, because of the unique global role of the
Catholic Church. The ambassador and combatant
commander often conduct one-on-one meetings over
the multiplicity of security issues.
The embassy country team is a miniature replica
of the Washington interagency. In the country team,
the rubber proverbially meets the road of interagency
implementation. Ambassadors and COCOMs rely on
each other to promote policies that will enhance American interests in a country and region. COCOMs have
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large staffs and awesome resources compared to the
small staffs and resources of ambassadors. Moreover,
their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates
ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications
through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she
promotes understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes
American culture and business, and is responsible for
American citizens in that country. The ambassador is
the personal emissary of the president, who signs the
ambassador’s formal letter of instruction. The letter
charges the ambassador “to exercise full responsibility
for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
executive branch officers in (name of country), except
for personnel under the command of a U.S. area
military commander . . .” There is enough ambiguity in
the mandate to require both ambassador and COCOM
to use common sense and, in a nonbureaucratic way,
work out issues of command and control over U.S.
military personnel in the country. In effect, control is
shared, the ambassador having policy control and the
COCOM control over day-to-day military operations.
Thus it is prudent that both work closely together to
ensure that military operations meet the objectives of
U.S. policy.
This is particularly the case in military operations
other than war. Before and during noncombatant
evacuations, peace operations, exercises, disaster relief,
and humanitarian assistance, such cooperation will be
imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy,
force, and preparation required. A successful U.S.
policy effort requires a carefully calibrated combination
of diplomatic and military pressure, with economic
inducements added. The security assistance officer at
the embassy can facilitate communication and bridge
the policy and operational distance between the
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ambassador and the COCOM. So can State’s Foreign
Policy Advisor to the COCOM, a senior ranking
foreign service officer whose function is to provide the
diplomatic and foreign policy perspective on military
operations.30 The personal and professional relationship
between the Foreign Policy Advisor and the COCOM
is key to success.
The COCOM represents the coercive capacity of
American power through a chain of command that
goes to the president. He and his sizable staff oversee
the operational tempo, deployments, readiness,
exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets,
and air wings—resources, language, and culture that
are the opposite of the art of diplomacy. Since all
military activities have diplomatic impact, it is prudent
that ambassador and commander work harmoniously
to achieve common purpose. Their interests intersect
at the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)
(also called Military Advisory Group, Military Liaison
Office, and Office of Defense Coordination) level. The
commander of the MAAG, which is an important arm
of the country team since it provides training and
military equipment to the host country, works for both
the ambassador and the COCOM.
In the spectrum from peace to crisis to war, the
ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the
lower end of the conflict spectrum. As the environment
transitions to war the Commander assumes greater
authority and influence. Haiti 1994 is an excellent
example of how the handoff from ambassador to
COCOM takes place. The American ambassador
in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of
U.S. policy until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S.
military forces arrived in September of that year. Once
the military phase was completed, policy control
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reverted to Swing, thus restoring the normal pattern of
authority. In the gray area of military operations other
than war, such as Latin America, disputes can arise
between ambassadors and COCOMs about jurisdiction
over U.S. military personnel in the country. The most
illustrative was in 1994 between the Commander in
Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General Barry
McCaffrey, and the U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia,
Charles R. Bowers, and Colombia, Morris D. Busby.
The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, something the system
would rather not do. 31 The fact is that ambassador and
COCOM must work closely together to coordinate U.S.
military activities. The exception cited here proves the
rule of harmony between ambassadors and regional
military commanders.
A very promising innovation at the regional command level is the creation at the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) of an entirely new staffing system. It is a creative concept for strategy and American
civil-military relations. Accordingly, the COCOM
remains a four-star officer, while the deputy COCOM
will be a State Department ambassador. At the same
time, some of the directorates are headed by civilian
Senior Executive Service Officers. In addition, there is a
new Partnering Directorate, which works to build bridges
with the interagency community in Washington, with
the private sector, and with Latin American governments.32 The adaptations at USSOUTHCOM (and
also at the new African Command) respond to the
changed security environment in Latin America and
the consequent need to address the broad spectrum of
human security needs. Poverty, crime, environmental
degradation, illegal narcotics, natural disasters, and
contraband call for an integrated policy approach that
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harnesses all the partners in the U.S. Government and
the private sector. In the USSOUTHCOM region, various
offices of the Agency for International Development
(Transition Initiatives, Conflict Management and
Mitigation, Democracy and Governance); the
Department of Justice; the Department of the Treasury;
the Army Corps of Engineers; the Department of
State’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; the Office
of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Bureau
of International Narcotics and Labor; and the Office
of Reconstruction and Stability are the main partners
to DoD. This partnership works especially well with
the Colombian government in integrating rural
communities in Colombia to the national polity through
the Coordination Center for Integrated Action.33
Another example of interagency creativity is State’s
Project Horizon. Started in 2005, the Project engages
the interagency community to postulate future global
scenarios that require integrated strategic planning
across the many departments and agencies. The purpose
is to develop a common intellectual framework within
which the various players can identify their stakes and
therefore the capabilities they will need to meet their
departmental and agency responsibilities. A shared
effort of this kind builds synergies for interagency
cooperation and integration.34
Continuing Challenges in the Interagency.
The tensions generated by cultural differences, turf,
and competition for limited resources will always be
part of the interagency process. The diplomatic and the
military cultures dominate the national security system,
though there are other cultures and even subcultures.
The former uses words to solve problems while the
latter uses force packages. Cultural differences are
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large, but communicating across them is possible.35
Table 2 compares the cultures of military officers and
diplomats.
The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking
is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge. As
long as personalities are involved who work well
together and have leadership support in the NSC,
interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence
is not predictable. The world situation does not wait for
the proper alignment of the planets in Washington.
Asymmetries in resources are another impediment.
The Department of State, which has the responsibility
to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its
diplomats may have the best words in town in terms
of speaking and writing skills and superb knowledge
of foreign countries and foreign affairs, but it is a
very small organization that has been getting smaller
budget allocations from Congress. In 2008, the foreign
service officers corps comprises some 6500 people,
which is less than the U.S. Army has in military bands.
Compare DoD’s budget of nearly $500 billion (not
including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) to State’s
puny $36 billion (which includes economic and military
assistance). The military maintains a personnel float of
11 percent for very good reasons, such as schooling
and the need for redundancy. In contrast, State in 2008
had a negative personnel float. State’s information
technology was, until recently, primitive, and officer
professional development of the kind that the military
thrives on is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the
military, State lacks a strong domestic constituency of
support. Curiously, the military has more money to
conduct diplomacy than does State. Secretary of State
Colin Powell began to improve State’s budget. But
the inability to hire personnel during the lean years of
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Military Officers

Foreign Service Officers

Mission: prepare for and fight war

Mission: conduct diplomacy

Training a major activity, important for units and
individuals

Training not a significant activity. Not important either
for units or individuals

Extensive training for episodic, undesired events,
to think the unthinkable

Little formal training, learning by experience in doing
desired activities (negotiating, reporting)

Uncomfortable with ambiguity

Can deal with ambiguity

Plans and planning–both general and detailed–are
important core activities

Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value
flexibility and innovation

Doctrine: important

Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign policy

Focused on all aspects of foreign policy

Focused on discrete events and activities with
plans, objectives, courses of action, endstates

Focused on ongoing processes without expectation of
an “endstate”

Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or
partners in active war fighting

Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and
opponents in active diplomacy

Officer corps commands significant numbers of
NCOs and enlisted personnel

Officers supervise only other officers in core (political
and economic) activities

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core
functions (war fighting)

Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)

Leadership: career professional military officers
(within the military services and in operations)

Leadership: a mix of politicians, academics, policy
wonks, and career Foreign Service professionals at
headquarters and in field

All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/
diplomatic, becoming more important

All aspects of peace operations, including military,
becoming more important

Writing and written word less important, physical
actions more important

Writing and written word very important. Used
extensively in conduct of diplomacy

Teamwork and management skills are rewarded,
interpersonal skills important internally

Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded,
inter-personal skills important externally

Understand “humma-humma” and “decon
flict”

Understand “demarche” and “non-paper”

Accustomed to large resources, manpower,
equipment, and money

Focus meager resources on essential needs

Table 2. Comparing Military and Foreign Service Officers.36
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the 1990s, because of previous budgetary constraints,
affected hundreds of positions in the middle ranks of
the diplomatic service. State is so short of personnel to
staff its various missions abroad that in 2008 there was
an initiative in Congress to approve the hiring of 1,100
foreign service officers and add 12 percent to the State
budget.
In a role reversal that was becoming habitual,
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in June 2008
requested money for State, warned against the
“creeping militarization” of foreign policy, and
lamented that: “America’s civilian institutions of
diplomacy and development have been chronically
underfunded for far too long relative to what we spend
on the military, and . . . the responsibilities our nation
has around the world.”37 He added: “Our diplomatic
leaders—be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the
seventh floor of the State Department—must have the
resource and political support needed to fully exercise
their statutory responsibilities in leading American
foreign policy.” Something’s amiss when the Secretary
of Defense has to request money for the Department
of State. Such role reversal indicates that the arsenal of
American power is dangerously imbalanced, and the
default response is to look to the Pentagon. The United
States is increasingly a one-dimensional power. In
peace and war the entire government should contribute
to protect the wide range of U.S. national interests.
These include defense, economic prosperity, safety of
U.S. citizens, humanitarian aid, health, environment,
climate, refugees, border security, and others.
The resource barons, those with people, money,
technical expertise, and equipment, reside in DoD
and the military services. Consequently, the military,
especially the Army, is constantly being asked to
provide resources out of hide for nation-building
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purposes, for example in Haiti, Panama, and Iraq.
It is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only
institution with an expeditionary capability and fungible
resources and expertise. It can get there quickly, show
the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stabilize a
situation, and create an environment secure enough
for other agencies to operate. On a much smaller
scale, the Agency for International Development is a
baron, because it has money and technical expertise
to promote development and institution building.
Other baronies exist, such as intelligence, Department
of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug
Control Policy.
Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies
of the U.S. Government do not promote professionalization
and rewards in interagency jobs. What is needed is a
systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres
that are experts in interagency policy coordination,
integration, and operations. Some of this takes place.
Military officers are assigned to various departments.
For example, until 2002, 35 officers from all military
services worked in the regional and functional bureaus
of the Department of State. Senior diplomats, often of
ambassadorial rank, are also allocated to military and
civilian agencies, such as Foreign Policy Advisors at
the regional unified commands, the Special Operations
Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian
missions, various key positions in the Pentagon, and
the war colleges. These programs must be expanded.
Unfortunately, the opposite was occurring in 2003.
To convert military personnel slots to warfighting
positions, the DoD recalled most of its officers from
the civilian agencies, to include the State Department,
which in turn reduced to 30 the number of diplomats
posted to military organizations. Accordingly, an
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important element for interagency integration and
harmony was weakened.
Moreover, there ought to be incentives for national
security professionalism, as there are for joint duty
in the military. For civilian agencies, incentives are
needed to encourage interagency service, to include the
Department of State. Promotions should be based not
only on performance at Foggy Bottom and in embassies,
but on mandatory interagency tours as well. Similarly,
professional development incentives should apply to
civil servants that work in the national security arena.38
Responding to this need, the Quadrennial Defense Review
of 2006 recommended strengthening interagency
operations by establishing a new National Security
Officer career track. It also recommended creation of
a “National Security Planning Document” to: “direct
the development of both military and nonmilitary
plans and institutional capabilities.”39 Moreover, to
win the peace, DoD issued guidance to “place stability
operations on a par with major combat operations.”40
This should help engender cultural change in the
military and promote interagency integration.
Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would
require significant changes in personnel systems and
career tracking. The Report of the National Defense
Panel of 1997, Transforming Defense: National Security
in the Twenty-first Century, recommended creating “an
interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian
and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff
key positions in the national security structures.”41
The Report also recommended a national security
curriculum for a mix of civilian, military, and foreign
students. The Defense Leadership and Management
Program of the DoD, a Master’s level initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is an im-
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portant step in this direction. The Department of State,
under Colin Powell’s guidance, began to invest in educating its personnel in strategic planning. Accordingly,
the Department published The Department of State
and Agency for International Development Strategic Plan
for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009. The document sets forth
directions and priorities and supports policy positions
enunciated in the President’s National Security Strategy.
This is another breakthrough for strategic integration.
Implications for Warriors.
The future use of power is likely to be more military
operations other than war, requiring more mobile,
flexible light forces, working in unison with civilians.
Future deployments in peace and war will also require a
more intellectual military officer, one who understands
the imperative of working with the panoply of
civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the
national and international media, and foreign armed
forces. It is a commonplace of strategy that American
forces will rarely fight alone again; they will do so in
coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity of
the people, the armed forces, and the government now
encompasses the global community. The implications
are clear; the military officer will have to develop
greater diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater
understanding of international affairs, capability
in foreign languages, and more than a passing
acquaintance with economics.
Moreover, the warrior will likely work with
civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities
short of war. These include strategic planning and
budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations,
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, security assistance,
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environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence,
war planning and termination strategy, command
and control of forces, continuity of government, postconflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, noncombatant
evacuations, and homeland defense.
Therefore, the future officer will also need greater
appreciation of the institutional diversity and
complexity of government, because of the need to
advise a diverse audience of civilians on the utility
of military power in complex contingencies that are
neither peace nor war. He or she will have to work in
tandem with civilian agencies and nongovernmental
organizations unaccustomed to command systems and
deliberate planning, and that often do not understand
the limits of military power.42 Lastly, instruction on the
interagency system and process should be mandatory
for civilians and military alike. Such education must
have a sound theoretical foundation in national security
decisionmaking, strategic planning, and organizational
behavior, expanded by sophisticated case studies.
Because the United States will be heavily engaged
in the spectrum of activities entitled humanitarian
intervention, stabilization and reconstruction, and
the transformation of societies, the curriculum of
senior service colleges must emphasize the strategic
integration of the instruments of power to a much
greater degree.
What attributes should the military officer bring?
Above all, holistic thinking, the ability to think in terms
of all the instruments of national power and respect for
the functions and cultures of diverse departments and
agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The
effective interagency player writes and speaks well.
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He or she will be bilingual, able to function in military
as well as civilian English. Bureaucratic jargon is the
enemy of interagency communication. The military
briefing, though an excellent vehicle for quickly
transmitting a lot of information in formatted style,
is not acceptable. One must be less conscious of rank
because ranks will vary among the representatives
around a table. Someone of lower rank may be in charge
of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience, endurance,
and tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will
help. The ability to “stay in your box” and articulate
the perspective of your department will be respected.
The ability to anticipate issues, to consider the second
and third order effects from the national level down to
the country team and theater levels, will be invaluable.
Finally, the interagency requires diplomatic and
negotiating skills, the ability to network, and mastery
of the nuances of bureaucratic politics and language.43
The most evolved democracy in the world has the
most cumbersome national security decisionmaking
process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers
imposed for democratic accountability. But some of the
inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture,
with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused
resources coupled with the penchant to throw resources
at the problem, and the propensity to segment peace
and diplomacy from war and military power.
Democracy is defined as a process of mutual learning
and adaptation. All institutions of government learn,
adapt, and make appropriate changes. This is even
more imperative for the national security agencies and
personnel, where the stakes are high. The distempers
in the interagency process evidenced since 2001 created
new opportunities for learning and for adaptation.
Fortunately, in time American democracy will make
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those adaptations. The question will be at what price
and how quickly.
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CHAPTER 2
CONSTRUCTING THE IRON CAGE:
THE 1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT1
Douglas Stuart
Introduction.
Proponents and critics of sociologically-informed
approaches to the study of international relations agree
on one thing: There is a need for more empirical research
on the circumstances under which “conceptions of self
and interest” which guide a nation’s foreign policy
are institutionalized.2 One reason why there are still
very few studies of the genesis of a nation’s foreign
policy is the traditional historiographic problem of
infinite regression. (Should a study of the ideational
and institutional elements of German Weltpolitik begin
with Bismarck’s arrival in 1862 or his removal in
1890?) From time to time, however, history provides
us with a relatively unambiguous starting point for a
particular story. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941, is one such event. This incident had
such a powerful generative effect on the U.S. national
security bureaucracy that we are justified in calling
this network of institutions the “Pearl Harbor system.”
This monograph will identify the defining elements of
the Pearl Harbor system, by recourse to the debates
which took place between 1941 and the passage of the
1947 National Security Act (NSA). The participants in
these debates were, in the truest sense, “present at the
creation” of an entirely new approach to American
foreign policy.3 I will discuss how the interplay of their
differing goals, concerns, and interests culminated in
this extraordinarily ambitious piece of legislation.
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In a forthcoming book, I argue that the 1947 National
Security Act is the second most important piece of
legislation in modern American history (second only to
the 1964 Civil Rights Act).4 This single piece of omnibus
legislation created the National Military Establishment
(which became the Department of Defense [DoD] in
1949) as well as the office of the Secretary of Defense.
It gave a statutory identity to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and established the Air Force as a separate military
service. It created the National Security Council (NSC)
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well
as four other institutions which are less well known
(the National Security Resources Board, the Research
and Development Board, the War Council and the
Munitions Board).
The system created in 1947 served U.S. interests
for over 4 decades, but with the end of the Cold War
some experts argued that key elements of the national
security bureaucracy were in need of fundamental
reform.5 The fact that no such reform occurred during
the 1990s is attributable to both institutional resistance
and lack of motivation on the part of both the legislative
and executive branches of government.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 (9/11), the nation no longer lacked motivation.
The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that “Americans
should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustment
to a system designed generations ago for a world that
no longer exists.”6 To date, however, each attempt at
institutional reform has focused on a particular part
of the Pearl Harbor system rather than on the system
itself. There is a need for a more synthetic view of the
defining concepts and structures of the Pearl Harbor
system, as a point of reference for future debates about
comprehensive reform.
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This monograph will survey the events and
discussions which culminated in the passage of the 1947
National Security Act. I will develop my arguments
around a five-stage model of institutional design: (1)
Initial problem or goal, (2) Impetus or trigger event,
(3) Tests and models, (4) Construction, and (5) Initial
operation and adjustments.
As illustrated in Figure 1, I envision a process in
which an initial problem or goal combines with a
trigger event to create a public theory which guides
the search for relevant tests and models and culminates
in the construction of a new network of institutions.
This linear process of institutional design is completed
by an initial shake-out period, during which the new
institutions compete with each other, and with the
established network of bureaucratic actors, to carve
out areas of responsibility and authority. As a result of
this shake-out process, some new institutions survive
in the form that they were created, some undergo
fundamental revision, and some are eliminated.
Hopefully this template will prove useful for the study
of other cases of institutional design. At minimum, it
will provide some insights into the way that America
changed, and was then changed by, the structures
and processes which guided its foreign and defense
policies.

Initial
Problem or
Goal

Trigger
Event

Public
Theory

Tests and
Models

Construction

Figure 1. Institutional Design.
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Initial Problem or Goal.
Throughout the 19th century, U.S. policymakers
had, in fact, enjoyed the benefits of insularity.
According to Arnold Wolfers, “. . . external attack and
invasion were unlikely contingencies most of the time,
so that self-preservation in the strict sense of the term
rarely came to place restrictions on the leeway they
enjoyed in respect to other policy objectives.”7 Largely
as a result of their relative isolation from world affairs,
American leaders were able to pursue a sophisticated
and successful foreign policy, managed by the State
Department and guided by reliable calculations of
national interest.8 It is not surprising that Americans
tried to hold onto this very attractive situation, even
after their nation had failed to stay out of World War I.
A majority of citizens during the interwar period were
still convinced that America was an “insular” nation,
and, as John Gaddis has observed, the United States “.
. . came closer during the late 1930s to hiding in the face
of threats than it had done at any point since the years
preceding the War of 1812.”9
By the end of the 1930s, however, some policymakers
and experts were becoming increasingly concerned
about America’s vulnerability, for two reasons: the
global spread of dictatorial regimes, and revolutionary
changes in war fighting technologies. In the 1937
edition of Liberty and the Modern State, Harold Laski
summarized the political problem as follows: “In
the seven years since this book was first published,
the condition of liberty has visibly deteriorated over
most of the civilized world.”10 Many commentators
worried that the age of democracy was coming to a
close, and that modernity itself favored dictatorship.
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As Hans Morgenthau would later explain, “The
modern totalitarian state has been able to fill the gap
between government and people . . . through the use
of democratic symbols, totalitarian control of public
opinion, and policies actually or seemingly benefiting
the people.”11 Dictatorial regimes were also considered
to pose a special problem for democracies because they
were economically competitive. At a time when the U.S.
economy seemed to be inextricably mired in the great
depression, the American media frequently gushed
over the productivity and administrative efficiency
of totalitarian regimes. By contrast, the American
economy was frequently described as “mature,” a
term which was meant to be pejorative, implying both
sclerosis and senescence.
Franklin Roosevelt was deeply concerned about
the apparent political and economic advantages of
totalitarianism. Indeed, shortly before his inauguration
in 1933, Walter Lippmann warned President Franklin D.
Roosevelt (FDR) that “The situation is critical, Franklin.
You may have no alternative but to assume dictatorial
power.”12 While the President had no intention of
overthrowing the Constitution, he did what he could
within limits imposed by politics and public opinion
to replicate those aspects of totalitarianism which
he associated with enhanced efficiency—including
massive public works programs, centralization, and
national planning.13
Roosevelt was also convinced that dictatorial
regimes were inherently predisposed to aggression,
both as a means of consolidating their internal authority
and expanding their power abroad. This posed a special
problem for the United States, according to FDR,
because Americans could no longer assume that they
were protected by two oceans from the vicissitudes of

57

international relations. As a member of the American
Geographical Society, the President followed closely
the debates associated with the “new geopolitics,”
which emphasized the importance of technology in
overcoming traditional limitations of time and space.
Improvements in air power were of special importance
to this community, and the fact that many of these
innovations were taking place in Germany contributed
to the sense of emergency.
In the period just prior to World War II, a few experts
attempted to capture this sense of national emergency
with a relatively new term—national security. This
phrase was virtually unknown prior to the 20th
century. It gained some national attention in 1915
with the appearance of the National Security League,
which was established to encourage national military
preparedness. The League grew to over 90,000 members
during World War I, but then gradually evaporated
during the interwar period.14 By the late 1930s, a small
group of commentators began to use the term in a
systematic and consistent way to draw attention to the
changing nature of America’s international situation.
It is worth emphasizing that the concept of national
security was attractive to these individuals in part
because it represented an alternative to the previously
dominant concept—national interest. By the 1930s,
there was a widespread sense that national interest
was an unreliable guide to U.S. foreign policy because
it had proven to be easily co-opted by special interests
prior to and during the Great War. Various official
studies (most notably, the Nye Committee hearings)
and popular revisionist books had contributed to a
pervasive belief that the “merchants of death” had led
the United States into World War I for their own selfish
reasons. Furthermore, both the State Department and
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Congress were considered to be particularly vulnerable
to pressure from these parochial interests.
No prewar writer was more effective than Edward
Pendleton Herring at both critiquing the concept of
national interest and making the case for the alternative
concept of national security. His 1941 study of The
Impact of War was particularly important, because
it presented a forceful argument for comprehensive
change in the way U.S. leaders thought about, and
managed, foreign affairs. Herring claimed that as a
result of the nation’s fortuitous geographical situation
Americans had developed a bifurcated approach to
international relations. During periods of peace, the
State Department was expected to run foreign affairs,
and the armed services were left out of the policymaking
process. Conversely, the War Department (Army) and
the Navy were expected to play a dominant role in
policymaking during major wars, but as soon as peace
was restored, the military was expected to relinquish
its influence within Washington.15 Herring argued
that America’s “persistent suspicion of militarism”
was increasingly naïve and dangerous. “Air power
means that the globe has shrunk. Mechanized warfare
means that armies of industry are in conflict. . . . The
margins of safety that our democracy has known have
been cut away.”16 Under these changed circumstances,
Washington needed to establish a permanent and
influential place for the military at the top of the
policymaking community. A strong military influence
was essential for the development of new modes of
thinking about world affairs, based on the concept of
national security.
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Trigger Event.
Herring’s book was published 3 months before
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. No event in U.S.
history has had a greater impact upon the American
people and their government. John Gaddis has argued
that “. . . surprise attacks tend to sweep away old
conceptions of national security and what it takes to
achieve it.”17 What made Pearl Harbor unique was
that it actually established the concept of national
security as the lodestar of American foreign policy.
In the jargon of the new institutionalism, national
security became the public theory which served as the
necessary precondition for the social construction of
a wholly new institutional infrastructure.18 Once this
infrastructure was in place, it then helped to reinforce
and elucidate the public theory.
According to Gordon Prange, the U.S. public reacted
to Pearl Harbor “. . . with a mind-staggering mixture
of surprise, awe, mystification, grief, humiliation, and,
above all, cataclysmic fury.”19 It took the American
people and their leaders about 5 years to distill this
complex mix of emotions into a few policy-relevant
and universally accepted “lessons.” The process of
post-attack fact finding (and fault finding) progressed
throughout the war and reached a high point during
the immediate postwar period, with congressional
hearings which ran from November 1945 to May 1946.
The hearings generated 15,000 pages of transcribed
testimony, plus an appendix of nearly 10,000 pages from
seven other official inquiries into the disaster.20 The most
important general conclusion of these investigations
was that America could never again allow itself to be
“sucker punched” by another country. The attack on
Pearl Harbor also highlighted inexcusable gaps within
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the U.S. policymaking community:
• Between the entities responsible for the collection
of raw intelligence and the entities responsible
for its analysis, dissemination and application.
• Between, and within, the two military services.
• Between the civilian and military leadership.
Specific government agencies also drew their
own conclusions from the Pearl Harbor disaster.
For the Army and Navy, Pearl Harbor reinforced
already strong doubts about the reliability of the State
Department as a strategic partner. Mark Stoler notes
that “. . . many officers saw [Secretary of State] Hull
and his associates as the real culprits” in the Pearl
Harbor story.21 The military held State responsible for
precipitating Japanese aggression by pursuing a policy
of confrontation and pressure against Tokyo at a time
when the armed forces were hoping to delay the start
of war until they had fortified their bases in the Pacific
theater.
After December 7, 1941, Pendleton Herring’s
arguments were universally recognized as common
sense. “No More Pearl Harbors” was understood as the
non-negotiable mandate for future U.S. policymakers.
This translated into an expectation that the government
would continuously monitor antidemocratic and
military trends across the globe, identify any potential
aggressors, and either discourage them from attacking
us or be prepared to strike back, massively and
decisively, as soon as an attack occurred.
“No more Pearl Harbors” also implied vigilance
on the home front. In justifying his decision for the
wartime internment of Japanese-Americans, Secretary
of War Henry Stimson asserted that, following Pearl
Harbor, “Japanese raids on the west coast seemed
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not only possible but probable . . . and it was quite
impossible to be sure that the raiders would not
receive important help from individuals of Japanese
origin.”22 As the war progressed, the government
became even more concerned about fifth columnists,
as secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project became
increasingly important and increasingly difficult.
Whatever mechanisms for the management of national
security were to be created at the end of the war, they
would have to be capable of identifying and coping
with domestic, as well as international, threats.
Tests and Models.
But first, the United States had to win the peace.
World War II provided Washington with the
opportunity and the impetus to experiment with new
institutions for the management of national security.
And no president in American history was more
inclined to experiment than Roosevelt.
Many of the national security agencies which FDR
created were modeled upon British institutions which
became familiar to the President and his advisers as a
result of the close Anglo-American wartime relationship. For example, the British played an indispensable
role in the creation of America’s wartime intelligence
system. The United States had been studying British
institutions and procedures for covert activity and
intelligence gathering and analysis since World War I.
In the immediate pre-World War II period, however,
London began to actively encourage intelligence
cooperation with Washington as part of a campaign to
draw the United States into the war. The British even
set up a training school for the first wave of recruits for
the U.S. Coordinator of Information (COI), which was
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established in 1941 and replaced a year later by the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Throughout the war,
OSS often found it easier to obtain information from
Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) than from the
older American intelligence agencies associated with
the War, Navy, and State Departments.23 The problem
of interagency intelligence sharing would persist into
the postwar era, in spite of the cautionary lesson of
Pearl Harbor.
British institutions had an even more direct impact
on the development of U.S. wartime arrangements
for interservice cooperation. According to the official
Department of the Army history, the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) “. . . sprang up almost accidentally” in
response to the perceived need for a corporate body
capable of working with the British Chiefs of Staff.24
Prior to World War II, the Army and Navy relied upon
the Joint Board and the Army-Navy Joint Munitions
Board to facilitate cooperation regarding planning and
procurement issues, respectively. These institutions
frequently served as little more than venues for the
airing of incompatible positions. At their first wartime
meeting with their British counterparts (the Arcadia
Conference, which began on December 22, 1941), it
became very clear to U.S. military leaders that they
were at a distinct disadvantage in these bilateral
discussions because of their lack of coordination. By
February, the JCS was holding official meetings and
developing plans for the creation of its own staff.
It took another 5 months for Roosevelt to accept
Army Chief of Staff George Marshall’s recommendation
for the creation of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
When FDR did appoint Admiral William Leahy to this
position, he made it clear that he was not creating a
powerful new military leader (along the lines of the
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German General Staff model). Leahy was designated as
the President’s liaison with the Joint Chiefs, although
the Admiral also served as ex officio chairman of those
JCS meetings which he attended. Marshall would later
admit that Leahy’s designation as Roosevelt’s “leg
man” was not what he had in mind when he initially
envisioned the position of JCS Chairman.25 This
wartime arrangement nonetheless served as a point
of reference for an extended postwar debate over the
need for a “real” military Chief of Staff.
General Marshall also recognized early in the war
that the British had a great advantage over their American counterparts in terms of overall coordination between the civilian and military branches of government. In a confidential letter to James Byrnes, who
was serving as Director of War Mobilization, Marshall
complained that British war planners “. . . are connected
up with other branches of their Government through an
elaborate but most closely knit Secretariat. On our side
there is no such animal and we suffer accordingly. . . .”26
The mechanism which the British relied upon to
facilitate civilian-military cooperation was the War
Cabinet, a subgroup of the Committee on Imperial
Defence (CID) which had been established in 1904
to manage the complex administrative and logistical
challenges of the British Empire. During the first half
of the war, proposals for replicating the British War
Cabinet foundered on the aforementioned military
doubts about the State Department’s reliability, which
the President tended to share. As the tide of war turned,
however, and U.S. planners began to confront issues
of postwar reconstruction and occupation, it became
increasingly apparent that some mechanism needed
to be developed to facilitate strategic cooperation at
the highest levels of the Foreign Service and the War
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and Navy Departments. In November 1944 the three
agencies agreed to establish the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). Over the next 2
1/2 years, SWNCC evolved into an important source
of wartime and postwar policy advice. Its deliberations
also presaged a trend, however, which would be
accelerated after the passage of the 1947 National
Security Act. By the simple fact that the armed services
outnumbered State two-to-one within SWNCC,
the institution came gradually to be dominated by
the military. It may be an exaggeration to claim, as
Alan Ciamporcero has, that “. . . SWNCC skewed
American policy toward military solutions to political
problems.”27 The Committee nonetheless helped to
prepare the Washington policy community for a new
national security system in which the military’s point
of view was accorded a permanent and influential
position, often at the expense of State.
It would be difficult to overestimate the role that
British institutions played in shaping U.S. thinking
about the management of national security. But British
institutions were also misleading models for U.S.
planners. As both FDR and Truman noted during
the war, these agencies were designed to serve a
parliamentary political system and could not be easily
adapted to serve a presidential form of democracy.
During the latter stages of the war, Truman’s staff had
looked closely at the CID and War Cabinet models.
White House staffer George Elsey’s record of his April
9, 1945, meeting with a representative of the War
Cabinet Secretariat notes that “Churchill [takes] no
action without War Cabinet,” whose members have
“mutual group responsibility” for the management
of the war effort at home and abroad.28 Although
both Roosevelt and Truman were suspicious of the
Parliamentary model, what Paul Hammond would
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later dub the “cabinet fallacy” exercised a powerful
influence on the thinking of many people in Washington
who dominated the postwar debate about institutional
reform.29
World War II also provided one important negative
lesson for the postwar architects of national security. It
overturned the widely-held prewar belief that centrally
controlled economies were significantly more efficient
than laissez-faire systems. During the first half of the
war, FDR experimented with various administrative
arrangements to facilitate mobilization and supply,
but he resisted pressure from the media and members
of Congress for the creation of a mobilization “czar” to
control the American economy. It was not until May
1943 that Roosevelt established a strong mobilization
agency (the Office of War Mobilization), and when he
did so, he located it within the executive office of the
President and made sure that it was directed by one of
his closest advisers, James Byrnes. Byrnes soon became
known as the “assistant president,” but he continued
to respect, and protect, the competitive and capitalist
elements of the American economy for the rest of the
war.
The wisdom of FDR’s decision to avoid excessive
economic centralization was confirmed by victory.
Pendleton Herring chaired the committee established
by the Bureau of the Budget to write the official
administrative history of the War. The report concluded
that:
Our reluctance to establish even the semblance of
autocratic rule may have been partly responsible for
our constant struggle to coordinate or harmonize a
mobilization effort made up of many separately operating
parts, but problems of coordination do not disappear
even in an autocratic administration, and we developed
methods that produced effective end results.30
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The findings of the Herring Report were welcomed by
the American people, since they validated what Aaron
Friedberg has called “a strong and widely shared
presumption in favor of the market over the state. . . .”31
Construction.
Roosevelt’s wartime experiments with national
security planning provided useful points of reference
for those individuals who became actively involved in
the postwar debates about comprehensive reform of the
Washington bureaucracy. The highly publicized Pearl
Harbor hearings also provided an impetus for reform.
All parties accepted the aforementioned mandate of
“no more Pearl Harbors.” There was considerable
disagreement, however, about how to accomplish it.
The most intense disputes took place over the issue
of armed forces unification. This controversy eclipsed
all of the other debates which culminated in the 1947
National Security Act. By the end of the war almost the
entire War Department leadership was convinced that
unification was both essential and inevitable, in light
of fundamental changes in the strategic environment.
According to a 1943 report by the Army’s Special
Planning Division: “This war is, and future wars
undoubtedly will be, largely a series of combined
operations in each of which ground, air, and sea forces
must be employed together and coordinated under one
directing head.”32 Under these circumstances, Army
leaders believed that national security demanded the
complete merger of the Army and Navy into a single
service, as well as a peacetime Joint Chiefs of Staff
headed by a Chief of Staff who would serve as the
principal military adviser to the President.
The Navy leadership did not share the Army’s
enthusiasm for full unification. While some influential
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admirals (most notably, Chester W. Nimitz and
William F. Halsey, Jr.) had expressed support for the
principle of unification during the war, the postwar
Navy leadership under Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal worried that merger would undermine the
tradition of autonomy which the Navy had cultivated
and protected for more than 150 years. Forrestal and his
colleagues were also concerned that the Army would be
able to use the new arrangement, in collaboration with
the supporters of land based air power, to undermine
or eliminate the Navy’s air wing and the Marine Corps.
Along with these very practical institutional concerns,
Navy leaders also warned that unification and the
creation of a strong Chief of Staff would set in motion
an antidemocratic trend toward military domination
of the U.S. Government.33
By the summer of 1945, the momentum in support
of unification seemed irresistible. Not only had the
War Department orchestrated an impressive public
campaign, but the new President had made it clear
that he considered unification to be one of his top
priorities. In an article published shortly before he
became President, Harry Truman called for “one
department under one authoritative, responsible
head” and expressed confidence that “under such
a set-up, another Pearl Harbor will not have to be
feared.”34 The President also supported the Army’s
call for continuation of the JCS and the creation of an
influential Chief of Staff.
Secretary Forrestal recognized that the Navy faced
a serious public relations problem because it seemed
to contribute nothing to the unification debate except
a curmudgeonly resistance to innovation. To solve
this problem, he asked his long-time friend Ferdinand
Eberstadt, an influential Wall Street lawyer, to oversee
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a study which would change the terms of the debate
by placing the issue of armed forces unification in
the context of comprehensive institutional reform.
Eberstadt pulled together a team of about 30 experts,
including Pendleton Herring, and completed his study
over the summer of 1945. The report drew lessons
from corporate America and from other governments
in order to develop the case against armed forces
unification. “Our present situation calls for action far
more drastic and far-reaching than simply unification
of the military services. It calls for a complete realinment
(sic) of our governmental organizations to serve our
national security. . . .”35
The Eberstadt Report was designed to shift the
focus of the debate from the military, per se, to civilianmilitary coordination at the top of the Washington
policy community. It not only opposed merger of the
armed services, it omitted any reference to a Defense
Department or a Secretary of Defense. Citing the
British CID and SWNCC as models, it recommended
the creation of a small committee, the National Security
Council (NSC), which would be chaired by the President
and bring together the Secretaries of State, War, Navy,
and Air (proposed as a new, independent Department)
to coordinate foreign and defense policies and advise
the White House on matters of national security. The
Report also recommended the establishment of a
National Security Resources Board (NSRB) to prepare
the U.S. economy for rapid mobilization in the event
of an imminent or actual attack. The Chairman of
the NSRB was included as a statutory member of the
proposed National Security Council. The NSC would
be served by a small secretariat, “headed by a full-time
executive” and by a new CIA which would provide the
“grist” for NSC discussions in the form of “complete,
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up-to-date, and accurate intelligence, properly
analyzed and made available in useable form.”36 It was
assumed by Eberstadt’s team that the CIA would rely
upon the established intelligence services for the bulk
of its information, although no arrangements were
made for insuring their compliance. In deference to the
widespread concern about the creation of a postwar
“Gestapo” in the United States, the report also made
it clear that the CIA’s mandate would only apply to
foreign intelligence activities.
The Eberstadt Report also supported the idea
of giving the JCS a permanent statutory identity. By
placing it under the authority of the NSC, however, the
authors sought to ensure that the JCS would remain
firmly under civilian authority. The report recognized
that the President should have the option of adding a
Chief of Staff to the JCS, but in subsequent testimony
Eberstadt made it clear that his model for a Chief of Staff
was Admiral William D. Leahy, who had served as a
liaison between the White House and the Joint Chiefs,
rather than as a “super chief” with direct control over
the other service chiefs.
Paul Hammond associated Eberstadt’s vision of
an NSC designed for collective decisionmaking with
the aforementioned cabinet fallacy: “The idea that a
committee of some kind could assume some major
burdens of the Presidency.”37 In fact, Eberstadt’s whole
approach to postwar security planning reflected these
assumptions. Eberstadt’s experiences in the business
world had convinced him that the best way to manage
a complex social organization was to establish a
network of institutions which allowed “good men”
who recognize a mutual interest in achieving some
common goal to develop habits of cooperation. To the
extent possible, such systems were to be voluntary,
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with only as much central control as was needed to
facilitate negotiations.38 Based on this formula, the
Eberstadt Report envisioned a postwar system of
interlocking agencies which would encourage both
healthy competition and cooperation. The NSC was to
be the “keystone” of this arrangement, with primary
responsibility for ensuring strategic coordination at
the highest levels of government. Forrestal was fully
supportive of this vision. There was nonetheless a
great deal of ambivalence in both men’s approach to
fundamental reform, since they both expressed the
conviction that national security was too important
to be allowed to become the captive of intransigent
parochial interests. Over the next decade, the challenge
of squaring this circle would become an increasing
source of frustration for Eberstadt, and over the next 4
years it would come to overwhelm Forrestal.
Harry Truman was also deeply ambivalent about
the relative merits of horizontal and vertical systems
of administration, but he came at the problem from
the other side. Both on constitutional and personal
grounds, he was viscerally opposed to any system which
threatened to steal, or leach, power from the President.
But Truman was also too much of a politician not to
appreciate that public policy demanded continuous
compromise. While he was committed to a system
in which “the buck stops” in his office, he was also
convinced that such an arrangement would collapse
if it depended too heavily upon presidential micromanagement. With specific reference to Eberstadt’s
proposal for an NSC-dominated system, the President
felt that there was “much to this idea” in part because
he had positive experiences working with SWNCC
at the end of the war. Truman and his advisers were
nonetheless alert to the possibility that the “Navy
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Plan” might be more compatible with the British than
the American system of government. As he noted in
his memoirs, “Under our system the responsibility
rests on one man—the President. To change it we
would have to change the Constitution, and I think we
are doing very well under our Constitution.”39 Truman
was therefore willing to consider some form of NSC at
the top of a new national security system, but he and
his assistants monitored the evolving debates for any
signs that the proposed agency posed a threat to the
President’s constitutional authority.
Eberstadt’s model of an NSC-dominated system
gave the Navy the ammunition that it needed to
organize a counteroffensive against the Army’s (and
Truman’s) plan for armed forces unification. Over
the next 2 years, Forrestal worked with the Navy’s
sponsors in Congress to resist unification. The Navy
Secretary’s activities during this period often verged
on insubordination, but Truman had informed the
members of his cabinet that they were free to express
their personal views on unification, as long as they
prefaced their remarks with an accurate summary
of the official White House position on this matter.
Forrestal’s first victory occurred in May 1946, when
Truman agreed to drop the idea of a powerful Chief
of Staff to oversee the armed forces. The President
was actually discouraged by Leahy, whose wartime
experience had convinced him that the position posed
a threat to American democracy. Truman concluded
that the idea “was too much along the lines of the ‘man
on horseback’ philosophy.”40
Over the next year, as Truman’s popularity
continued to decline, the President began to view
the battle for armed forces unification as a political
albatross.41 He was anxious for closure as quickly and
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painlessly as possible. He relied upon Forrestal and
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson to work out a
reasonable compromise that could gain the approval
of the “damned 80th Congress.” After a torturous
process of negotiations, a deal was reached which
gave the Navy most of what it wanted. The system
created by the 1947 National Security Act was similar
in many respects to the Eberstadt plan: It preserved the
institutional autonomy of the Army and Navy, and it
favored interservice coordination over centralization.
The Navy leadership was not pleased that, in
accordance with the recommendations of the Eberstadt
Report, the legislation established the Air Force as an
independent military service. On the other hand, the
Navy’s friends succeeded in inserting in the legislation
specific protections for Navy Air and for the Marine
Corps.
The legislation reflected the Eberstadt Report’s
thesis that national security was too complex and
comprehensive a concept to be addressed at the level
of the armed forces. It required coordination at the
top, through the mechanism of the National Security
Council, with the President as ex officio Chairman.
The permanent members of the NSC were to be the
Secretary of Defense, the three Service Secretaries, the
Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the proposed
National Security Resources Board. The President was
authorized to add other cabinet members to the NSC,
and to designate a member of the Council as Chairman
in his absence.
This last arrangement was, in fact, a controversial
matter, which was only resolved in the final days
before the NSA was passed. Up until that point some
legislators had attempted to designate the new Secretary
of Defense as the President’s ex officio stand-in on the
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NSC. James Forrestal, who was chosen by Truman as
the first Secretary of Defense, was particularly attracted
to this idea, because he believed that it was within the
NSC-dominated system, rather than within the defense
community, that the Secretary of Defense would be
able to exercise real power over national security. This
helps to explain why Forrestal accepted the position of
Secretary of Defense when he knew better than almost
anyone else how limited this individual’s power
would be within the National Military Establishment
(NME). It also helps to explain why Forrestal became
so frustrated with the new position so soon after
taking office—once Truman made it clear that he did
not intend to designate the Secretary of Defense as his
surrogate within the NSC.
The failure to achieve armed forces unification
represented a major political defeat for Truman. The
President nonetheless made the most of a bad situation
by focusing on those aspects of the legislation which
reflected his priorities. First, and most importantly,
the Act gave a nod to the principle of unification by
creating a NME to coordinate the activities of the
separate military services. The NME was to be headed
by a civilian Secretary of Defense who was expected
to “exercise general direction, authority, and control”
over the military, including supervision of the budget
process.42 Even a superficial reading of the legislation
was sufficient, however, to highlight the difficulties
that the Secretary would face in fulfilling this mandate,
since the three services preserved their departmental
identities, with civilian Secretaries who were authorized
to go over the head of the new Secretary of Defense—
to the President or the Budget Director—on any issue
affecting their service. To facilitate cooperation, the
legislation placed the JCS (with a small Joint Staff)
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within the NME, along with a Munitions Board, a
Research and Development Board, and a War Council.
These agencies were expected to provide the Secretary
of Defense with “strong ligaments” for interservice
coordination while preserving innovation and esprit de
corps within each service.
By the time the legislation was passed, the President had also decided, in principle, to accept the NSC.
Truman still harbored real concerns about this innovation, however, some of which were encouraged by
George Marshall. In one of his first memos as Secretary of
State, Marshall attempted to convince Truman to press
for the removal of the NSC from the draft legislation
on the grounds that it would constitute a “second
cabinet” which would infringe on the constitutionallydesignated powers of the President. Marshall also
claimed that the proposed NSC would pose a threat to
the constitutionally-designated office of the Secretary
of State, since the permanent membership of the new
organization (composed of four representatives of the
NME and only two other civilian representatives beside
the President) would inevitably favor the military.
Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State was
in danger of becoming an “automaton” of the NSC.43
Truman was sensitive to the “second cabinet”
argument, but rather than directly oppose the NSC,
he pressed for changes in the draft legislation. The
function of the Council was changed from “. . . to
integrate our foreign and military policies” to “. . . to
advise the President with respect to the integration” of
national security policies. The President also resolved,
on the advice of the Bureau of the Budget, not to attend
NSC meetings on a regular basis so that he “could
best preserve his full freedom of action with respect
to NSC policy recommendations.”44 Finally, Truman
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decided to designate the Secretary of State, rather than
the Secretary of Defense, as his surrogate within the
NSC.45
The President was also willing to support, and take
credit for, the creation of the CIA as a subordinate agency
of the NSC. The Agency, with a Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) as its head, was given responsibility
for “coordinating the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and agencies in the
interest of national security.”46 It was assumed that
since the major departments with intelligence branches
were represented in the NSC, they would recognize
an interest in facilitating interagency cooperation. In
the case of the one executive branch agency which
was deeply involved in intelligence activities but not
represented on the NSC, the legislation stipulated
that the DCI would have to make a written request
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for any
needed information. Effective lobbying by the FBI also
contributed to the decision not to permit the CIA to
have “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or
internal security functions.” The firewalls which were
created by the National Security Act to prohibit the CIA
from engaging in domestic intelligence activities were
understandable, in light of the aforementioned concern
about a postwar “Gestapo.” They nonetheless created
a structural problem at the top of the new system, since
the CIA was expected to provide the NSC with the
“grist” for its decisionmaking, but the NSC’s mandate
extended to both domestic and international issues of
national security.
After 3 years of high-level haggling, all parties
had reason to be dissatisfied with portions of the
legislation which was rushed through Congress on
July 26, the last day before summer recess. President
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Truman had reason to be especially disappointed, but
he was nonetheless realistic about the process. With
specific reference to his primary interest in armed
forces unification he observed that: “We can’t always
start out with a complete and finished organization; we
must remember that since 1798 there has been a Navy
Department and since the beginning of the Republic
there has been a War Department . . . It is hard to
work on a bureaucracy like that.”47 The President was
satisfied, however, that his administration had put
in place a new system which, regardless of its flaws,
responded to the general mandate of “no more Pearl
Harbors.”
Initial Operation and Adjustments.
Any study of institutional design must allow for
some period of road testing, since many agencies
do not survive their first few years of operation and
many more undergo fundamental changes in light of
unforeseen developments. Both institutional failure
and structural adjustment are most likely to occur for
completely new agencies which must carve out their
turf at the expense of established organizations. The
period from 1947 to 1960 can be viewed as the shakeout period for the Pearl Harbor system. By the time the
Kennedy administration arrived in office, the national
security agencies which were strong enough to
survive were well established within Washington, and
those agencies which were either too frail or naively
ambitious had disappeared. Furthermore, by 1960
the Washington policy community had adapted to a
world view in which national security had completely
supplanted national interest as the “one guiding star”
in the formulation and management of U.S. foreign
policy.48
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Amy Zegart has argued that the system created
by the 1947 National Security Act was “flawed by
design.”49 It is certainly true that some of the inherent
defects of the Pearl Harbor system were obvious to all
parties at the time that the NSA was passed. But most
people agreed with the President that the legislation
was a sensible, and necessary, first step. As C. P.
Trussell noted in The New York Times: “The measure
was conceded to be experimental. It was agreed that
it might require refinement later, as dictated by trial
operations.”50
The NME was the first component of the 1947
system to exhibit serious design flaws. Shortly
after accepting the position of Secretary of Defense,
Forrestal predicted that he would probably require
“. . . the combined attention of [Bishop] Fulton Sheen
and the entire psychiatric profession by the end of
another year.”51 In fact, the system began to break
down almost immediately. One of the first salvoes in
what soon became an interservice war was an Army
memo, dated August 11, 1947, which was designed
to guide planning for a future war. In its survey of
the respective responsibilities of the three services,
the memo failed to include any offensive role for the
Navy.52 The three services were soon engaged in very
public arguments over roles, missions and budgets,
which Forrestal seemed powerless to control. Within
a year, Forrestal was actively seeking the support of
members of the Truman administration, Congress, and
the Hoover Commission for changes to the NSA which
would enhance the direct authority of the Secretary of
Defense over the services. In August 1949, amendments
were approved which transformed the National
Military Establishment into DoD. The wording of
the legislation was changed in order to bolster the
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Secretary’s “direction, authority, and control” over
the new Department, and to give the Secretary explicit
control over the budgetary process. More importantly,
the Service Secretaries were removed from the cabinet
and from the National Security Council, and lost their
direct access to the President. These very substantial
changes were followed by further refinements of the
Secretary of Defense’s authority during the Eisenhower
era. Taken together, these reforms laid the groundwork
for a significant expansion of the powers of the Secretary
of Defense and the Office of Secretary of Defense during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. According
to Lawrence Korb, “The power of the Secretary of
Defense reached its zenith” during this era, and since
then the Secretaries have “been as powerful, really, as
they have wanted to be.”53
The 1949 amendments to the NSA also sought to
improve decisionmaking within the JCS by establishing
the position of Chairman and expanding the Joint Staff.
The Chairman was expected to serve as a nonvoting
executive secretary, with only partial control over
the Joint Staff. The Eisenhower administration took
steps in 1953 and 1958 to further enhance the personal
authority of the Chairman over the Joint Staff, and to
further expand the size of the Staff. The Chairman was
also given a vote within the JCS. This situation would
remain relatively unchanged until the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act some 3 decades later.
The removal of the Service Secretaries from the
National Security Council in 1949 ameliorated, but
did not solve, the State Department’s “automaton”
problem. This is because State’s problems could not be
fixed by changes in a line and box diagram. Under the
Pearl Harbor system, the Foreign Service preserved its
independent status within the executive branch, and no
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structural barriers were placed between the Secretary
of State and the President. But a system designed to
serve the concept of national security was simply not
conducive to the perpetuation of the State Department’s
role as the lead agency in U.S. foreign policy
decisionmaking. To the extent that State Department
representatives like Dean Acheson, George Kennan,
and Paul Nitze became articulate spokespersons for
the new national security perspective, they bolstered
their personal influence within Washington. But they
helped to establish a point of view which favored
the new national security agencies at the long term
expense of the Foreign Service: Why defer to a “born
again” national security institution when an entirely
new network of institutions had been created to serve
this specific purpose? On the other hand, to the extent
that the State Department sought to focus its attention
on alternative themes, it ran the risk of becoming
completely irrelevant.
The State Department was often its own worst enemy
in the postwar bureaucratic battles. The most glaring
instance was State’s failure to grasp the opportunity
provided by Truman in 1945 to play a dominant role
in the field of intelligence analysis and coordination.
At the end of the War, the President had disbanded
the OSS and transferred its Research and Analysis
branch to the State Department. More importantly, the
President designated State to serve as the lead agency
in the coordination of all federal agencies involved in
the gathering and analysis of intelligence relating to
national security. Dean Acheson recounts in his memoirs that his Department “muffed” this opportunity
because senior members of the Foreign Service balked
at the prospect of integrating OSS personnel into their
exclusive community and because they feared that
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these new responsibilities would cut into the budgets
of the existing State Department desks.54 In the face
of State Department reluctance and active lobbying
from other government agencies (FBI, War, and Navy
Departments), the President took back his gift and
began to develop plans for a new intelligence agency
linked to the proposed National Security Council.
For a brief period after the passage of the 1947
NSA, the State Department, with Truman’s support,
was able to preserve its institutional influence within
the Washington policymaking community. The role
played by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff
in the formulation of NSC 68 is a familiar illustration of
this fact. But by the time the Eisenhower administration
arrived, the inherent logic of national security was
beginning to erode State’s power base within the
beltway. Historians looking for a specific turning point
might take note of the first official meeting between
Paul Nitze and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
Soon after Eisenhower’s inauguration, Dulles informed
Nitze that he was being removed from his position
as head of the Policy Planning Staff. Dulles went on
to tell Nitze that since the Policy Planning Staff dealt
primarily with national security issues, its activities
should be placed under the National Security Council.
The Secretary also stated that “he hoped to devote 95
percent of his own time to those issues.”55
As previously mentioned, Truman was suspicious
of the National Security Council even before he signed
the National Security Act. To ensure that the NSC
remained an advisory rather than a policymaking
body, he attended only 12 of 57 meetings prior to
the outbreak of the Korean War. During this period,
he relied upon the NSC’s first executive secretary,
Admiral Sidney Souers, to provide him with
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summaries of the meetings. Following the North
Korean invasion, however, the President concluded
that he needed to rely much more heavily upon the
NSC, and that whenever possible he should preside
over its meetings. It was nonetheless left to Truman’s
successor to elevate the National Security Council to
the “keystone” status that was envisioned by the 1947
legislation. President Eisenhower worked with Robert
Cutler (who was given the title of Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs) to introduce a clearly
articulated and vertically structured decisionmaking
system with an expanded NSC staff and an extensive
committee network, all under the direct authority of
the President. A congressional subcommittee chaired
by Senator Henry Jackson would later criticize the
Eisenhower administration for its expansion of the
NSC and recommend that it be “de-institutionalized.”56
From this point onward, however, the NSC would be
accepted by the Washington policy community as an
independent and influential corporate entity “at the
top of policy hill.”57
The CIA also underwent significant transformation
during the first 13 years of its existence, but not in the
direction envisioned by the National Security Act. With
20-20 hindsight the authors of the 1947 legislation seem
naïve for believing that the CIA and the DCI would
be permitted by the other large and well-networked
national security agencies to become the gatekeepers
between the White House and the intelligence
community. In any event, in a situation in which the
CIA was almost immediately blocked in its efforts to
fulfill its primary mandate as the coordinator of national
intelligence, the Agency found an alternative outlet for
its energies and attention in the form of covert activity.
The difficult negotiations which culminated in the CIA
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taking responsibility for “black operations” turned on
the problem of distinguishing between war, peace, and
some third international situation. Since both the State
Department and the military were concerned about
guilt by association with covert activities in a period
of undeclared war against the Soviet Union, reliance
upon the CIA became the default solution.58
The rapid growth of the covert side of the CIA
during the formative period of the Cold War tended
to divert attention from the fact that the Agency was
not performing the coordinative role for which it was
created.59 Control over intelligence, as one of the most
fungible forms of bureaucratic power, was simply too
important to the established Departments to be given
away to the fledgling CIA, even in the name of national
security. Five decades later, Jeffrey Richelson was
justified in claiming that “the CIA developed in accord
with a maximal interpretation” of the 1947 National
Security Act as it relates to both its analytical and its
covert activities.60 But there is no basis for making this
claim regarding intelligence coordination.
The National Security Resources Board was also
severely tested during the formative period of the
Cold War. Considered by Eberstadt and Forrestal to
be the second most important innovation of the 1947
Act (after the NSC) the NSRB was designed “to advise
the President concerning the coordination of military,
industrial and civilian mobilization.”61 To accomplish
this task, Arthur Hill, the first Chairman of the NSRB,
argued that he needed unfettered access to data from
other federal agencies. He suffered the same fate as
the Director of Central Intelligence when he pressed
this argument. But unlike the CIA, the NSRB had no
alternative role to play within the Pearl Harbor system
when its initial efforts were blocked. Hill also sought to
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bolster both his personal influence over the NSRB board
and his agency’s direct control over key elements of the
domestic economy. But as had been the case after World
War I, when Bernard Baruch had failed in his efforts to
continue the activities of the powerful War Industries
Board after the conflict ended, Hill discovered that
neither the American people nor their elected officials
were willing to accept comprehensive economic
regulation in a period of peace. More importantly,
World War II had confirmed for most Americans that
even in a situation of national emergency, excessive
government interference in the economy stifled
competition and innovation. Hill soon returned to the
private sector, and the NSRB was dissolved at the start
of the Eisenhower administration.
Shape and Content.
The Pearl Harbor system shared many characteristics with British arrangements for civilian-military
and interservice cooperation, but it also exhibited
some uniquely American elements. It corresponded
to Eberstadt’s vision of coordinated rather than
directive decisionmaking, while preserving both the
constitutionally-designated authority of the President
as Commander in Chief, Chief Diplomat, and Chief
Executive; and the budgetary, oversight, and advice
and consent authority of Congress. It seems safe to
argue that if this system had been created immediately
after Pearl Harbor, it would have been much more
centralized. The fact that key participants in the
postwar debates (in particular, Eberstadt and Forrestal)
were able to make a convincing case for a coordinated
decisionmaking system was largely attributable to
the high degree of civilian-military and interservice
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cooperation which occurred during the war. The critics
of centralization could point to the record of SWNCC
and the JCS to back up their claims that interagency
and interservice cooperation was not only possible but
preferable to more vertically structured arrangements.
It soon became apparent, however, that civilian and
military agencies were significantly less inclined to
cooperate in a postwar environment, even in the service
of national security.
During the first 13 years of its operation, some of the
structural flaws in the Pearl Harbor system were identified and corrected, either by statutory amendments
or executive action. The pervasive defect of the 1947
system, a reliance upon voluntary cooperation to
resolve serious institutional differences, was especially
evident within the National Military Establishment.
The result was an unprecedented situation of gridlock
and open conflict among the three services. Successive
revisions of the National Security Act corrected many
of the NME’s initial flaws, by enhancing the personal
authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the JCS, and marginalizing the Service Secretaries.
Between 1947 and 1960, Truman and (to a greater
extent) Eisenhower also took steps to insure that
the National Security Council did not challenge the
constitutional authority of the President. The Korean
War played an important role in convincing both
Presidents that they needed something like an NSC
to assist in the formulation of strategy. But both men
made arrangements to closely monitor and manage
the National Security Council. It is a measure of their
success that, by the time Eisenhower left office, one
expert could describe the NSC as “a creature of the
president.”62
The tendency on the part of the framers of the
1947 system to rely upon voluntary cooperation to
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overcome institutional differences also created serious
problems for the CIA. Established as the lead agency in
intelligence coordination, it was never able to convince
or compel other key institutional actors to accept it as a
gatekeeper between themselves and the President. The
CIA was also constrained by strict legal prohibitions
against domestic operations. Over time, the Agency
was able to compensate for these serious problems
by establishing itself as “. . . the chief instrument for
carrying the Cold War to the enemy.”63 But the problems
inherent in the CIA’s charter continue to complicate
the nation’s ability to collect and analyze intelligence
today.
Other elements of the Pearl Harbor system exhibited
structural flaws which either overwhelmed them or
were at least never resolved. Encouraged by a vaguely
worded legislative mandate and growing Cold War
tensions, the Director of the National Security Resources
Board attempted to acquire comprehensive control over
the U.S. economy. This went beyond what the American
people, and their elected representatives, were willing
to accept, even in the name of preparedness. A national
security state was one thing, but a garrison state was
an entirely different matter.64
Conclusion.
Triggered by crisis, tested in war and tempered
by postwar politics and enduring national values, the
Pearl Harbor system was designed to serve a public
theory of national security which was characterized
by a new sense of permanent vulnerability and a
commitment to permanent preparedness. The sine qua
non of this public theory was that the military had to be
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accorded a preeminent position in the shaping of both
peacetime and wartime policies. With 20-20 hindsight,
we can conclude that the military (broadly defined to
include the civilian Secretary of Defense and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense) has been the principal
beneficiary of the reforms which took place between
1947 and 1960, and the Department of State has been
the primary victim.
The Pearl Harbor system came into existence just
in time to guide and sustain the Cold War. Ironically,
this threat-based system proved to be well suited to a
radically changed strategic environment characterized
by “Buck Rogers weapons” and a worldwide Soviet
threat. The public theory of national security and the
institutions created in 1947 sustained and legitimized
each other for over 5 decades. Together they created
a national security community which was strong
enough to cope with numerous Kuhnian “anomalies”
(including post-colonial nationalism, nonalignment,
and authoritarian versus totalitarian governments)
during the Cold War.65 Figure 2 illustrates the process
of mutual reinforcement between the public theory of
national security and the institutional elements of the
Pearl Harbor system.
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Institutions.
Operationalization and Codification.
It was not until America was directly attacked on
September 11, 2001 (9/11), that the nation as a whole
began to question key premises of this national security
community. Since that time, there has been widespread
support for architectonic reform of the Pearl Harbor
system. This monograph has been guided by a
conviction that a useful first step in undertaking such
changes is to understand how and why the framers
of the National Security Act were able to accomplish
comprehensive reform nearly 60 years ago, and how
and why they made certain mistakes in the process.
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CHAPTER 3
The National Security Policy Process:
The National Security Council
and Interagency System
Alan G. Whittaker
Frederick C. Smith
Elizabeth McKune1
How U.S. foreign, defense, and other policies are
developed, coordinated, articulated, and implemented
is critically important to this nation’s well being. Central
to the policy development and decisionmaking process
is the National Security Council (NSC), which serves as
the president’s principal forum for considering national
security and foreign policy matters. The Council
advises and assists the president on national security
and foreign policies and also serves as the principal
arm for coordinating these policies among various
departments.2
This monograph describes the national security
decisionmaking process. Readers should keep in mind
that the processes described reflect, in general, the
operation of the national security interagency system.
However, at times, individuals and circumstances
will produce idiosyncratic ways of doing business.
National Security Council Organization.
The NSC is chaired by the President and is called
into session at the President’s discretion. Its statutory
members are the President, Vice President, and the
Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the statutory military
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advisor to the Council, and the Director of National
Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The National
Security Advisor (NSA) is not a statutory member, but is
responsible for determining the agenda in consultation
with the other regular attendees of the NSC, ensuring
that papers are prepared, recording deliberations, and
disseminating Presidential decisions.
In the current Bush administration, others invited
to attend formal NSC meetings include the Chief
of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Assistant to the
President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security. The Attorney
General and Director of the Office of Management
and Budget are invited to attend meetings that address
issues pertaining to their responsibilities. Heads of other
executive departments and agencies, as well as other
senior officials, may be invited.
The NSA is the President’s personal advisor
responsible for the daily management of national
security affairs for the President. The President
alone decides national security policy, but the NSA
is responsible for ensuring that the President has all
the necessary information, that a full range of policy
options have been identified, that the prospects and
risks of each option have been identified, that legal
considerations have been addressed, that difficulties
in implementation have been identified, and that
all NSC principals have been included in the
development process. The NSA, appointed by the President as a personal aide, is not subject to Congressional
confirmation. Thus, any attempt at oversight of the NSC
and its staff by Congress must be conducted through
meetings with the President or other principals of the
NSC.

98

The professionals who work directly for the NSA
constitute the NSC staff. Staff members handling
substantive issues include political appointees,
frequently experts from think tanks and academia,
senior professionals on detail from executive branch
departments, and military officers. The expertise
of career Foreign Service Officers in foreign affairs
often means that the senior positions of the NSC
regional directorates are assigned to State Department
personnel.
This staff conducts the day-to-day management of
national security affairs for the White House and
numbered approximately 225 in 2007, with around
110 policy positions. However, the NSC also can
rely on a network of former NSC staffers and other
trusted policy experts, if needed, when reviewing
policy issues. Because the statutory NSC historically has
met infrequently and has had little direct contact with
the staff level components of the executive branch
as a body, the NSC staff is commonly referred to
(incorrectly) as “the NSC.” Thus, when people in the
executive branch agencies or legislative branch talk
about calling or working with the NSC, they nearly
always are referring to the NSC staff.
Formal meetings of the NSC tended to be
rare. Presidents were inclined to manage national
security affairs through direct meetings with cabinet
officers and key advisors, and through a series of
committees with defined responsibilities. This pattern
of infrequent NSC meetings changed with the advent
of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and the
subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Like President Harry Truman during the Korean
War, President George W. Bush found it valuable to
bring together his most senior policymakers on a
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regular basis to formulate policies for conducting
the global war on terrorism, military campaigns
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the reorganization of
agencies and activities to ensure the security of the
U.S. homeland. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11
and during the height of U.S. military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush NSC met on a daily
basis. In the intervening periods and subsequently, it
has met at least weekly at the White House or through
the use of the Secure Video-Teleconference Service (or
SVTS called “civits”) when the President traveled or
spent time at his ranch in Texas.
The most senior, regularly constituted interagency
group is the Principals Committee (PC). The six
principal Presidential advisors responsible for dealing
with national security are the Secretaries of State,
Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Advisor,
Director of National Intelligence, and CJCS. In different
administrations, these individuals, along with the
President’s Chief of Staff and the Vice President, have
met on a regular basis to discuss current and developing
issues, review and coordinate policy recommendations
developed by subordinate interagency groups and
affected departments and agencies, and give direction
for implementation or follow-up analyses. Especially
during the current administration, the Vice President
has played a major role in the PC policy process.
Other key executive branch officials may be called
to attend Principals Committee meetings when matters
relating to their areas of responsibility are discussed.
These invitees include the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (DCIA, particularly when covert
operations are being considered), the Attorney General,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and the Assistant to the President for Homeland
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Security Affairs. When international economic issues
are on the agenda, attendees may include the Secretary
of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and
the Secretary of Agriculture. The Bush administration
also has included the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, the White House Chief of Staff,
the Deputy National Security Advisor, and National
Security Advisor to the Vice President in PC meetings
when appropriate.
Subordinate to the Principals Committee is
the Deputies Committee (DC). As the senior subCabinet interagency forum, the DC is responsible for
directing the work of interagency working groups
and ensuring that issues brought before the PC or
the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared
for high-level deliberation. The DC is where the bulk
of the government’s policy decisions are made in
preparation for the PC’s review and the President’s
decision. Issues decided above the DC level either are
very significant national security decisions, are very
contentious, or both. In some circumstances (e.g., crisis
situations), a significant portion of interagency policy
development and coordination may be done at the
DC level rather than at lower levels. Moreover, the
global war on terrorism and military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq significantly affected the policy
decision responsibilities of both the PC and DC.
The DC is composed of the deputy or relevant
under secretary to the cabinet secretaries. The regular
DC members include the Deputy Secretary of State
or Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Under
Secretary of the Treasury or Under Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, Deputy Secretary
of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
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Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Director
of National Intelligence (or the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center if counterterrorism issues are
being considered), Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Vice CJCS), Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
for Policy, Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor
to the Vice President, Deputy Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant to the
President for International Economics, and the Deputy
National Security Advisor (who serves as its chair
except when the Deputy Assistant to the President for
International Economics chairs meetings dealing with
international economic issues). When international
economic issues are on the agenda, the DC’s regular
membership adds the Deputy Secretary of Commerce,
a Deputy United States Trade Representative, and the
Deputy Secretary of Agriculture.
Subordinate to the DC are a variety of interagency
working groups called Policy Coordination Committees
(PCCs).3 These interagency committees are composed
of substantive experts and senior officials from the
departments and agencies represented on the DC.
Although bounded by how much control is exerted
over policy issues by the PC and DC groups, PCCs
historically were the main forum for interagency
coordination. In the post-9/11 policy environment
with more issues being worked at the PC and DC level,
PCCs have had more coordination and implementation
duties than policy development responsibilities.
Contingent upon the scope of their responsibilities,
some PCCs may meet regularly (weekly or even
daily in a crisis situation) while others meet only
when developments or planning require policy
synchronization. They are responsible for managing
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the development and implementation of national
security policies when they involve more than one
government agency. PCCs provide policy analysis
for consideration by the more senior committees of the
NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions
made by the President. The role of each PCC in policy
development and implementation has tended to vary
according to the amount of authority and responsibility
delegated to them by the DC and PC. They are organized
around either regional or functional issues. Regional
PCCs normally are headed by Assistant Secretaries
of State while functional PCCs are headed by senior
department officials or NSC Senior Directors.
Regional PCCs include:
• Europe and Eurasia
• Western Hemisphere
• East Asia
• South Asia
• Near East and North Africa
• Africa (State and NSC co-chair).
Functional PCCs in 2007 included (the department
responsible for chairing the committee is in
parentheses):
• Arms Control (NSC)
• Biodefense (NSC and Homeland Security
Council [HSC])
• Combating Terrorism Information Strategy
(NSC)
• Contingency Planning (NSC: Pol-Mil and Crisis
planning)
• Counter-Terrorism Security Group (NSC)
• Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
(Department of Defense [DoD])
• Democracy, Human Rights, and International
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Operations (NSC)
• Detainees (NSC)
• Global Environment (NSC and National
Economic Council [NEC] co-chair)
• HIV-AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State and
Health and Human Services [HHS])
• Information Sharing
• Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
• Interdiction (NSC)
• International Development and Humanitarian
Assistance (State)
• International Drug Control Policy (NSC and
Office of National Drug Control Policy)
• International Finance (Treasury)
• International Organized Crime (NSC)
• Maritime Security (NSC and HSC)
• Muslim World Outreach (NSC and State cochair)
• Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and
Homeland Defense (NSC)
• Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
(State)
• Records Access and Information Security
(NSC)
• Space (NSC)
• Strategic Communication (NSC and State:
international public diplomacy)
• Terrorist Finance (Treasury)
• Transnational Economic Issues (NEC).
Although PCCs are divided into regional or
functional groups, participation is not limited to people
with only regional or functional expertise. Regional
PCCs may contain department or agency members
with functional expertise, and functional PCCs are
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likely to include regional experts. For example, the non
proliferation PCC may include regional experts covering
countries involved with proliferation issues, and the
Counter-Terrorism Security Group (which meets
weekly) includes representatives from the Department
of Homeland Security.
In addition to PCC working groups, the Bush
administration has found it necessary to stand up two
special interagency groups to coordinate the activities of
the large commitments of U.S. military, reconstruction,
and diplomatic contingents in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Neither group is a traditional PCC because both have
assigned staffs to handle day-to-day operations, but
both report to the DC. The Afghanistan Interagency
Operations Group (AIOG, chaired by the State
Department’s Coordinator for Afghanistan) coordinates
interagency, evaluates progress and whether
benchmarks have been achieved, and notifies the DC
when problems arise with respect to Afghanistan.
Likewise, the Iraq Policy and Operations Group
(IPOG) coordinates the multifaceted involvement
of U.S. Government and private sector agencies in
Iraq. Established after the Iraq interim government
assumed sovereignty over the country’s affairs, the
IPOG is chaired by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State and a Senior NSC Director for Defense Policy,
and reports directly to the DC. The IPOG conducts daily
video teleconferences on such issues as infrastructure
reconstruction, security, and elections planning in
Iraq.
The AIOG and IPOG represent sub-PCC working
groups that often are established to allow the
interagency to scrutinize and brainstorm about
developing policy. Such groups may be short-lived as
the policy issues recede in importance or appear not to
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warrant a major interagency effort, or eventually evolve
into full blown, formal interagency PCCs. For example,
during 2006-07, PCCs have been established with
regard to Information Sharing and for Reconstruction
and Stabilization as result of the need for greater
interagency collaboration and coordination. The
President makes the decision as to whether or not a
working group becomes designated as a formal PCC.
As mentioned earlier, another major White House
entity associated with national security is the NEC,
first established in 1993 by President Bill Clinton. It
advises the President on matters related to global
economic policy. By Executive Order, the NEC has
four principal functions: to coordinate policymaking
for domestic and international economic issues; to
coordinate economic policy advice for the President;
to ensure that policy decisions and programs are
consistent with the President’s economic goals; and
to monitor implementation of the President’s economic
policy agenda. In many foreign policy areas economic
issues have become equally or more important than
traditional military issues—as in the case of China.
Also increasingly, international and domestic policy
issues and their implications for the well-being of the
United States are seen to overlap. As a result, there is
increased coordination and integration between the
NSC and NEC staffs.
Soon after 9/11, another interagency body
responsible for coordinating policies related to
homeland security was established by the Bush
administration. The Homeland Security Council (HSC)
was established on October 8, 2001, and its Principals
Committee was organized as the senior interagency
forum for homeland security issues.
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NSC Policy Process.
The NSC is the President’s principal forum for
considering national security and foreign policy matters
with his senior national security advisors and cabinet
officials. The National Security Act of 19474 directs
that the function of the NSC “shall be to advise the
President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies related to the national
security so as to enable the military services and the
other departments and agencies of the government
to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security,” as well as to perform “other
functions the President may direct for the purpose of
more effectively coordinating the policies and functions
of the departments and agencies of the government
relating to the national security.” The NSC has the
responsibility to “assess and appraise the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States” and to
“consider policies on matters of common interest to
the departments and agencies of the Government
concerned with the national security.”
When the president makes a policy decision, he
usually transmits the information verbally to the relevant
cabinet secretaries, the NSA, or other appropriate
officials. Occasionally, he will wish to ensure that
there is clear understanding of policy objectives and
requirements and will issue a formal decision document
stating the policy in order to communicate the specifics
of the decision to affected government departments and
agencies or to the general public. The current Bush
administration calls these formal policy decisions
National Security Presidential Directives. (See Appendix
A for the titles used in previous administrations.)
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The roles of the parts of the NSC system also are
influenced by historical events and developments. For
example, during the Clinton administration, the NSC
increasingly focused on the relationship of economic
matters and international trade to overall national
security. Historically, economic issues were handled by
the NSC staff and supported by the President’s Council
of Economic Advisors. The increasing complexity
of macro-economic issues, however, and the extent
to which national interests progressively involved
economic policy, led to the creation of the NEC and
the appointment of an Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy. The Bush administration continues
to recognize the increasing importance of economic
matters to national security affairs by appointing (or
“embedding”) economic specialists to most of the
NSC directorates. Likewise, the attacks of 9/11 led
to the establishment of the Homeland Security Council
and the Department of Homeland Security.
Historical events also affect the composition of
the designated directorates within the NSC staff—
causing them to vary from one administration to the
next and sometimes change during an administration.
For example, until 1997, the Clinton administration had a
separate NSC directorate for “Gulf War Illness Affairs,”
which dealt with questions of Iraq’s possession and
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
against the United States during the Gulf War of 199192. As policy concerns shifted to other areas, this office
was disbanded and its remaining policy issues merged
with the Defense Policy and Arms Control Directorate.
When the current Bush administration came into office,
NSC Directorates responsible for Russian policy and
for Southeast European policy (i.e., the Balkans)
merged with the European Affairs Directorate into
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a single European and Eurasian Affairs Directorate,
reflecting the administration’s desire to deal with Russia
and Central and Southern Europe within the larger
context of interrelated European affairs. Also following
the 9/11 attacks, the NSC established the Office for
Combating Terrorism (under a new Deputy Assistant
to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for
Combating Terrorism), and other NSC directorates and
PCCs are devoting more time to terrorist considerations
and developments that may affect homeland security.
This office continues in the current NSC as a Directorate
headed by a Deputy Assistant to the President/Deputy
National Security Advisor.
The organization of the NSC staff underwent further
reorganization at the beginning of the second term of
the administration of George W. Bush when Stephen
Hadley replaced Condoleezza Rice as National
Security Advisor. Hadley established a Deputy National
Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, and Deputy
Assistants to the President/Deputy National Security
Advisors (DAP/DNSA) for Strategic Communication
and Global Outreach, and Global Democracy Strategy
in addition to the continuing positions of DAP/DNSAs
for International Economics, and Combating Terrorism.
These reflected the increased emphasis on Iraq and
Afghanistan; promoting freedom, democracy, and
human rights in the world; and communicating U.S.
values and priorities effectively to the American
people as well as to other countries.
The increased emphasis on the policy areas noted
above is also reflected in the establishment of an NSC
Directorate for Near East and North Africa Affairs
under the Directorate for Global Democracy Strategy
in addition to the regional directorates covering
those areas. The reorganization also reestablished a
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separate NSC regional Directorate for Russia, reflecting
the importance of relations with Russia on a wide range
of bilateral and multilateral issues. Also noteworthy is
the formation of a Directorate for Relief, Stabilization,
and Development under the DAP for International
Economics, which signals the increased importance of
these areas.
The National Security Advisor and the Policy
Process.5
Presidents rely heavily upon their NSA to
undertake a number of specific roles. This person must
enjoy the President’s full trust and confidence. The 1987
report by the Tower Commission on the operation
of the NSC staff identified a number of specific roles
for NSA’s that have evolved and proven beneficial to
the President in effectively managing national security
affairs.6
• He is an “honest broker” for the NSC process. He
assures that issues are clearly presented to the
President; that all reasonable options, together
with an analysis of their disadvantages and
risks, are brought to his attention; and that the
views of the President’s other principal advisors
are accurately conveyed.
• He provides advice from the President’s vantage
point, unalloyed by institutional responsibilities
and biases. Unlike the Secretaries of State or
Defense, who have substantial organizations
for which they are responsible, the President is
the NSA’s only constituency.
• He monitors the actions taken by the executive
departments in implementing the President’s
national security policies. He determines whether
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these actions are consistent with Presidential
decisions and whether, over time, the underlying
policies continue to serve U.S. interests.
• He assumes a special role in crisis management.
The rapid pace of developments during crises
often draws the National Security Advisor
into an even more active role of advising the
President. He fulfills the need for prompt and
coordinated action under Presidential control
(often with secrecy being essential) and in
communicating Presidential needs and directives
to the departments and agencies of the Executive
Branch.
• He reaches out for new ideas and initiatives
that will give substance to broad Presidential
objectives for national security.
• He keeps the President informed about
international events and developments in the
Congress and the Executive Branch that affect the
President’s policies and priorities.
The emphasis placed upon these various roles
as described in the Tower Commission report varies
from administration to administration according to the
President’s preferences, the NSA’s interpretation of
his or her role, and the personalities and styles of the
various members of the Principals Committee and
other policymaking bodies. For example, during the
tenure of Condoleezza Rice as NSA, she focused more
on advising the President and ensuring coordination of
policy between departments, and less on initiating policy
at the NSC and directly monitoring the implementation
of policy in executive branch departments. The intense
involvement of the Departments of Defense and State in
the global war on terrorism and missions in Afghanistan
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and Iraq resulted in Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld
and Colin Powell being more frequently involved
directly in policy development and coordination with
the President and Vice President rather than through the
NSA.
Under Stephen Hadley, the NSC emphasizes
brokering policy decisions and developing consensus
between executive branch agencies. Moreover, Hadley
is seeking to more effectively organize the administrative
processes of the NSC as a result of technology
advances threatening to overwhelm the staff with
e-mails, heightened overseas involvement of U.S.
military and diplomatic assets, increased classified and
open-source intelligence information, and instantaneous
communication with U.S. ambassadors, commanders,
and other officials throughout the world. Hadley is
instituting mechanisms to triage information coming
into the NSC staff and better organize the kinds of
policy documents being prepared for the various policy
committees and the President.
In general, the NSA’s primary roles are to advise
the President, advance the President’s national security
agenda, and oversee the effective operation of the
interagency system. The NSA must be able to manage
the process of integrating information and policy
considerations affecting national interests across the
spectrum of government agencies and instruments of
power, prioritizing their strategic importance, and
synthesizing them into options for the President’s
consideration. The NSA should bring to the President
only those issues vetted through the interagency
system so that he can benefit from the counsel of those
departments with concomitant responsibilities and
authorities. The NSA also must ensure that, given
demands upon the President’s time from such a wide
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variety of policy issues and political constituencies,
the President only has to deal with those problems
that require his level of involvement. This is a delicate
management problem seeking to not usurp the
President’s authority on “lower level” issues, while, at
the same time, not consuming his limited time on issues
that others have been delegated the authority to
decide. Protecting the President’s time involves not
only concisely and effectively presenting issues to
him, but also managing the constant demands of visiting
dignitaries and modern telecommunications that allow
foreign governments the capability to communicate
directly with the White House. Increasingly, the
ability for government leaders to converse directly
means the NSA must manage the President’s direct
communications and act as a gatekeeper for the President
to determine who warrants access to directly discuss
national security matters.
On occasion, protecting the President’s time requires
the NSA to meet with foreign officials to deliver or
receive messages, or discuss U.S. policy (as when NSA
Hadley has met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair
in London or Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
in Baghdad). The Tower Commission strongly
cautioned that neither the NSA nor the NSC staff should
be engaged in operations, or the implementation of
policy, as happened during the Iran-Contra affair.
Nevertheless, although the Department of State
clearly has the responsibility for dealing with foreign
officials and implementing foreign policy, the NSA
may act as the President’s emissary to the extent that
the President wishes to use the NSA in this manner—
although this role has been utilized sparingly in recent
administrations.
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The NSA also has responsibilities that affect
the President’s domestic political standing. This
involves the NSA’s dealings with Congress and the
media. The NSA must work alongside other executive
branch officials to build trust with Congress in order to
facilitate cooperation between them.
Moreover,
the NSA must avoid, if possible, any appearance of
national security decisions being driven by domestic
politics (e.g., emphasizing international crises to divert
attention from a domestic political problem), both
because national security affairs should be dealt with
on their own merits, and because of the need to build
bi-partisan consensus on foreign policy. As such, one
additional responsibility of the NSA is insulating the
NSC staff from any political pressure—either from
other components of the White House staff responsible
for domestic political affairs or from political interests
outside the White House. This can be a difficult
mission because national security priorities often
are influenced by domestic politics. Consequently,
the NSA must focus on advising the President about
broader national security problems while being mindful
of domestic political factors that may influence the
acceptability of policy options.
The NSA’s dealings with the media are complicated
because while the Secretary of State is primarily
responsible for the overall management and explanation
of foreign policy, the NSA often acts as an “explicator”
of policy to the media. The NSA must balance secrecy
requirements with the public’s right to know, and the
unrelenting pressure from the media for information
on a daily basis. Secrets are difficult to maintain in
a democracy with a massive bureaucracy and a
free press. According to former NSC staffers, news
reporting and analysis generally lags policy decisions
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by 3-4 days and is about 60-80 percent accurate,
depending upon the news operation and its familiarity
with the issues being covered.
Thus, to be effective, the NSA must have the
trust of the president, the principals of the departments
and agencies involved in national security matters,
substantive experts in the bureaucracy, numerous
foreign leaders and their ministries, members of
both parties in Congress, and the news media. He (or
she) must be able to manage this series of complex
interrelationships and promote cooperation rather than
competition among the various stakeholders. In an
increasingly complex, multidimensional policy world
still possessing strategic threats, the NSA must effectively
administer advice and access to the president to enable
him to effectively do his job.
The NSC Staff and the Policy Process.
Like the NSA, the roles undertaken by the NSC staff
have evolved. Variations from one administration
to another are due largely to presidential preferences,
organizational and management preferences of
the NSA, and changes brought about through the
necessity of responding to crises or complex national
security problems. A close working relationship
between the president and his cabinet secretaries
may result in those departments dominating the
development and implementation of national security
policy. Alternatively, greater dependence by the
president on the NSA and interagency rivalries
sometimes can lead to a more active role in initiating
and guiding policy for the NSC staff. Historical events
also can limit or expand the roles taken on by the NSC.
For example, the establishment of the NEC in 1993
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resulted from the increasing importance and complexity
of economics in national security following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the growth of fledgling market
economies in former communist countries. Likewise,
9/11 increased the involvement of the NSC staff in
counterterrorism policymaking for both domestic and
international venues, and the political and military
complexities of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq
have emphasized the roles of DoD and the State Department in policy development and implementation.
During the first term of the Bush administration, the
NSC staff established a new Directorate for Strategic
Planning and Southwest Asia Affairs designed to
conduct strategic planning and coordination across the
NSC as well as handle Southwest Asia.
NSA Hadley has sought to keep the NSC staff
focused at a strategic policy level, dealing with
the long term implications of foreign developments,
national security-related events and circumstances,
and intelligence gathering and analysis. Hadley does
not want the NSC staff taking a leading role in the
implementation of presidential policies, but he does
want the directors to ensure that there is successful
coordination and implementation, or “followthrough,” of policy decisions made by the PC or DC.
For this reason, Hadley established a Senior Advisor
for Policy Implementation and Execution in 2005 to
take responsibility for strategically tracking policy
implementation. Hadley has sought to institute
procedures through NSC directors to ensure that
policies are implemented and monitored in a coordinated
fashion, feedback is obtained on the outcomes of
the policy, and that mechanisms are in place to reassess
policies if monitoring determines that acceptable results
are not achieved. In particular, Hadley has sought to
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define measures of success with regard to outcomes
as well as specific timeline milestones. Also, Hadley
has sought to establish procedures to establish and
monitor proper funding processes for policy decisions
by establishing a closer relationship with the Office of
Management and Budget.
Some of the responsibilities of the NSC staff that
have evolved include:7
• Direct support to the President in crisis
management.
• Liaison with foreign governments.
• Support for negotiations in Presidential
summits.8
• Articulation of the President’s policies to other
departments and, at times, to the U.S. public
(through the NSA).
• Coordination of summit meetings and overseas
travel by the President.
• Support to the President during telephone
conversations with foreign leaders.
• Coordination of the interagency policy process
and policy implementation follow-up.
The wide-ranging duties and activities of the NSC
staff result from the fact that the NSA and the NSC
staff work directly for the President. Although the
Secretaries of State and Defense are cabinet level
officials who belong to the formal National Security
Council, they have no authority over the NSC staff.
To the extent that the NSA and his/her staff take on
functions seen as the prerogative of departments or
agencies, tensions and turf battles can develop that may
affect the ability of an administration to develop and
coordinate policy.
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For example, President Richard Nixon’s desire to
control U.S. foreign policy led him to support NSA
Henry Kissinger’s efforts to direct a number of foreign
policy issues, including normalizing bilateral relations
with the People’s Republic of China, conducting the war
in Vietnam and eventually chairing the peace talks with
North Vietnam in Paris. This led to a dominant role by
the NSC staff in the development and implementation of
policy in a number of areas while supporting the NSA.
During the Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations
(1973-75), Kissinger served concurrently as the NSA
and Secretary of State. This arrangement most likely
will never occur again, in part, because this arrangement
defeats the objective of having the NSA act as an honest
broker of policy among the various executive branch
agencies involved in national security affairs.
Although the Secretary of State, by law, is responsible
for developing and implementing foreign policy,
the President ultimately decides who among his
national security team has what responsibilities.
Presidents who do not wish to be involved in the details
and implementation of foreign policy delegate that
authority to the Secretary of State. On the other hand,
Presidents who wish to be intimately involved usually
rely heavily upon the NSA to help formulate foreign
policy and keep them updated on developments. A
President’s willingness to delegate authority for
managing specific issues to his NSA also occasionally
results in the NSC staff assuming responsibility both for
policy planning and execution. This situation developed
during the Reagan administration, resulting in the
aberrant Iran-Contra affair.
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Principals and Deputies Committees and the Policy
Process.
The Principals Committee (PC) acts as the President’s
senior level policy review and coordination group. In
effect, the PC is the same as the NSC without the
President and Vice President (although Vice President
Richard Cheney regularly participates in PC meetings
in the current Bush administration). The PC’s mission
is to ensure that, as much as possible, policy decisions
brought to the President reflect a consensus within the
departments.
If the process works as intended, the President
does not have to spend time on uncoordinated
policy recommendations and can focus on high level
problems and those issues upon which the departments
could not reach a consensus. In administrations
where there are strong rivalries among senior advisors
(such as the Kissinger-Secretary of State William Pierce
Rogers enmity during the Nixon administration, or the
competition between NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance during the Jimmy
Carter administration), policy coordination frequently
breaks down. Even when strong disagreements (or
rivalries) occur between senior policy advisors, such
as the Secretaries of State and Defense (e.g., George
P. Shultz and Caspar Weinberger during the Ronald
Reagan administration, and Powell and Rumsfeld
during the first term of George W. Bush), regularly
scheduled PC meetings allow for such differences
to be aired and identified, and consensus policy
recommendations coordinated.
The frequency of PC meetings is driven primarily
by the pace of events. It often meets once or twice
each week to review policy on pressing matters, but
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may meet less or more frequently depending upon
circumstances such as crisis situations or just prior to
major summit meetings. Currently, when the PC in the
Bush administration meets four times a week, it conducts
two 45-minute back-to-back meetings on Tuesday
afternoons, and a second series of two 45-minute
back-to-back meetings on Thursday mornings. Each
45-minute meeting usually covers one major policy
topic. In addition to (or sometimes in lieu of) formal
PC meetings, weekly informal meetings involving the
Secretaries of State and Defense and NSA often are held
over breakfast or lunch, or via conference calls or secure
video teleconferences. Approximately 50 percent of the
PC meetings are conducted using the SVTS. During 200607, meetings topics frequently included discussions of
the overall strategies for Iraq, Afghanistan, the global war
on terrorism, and dealing with North Korea, Iran, and
Sudan. Other issues that are time sensitive and involve
critical U.S. interests (such as the security situation in
Baghdad and the plot to hijack airliners originating in
England during the summer of 2006) also are likely
to be discussed at the PC level. In general, as the
George W. Bush administration progresses through its
second term, there has been more involvement at the
PC level on updating policies and honing and ensuring
the successful implementation, or “follow-through,”
of existing policies rather than developing many new
initiatives.
Likewise, the Deputies Committee (DC) meets
when necessary, often four or five times a week, to
review PCC recommendations, deliberate issues
upon which the PCCs could not reach a consensus,
and decide what matters should be forwarded to
the PC. Like the PC, many of the DC meetings are
conducted via SVTS. Issues worked during the last
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year in the Bush administration at the DC level parallel
those worked at the PC level. Like the PC during the
last year of the administration’s first term, the DC has
been more involved with refining and ensuring the
successful implementation of existing policies rather
than developing many new initiatives.
Issues forwarded to the PC include policy
recommendations made at the DC and PCC level, and
policy issues upon which an interagency consensus
could not be reached at the PCC and DC levels (although
sometimes President Bush prefers the PC to see an array
of analyses and options rather than a single, consensus
position). In general, the DC seeks to review issue papers
and policy options and recommendations provided by
PCC level groups and pass them up to the PC during
the following week.
During crisises, the PC, DC, and PCCs meet
frequently. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War,
1999 Kosovo crisis, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in
September 2001, and the conduct of military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, a typical day often included:
• Departmental meetings with Secretaries or
Deputy Secretaries in the early morning to
review
developments,
responsibilities,
taskings, and policy matters related to each
department.
• In mid-morning, the DC meets, sometimes
conducted via secure teleconferencing with senior
staff and area/functional experts, to develop
interagency positions on developments and
new policy issues. This DC meeting might be
followed immediately by a meeting of the DC
senior members (without supporting staff) to
discuss sensitive intelligence or policy issues.
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• In late morning or early afternoon, the PC meets
to discuss the results and unresolved issues of
the DC, consider strategic policy directions,
and determine what issues need to be
brought to the attention of the President.
PC members may then meet with the President
(who usually receives updates on the crisis
situation from the NSA throughout the day).
• In mid or late afternoon, the DC again
meets to discuss the implementation of
decisions reached by the PC and President,
and discuss the results of PCC meetings
that have been held throughout the day.
(Individual PCCs may meet more than once
a day during crisis periods.)
• Individual members of the DC are likely
to have a late afternoon meeting with their
principal to confer about developments of the
day, and a subsequent meeting with their staffs
to discuss the day’s decisions, developments,
and next steps. Depending upon the
circumstances of the day, the PC may have an
additional evening meeting and subsequent
consultation with the President.
This kind of high operational tempo may persist for
several weeks or months, depending upon the duration
of the crisis and the need to involve the President and
cabinet level officers on a daily basis.
9/11 and the subsequent missions of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan) and Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM produced a policy decision tempo
that resulted in unusually frequent (from an historical
standpoint) NSC and PC meetings. Due to the
simultaneity of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
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the evolving policies and operations related to the
global war on terrorism (and domestic policy concerns
related to the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security and potential domestic terrorist
threats), the NSC and PC found themselves meeting
on a regular, often daily, basis during the first
term of President George W. Bush. The swiftness
with which potential threats and circumstances
could change, and the complex, multiple, and often
overlapping or conflicting policy and operational
issues, required regular review of mission outcomes
and their implications for maintaining or altering policy
decisions. The rapid pace of developments combined
with the extensive senior government experience of
the PC (Vice President Cheney as a former Secretary
of Defense, Secretary Powell as a former NSA and
CJCS, and Secretary Rumsfeld as a previous Secretary
of Defense) meant that many policy problems were
identified, assessed, and decided at the NSC or PC level
rather than being delegated to the DC or PCCs to be
staffed. Furthermore, the evolution of events in the
field meant that PC decisions coordinated one day
might be modified in a discussion by a principal the next
day with President Bush or in a departmental meeting
because of some new development. As such, members
of the Deputies Committee often had to work hard to
keep abreast of evolving decisions from the PC level,
and strived to implement well-coordinated policies
across departments and agencies.
Policy Coordination Committees and the Policy
Process.
Policy Coordination Committees deal with a
range of national security matters that cut across the
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responsibilities of executive branch departments and
agencies. Issues may be regional, such as U.S. policy
toward Iraq or NATO expansion, or functional, such
as arms control agreements with Russia or terrorism in
South Asia. PCC work is different than that performed
in the departments or agencies. Departmental or agency
planning focuses on achieving agency objectives on a
regional and operational level. Coordination is focused
on departmental ways and means and is based upon
internal agency doctrine and processes.
Contentious issues are resolved internally at
senior levels. PCC planning is focused more on
advance planning at the political and strategic level.
PCCs do the “heavy lifting” in analyzing policy issues
and developing policy options and recommendations
that provide policymakers with flexibility and a
range of options that are politically acceptable and
minimize the risk of failure. Interagency groups also
must develop policy options that advance U.S. interests
through coordinated actions often involving many
departments and agencies. An effective interagency
process reduces the complexity of the policy decisions
and focuses the planning on how to make the mission
succeed. Accordingly, policy planning must integrate
desired policy aims and synchronize the efforts of the
different departments and agencies.
Collaboration is central for success, but teamwork
and unity is vulnerable to political risks, bureaucratic
equities, and personal relationships. Because U.S.
interests and foreign policy have tended to remain
fairly stable from administration to administration,
an informal policy consensus often exists across
agencies when dealing with routine matters. But,
policy disagreements and turf battles are inevitable
because of divergent political philosophies,
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different departmental objectives and priorities,
disagreements about the dynamics or implications
of developing situations, or because departments
are seeking to evolve or formulate new roles and
missions. Also, hard problems do not lend themselves
to easy solutions, and frequently there are genuine
differences between departments over the best ways
and objectives for dealing with a national security
problem. Moreover, because regional experts tend to
dominate on overall policy approaches (even though
they may lack expertise on many functional issues),
different interpretations of events or credibility issues
may arise within the PCC group. These issues must be
openly addressed to enable the group to collaborate
effectively, refine core policy issues, and achieve a
consensus policy document. As one former NSC staff
member observed, the easiest outcome to produce in
the interagency process is to prevent policy from being
made.
The operational dynamics of individual PCCs
vary according to the personalities (and, sometimes,
personal agenda) of the individuals who are in charge
of, or participate in, them. In general, however, most
PCCs undertake a five-part process when working on a
policy issue:
1. Define the problem: This includes assessing
what U.S. national interests and strategic objectives are
involved, reviewing intelligence reports, and seeking
to determine some understanding of the dynamics of the
situation (including what is known, what is assumed, and
what is unknown) and the interests and motivations of
the actors involved. Is there a consensus on the issues
at stake for the United States and the implications
of acting or not acting? This part of the process also
includes identifying additional information and
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intelligence needs and levying requirements to the
intelligence and diplomatic communities.
2. Clarify PCC processes and intragroup “rules
of engagement”: Develop broad principles to guide
the way the interagency group should think about a
problem and craft a strategy for addressing it.
3. Articulate policy objectives, assess options,
and develop an overall strategy for implementing
U.S. policy: Deliberations may include preventive
strategies, or strategies for responses to possible
developments as policies are implemented. Mission
areas for the departments and agencies should
be clarified and component strategies (including
identifying capabilities and resource needs) developed
that, eventually, are integrated into a single strategic
approach. “Strawman” proposals are useful for
clarifying departmental perspectives. Strategies
usually are required for consulting with friends and
allies, and developing multilateral consensus on
strategic objectives and operational activities. Other
considerations include monitoring the implementation
of complex, multidimensional activities (which may
include the activities of several departments), and
anticipating transition dynamics as policies begin
to produce expected and unanticipated effects.
4. Identify policy instruments and component
strategies (including ways and means) to achieve
the desired policy objectives: Operational planning
must be clarified and coordinated among the agencies
involved, and integrated missions must be identified
and coordinated where appropriate. A process must
be developed that steers around interagency and
bureaucratic roadblocks. The standard operating
procedures in departments and agencies may have
difficulty working with coordinated interagency plans
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and gaps may develop in implementation. PCCs must
seek ways to talk with operational-level staff to
determine potential problems and solicit suggestions
for effective implementation.
5. Draft an integrated policy document: Ideally,
this document should confirm the strategic approach,
objectives, scope of effort and timelines, requirements
and preparatory actions, chains of command,
communication, and responsibilities (independent and
shared) and accountability for the departments. It
also should identify assets, resource, and logistical
requirements. Mechanisms should be established for
integration at all levels as policies are implemented.
Key judgments about the situation, the important policy
issues, and recommendations should be identified
for the Deputies and Principals Committees. The
Deputies and Principals need enough detail (but not
too much) to be able to understand the dynamics of
the situation, the major issues at stake, and implications
for our national security. Depending upon the
preferences of the incumbent administration, the PCC
may be tasked to recommend a single policy option
or multiple options, and provide majority and
dissenting positions.
Although regional or functional PCCs deal with
issues unique to their area of responsibility, there are
a number of issues that most, if not all, PCCs find
useful to consider. These include assessments of:
• Whether there is a compelling necessity for
action. Are there threats to vital (or critical or
important) U.S. interests? Is there an imperative
for the United States to act? Are there viable
alternatives to U.S. action?
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• Desired U.S. objectives and the level of
commitment to those objectives (by the
departments and agencies, Congress, and U.S.
public). Are the objectives clear and directly
linked to U.S. interests?
• The level of U.S. resolve in its policy commitments
as perceived by the countries the policies are
targeted toward, as well as other states in
the region, allied, friendly, neutral and hostile
states. The PCCs also should consider how the
U.S. Congress and the U.S. public are likely
to perceive the administration’s resolve on
proposed policies.
• The capabilities and willingness of allies,
friends, and neutrals to support U.S. policy
objectives and initiatives. Is there a consensus
by key states or actors on the issue? What are
their national interests? To what extent will
they benefit or experience costs for supporting
U.S. policy? What resources (political or
otherwise) will they be willing to commit in
support of the policy objectives; are they
willing to act in a combined or coordinated
manner?
• The likely reaction of regional states, allies,
friends, neutrals, or hostile states that might oppose U.S. objectives. What are their calculations
of costs and risks versus benefits to opposing
the United States?
• The likely reaction of the United Nations
or other international organizations to U.S.
objectives. What are their calculations of costs
versus benefits to supporting or opposing the
United States?
• Costs and risks in implementing the policy
versus costs and risks of inaction.
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• Supporting or opposing legal authorities (e.g.,
international law, U.N. resolutions).
• The effects of stalled policy initiatives, and the
administration’s willingness to escalate (e.g.,
incentives, influence, coercion, etc.) to achieve
policy objectives.
• Receptivity to considerations of alternative
policies, and strategies for achieving the policy
objectives in the face of stalled initiatives.
• The inherent limitations in trying to influence the
course of events in achieving policy objectives.
• The effects of policy actions over time, including
unintended consequences.
• Expected costs and benefits for those departments and agencies involved.
Some policy issues are even more complex and
involve multidimensional assessments of allies and
friends, neutrals, international organizations, and
affected populations. For example, policy planning
for peace operations, stabilization and reconstruction,
or humanitarian missions would include consideration
of issues related to:
• Diplomatic collaboration to solicit participants
and build coalitions for delivering humanitarian
assistance and deploying military forces (if
required).
• The role of regional groups and organizations.
• The role of the United Nations or other
international organization.
• Cease-fire/disengagement/stabilization in the
crisis area.
• Prisoner exchange between warring parties.
• Weapons control/demobilization.
• Demining.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Humanitarian relief.
Refugee/displaced person return.
Internal political cooperation.
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
Antiofficial corruption/illicit criminal operations.
Strengthening local or regional institutions or
organizations.
Management of factions/actors in the crisis area
with political objectives incompatible with, or
in direct opposition to U.S. objectives and who
will seek to thwart U.S. actions.
Political transition/elections/democratization.
Rule of law/police/criminal justice.
Atrocities/abuses/war crimes prosecution.
Civil and social order.
National reconciliation.
Economic reform and restoration/private investment.
Public diplomacy.
Flash point management.

Likewise, a PCC dealing with trade issues would
involve considerations related to domestic and foreign
economic and political issues, international laws and
organizations, and the concerns of departments and
agencies involved.
Managing the process by which a PCC conducts
business is complicated given the range and
complexity of issues addressed. Lessons learned in
the PCC process for promoting collaboration and
high performance include maintaining a focus on
a “high conceptual level.” This includes having
participants support the following objectives:
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1. Share an understanding of principles, goals, and
priorities.
• Bureaucratic interests must be represented,
but remember that the final objective is good
policy.
• Fully understand the policy context and
preferences of their department principals, as
well as those represented by others around
the table.
• Expand individual frames of reference
to gain an understanding of diplomatic,
political, military, economic, humanitarian,
developmental, and legal perspectives on
the policy problem at hand.
• Seek a broad situation assessment, utilizing
a wide range of intelligence, diplomatic,
allies and friends, and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) sources.
• Search for ambiguous assumptions and
information gaps.
• Focus on a realistic time horizon.
• Clarify the tough value trade-offs in the
policy decisions.
• Match commitments with political will.
2. Support a prudent consensus approach.
• Agree on an effective process plan.
• Strengthen interagency team identity.
• Control internal politics among team members.
• Foster competitive — and constructive — debate.
• Prepare well thought out issue or policy
positions backed up by data, examples, or
persuasive points of argument.
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•

•

Forge a consensus approach for action.
Internally, bring together opposing views
and develop a consolidated position without
diluting or ignoring important issues.
Externally, build support with those
sharing similar perspectives, and bring in
supporting material from outside actors
not directly involved in the meetings but
who can affect final acceptance of policy
decisions (e.g., congressmen, staffers, trade
interests, NGOs, etc.). This consideration
should be weighed against the desires
of higher-level policy groups who prefer
to have multiple analyses and options to
contemplate in order to determine their
own policy recommendations. Awareness
of the preferences and operating styles of
senior policy groups is crucial for working
effectively at the PCC level.
Keep your boss informed of developments;
don’t let him or her be blindsided in a higherlevel policy forum.

3. Maintain vigilance over intra-group management.
• Be well prepared on substantive issues,
legal constraints, and the bureaucratic/
policy preferences of your principal and
the other agencies represented.
• Adjust and self-correct for changing
conditions or ineffective group practices.
• Manage time, including competing commitments and responsibilities, in order to
advance the analytical and decision process
and produce required policy products on
time.
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•
•

•
•

Seek to be constructive and be willing to
compromise and make trade offs.
Participants in such meetings are not immune
to considerations of their professional
reputations and careers. Professionalism and
the constructive handling of disagreements
are important to successful operations.
Keep pace—stay ahead of the crisis
environment.
Anticipate media/press issues and congressional concerns.

Meetings in response to crisis conditions are
likely to experience additional complications.
Crises are characterized by fast moving events,
pressure to act quickly to minimize damage or
prevent crisis escalation, partial and sometimes
confusing or conflicting information or intelligence,
and the complexities of multitasking and coordinating
the activities of a wide range of actors and interested
parties. Moreover, in crisis situations similar to the post9/11 period in the George W. Bush first term, PCCs
may find that most policy decisions are handled at the
PC and DC level. The PCC groups may find that they
are dealing with regularly changing higher level policy
directives, uncertainty about policy deliberations and
decisions, and limited representative authority from
their department to make decisions because the rapid
pace of developments keeps most serious decision
issues at the PC or DC level.
For the individual, the keys to being an effective
member of a crisis management team are: (1) flexibility in
thinking, (2) maintaining involvement, (3) maintaining
alertness, (4) maintaining a strategic focus, (5)
excellent writing skills, and (6) being unbiased.
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• Flexibility in thinking: The preparation process
for this annual report involves interviewing a
range of experienced, senior U.S. Government
officials who have served on or supported
principals in high level policy groups. The
one attribute most frequently mentioned by
these senior officials over the years as needed
for working effectively in interagency groups is
flexibility in thinking. Participants must be able
to understand the concerns and perspectives
of other participants, quickly recognize new
problems, and be creative in developing
new approaches for dealing with problems.
Reaching a consensus decision does not mean
settling for the lowest common denominator,
but instead balancing competing concerns to
achieve the best policy recommendations for
U.S. interests. Participants also must be able to
understand the viewpoints of other participants
and agencies, and capable of “reframing” their
perspectives on analyses and issues as events,
actors, and interagency needs change. A firmly
fixed view of the world and U.S. Government
priorities becomes an obstacle to finding
creative and effective solutions to complex,
multidimensional problems.
• Maintaining involvement: Effective participation in working groups includes being an
active team member, making insightful (but not
redundant) contributions at meetings, knowing
your department’s positions and equities, keeping
senior officials in your department informed,
staying abreast of the latest developments (e.g.,
reading the intelligence reports and embassy
cables), doing a share of the drafting of papers,
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and being reliable (i.e., producing what you say
you are going to do). This skill also includes
being able to contribute to effective meeting
dynamics in often unstructured situations,
including supporting processes that move the
analytical and policy issue paper writing process
along expeditiously, and contribute to producing
a high quality written document in a timely
fashion.
• Maintaining alertness: Although self-evident
at a superficial level, the day-to-day demands
of working at the NSC or on interagency groups
can be grueling, often 12-14 hours a day, 7 days
a week. NSC Directors frequently work on 3-5
PCCs simultaneously, sometimes working
multiple taskings from each group in addition
to their normal NSC staff responsibilities.
Moreover, NSC Senior Directors also have
responsibility for the 3-6 Directors who work
under their supervision. Working in support
of the President requires having physical and
mental stamina. Crises that last weeks and
months are even more physically and mentally
demanding. They require perseverance and
a willingness to spend long hours attending
meetings and doing follow up work (as in the
case, for example, of the Counter-Terrorism
Security Group PCC which meets twice daily).
• Maintaining a strategic focus: Although
individual working group members normally
represent individual agencies, they must be able
to concentrate on strategic interests and broad
objectives, and not get bogged down in tactical
or trivial issues that are the responsibilities
of the policy implementing departments.

135

They must keep in mind that they are writing
recommendations for presidential action that
must serve the interests of all agencies as well
as the nation. Participants must be able to
succinctly identify the critical central issues
in frequently volatile, uncertain, complex, and
ambiguous situations.
• Excellent writing skills: The typical policy issue
paper written for the NSA or the President is
only a couple of pages. PCC level issue papers
on complex topics are only a few pages long.
Working group members must be able to
write short, well-organized documents which
clearly and succinctly describe the policy issue
being considered, why the issue is important
enough to warrant presidential attention, and
what options the President has for dealing
with the situation. Participants must be
able to think and write at the presidential
level and present concise, clear analysis and
arguments. A clearly written, well-organized
issue paper allows for more effective use of a
senior policymaker’s time.
• Being unbiased: Being unbiased means coming
to working groups without personal agendas
or predetermined, inflexible positions.
Effective participation on working groups
requires the ability to be objective about different
perspectives and aspects of issues, and
being able to develop balanced analyses
and recommendations that take into account
the many concerns and equities of the
interagency. Written recommendations for
the President must clearly present facts and
data, what is known, unknown or assumed,
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without partiality. Participants also must be
able to step back from the crisis periodically to
see if interests, dynamics, or its strategic context
have changed. Effective PCCs must be able to
periodically question assumptions established
earlier in the crisis management cycle.
Department of State.
Under the Constitution, the executive branch and
the Congress have responsibilities for foreign policy.
President George Washington’s first cabinet included
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. The Secretary of
State is fourth in line of succession to the presidency.
Within the executive branch, the Department of State
is the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretary
of State is the President’s principal foreign policy
advisor. The Department also supports the foreign
affairs activities of other U.S. Government entities,
including the Department of Commerce and the Agency
for International Development.
As the lead foreign affairs agency, State has the
primary role in:
• Leading interagency coordination in developing
and implementing foreign policy;
• Managing the foreign affairs budget and other
foreign affairs resources;
• Leading and coordinating U.S. representation
abroad, and conveying U.S. foreign policy
to foreign governments and international
organizations through U.S. embassies and
consulates in foreign countries and
diplomatic missions to international organizations;
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• Conducting negotiations and concluding
agreements and treaties on issues ranging from
trade to nuclear weapons; and,
• Coordinating and supporting international
activities of other U.S. agencies and officials.
The Department of State, like many other cabinet
departments, is a centralized organization, with the
Secretary of State at the helm. Beneath the Secretary
in the senior hierarchy are other principals—the
Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Counselor of
the Department. In rank order, assistant secretaries for
regional bureaus follow.
Although the Department of State is the lead
government foreign affairs agency, it does not dictate
foreign policy for the U.S. Government. Because so
many executive branch departments have international
programs, there is an inherent difference in perspective
at interagency meetings. Secretary Powell, in his
testimony before Congress on April 23, 2003, addressed
the phenomenon in this way:
With respect to what’s going on within the administration,
it’s not the first time I have seen discussions within the
administration between one department or another. I have
seen four straight administrations at a senior level; and
thus it has been, and thus it has always been, and thus
it should be. There should be tension within the national
security team, and from that tension, arguments are
surfaced for the President. And the one who decides,
the one who makes the foreign policy decisions for the
United States of America, is not the Secretary of State,
or the Secretary of Defense or the National Security
Advisor. It’s the President.

In conducting international affairs, the Secretary
attends cabinet meetings, NSC meetings chaired by
the NSA, and PCs. When the Secretary is traveling
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abroad a deputy may be designated to attend as State’s
senior representative. For example, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice designated Deputy Secretary
John Negroponte to attend PCs in her absence.
Similarly, Deputy Secretary Negroponte has asked
Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries to attend
DCs. Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas
Burns is a prime example of an undersecretary who
has attended PCs and DCs, in part because of the
expertise he brings to bear. Regarding PCCs,
assistant secretaries or their deputies usually attend.
Delegating others to attend interagency meetings has
been a fairly common practice in all administrations.
Frequently, special senior interagency committees
are established. During the Clinton administration,
an interagency “Coordinating Sub Group” on
terrorism, whose members included State’s Ambassador
for Counter-Terrorism Affairs and similarly ranked
officials from DoD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) met
under the chairmanship of a senior NSC official. This
practice persists in the current Bush administration.
For example, there is an “Executive Steering Group,”
chaired by a senior NSC advisor, which deals with a
wide variety of issues (including Iraq) and a CounterTerrorism Security Group that reports directly to the
Deputies Committee.
After the August 1998 bombings at the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright appointed Accountability Review
Boards (ARBs) for both events.9 These boards were
chaired by retired Admiral William Crowe, a former
CJCS and later U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain.
This was done in accordance with U.S. laws that
mandate convening such boards any time there is a
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security-related incident causing serious injury, loss
of life, or significant damage of property at or related to
a U.S. mission abroad. In brief, ARBs investigate and
to make recommendations. Retired and active duty
representatives from State, the FBI, CIA, and the private
sector served on the two boards.
Among the recommendations from the ARBs chaired
by Crowe was an appropriation of $1.4 billion a year for
at least 10 years for embassy construction and repair.
Albright writes in her autobiography:
By the time I left office, we had gained agreement
for appropriations close to the level recommended by
Admiral Crowe, an agreement that was critical because we
had learned that the dangers to our personnel were no
longer localized but global. There was no such thing as
a low-risk post. If we had soft spots, we could expect
our enemies to exploit them.

Below this level, there are numerous other
interagency groups. They may meet recurrently or
just once. After Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait
and Operation DESERT STORM, there were a series of
interagency sessions on a wide range of U.S. policy
issues in the Gulf. Similarly, during the Clinton
administration, the State Department called a one-time
interagency meeting on Lebanon when the issue of the
passport restriction on American citizens was under
review. Officers at the GS-15 or equivalent rank were
asked to attend from a wide array of agencies—DoD,
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), CIA, and
the like. Likewise, a variety of interagency meetings
were held before, during, and after Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. The purpose of such meetings may not
be to decide the issue, but to exchange views and lay
groundwork for issues expected to be considered by
PCCs, DCs, and PCs. Staff work for such meetings
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may be narrowly focused, and handled even by a
single office in a bureau.
One State Department office created explicitly for
the purpose of promoting interagency collaboration
on policy development and execution is the Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS). Established on August 5, 2004, the mission of
S/CRS is “to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S.
Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare
for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize
and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict
or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path
toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”10
The State Department’s authority for this mission
is derived from National Security Presidential
Directive-44 (NSPD-44) concerning the “Management
of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction
and Stabilization” which directs the Secretary of
State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments
and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction
activities.”11 Working under the authority of NSPD-44,
S/CRS has established a number of sub-PCC working
groups to plan, prepare, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction missions. The office works with the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
Justice, Treasury, the Department of Labor, Office
of Management and Budget and other government
agencies to devise interagency organizational
structures, identify resource requirements and prepare
interagency mobilization plans, coordinate politicalmilitary planning for stabilization and reconstruction
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operations, conduct decision support exercises and
prepare implementation strategies.
The staff work done for the Secretary of State and his
or her principals for interagency meetings is a complex
and highly organized undertaking. The Office of the
Executive Secretary (S/ES) is key. S/ES is located on
State’s “seventh floor” and is comprised of some 175plus employees. It is responsible for coordinating
State Department’s internal operations, liaising
between the bureaus and principals, running the State
Department’s 24\7 operations center, organizing and
staffing the Secretary’s foreign travel, and liaising
between the NSC and other executive branch
departments. More specifically, S/ES is responsible
for tasking papers within the State Department for
interagency meetings involving the principals. S/
ES sets the due dates for these papers in line with the
time of the meetings. An Executive Secretary and four
Deputy Executive Secretaries lead S/ES. The Executive
Secretary traditionally is a very senior, career Foreign
Service officer.
The relationship between State’s Executive Secretary
and Executive Secretaries in the National Security
Council and DoD is very important. It is often through
their communications, both verbally and in writing
that notification of high-level meetings is made. State
Executive Secretaries also may receive debriefs from
their counterparts on decisions from more informal
meetings or discussions among the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor.
One aspect of the State Department which sets it
apart in the interagency process is its own special
composition. In his memoirs, James Baker, former
Secretary of State under Bush 41, wrote that,
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Without a doubt, the State Department has the most
unique bureaucratic culture I’ve ever encountered.
In most of the federal government, the work is guided
by a small number of political appointees who work
together with civil service—the career bureaucracy that is
designated to be above politics and provide institutional
memory and substantive expertise. But at State there is
also the Foreign Service, the elite corps of foreign affairs
officers who staff the Department’s country and functional
desks in Washington and our embassies abroad.12

At interagency meetings, the State Department
representatives, whether in support of a Principal or
on their own, bring to the table a wealth of on the
ground, in-depth experiences in dealing with foreign
governments and cultures from around the globe,
which helps frame their recommendations and
conclusions. In addition, by virtue of State’s position
as the lead government agency in foreign affairs,
the State Department has an unusual breadth of
information to tap—from all agencies. In his memoirs,
Secretary Shultz wrote that,
As secretary, I could see that I had at hand an extraordinary
information machine: it could produce a flow of reports
on what was happening in real time, background on
what had been done before and how that had worked,
analyses of alternative courses of action, and ideas
on what might be done. The Department is a great
engine of diplomacy for the secretary to use in carrying
out the president’s foreign policy.13

Department of Defense.
To understand and have an appreciation of DoD’s
role in the interagency process, it is instructive to look
briefly at DoD’s history and how it evolved into the
organization it is today.

143

One should remember that the department did
not exist, nor did the JCS receive statutory authority,
until the late 1940s. Up until and through World War
II, there were two military departments—War and
Navy. Both the Secretary of War and Secretary of the
Navy reported directly to the President. Conflicting
judgments often arose between the Army and Navy
over critical issues, including allocation of resources,
strategic priorities, and command arrangements.
Disagreements sometimes affected how military
operations were conducted. To coordinate efforts
during World War II, some 75 interservice agencies and
interdepartmental committees were formed. These ad
hoc arrangements worked, but only because of the
nation’s vast resources were we able to compensate for
mistakes, inefficiencies, and internal divisions.
The National Security Act of 1947 created a
National Military Establishment (NME) headed by
a Secretary of Defense. The three secretaries of the
military departments (including the Secretary of
the newly formed Air Force) retained their powers,
subject only to the authority of the Secretary of Defense
to exercise “general direction, authority, and
control.” The newly formed NSC, chaired by the
President, included the Secretaries of State, Defense,
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board. During this nascent
phase of the NSC, the military’s perspectives were well
represented by occupying four of the seven NSC seats.
The NME was replaced by DoD under provisions
of the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act.
The 1949 Amendment also increased the powers of
the Secretary of Defense, diminished those of the
military departments, and provided for a Chairman
with no direct military command function to preside
over the JCS (and the Service Chiefs as a corporate
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body). Moreover, with this amendment, the secretaries
of the military departments lost their membership on
the NSC.
There were two legislative acts during the
Eisenhower administration (1953 and 1958) that
consolidated more authority in the hands of the
Secretary of Defense. Given President Eisenhower’s
military background, it should be no surprise that he
was a firm believer in centralized control and a clearly
defined chain of command. A fairly strong Secretary
of Defense, together with a weakly structured JCS that
functioned as a committee, prevailed through the 1960s
(mainly the Robert McNamara years) and the 1970s.
It was not until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
that the military gained a greater voice in interagency
affairs. The Act provided, among other things, for
a stronger and more active CJCS who would be the
principal military advisor to the President, the NSC,
and Secretary of Defense (as compared to a Chairman
who previously represented the views of the four
Chiefs of the Services). Goldwater-Nichols also
significantly increased the powers of the combatant
commanders and clarified the chain of command from
the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified
commanders. This ascension of the commanders, in
effect, further weakened the influence of the individual
service secretaries and chiefs.
Today, DoD is a centralized organization with
power clearly resting in the hands of the Secretary of
Defense and, secondarily, in the hands of the CJCS. The
Secretary of Defense, together with the Commanderin-Chief, epitomizes the principle of “civilian control
of the military.” Ultimate authority within DoD rests
with the Secretary. The three Service Secretaries report
directly to him, as do the senior civilian officials in the
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Office of the Secretary of Defense. The CJCS, who is
the senior ranking member of the U.S. armed forces
but by law does not exercise military command,
also reports to the Secretary of Defense. While the
unified combatant commanders, by statute, report
to the Secretary of Defense, by practice they clear (or
at least discuss) all positions with the CJCS prior to
communicating with the Secretary. The JCS refers to
the Joint Staffs of the Service Chiefs, while the Joint Staff
refers to the staff who work directly for the Chairman
(CJCS), not for the JCS.
The Secretary of Defense and CJCS are the primary
Defense players in the interagency arena. They
represent the Department at NSC meetings chaired
by the President, and at PC meetings chaired by the
NSA. Their deputies, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and Vice CJCS, attend the DC meetings (throughout
the first Bush and the Clinton administrations,
however, the Secretary of Defense was represented at
the DC meetings by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy).
At the staff level, virtually all the work in DoD
for interagency deliberations is done in the Policy
organization for OSD and in the J-5 directorate (Strategy,
Plans and Policy) for the Joint Staff. Attendees at
the PCC meetings and lower lever interagency
groups are Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant
Secretaries, and GS-15s from Policy and one- or twostar flag officers and action officers (O-5s and O-6s)
from J-5. With regard to homeland defense and defense
support to civil authorities (DSCA) issues, the Assistant
Secretary for Homeland Defense is the single point of
contact for the many directorates and agencies within
DoD. It is uncommon for representatives from the
unified commands or the individual services to attend

146

interagency meetings. The possible exception might be
if a combatant commander is specifically invited by
the President (or NSA) to attend a meeting. The Joint
Staff typically represents the combatant commanders
in interagency meetings. People from the Joint Staff
are quite protective of the fact that they work to fulfill
the statutory responsibilities of the CJCS as the principal
military advisor to the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the NSC.
Some Presidents have preferred to hear a
coordinated DoD position while others wished to hear
counterarguments and multiple options. Especially
since Goldwater-Nichols, the military’s views should be
submitted separately from OSD’s. Moreover, President
Bush, in general, prefers to hear all views, including
disagreements between the Secretary of Defense
and the CJCS when circumstances allow. However,
crisis conditions may affect the President’s willingness
to pursue extensive debates on competing options. For
example, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Secretary
of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense expressed
opinions at a strategy session of senior Presidential
advisors. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
President’s Chief of Staff pulled the two participants
aside and admonished, “The President will expect
one person to speak for the Department of Defense.”14
Some DoD officials believe strongly that if the OSD
civilians and the military have a coordinated position
and speak as one voice, the Department’s views carry
more weight, and DoD officials can be more effective in
the interagency process.
Another example of differing voices occurred
during the initial deliberations in August 1990
after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After a meeting with the
President, then Secretary of Defense Cheney chastised
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General Powell, then CJCS, for offering an opinion that
the Secretary perceived as political advice. ”Colin,”
he said, “you’re the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
You’re not Secretary of State. You’re not the National
Security Advisor anymore. And you’re not Secretary
of Defense. So stick to military matters.”15
This is not to say, however, that military officers
should not speak at interagency meetings. They
should speak. They are obligated to give their best
military advice. Often, military officers are criticized for
not speaking out more forcefully. Their reluctance to
speak might be because they do not want to be viewed
(especially at the lower officer levels) as presenting
the views of the CJCS. Another reason for their
reluctance may be personality driven, i.e., a certain
amount of intimidation by the senior civilians around
the table. Nevertheless, some senior flag officers believe
strongly that military officers also should comment
on nonmilitary matters. They argue that military
officers bring a strategic perspective to interagency
groups that can help clarify (or question) assumptions,
identify conflicting interests, or raise questions about
unintended second or third order effects of proposed
policies. One former DC participant with extensive
government experience recommended that military
officers educate themselves more broadly on national
security issues (including resource and economic
issues, homeland defense and security, intrastate
conflict, refugees, and migration, etc.) to be able to
better understand how military roles and missions may
affect, or are affected by, such traditionally nonmilitary
policy matters that increasingly involve or constrain
military planning.
Even so, it is important that the proper military
advice be given (with officers clearly delineating
whether they are representing the “position of the
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Chairman” or their own expertise). Most of the
civilians at interagency meetings have little or no
experience with military operations. They generally do
not have an appreciation for what happens “behind the
scenes” of any successful military operation. Without
getting into the weeds, military officers need to explain
what could be accomplished with the use of military
forces, and what the limitations are. At the same
time, the military should expect at the conclusion of
these deliberations to have a clear set of objectives and
parameters within which to operate. It is critical that
DoD, and especially the uniformed military, be fully
engaged in debates taking place in the White House
by civilians when use of the military instrument of
national policy is being considered.
Traditionally, DoD performs a secondary (or support) role to State’s lead in foreign policy, but plays an
active role at interagency meetings in determining the
tools of foreign policy. From DoD’s perspective, its three
primary concerns are possible uses of military forces,
expenditure of Defense resources, and preventing
a situation from deteriorating to the point that it
requires military intervention. During the current war
on terrorism with military operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq (and supporting anti-terrorist military actions
by other countries), however, DoD plays a more equal
role in foreign policy discussions because of coalition
military considerations, and political-military and
security problems in the two countries. Historically,
though, DoD frequently has resisted the involvement
of U.S. troops because situations were assessed to not
constitute a proper military mission or there are other
alternatives available (i.e., other countries’ military
forces, UN, NGOs). The Department’s position in
such meetings often is to withhold use of U.S. forces
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unless they, and only they, possess the capability
to perform a function that protects or promotes U.S.
security interests.
Ultimately the decision to use military forces
may be based upon political interests and not DoD’s
judgments about the “best” use of combatant forces.
For example, in the days leading up to the decision
to deploy U.S. forces into Somalia in 1992 to assist
humanitarian operations responding to widespread
famine, the combatant commander of the U.S. Central
Command argued about the deleterious impact on
military readiness for dealing with potential threats
to higher level U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and
broader Middle East region. Nevertheless, the political
decision was that the acute humanitarian and U.S.
international leadership interests at the time required
U.S. intervention and overrode DoD’s concerns about
the impact on traditional mission capabilities.
The second frequent DoD concern is the expenditure
of resources. Policymakers rarely consider the cost of
operations directed by the NSC. This usually is due to
the urgency of taking action or a tendency to ignore (or
avoid) the fact that ultimately someone has to pay the
bill. There also is a common belief that “DoD possesses
all the resources.” While it is true that Defense’s
budget is many times larger than State’s, there are
laws and regulations on precisely how and for what
purposes DoD’s money may be spent. So, just as use
of military forces is not necessarily the best solution,
careful attention needs to be paid to the cost of actions
taken through the interagency process, and to who will
pay it.
The third concern is preventing a situation from
deteriorating to the point that it requires military
intervention. DoD plays an active role in interagency
meetings shaping the strategic situation in many
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regions of the world. DoD strives to ensure that U.S.
Government policy and resources are adequately
coordinated to shape the environment and obtain results
favorable to U.S. interests. Working closely with the
Department of State, USAID, and other agencies, DoD’s
involvement in regional programs can be the catalyst
for policy changes that could avert future military
intervention. A pertinent example was DoD’s active role
in changing policy regarding Colombia. Until 2002,
U.S. policy was based upon helping Colombia reduce
its drug production. After 9/11, DoD lobbied hard for
a change in the policy and was successful in getting
a PC to authorize the development of a new NSPD
for Colombia. DoD led the effort to produce NSPD 18
on November 2002—in effect changing the Colombia
policy from counterdrug to counter narco-terrorism.
This policy’s immediate impact was strengthening the
Colombian government and avoiding potential security
problems that could have triggered a request for more
military assets.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have broadened the
scope of DoD’s contacts, roles, and missions in the
interagency arena. In response to the attacks, DoD
approved the concept of Joint and Interagency
Coordination Groups (JIACG) to improve interagency
cooperation and improve operational effectiveness
for all Regional Combatant Commands, Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM), Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
JIACGs are tailored to meet the requirements and
challenges of each Combatant Commander’s Area of
Responsibility (AOR), and may include representatives
from a wide range of U.S. Government agencies, the
intelligence community, and even NGOs such as the
American Red Cross.
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The JIACG concept seeks to establish operational
connections between civilian and military departments
and agencies that will improve planning and
coordination within the government.16 The JIACG
is intended to be a multifunctional, advisory
element that represents the civilian departments and
agencies and facilitates information sharing across the
interagency community. It provides regular, timely,
and collaborative day-to-day working relationships
between civilian and military operational planners.
JIACGs coordinate where DoD assets need to be on
a day to day basis, and with regard to contingency
planning. JIACGs support Joint Planning Groups, Joint
Operations Groups, Interagency Coordination Groups,
and Joint Support Cells. JIACG functions include:
• Participating in combatant command staff crisis
planning and assessment.
• Advising the combatant command staff on
civilian agency campaign planning.
• Working civilian-military campaign planning
issues.
• Providing civilian agency perspectives during
military operational planning activities and
exercises.
• Presenting unique civilian agency approaches,
capabilities & limitations to the military
campaign planners.
• Providing vital links to Washington civilian
agency campaign planners.
• Arranging interfaces for a number of useful
agency crisis planning activities.
• Conducting outreach to key civilian international
and regional contacts.
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The Intelligence Community.
The primary role of the intelligence community
is to provide information that will help policymakers
understand the elements and dynamics of the various
situations they are dealing with. Information provided
by the Director of National Intelligence, CIA,
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security
Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, and other intelligence
community components provides analysis about what
is happening on the ground, what is the nature of the
geographic area of concern, who are the actors, what
are their dispositions, and what are their likely
intentions. The latter is the most difficult analysis for
the intelligence community to produce and often is
the most contentious.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) was established in December 2004 through
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
who must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate, does not
serve as the head of any of the sixteen agencies within
the U.S. intelligence community, but establishes
objectives and priorities for the intelligence community
and manages and directs tasking of collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination of national
intelligence.17 The DNI approves requirements for
collection and analysis, including requirements
responding to the needs of policymakers and other
intelligence consumers. The DNI also has responsibility
for developing and executing the overall budget for the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) and provides
advisory tasking to intelligence elements outside of the
NIP. The DNI has the authority to establish national
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intelligence centers as necessary and is responsible
for the management of the Intelligence Community
and the National Intelligence Council (NIC) which
is accountable for mid-term and long-term strategic
analysis and the production of National Intelligence
Estimates. The DNI also is responsible for ensuring
accurate all-source intelligence, competitive analysis,
and that alternative views are brought to the attention
of policymakers.
Since the establishment of the ODNI in 2004 and
the appointment of its first director in April 2005,
DNI representatives have assumed the role of primary
intelligence support to the President and the NSC
interagency system. For example, the DNI is now the
statutory intelligence advisor to the National Security
Council, replacing the DCIA. The DNI serves on the
PC, and likewise, the DNI Principal Deputy Director
serves on the Deputies Committee. However, the
DCIA and DDCIA attend NSC, PC and DC meetings
(respectively) when appropriate for CIA related
intelligence matters. All policy statements related to
the intelligence community are vetted through the
ODNI.
Established to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program, the ODNI
serves as an interface between the Intelligence Community and policymakers. Most intelligence taskers are
routed through the ODNI to ensure proper coordination, although finished intelligence products often move
directly from each agency to NSC members and other
policymakers. Many other responsibilities and functions
of intelligence community components (such as the
CIA) have not changed with the establishment of
the ODNI. Of note, though, the ODNI now produces
the President’s Daily Brief, with input from across
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the Community. Whenever covert operations
issues are being considered, the DCIA or DDCIA are
involved because the CIA retains its responsibility as
the executive agency responsible for covert operations.
Including representatives from the various agencies
in the intelligence community in PCCs or other policy
planning groups is critical because reviewing existing
intelligence information and determining requirements
for additional intelligence collection and analysis should
be one of the first steps in considering national security
issues. Analysis from the intelligence community
will help decisionmakers better understand the
actual conditions (political, social, economic, military,
transportation, communications, public health, etc.) in
other countries, the capabilities of groups or countries
in the area, the motivations and likely intentions
of leaders, the interests and capabilities of other
stakeholders, and what the potential threats are to
U.S. interests and personnel both abroad and within
the United States. The intelligence community also
can provide assessments of the likely effects (near
and long term) of proposed courses of action on
specific individuals, groups, or national and regional
populations. However, remember that you will never
get all the information you want or feel that you need.
The intelligence community is highly capable, but not
omniscient.
An example of intelligence support to the
interagency is the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC). The NCTC is responsible for integrating
and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism
and counterterrorism (CT) and conducting strategic
operational planning by integrating all appropriate
instruments of national power. The purpose of
the coordinating role of the NCTC is to ensure
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that all elements of the executive branch—beyond
simply elements of the Intelligence Community—are
coordinated in their counterterrorism efforts. The
Director of the NCTC monitors the implementation of
these plans and has access to information from every
element of the government relevant to assessing their
progress and implementation. In this role, the Director
of the NCTC reports directly to the President (vice the
DNI), although in practice Strategic Operational Plans
are approved through the DC and PC process.
Ultimately, it is up to the policymaker to decide how
he or she uses intelligence; and there are many reasons
why a policymaker will or will not use intelligence. For
example, intelligence information enhances power
in policy discussions when it bolsters one’s own
position, but it may be discounted if it calls into
question the wisdom of following a preferred policy
path. Policymakers must work out how to resolve often
conflicting information or unknowns resulting from
incomplete intelligence. Policymakers may request
focused analyses from specific intelligence agencies,
or community-wide assessments in the form of indepth National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) or rapid
assessment Special NIEs (SNIEs) under the authority
of the NIC. Conversely, policymakers may resist
additional intelligence analysis if they worry that their
policy positions will not be supported by the results.
Although the intelligence community’s mission is
to produce objective analyses that support the policy
process, it often is drawn into policy deliberations
by providing assessments about the likely outcome
of proposed courses of action, by determining
what kinds of policies are most likely to influence
leaders or groups, and by advising on whether
different factions in foreign governments (including
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intelligence services) are likely to help or hinder the
implementation of policies. The involvement of the
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet (July 1997July 2004), with Israeli and Palestinian security services
on security issues in a possible peace agreement reflects
how intelligence sometimes has a direct involvement
in the implementation of U.S. policy. If directed by
the President, the CIA also can be used to implement
foreign policy through covert action.
Homeland Security Council Organization.18
In response to the 9/11 attacks and the continuing
terrorist threats to the United States, President Bush
established the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in
October 2001 and a new Department of Homeland
Security in March 2003. Established on October 8,
2001, the HSC serves as the mechanism for ensuring
coordination of homeland security-related activities
of executive departments and agencies and effective
development and implementation of homeland security
policies.19 The members of the Council include the
President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, the Secretary of Transportation,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (APHS/CT), the Chief of Staff to the
President, and the Chief of Staff to the Vice President.
The Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs and the Counsel to the President are invited
to attend all meetings of the HSC. The Secretary of
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State and the Chairman of the JCS (or Vice CJCS) have
regularly attended HSC meetings during the Bush
administration, and the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to
the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant
to the President for Domestic Policy are invited to
attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The
heads of other executive departments and agencies
and other senior officials are invited to attend Council
meetings when appropriate.
The HSC meets at the President’s direction and in the
last year normally has met about bimonthly—although
more frequently when events and issues dictate. For
example, the HSC met daily in response to the plot to
hijack passenger airliners originating in England during
the summer of 2006. When the President is absent
from a meeting of the Council, at the President’s
direction, the Vice President may preside. The APHS/
CT is responsible for determining the agenda, ensuring
that necessary papers are prepared, and recording
Council actions and Presidential decisions. Like the
National Security Advisor in matters of national
security, the APHS/CT serves as the President’s
key homeland security and counterterrorism advisor
in the White House; Frances Townsend leads the
HSC staff, and also co-leads, along with the NSA, the
NSC’s Combating Terrorism Strategy directorate.
The APHS/CT conducts regular sessions with HSC
principals as well as chairing frequent meetings of the
HSC staff and representatives from the NSC. Currently
the HSC staff conducts the day-to-day management
of homeland security affairs for the White House and
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numbers approximately 40 policy positions including
detailees and assignees from the U.S. Secret Service and
other Department of Homeland Security agencies, DoD,
the FBI, the Department of Health and Human Services,
and individuals assigned from other executive branch
agencies.
The HSC and the Policy Process.
The primary role of the HSC and the APHS/
CT is to advise the President on homeland security
and counterterrorism matters. Some national security
commentators contend there is not a discernible difference between national security and homeland security—that one flows into the other. If national security
focuses on protecting U.S. interests around the world,
homeland security begins at the nation’s waters’ edge
and protects our interests internally from terrorist
threats, presumably emanating from abroad. As
defined in the President’s National Strategy for Homeland
Security (July 2002),20 “homeland security” is a concerted
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States, reduce American’s vulnerability to
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover
from attacks that do occur. In the years since 9/11,
the HSC has taken an “all hazards” approach to its
mission of protecting the U.S. homeland from harm,
and homeland security programs focus on activities
within the United States and its territories, or on
activities in support of domestically-based systems
and processes. While homeland security concerns and
national security concerns both encompass threats to
the United States, homeland security includes not
only issues pertaining to attacks within the United
States by foreign interests or factions, but also attacks
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perpetrated by domestic groups not affiliated with
external organizations or nations. Homeland security
also addresses circumstances that occur within U.S.
borders, such as pandemic influenza, and responses to
national disasters and emergencies such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita that struck the U.S. Gulf coast in
August and September 2005. Thus, while the NSC
addresses activities outside of the United States and
combating terrorism overseas, at a minimum, national
security and homeland security have large areas of
overlapping responsibilities. This is particularly
evident when examining the make-up of the NSC and
the HSC.
A comparison of NSC and HSC organizations reveals
that all 11 members (or statutory advisors or frequent
substantive invitees) of the NSC are official HSC
members (the President, the Vice President, the Secretary
of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of
National Intelligence) or invited participants (the
Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, the Chief
of Staff to the President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security, the White House Counsel, the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget). At
the staff level, some directorates of the NSC (such as
that under the DAP/DNSA for Combating Terrorism)
have daily contact with HSC directorates. These dual
responsibilities between the NSC and the HSC illustrate
the post 9/11 evolution and overlap of homeland
security and more traditional international national
security affairs. One result is that President Bush has
held several formal joint NSC-HSC meetings—such as
those during the summer of 2006 concerning the threat
to hijack passenger airliners originating in England.
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Regardless of its relationship to the NSC, the
HSC has numerous priorities in policy development.
These include supporting the President and his objective
of ensuring the security of the United States, and ensuring
that policies associated with homeland security are
based upon strategic national security interests and
not political pressures. A core function of the HSC
is to recommend policies to the President that are
integrated and have been coordinated across the
government. When circumstances involving global
terrorism with domestic implications occur, the
APHS/CT and the National Security Advisor are
expected to act in concert. Because homeland security
involves a wide swath of domestic issues—some of
which have significant international components (e.g.,
visa policy, port security, pandemic issues, etc.)—HSC
coordination challenges can involve a wide range of domestically oriented executive branch agencies; the Congress; and state, local, and private interests. Preventive
strategies for domestic defense that are likely to require
state-level resource commitments; affect immigration,
trade, or other economic issues; produce outcomes that
are harder to visibly demonstrate (i.e., policies that
produce greater security means that potential attacks
are thwarted and become “non-events”); and affect a
wide range of federal, state, and local (not to mention
private sector) entities are highly likely to have local
political as well as national security effects.
In general, the HSC provides policy support to the
President on homeland security matters. HSC serves
as the conduit into and from the President (and
other White House offices) on policy matters. HSC is
responsible for pulling together the perspectives of DHS
and other government agencies that might be affected
by proposed homeland security-related policy and
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coordinating those views through to a policy decision,
and then monitoring the implementation of the policy.
The HSC deals mainly with domestic policy issues,
but also may play a major role in the consideration of
issues and policy recommendations related to Canada,
Mexico, and other actors in the immediate continental
United States geographic region. These bilateral policy
issues include air transport security, maritime security,
and border security, as well as other more traditional
national security policy matters that involve NSC policy
areas. HSC also is responsible for understanding
the domestic implications of potential policy decisions
in the homeland security area. DHS, on the other hand,
is responsible for coordinating with state and local
officials and first responders, and for informing the HSC
of state and local concerns with regard to homeland
security matters and potential policy issues. DHS
also is responsible for letting state and local officials
know what policies or DHS activities occur that affect
state and local administrations and business.
Like the PC for the NSC, the PC for the HSC acts
as the President’s senior level policy review and
coordination committee, and seeks to ensure that, as
much as possible, policy decisions brought to the
President reflect a consensus between the relevant
departments and agencies, but also clearly present
any unresolved disagreements. Typically, the HSC PC
meets regularly, but adjusts its frequency depending
upon circumstances such as crisis situations or
increased threat levels. The types of issues considered
by the PC and DC of the HSC include cyber-security;
bioterrorism; air, rail, road, and maritime security;
preparedness and protection against terrorism and
natural disasters; intelligence and information sharing;
and coordination and communication with federal,
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state, and local authorities as well as the private
sector. Since the HSC’s inception, President Bush
has issued over 18 Homeland Security Presidential
Directives and about a dozen Executive Orders
dealing with homeland security issues.
The APHS/CT and the HSC staff (as well as
Principals and Deputies when appropriate) are
responsible for ensuring interagency coordination
with the Department of Homeland Security, other
Cabinet Departments, and the Intelligence Community
(including the NCTC). Furthermore, the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security meets regularly
with the President’s other senior advisors, as well
as the Vice President’s senior advisors, and staff
from other White House offices. The overlapping
relationship between homeland security and traditional
national security issues is reflected by the fact that
over the last year, roughly one-fifth of HSC-related
meetings have been co-chaired by members of the NSC
staff.
Department of Homeland Security.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was
formed on March 1, 2003, through the merger of nearly
30 programs and agencies (over 180,000 personnel)
from throughout the Federal government. Headed by a
cabinet-level Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS has a
stated mission to lead a unified national effort to secure
America through preventing and deterring terrorist
attacks and protecting against and responding to
threats and hazards to the Nation. DHS also “will
ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of
commerce.”21
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To accomplish this mission, DHS has identified
seven “Strategic Goals”:22
1. Awareness. Identify and understand threats,
assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts
and disseminate timely information to the country’s
homeland security partners and the American public.
2. Prevention. Detect, deter and mitigate threats to
the U.S. homeland.
3. Protection. Safeguard the American people and
their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property, and the
economy of the nation from acts of terrorism, natural
disasters, or other emergencies.
4. Response. Lead, manage and coordinate the
national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters,
or other emergencies.
5. Recovery. Lead national, state, local, and private
sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities
after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other
emergencies.
6. Service. Serve the public effectively by facilitating
lawful trade, travel and immigration.
7. Organizational Excellence. Value the Department’s
most important resource, its people, and create a culture
that promotes a common identity, innovation, mutual
respect, accountability, and teamwork to achieve
efficiencies, effectiveness, and operational synergies.
DHS is charged with analyzing intelligence,
assessing threats, guarding U.S. borders and airports,
protecting the critical infrastructure of the country,
and coordinating emergency response (including
natural disaster assistance). The Department has broad
responsibility for a wide range of functions and activities
required to safeguard the citizens of the United States,
including coastal security, customs, immigration,
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transportation security, infrastructure protection,
emergency response, and information systems security.
Its intelligence functions include the analysis of
information and intelligence from the FBI, ODNI, CIA,
and other Federal agencies to assess potential terrorist
threats to the American homeland. During 2006, DHS
implemented a major reorganization based upon
lessons learned from the operations of the Department
since its inception. To fully perform its mission, DHS
now has four major “Directorates,” six other operational
Components (besides FEMA, which is also a Directorate),
and 18 support Components.
Because of overlap between the global war on
terrorism, homeland defense, and homeland security,
DHS works with DoD’s Assistant Secretary for
Homeland Defense, and with a number of other DoD
and U.S. Government entities, including Northern
Command, as mentioned above in the section on
the Department of Defense. In addition to DoD,
DHS works on a daily basis with the DNI, CIA, and
other elements of the Intelligence Community, as well
as the FBI, to coordinate intelligence and strategic
intelligence analysis.
The DHS and the HSC face several daunting challenges based upon the breadth of their responsibilities and number of Federal entities involved.
Trying to coordinate activities that range from the Coast
Guard to the Secret Service to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency continues to be a challenge that
the recent DHS reorganization is intended to meet more
effectively. Now merged into a single Department
for more than 4 years, the components are making
measured progress in understanding each other’s roles
and missions—and coordinating their activities and
operations, where appropriate.
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The reorganization of DHS in 2006 was intended
to capitalize on the successful lessons learned
during its brief existence, create new entities to more
effectively coordinate the operations of the many
components of the agency, and improve strategic
planning and policy coordination. Much remains
to be done, especially refining areas of responsibility,
developing common doctrine, unifying procedures,
and enhancing the effectiveness of working together.
The national security process is fairly
manageable because it involves a limited number of
key players—State, Defense (including the JCS), the
intelligence community, and NSC staff—all of whom
have personnel who know and have worked with
each other over the years. In contrast, the HSC has
eight departments and agencies, plus the White House,
directly involved, and another eight departments
possibly involved depending upon the issue being
addressed.
Despite the difficulties of melding nearly 30 formerly
separate programs and agencies, DHS, and its work
through the HSC, has shown that the country is capable
of responding in innovative ways to new challenges that
emerge and that the myriad departments and agencies
of the executive branch can learn to work together to
advance U.S. national security efforts.
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APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL NOMENCLATURE OF
PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
DECISION DOCUMENTS
Truman

National Security Council papers (NSC)

Eisenhower

National Security Council papers (NSC)

Kennedy	National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM)
Johnson	National Security Action Memorandum
(NSAM)
Nixon/Ford
		

NationalSecurityDecisionMemorandum
(NSDM)

Carter

Presidential Directive (PD)

Reagan	National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD)
Bush

National Security Directive (NSD)

Clinton

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)

Bush
		

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)23

Note: Presidents use Executive Orders and NSPDs
(or their historical equivalents) to authorize most
executive actions. In addition, the President uses
directives called “findings” to authorize covert action.
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CHAPTER 4
LEARNING TO PLAY THE GAME:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING
PROCESS
Clayton K.S. Chun and Frank L. Jones
A few weeks after the horrifying events of
September 11, 2001 (9/11), General Peter Pace, Vice
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked
that the success of the terrorists was, perhaps in part,
the result of a failure of coordination among the
various U.S. Government agencies that are responsible
for the nation’s security, and that the process needed
to be significantly reformed or strengthened.1 Now,
several years after the events of 9/11, this issue remains
pertinent. The successful prosecution of the Global
War on Terrorism depends largely on the interagency
process.
The use of the term “the interagency process” is
code among Washington insiders for the process by
which national security policy issues are identified and
through which this policy is formulated and executed
at the direction of the President of the United States or
for less critical issues, by senior government officials at
the cabinet or subcabinet level. Pace’s lament is just one
of many that senior military and civilian officials have
voiced for several years regarding the ineffectiveness of
this process. In response, various proposals have been
advanced for enhancing the process, but no proposal
has been sufficient. Nonetheless, the view persists
that there is a correct solution that will lead to a more
rational process, it just has not been found.
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Scholars who have studied the interagency process
have tended to examine it at the highest level, that is,
the National Security Council (NSC) level, focusing
primarily on the presidential decisionmaking level.
They have contributed to our understanding of the
behavior of bureaucrats as well as offering models for
understanding how national security decisionmaking
occurs. Yet, examining the national security process at
the pinnacle of the organizational structure, as well as
the use of case studies to build models usually based on
international crises, does not provide practitioners, as
well as scholars, with a theory of how the interagency
process operates. Additionally, gaining access to the
inner most thoughts of individual decisionmakers
during crises is difficult to accomplish.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out a theory of
how the interagency process works and, by positing
that theory, explain why it is impossible to change
the process to a degree that will satisfy senior leaders
who believe that there is a solution that will guarantee
better coordination, information sharing, and policy
outputs. We do not argue for structural changes, the
most often suggested panacea, but instead suggest that
the existence of such a solution is a chimera. Instead,
we contend that economic principles, specifically game
theory, provide a useful means for understanding the
process, for explaining why structural solutions will
not work, and for illustrating the difficulties inherent in
reforming the national security policymaking process.
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING
PROCESS
The process by which the U.S. Government
formulates and implements its national security policy
does not differ significantly from how it creates policy
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in other areas. Those differences that do exist are more
related to the cross-jurisdictional nature of national
security policymaking than any other factors. Further,
the generic models for describing how policy is made
are sufficient for the national security environment.
This policymaking process is taking place within
a decisionmaking structure known commonly as the
interagency process or more accurately known as the
National Security Council system. This system had its
origins 60 years ago.
The Components of the NSC System.
The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment
in 1949 created an organization of the Executive Branch
for national security matters. The Act created the NSC.
The statutory members of the NSC are the President,
Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the
Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence
advisor. The President heads the Council.2 Other heads
of departments and agencies, as well as other senior
administration officials, often have been invited by
Presidents to attend Council meetings or to serve as de
facto members.3
The Council is the President’s primary forum for
considering the most vital national security issues
confronting the nation. These issues are complex and
often of the utmost secrecy. During a crisis, decisions may
need to be made quickly without complete information
and under severe stress. The lack of information
can result from several arenas. NSC actors may not
want to share information, may discover information
exclusively, or may act on information different from
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the other actors. Conversely, individuals under stress
may not be able to acquire, absorb, analyze, or act on
information or other actions. In other instances, the
issues to be decided are less time sensitive and the pace
by which these issues are examined may have taken
months before being presented to the President.4
Each President has used the NSC in the manner
that best served his interests and style. Presidents rely
on certain institutions and individuals that they can
trust and listen to their advice. President Dwight D.
Eisenhower used the Council as a forum for obtaining
advice on national security issues. President John F.
Kennedy relied more heavily on informal groupings
of advisors rather than the institutionalized processes
of the NSC system.5 During a crisis, the tendency is to
use these small groups on an ad hoc basis. On these
occasions, decisions “rise to the top.”6 Relatively few
policymakers participate in the process, including not
only the statutory members of the NSC, but other close
policy advisors.
The second component of the NSC system is the
nominal integrator, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, often called the National
Security Advisor (NSA). This position, however, is not
a member of the Council. Eisenhower created it in 1953
to be the executive officer of the Council responsible
for setting the longer-term policy agenda, furnishing
the President’s perspective on issues, informing the
President of Council matters, and supervising the NSC
staff; but it was not envisioned to be a policy advisor.7
It was not until Kennedy’s administration that the
position assumed its present form as the President’s
personal advisor on national security affairs.
Each President since then has allowed the NSA to
serve in various capacities, but four roles are generally
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defined. The first is acting as an “honest broker” in
the policymaking process. In this capacity, the NSA
is responsible for presenting the President with
options, laying out the advantages and disadvantages,
and accurately portraying the positions of the NSC
principals.8
A second role is that of providing advice to the
President, unencumbered by the views of the various
bureaucratic constituencies that are involved in national
security matters; and, depending on the President,
leading policy formulation.9 A third role is monitoring
the actions of the national security apparatus to insure
that the President’s directives are executed faithfully.10
The fourth role has been as crisis manager. This
official’s proximity to the President allows for swift
and coordinated action under Presidential control.11
When the Congress established the Council, it
also authorized a small staff headed by an Executive
Secretary appointed by the President. Eisenhower
increased its size substantially for two purposes:
coordinating policy development and overseeing
its implementation. He also introduced an elaborate
number of committees to perform these two functions.
Again, each President has fashioned the NSC staff in
such a manner as to serve his personal ends and style.
Nonetheless, its roles remain relatively unchanged,
policy integration, and, if necessary, formulation;
preparing issues for presidential decision; and
monitoring policy execution.12
The final component of the system is the
interagency committee system. These committees,
which will be discussed in greater detail, are composed
of representatives of the various national security
departments and agencies.
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The NSC System Explored.
Thus, national security policymaking takes place
within this structure, which is hierarchical and crossjurisdictional given the nature of national security
policy, and which cannot be the purview of a single
agency because of the complexity involved. Below
the NSC are three levels of interagency committees
responsible for the formulation and execution of
national security policy.
The most senior of these committees has been
known since the administration of President George
H. W. Bush as the Principals Committee. The
Principals Committee is the senior interagency forum
for the deliberation of national security policy issues.
Its composition may differ in each administration,
but it is comprised of cabinet level officers as well as
other senior White House officials. It invariably has
included the two prominent members of the National
Security Council, the Secretaries of Defense and State,
and the NSA, who chairs the committee. Other senior
officials have included the Secretary of Treasury, the
Chief of Staff to the President, the Director for Central
Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
among others. With the exception of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, all the members of the Principals
Committee are high-ranking political appointees.
The next level down is the Deputies Committee,
which serves as the senior subcabinet interagency
group responsible for examining national security
policy issues. As the title of the committee suggests,
this committee is composed of the deputies to the
principals mentioned above. It is the hinge in the NSC
system. Its functions are twofold: to present policy
issues to the Principals for their consideration, and
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to prescribe and review the work of the next lower
interagency committees.
This lowest significant level, the name for which has
often changed with each administration, sometimes
known as committees and other times as interagency
working groups, is designed to serve as the dayto-day focal points for interagency formulation,
coordination, and implementation of national security
policy. These committees provide the policy analysis
for consideration by the more senior committees and
thus provide the core competencies needed to devise
policy. In essence, this level is where policy analysis
is conducted. These groups are also responsible for
ensuring timely responses to the actions directed by
these senior committees as well as the President. The
committees usually have geographic and functional
responsibilities. The former remain somewhat fixed
over administrations, such as regional committees
(e.g., Europe or Asia), but the functional committees or
groups often differ markedly, and their focus is largely
indicative of the national security priorities of the
President, the NSA, and other senior officials involved
in national security policymaking, particularly the
Secretaries of Defense and State. These committees
or groups are composed of representatives of the
organizations that are represented in the Deputies
Committees, but who chairs them and at what level
is not consistent between administrations. The current
administration has directed through National Security
Presidential Directive 1, “Organization of the National
Security System,” that the Policy Coordination
Committees, the name for this level, be chaired by an
official of under secretary or assistant secretary rank.13
This direction is at a much higher level than ordinarily
is the case and therefore, one could assume that the
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administration is interested in political appointees
controlling the process rather than career bureaucrats.
Nonetheless, the process cannot be insulated entirely
from the various bureaucracies involved for a number
of reasons. The most important one is expertise. These
committees are reliant to some degree or another on
the technical knowledge of the bureaucracies.
Characteristics of the Interagency Process.
As the term ”National Security Council System”
implies, the policymaking process for national
security creates an environment that has a number
of characteristics that can lubricate or impede the
formulation and implementation of policy. First,
as indicated earlier, the process is complex, that is,
several organizations are involved in the process, each
with its own organizational missions and cultures.
In addition to the institutions involved, numerous
participants take part in the meetings of the various
forums as well as personnel who prepare them for the
meetings. Coalitions of individuals form and disband
as the process unfolds. Additionally, the structure has
three or more levels, which underscores the difficulty
inherent in policy formulation, coordination, and
implementation. Further, this complexity transcends
the U.S. Government structure since national security
issues have domestic and international consequences.
Second, although there is a formal structure as
described previously, this process is not immune from
informal organizational dynamics. Some participants
in the process have stated that the pace of activity
associated with the conduct of business differs
dramatically. Unofficial business normally occurs
quickly, while the formal structure of decisionmaking
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moves relatively slowly. This is not a surprising
conclusion since the formal structure was expressly
created to be deliberative. Moreover, the slow pace of
the decisionmaking results from the often competing
interests of the organizations and individuals involved
in the process as well as the lack of familiarity that
participants in the formal structure might have with
one another, which may inhibit interaction as well as
speed. One should not discount another factor, that is,
the conditions under which a decision is occurring. If
the participants are involved in a reappraisal of existing
policy or the development of new policy, then it is
likely that they will be very deliberate in their actions,
searching for bureaucratic “landmines,” particularly
if there are a large number of actors in the process,
and not driven particularly by time constraints. In a
crisis situation, the pace of the process may change
significantly, as the government cannot afford to be
paralyzed by inaction. Thus the conduct of business
occurs rapidly with the direction sometimes being topdown driven, as opposed to the standard process of
bottom-up formulation, and fewer actors actually are
involved in the process since having too many actors
actually hampers decisionmaking. Although in both
cases consensus may be an objective, the constraints of
time drive the process.
A third characteristic of the process is the
fragmentation of power. Power is distributed among
various actors with varying degrees of capability.
Neither individual actors nor any group has the power
to control the outcome with any certainty. Again, not
only does the formal structure provide power to some
of the players, but there is also a network of interactive
subsystems involved that have their own sources
of power. These sources may be based on expertise,
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influence, information or power derived from others,
such as speaking in the name of a powerful player
within the system, or deriving power from external
sources, such as the Congress or interest groups that
hold sway with the administration.
This leads to a fourth attribute: the multiple
influences that impinge upon the process. These
influences are internal and external, and they create a
myriad of dynamics that are often difficulty to detect,
let alone diagnose. The policymaking environment
or events shape perceptions, reactions, and flows of
information that can color debate and ultimately,
decisions.
A fifth feature related to the rationale for the
existence of the NSC system itself is the desire for an
interdisciplinary thrust to policymaking. National
security policymaking requires an integrated set
of specialized knowledge and skills since no one
organization or individual has the technical expertise,
information, resources, or even influence to control the
process.
Sixth, the process is political in the most widely
understood definition of that term. Not only are a
number of political actors, i.e., appointees, involved in
this process, but the process takes place in the political
arena of the executive branch and, as described
previously, is heavily influenced by external political
actors. Further, bureaucrats are political actors with
related, but sometimes independent or contradictory
agendas and objectives.
The process by which decisions are reached is also a
characteristic because of the cross-jurisdictional nature
of the policy area. The process has been described
as consensual and thus is guided by compromise. A
majority may articulate a policy, but opposing views
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are taken into account and are often necessary for
success. Thus, collaboration is essential to the creation
of feasible policy and its implementation. In a crisis
situation particularly, an informal policy consensus
will exist across agencies but even in these times,
teamwork and unity is vulnerable to anxiety about
political risks, bureaucratic equities, and personal
relationships. Nevertheless, it is a rare political animal
who can afford to alienate other participants, and if this
occurs, then the viability of that person in the process
is diminished. Revenge can be a potent variable in the
process.
Seventh, the process involves discretion. Those
charged with execution of the policy are often allowed
broad powers to implement for a number of reasons,
but largely resulting from the often broad direction
given by the President or the senior level committees,
the Principals, or Deputies.
Running the Process: Wisely and Well.
Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft
is attributed with the statement that achieving success
in the national security policymaking process involves
the participants being able to “do it wisely and do it
well.” Doing it wisely suggests that the participants
must be able to make consistently sound decisions on a
variety of issues over time and when often confronted
with uncertainty, time limitations, and questionably
reliable information. Doing it well connotes the ability
to integrate the national instruments of policy—
diplomatic, military, economic, and informational—
or related functions such as humanitarian support in
such a manner as to address the various dimensions
of policy development and execution. It may also
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mean the ability to formulate U.S. national security
policy and win its acceptance by foreign governments,
to include mobilizing the international community
to respond successfully to a policy issue by acting in
harmony with the United States through a coalition of
interest and maintaining a long-term commitment.
The policymaking process has already been
discussed generically, but to it must be added
two other components. These are instruments and
information, alluded to earlier in the chapter. The
former refers to the policy instruments available to
leaders as well as the strategies needed to use these
instruments. The latter refers to information, derived
from the intelligence community or elsewhere, which
will enlighten the policymakers as they deliberate.
This information must be collected and analyzed for
reliability. In crises, these twin notions of wisdom and
competency mean that policymakers must deal with
numerous considerations that result in policy and,
depending on the circumstances, mission success.
Guaranteeing Success.
In a process as complex as this one, success is highly
dependent on effective collaboration and performance
at the interagency working level. The people working
at this level would have, ideally, three important
attributes needed for developing and executing policy
successfully. First, they must be comfortable working in
a conceptual environment. They must be able to share
an understanding of goals and priorities and be able
to expand the aperture of their understanding beyond
their own functional skills. Further, they must have the
capacity to make broad assessment of the situation and
the potential responses. They must be comfortable with
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ambiguity and with gaps in information. They must
be mindful of time and set realistic goals within that
constraint. Additionally, they need to be able to clarify
the values in trade-offs between possible options.
The next attribute relates to the ability to achieve
consensus. They must be malleable enough to agree
to an effective process for examining the issues and
coming to a decision; that is, be willing to debate, but
also be willing to accede. They have to forsake their
organizational identity at times to forge a consensus
approach for action.
Finally, they must be mindful of group dynamics
and have the stamina to contend with a pace that can
be grueling at times, particularly during a crisis. They
must be able to recognize emerging problems and see
the consequences in a number of dimensions: political,
public opinion, etc. They must always be flexible.
These are the ideal attributes the members would
have for successful collaboration and performance. The
reality is substantially different because of a number
of factors ranging from self-interest to organizational
loyalty. Group success contends with individual
success. Sometimes the objectives of both components
are consistent. Sometimes they are not. Further, not all
agencies are created equal. Even if the group members
have the best intentions, they may not be able to
deliver on their promises for a number of reasons.
They may be overruled by their superiors, who have
their own agenda, or the organization of which they
are a member may not have the resources available
to fulfill the agreement. Thus, the person chairing the
group must consider these factors in managing the
process. She must also continually raise her political
antenna and recognize the needs of her superiors in
the superior committees. Their needs are essentially
threefold: cognitive, political, and psychological.
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The cognitive need is for basic knowledge about
the situation, actors, and other dynamics occurring
in the policy formulation environment as well as the
external environment. The political need refers to
the policymaker’s need to understand the political
risks, to minimize those risks, and to be able to
communicate the value of the effort being undertaken
by one’s subordinates. The psychological need refers
to dealing with the uncertainty and complexity of the
process, which rises significantly if a crisis is involved.
Considering those concerns, policymakers want
flexibility above all else and a range of realistic options
that are politically acceptable and minimize the risk of
failure, which is the reason why the conduct of official
business often moves slowly. Against this runs the need
for a rational process that ensures that the options are
feasible and that risk is distributed equitably among
the actors involved in the policymaking process. It
is for this reason that policymakers and those who
support them look for a plan or strategy for integrating
the diverse elements at all levels that are involved in
creating and implementing national security policy.
They are looking for a rational approach that will ensure
a comprehensive assessment of the situation, promote
coordination through established mechanisms, clarify
agency responsibilities and priorities, forge consensus
on the means and ends, identify the essential issues
that require the principals and deputies to decide as
well as unresolved bureaucratic disputes and resource
shortfalls, and promote accountability.
The U.S. Government’s experience in peace
operations in the mid-1990s provided impetus for a
search to attain a rational approach, particularly among
the U.S. military who found the process unwieldy and
cumbersome. The failure of the 1993 Somalia mission,
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and in particular the difficulty involved in coordinating
and executing the 1994 Haiti peacekeeping mission,
were the specific catalysts for this attempt to find
an answer. The prime mover in this process was the
Department of Defense (DoD).
RATIONALIZING THE PROCESS
U.S. peace operations in Somalia and Haiti, while not
crises, were substantial operations. The former created
a political calamity for the Clinton administration when
18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in October
1993. After action reviews indicated that numerous
operational problems in the field might have been
remedied by adequate interagency coordination and
planning in Washington, particularly before November
1993, when a committee was eventually established
to ensure high-level interagency coordination.14
The latter demonstrated the difficulty inherent in
complex contingency operations that include such
elements as security, economic development, and
humanitarian assistance.15 The result of these analyses
was a presidential directive, Presidential Decision
Directive-56, signed by President William J. Clinton
in May 1997, which provided authoritative direction
on how the interagency would coordinate and plan for
complex operations.
In 1999, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
requested that the Institute of National Strategic
Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University
study the implementation of PDD-56, as it was the
military leadership’s view that this directive, which it
had urged be developed as a framework for achieving
interagency coordination and planning, had not been
accepted by a number of agencies. The study produced
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by INSS concluded, based on case studies, that there
was a correlation between the quality of interagency
coordination in Washington and the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts in the field. However, in the 2 years since
the PDD had been issued, it had not been implemented
as intended, and it had not been accepted across the
interagency, including acceptance by senior officials.16
In response, a few initiatives designed to overcome the
problems highlighted in the study were implemented
during the remainder of the Clinton administration’s
tenure but were not successful because support at the
cabinet level did not exist. PDD-56 was essentially
shelved after George W. Bush entered the White House
since some senior administration officials had an
aversion to U.S. participation in the types of operations
that the directive was designed to address.
Rearranging the Pieces.
As the new century began, political scientists, some
of whom had substantial experience in government
as NSC staff members or other related positions, and
some practitioners who had served in senior positions,
offered their views on how to improve the NSC
system to produce better national security policy by
improving interagency coordination.17 Such proposals
were not new. Noted scholars and practitioners have
expressed concerns about governance in the national
security arena for decades.18 The common element that
these proposals have is that they focus largely on the
role of the NSA and the NSC staff. (In one case the
recommendation is to abolish the NSC and replace
it with an executive committee of the cabinet.19) In
short, there has been no dearth of recommended
modifications to the organizational structure of the
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NSC staff or bromides offered about the role that the
NSA should have in the process. In the discussion of
how the NSC system could be made more effective, the
solution is usually seen as an organizational issue. In
making this claim, the scholars often fail to return to
the models of American foreign policy decisionmaking
that have served them well since the 1970s.20 Examining
the models is instructive in that no one model explains
national security policy decisionmaking. In fact, what
the plurality of models highlight is the complexity
involved in the decisionmaking process. Simply
modifying organizational structures or urging the
NSA to act in a particular manner cannot overcome
such complexity.
Public and business administration experts who
study organizational dynamics and behavior suggest
that reorganizing is not a panacea and is often selfdefeating. Scholarly literature abounds with examples.
As David Tucker points out, organizational culture
accounts for some of the difficulty as well as hierarchy,
bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives.21 Add
to that mix personal agendas, and you have a brew
that makes interagency coordination so difficult that
no level of exhortation by a senior level leader or
interagency training and rehearsal can overcome it.
William Newmann has indicated that the
various decisionmaking models are valuable since
they depict competing forces within a presidential
administration, describing different perspectives
that clash unceasingly. Structure and processes, in
part, explain an administration’s decisionmaking
process. All administrations commence with a similar
decisionmaking structure of hierarchically connected
interagency committees working under the NSC.22
Dissatisfaction with this structure and its related
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processes leads presidents to abandon temporarily or
permanently adjust these structures at certain points of
the policy process to achieve policy outputs consistent
with their strategic aims. If that is the case, then further
effort should not be put into enhancing interagency
coordination by reorganizing structure or changing
processes since very little is gained. When there is a
crisis or when the president wants a specific policy
outcome, top-down decisionmaking is in play.
Instead, attention must be paid to another aspect
then, the “alliances, coalitions, disagreements, and
rivalries between organizations, officials, and the
president in general and on any given issue.”23 This
aspect is worthy of additional analysis.
CHOICE, BARGAINING, AND TRANSACTIONS
Understanding alliances, coalitions, and rivalries is
critical to comprehending the nature of policymaking.
The personalities and the personal styles of the persons
involved in the process are important, but so are their
political calculations. Thus, we turn to economic theory,
especially game theory, to attain an appreciation
of how policy is made and how this process serves
presidents.
All decisionmakers have a constant need for
information to optimize their decisionmaking.
As Andrew Rudalevige indicates, where policy is
formulated is important for it has an effect on the
information the president receives.24 There are two
sources of information. The first is the departments
and agencies of the executive branch, which, as noted
previously, have substantial technical expertise and
sizable resources that can be dedicated to information
gathering. The president will also rely on the White
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House staff, the NSC staff in particular. The NSC staff
consists not only of political appointees, who often
are knowledgeable academic and political experts,
but also persons assigned to the White House by the
departments and agencies. These assigned individuals
become presidential loyalists by virtue of where they
operate and to whom they are answerable. As Leslie
Gelb has noted, “I have generally found that staffers
from the Department of State or Defense or the Central
Intelligence Agency behave very differently if they
are moved to the White House. They are far more
conscious of Presidential stakes and interests.”25 This
convergence and the diversity of expertise are valuable
to presidents. It would be inaccurate to assume,
however, that institutions matter more than individuals.
Individuals serve an institution (this is truer for the
bureaucracy than the White House staff since the staff
does not serve the presidency as an institution, but the
president as an individual) and assume the norms and
objectives of that organization, but they still behave as
individuals. This is not to dismiss the importance of
organizations, but it does suggest that if the focus is on
organizing to obtain greater effectiveness, it will not
succeed, because the president cannot control all the
actors in the process. The president can be reasonably
assured that the NSC staff is trustworthy and shares his
goals, but he cannot control them in their entirety, as
the Tower Commission underscores in its report on the
Iran/Contra affair. He certainly is not in control of the
individuals who constitute the bureaucracies. Although
there are organizational cultures and loyalties operative
here, the bureaucracy is not monolithic either. Thus,
the multitude of actors in the process have different
motivations and are making calculations based on cost
and benefits to be derived, such as time, effort, effect
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on reputation, success, advancement, and even the
avoidance of criticism from constituencies, interest
groups, and the Congress. These calculations influence
how they bargain in the interagency policymaking
process. In other words, “individual behavior is
strongly conditioned by that individual’s strategic
interaction with her institutional environment, because
the environment affects the costs and benefits—the
constraints and incentives—associated with a given
course of action.”26 The participants seek to maximize
the benefits or payoffs and minimize the costs of
interacting within the interagency environment in
which national security policy is forged. To counteract
this tendency, presidents and their loyal staff attempt
to centralize power in the NSC staff and make it more
effective, competent, and responsive to the needs of
the chief executive. The NSC staff members are agents
of the president. Their interests are consistent with
the reformers whose proposals seek to reconfigure
the NSC staff because it is the only institution that
a president can realistically control, though they
are optimistic that in doing so, they can control the
bureaucracy. They are also adherents of the belief that
the end of government is to serve the president and his
interests. Thus, the president has two interests in this
process: policy should reflect his preferences; and the
outcome must be successful with the Congress or the
public. Thus, while we talk about a president’s policy,
policy is truly the accretion of individual proposals,
each representing a series of transactions between the
president or his agents and other actors in the policy
formulation process. These transactions that create
a policy occur in different policy environments, or
marketplaces, and consist of different actors (buyers
and sellers). In other words, these environments
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change from policy issue to policy issue, and the costs
of the transactions differ significantly at each event.
The currency of these transactions differs as well. It
may be information or it may be support; information
or support needed to formulate policy that solves a
problem, while remaining politically viable. The policy
is a “good,” a commodity, and comes with a cost.
Bureaucrats instinctively understand how to price
their product to achieve their need no matter how that
need is measured.
Game Theory and the Interagency.
An interagency actor, in many respects, needs to
be an expert in his or her respective field. Yet, he or
she must be able to overcome a series of challenges
ranging from bureaucratic politics to interpersonal
idiosyncrasies. As stated previously, no single model
of approaching the complex interagency world can incorporate all possible situations that an interagency actor faces everyday. However, one particular branch of
social science thought, game theory, might provide a
framework to think about situations similar to those in
the interagency. Although not all inclusive in explaining interagency actions, many aspects of using a game
theoretic approach can provide a wider view towards
understanding problems and eventually improving interagency cooperation. Game theory and ideas about
the use of information can help explain why actors
take particular positions or actions.
Game theory is a field of economics that examines
the interaction between individuals who possess
differing information levels. Information is knowledge
that players use to make decisions and take appropriate
measures whether against another actor or in response

191

to the environment. Game theory can help individuals
evaluate and deal with interagency problems by
explaining actions due to information that a player has
in his or her exclusive possession.27 This information
may come about due to interaction between individuals
or as a result of nature.
In daily situations, players react to other players’
actions and choices that in turn affect how they operate
in a “game.” For example, in the game of chess,
opposing players observe directly the positions and
movements on the playing board. Information, but
not intent, is available openly to the opposing player.
An actor could anticipate permutations of all possible
moves and predict outcomes; however, depending on
the situation, this sophisticated level of analysis may
be difficult to accomplish. If this simple analogy were
representative of all situations, then we could end this
discussion with exploring ways to swiftly calculate
the most likely chess move by using a computer.
However, what if one person plays chess while another
selects the Chinese game similar to chess called “Go”?
Conflicting rules, motivations, playing pieces, and
other dissimilarities would obscure your impression
of your opponent’s objectives.
A more complex problem involves situations
where incomplete or no information is shared among
players. A game of chance, such as poker, provides
an excellent case. In five-card draw, players can keep
some or all of their cards. A player may attain some
information about an opposing hand, but he or she
only has a partial picture of an opponent’s cards. On
the other hand, in seven-card stud, depending on what
version one plays, no cards are revealed. This leaves
players with a heavy burden to decide whether to fold
their cards or continue play. A player can still win the
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game with a hand by bluffing or by manipulating an
opponent’s lack of information about his hand.
The interagency process includes many situations
similar to playing the game of poker. There are “players”
or actors with certain objectives. A player’s resources,
as well as opponent actions and objectives, drive the
options or “strategies” the player will use to achieve
his or her goals. The achievement of these objectives is
defined by “payoffs” or rewards that players receive
after completion of the game. Most importantly, there
is the added aspect of information. The nature of the
game may preclude revelation of any information
during the encounter or only partial information, or
information exposed only after a decision is made.
Many times a player might have insight into some
information because of his or her position, but may
also be duped by false information or players trying to
disavow certain positions on purpose.28 Further, events
in the real world are constantly changing and that
affects the validity or control of information. Actors
within the interagency process deal with many of the
aforementioned situations.
Actors in the interagency process could benefit
greatly with a basic understanding of game theory,
especially those who might be involved in the process.
One may not totally understand the strategies and
payoffs, or attain particular information that can
influence an actor’s behavior, but an understanding
of the particular game conditions can help someone
devise methods to better cope with this situation. These
actors could improve conditions for decisionmaking
that produce more effective and efficient policy.

193

Information: The Basis of Games.
Game theory helps explain many situations where
information possession and usage differ among
actors. An appropriate game theoretic approach that
characterizes the interagency process realistically
concerns actors who do not or cannot share information
among other actors. This would introduce many
opportunities where individuals hold an asymmetric
information advantage over rival actors that vie for
particular policy decisions. Coupled with personalities
and dynamic crisis situations, the mixture of these
conditions can create solutions that are suboptimal at
best and contradictory to national security interest at
worst.
Although game theoretic approaches may seem
common sense, the framework to think through a
problem is the key. Many interagency observers
expect individual actors to process information using
“rational” means that can translate clearly from a
problem statement to a logical solution. That is, trying
to “maximize” a return or “minimize” a cost. If true,
then our interagency process would seem like a
smooth, seamless running machine. Unfortunately, this
is not the case. Approaches to analyzing the reasons
why decisionmakers reach seemingly “irrational”
solutions include cognitive, organizational, traditional,
or historical motivations. Individuals also make
decisions that appear “rational,” given the asymmetry
of information.
An example that an interagency observer can use
to explain conditions involves one aspect of game
theory. An interesting game theory consideration
is the principal-agent approach. This may explain
decisions based on how much information each actor is
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endowed with by an event or through activities that he
or she performs in his or her organization. Individuals
in the national security decisionmaking arena fit into
two categories. In the NSC system, the President or
NSA might be thought of as the principal. A principal
normally has a much broader range of information
than subordinate agents, but that information usually
does not have the depth of the agents’ knowledge.
The principal therefore uses his or her leadership
position that controls the agents by selecting them to
take an action based on some criteria. In the case of
the President or the NSA, these agents are members
of the NSC staff. Other actors, such as bureaucrats
in the departments and agencies, are agents who
also operate under the purview of the principal, but
sometimes only nominally. These agents control finer
grades of information than the principal. In most cases,
these agents hold an informational advantage over the
principal and, in many cases, other agents, such as the
NSC staff.
These considerations allow for a series of possible
confrontations that can affect policy decisions that affect
subsequent operations where the principal directs the
agent to implement a particular decision. For example,
a principal can use agents to develop policy options for
a body, such as the NSC or Principals Committee, to
consider. Suppose an agent has appropriate information
about a national security issue, but if a particular option
is selected, it may reveal inadequacies about that agent’s
organization. The agent could hide the information
since others may not have this knowledge or may not
observe actions that would reflect this resource. Given
that some agents have selective information that others
may not possess, an actor can take actions that are to the
detriment to the nation, or the principal can select the
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wrong agent’s option leading to a suboptimal policy
decision.
Principal-agent models are usually explained in
terms of traditional commercial contracts. The parties
agree to a contract where an agent fulfills certain
conditions for the principal. If the agent has certain
information or knowledge that the principal does not
possess, then the agent could still fulfill the contract’s
requirements; but the principal could have received
better results if he had all the information. An agent
could have improved his or her performance through
better effort or by taking actions that could increase
efficiency or effectiveness. Like commercial contracts,
the NSC system could improve its decisionmaking
efficiency and effectiveness if information were more
symmetrical in its possession among all members.
Principals and agents who are mutually aware of
relevant information can improve national security
decisionmaking. Although a game theoretic approach
does not explain all issues, it does provide insights
into how to think about interagency problems. A first
step in improving this situation is becoming aware of
the possible impact of principal-agent relations. For
example, if the Principals Committee is, in many cases,
the pinnacle of decisions, can one view subordinate
committee levels as agents that also operate under
similar principal-agent conditions? This would affect
how one views and interprets decisions and actions
conducted by lower level committees. Second, the
relationship between principals and agents can create
behavior that is contrary to the desires of a principal.
Third, the President, NSA, and other strategic leaders
could attempt to force their agents to reveal more
information. Some agents might have information
before a decision is made, while at other times they
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gain advantage with information revealed to them
after a decision is made. The interagency process could
implement several initiatives to improve information
revelation.
National Security Decisionmaking as a PrincipalAgent Hierarchy.
One might view the national security decisionmaking apparatus as a series of principals and agents.
This apparatus runs on a hierarchy of authority that
deals with higher-level policy issues at increasing
levels of decisionmaking. The NSC system lends
itself to dependence on subordinate groups. Each
succeeding committee level relies on options, analyses,
and actions from subordinate groups. The agents from
these subordinate groups have specific information
that the superior organization might not have or be
aware that it exists.
Organizations can transition from a principal to
an agent once decisions are made and higher-level
organizations use the subordinate committees. The
problem is compounded because the time required for
a decision may diminish, the policy issue may broaden,
bringing several principal-agent interactions into play,
and the stakes may become higher as decisions move
their way up to the President. Information might
become more compartmentalized, harder to integrate,
and possible options narrowed as policy issues advance.
Intradepartmental organizations frequently involve
informational asymmetries, and those in charge deal
with principal-agent types of problems daily. Getting
the suborganizations to cooperate is difficult due to
“turf” wars that affect budget, missions, egos, and
in some cases differences in professional judgment.
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However, the secretary of a department or agency
head can extend his or her authority to force release
of information or change agents. The problem is more
difficult in interdepartmental dealings.
Interagency committees do not necessarily have
a single source of authority, but may only have an
integrator as their nominal leader or may have an ad hoc
chairperson depending on the situation. Additionally,
the committee may focus on a very broad range of
issues rather than a narrower and commonly agreedupon set of concerns that a department may have. This
condition results in a more complex problem to solve
within the interagency. Access to information is limited
not only within the immediate interagency committee
structure, but if detailed information is required, then it
will need to cross departmental boundaries. It may even
require confronting reluctant subordinate interagency
committees that resist releasing information to provide
it.
The challenge facing interagency committees
becomes how to address the information asymmetries.
Some of these issues are difficult to solve. For
example, restricted intelligence data or analysis
may create conflict over who can receive particular
information. If information is released, then the
question of interpretation and analysis is also relevant.
The question about information becomes more
masked when experts in the application of particular
instruments of national power, such as military or
economic power, hold most or the only expertise in
the interagency group. Unlike the typical principalagent relationship where most of the actors have at
least a common understanding of the basic conditions
that affect a problem, today’s focus on agents with
information that may be mutually exclusive can create
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even more separation among agents. Representatives
from DoD, the State Department, and the Commerce
Department may share basic understanding about the
issue. However, DoD representatives may have an
insurmountable information asymmetry advantage
regarding military power, but may have only a faint
inkling of diplomatic capabilities or limitations facing
the State Department. This characteristic is radically
different from a typical contract where individuals
compete for a production contract. Agents vying
for a contract to build a skyscraper have a broad
common information background because they are all
construction firms and they may have observed their
competitors in action or belong to a common agents’
group, like a local construction industry association.
Nonetheless, the NSC system’s hierarchical
arrangement is consistent with the principal-agent
model. However, harsher divisions among holders
of information, more and complex principal-agent
relations, and other issues create many problems and
behaviors that are different from the private sector
environment and can be detrimental to the selection of
an appropriate solution.
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems.
Information asymmetries create other unhealthy
situations. Two situations that are relevant to the
interagency are moral hazard and adverse selection.
Moral hazard conditions involve agents acting in ways
that are unobservable to the principal. In these cases,
the agent has some information that he or she receives
or that he or she can control to which the principal does
not have access. This control of information influences
choices made by the agent that may be contrary to
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the principal’s best interest. For example, suppose an
agency knows that a policy decision will greatly expand
its mission. That agency could bank on this expansion,
with subsequent budget authority, and start acquiring
systems and increasing personnel to work in areas
that are indirectly related to the approved, expanded
mission areas. Unless this information is uncovered,
the agency could act in ways contrary to the original
intent. Conversely, in an adverse selection situation,
principals cannot discern the viability of the options
that the various agents offer. Adverse selection occurs
when a principal picks the wrong agent. An agency
could present proposals or options that promise more
or less than they can possibly deliver. Unfortunately, if
that agency controls information or expertise that others
cannot use, they could present alternatives that seem
viable and better than more realistic alternatives. The
principal might not be able to compare fairly all of the
relevant options and thus might select a questionable
agent.
Moral hazard conditions often occur in the
interagency. Suppose during a decisionmaking
committee meeting, interagency actors wrestle with
a policy review of ongoing operations in a foreign
country. The lead agency for the policy has the
advantage of controlling a number of resources to
include not only funding, but also personnel in the
country that may affect contact and cooperation
with foreign officials. Could the lead agency, with an
informational advantage regarding conditions of the
foreign nation, and an operational advantage of how
it applies the resources, skew the policy formulation
process? Instead of integrating all elements of national
power, the agency might take actions that either
strengthen its particular view of how to solve the
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problem or create conditions that make other options
less acceptable. The agent could take “hidden actions”
that are not apparent to others because he possesses
“hidden knowledge.” Additionally, agents may become
less concerned about the impact of their actions; agents
can act independently since they can mask information
regarding the action from the principal. Similarly, since
an agent’s ability to assume risk, given its support by
the entire interagency, may be reduced, he or she could
also become emboldened to take more aggressive
action. Suppose in the interagency, agreements are
made to accept an option that uses military, economic,
and diplomatic instruments. Diplomats may take
more uncompromising positions in negotiations
with other parties since military forces support them.
These diplomats, given selected information that is
not available to other agents, may compound the
problem.
In many foreign policy issues, a nation might
request aid (material, technological, and financial) from
the U.S. Government, United Nations (UN), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Agents within
the U.S. Government responsible for administering this
aid might have a vested interest in supporting these
nations since doing so provides an enhanced role and
mission for the agents, greater budget authority, and
status among other players in the region. However,
some foreign aid recipients might not have the ability or
motivation to properly account for foreign aid funds or
rightly use resources. Some foreign leaders might divert
funding from its intended purposes to more nefarious
ones, namely into undisclosed private bank or terrorist
accounts. Similarly, the release of critical technologies
that have dual military and civilian use could be a
boon or dilemma for different agents. Suppose, under
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the Missile Technology Control Regime, that a nation
requests purchase of microprocessors designed for
nano-technology applications, but found to be in use
for ballistic missiles. Representatives from the State
Department might want to encourage the sale to
cement foreign relations with the nation. Likewise, the
Commerce Department might do so to ensure jobs and
business are maintained rather than lost to a foreign
competitor. Conversely, DoD may object for national
security reasons. Depending on the decision to sell or
not to sell the microprocessor, the agent could ignore
reporting behavior for moral hazard reasons. The U.S.
Government agents, if they know about the fraud or
misuse of resources, face a moral hazard decision. If
they report the fraud, then this may threaten future
operations that could diminish their status within the
interagency and the region. Conversely, if they do
not report the problem to the NSC, then the program
may continue unabated unless another party observes
the issue. Moral hazard situations provide perverse
situations for the agents, and major challenges for the
principal to confront.
The interagency process also may shield certain
agents and this in turn creates a problem of adverse
selection. An agent knows his or her ability to accept
certain risks or the shortcomings of his or her abilities.
If the agent does not identify these shortcomings or
the principal cannot identify them, then the principal
could select the wrong option or agent to take action.
If the principal cannot tell who among interagency
participants can adequately accomplish a task, then
the principal might select the wrong agent or delay a
decision.29 An agent might have different payoffs and
motivations from other agents. Unless an agent that
has the requisite abilities to meet the principal’s needs
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is chosen, any solution becomes suspect of turning into
a suboptimal one. Further, agents that propose options
may not have an equal chance of success advocating
their positions. With an agent’s private information
and no apparent mechanism to ascertain claims, the
principal has difficulty determining who is the proper
agent or identifying agents who might put forth
equally weak options. This could drive out agents that
have workable solutions since they do not want to be
associated with an outcome that would either damage
their reputations or end in a poor result.30 Questionable
agents might force out other reputable agents. In this
case of adverse selection, we cannot tell what type of
agent we have to consider. Only the agents know, with
their own private information, and they may not want
to reveal it to the principal.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President
Kennedy and his interagency Executive Committee
(ExCom) decided to blockade the island through a
quarantine to stop the importation of nuclear and
conventional weapons by the Soviets. Since the U.S.
Navy had the only practical means to conduct the
quarantine, it could take potential actions that might
not coincide with ExCom intent. The “details” of the
blockade belonged to the Navy.31 The Navy wanted to
conduct, naturally, a military mission of conducting
a blockade to include stopping vessels. The President
and ExCom members wanted to send a message to
Soviet leadership to negotiate the nuclear threat out
of Cuba through delaying employment of weapons
and allowing diplomatic efforts to prevail. The agent,
the Chief of Naval Operations, did not intentionally
mislead the President, but he took actions that were
not in concert with the President’s intended objectives.
The members of ExCom were not aware of details of
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the agent’s options that could threaten an escalation of
the crisis if the Navy had inadvertently attacked a ship
to stop it from breaking the blockade.
The principal in the case of the interagency has
a slight advantage over a private contract signatory.
Information that is kept private may work while
deliberations are made concerning policy options.
However, during and after a policy option is executed,
information may become more public. During the
course of private contracts, an agent could hide
information effectively from the principal. Suppose
the agent is in the building construction industry. The
agent could use faulty construction materials, poor
quality labor, or improper architecture. Unless the
principal hires an independent building inspector or
gets a warranty, then the principal could suffer from a
moral hazard or adverse selection situation.
The interagency differs from private concerns in
several areas. First, interagency actors normally do
not leave the policy action after a particular position is
selected. In the skyscraper construction scenario, once
a building contractor is selected, competing agents
leave the market. In the interagency, agents often take
part in the execution of the policy option advocated by
a particular agent. Thus, information or observations
about the policy’s effectiveness or efficiency become
more apparent. These agents become part in the
“solution” or continue with the same standing
interagency committee. The principal and the selected
agent have, in some respects, an independent set
of observers or critics to oversee or criticize selected
actions. Second, private contract information may stay
unseen for legal, public relations, or other concerns.
Interagency actions often occur under the glare of
public interest. The media, government oversight
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organizations (e.g., Congress), international allies, and
public advocacy groups can provide outside sources
of information about the policy option outcome and
review. Third, many principal-agent situations analyze
conditions where discrete actions occur. An interagency
policy action may be a portion of a larger consideration
that may put constraints or additional oversight into
the problem.
Despite these influences, interagency problems
involving principal-agent situations are still present.
Moral hazard and adverse selection conditions
are prevalent in several situations such as early
considerations of policy options. Circumstances
arise where initial considerations of policy or highly
classified and compartmentalized actions lead to
situations where once a policy is selected, information
is restricted to a single agent only. These conditions can
create situations where the principle must incorporate
considerations of information asymmetries into the
interagency process. Not all decisions are made public,
and the process of interagency policy formulation
may go unnoticed until a final decision is made. The
public eye is blinded to these activities until problems
surface. Unknown conditions, facing a situation that
the interagency has never seen, the highly segregated
(by expertise and information) nature of government
operations and organization, and other concerns
put contemplation of the moral hazard and adverse
selection process squarely in the interagency arena.
Revealing Information is the Key.
If agents choose to reveal information that they
possess during interagency deliberations or changing
circumstances, the nation’s national security decisions
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would improve. Lack of information or unwarranted
actions due to information asymmetry could create
conditions where first-best solutions are bypassed
for less effective policies. Unfortunately, the day of
full disclosure of all information is difficult for many
reasons. Given the possible problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection, national security decisionmakers
should design methods to encourage the proper
information being released at the appropriate time.
The NSC could redesign how it organizes, rewards,
or selects policy options. The key problem is how to
extract certain information. This process becomes
difficult given the multiple policy options considered,
the ad hoc nature of some interagency groups, and other
challenges. Some of our suggestions deal with how
individuals react to certain actions or situations. These
actions involve moral hazard. Other recommendations
deal with how one might design the game to avoid
adverse selection.
Individuals, in this case representatives of
organizations in the interagency, choose to reveal or
not information for a variety of reasons. Some of their
reasons may be noble, while others less so. Agents
could decide not to release certain information because
they are risk-averse to potential poor outcomes. Riskaversion, the degree of willingness to hazard losing a
position or resource, may affect the selection of certain
information shared among colleagues within the
interagency.
Although difficult to combat, education and added
emphasis on information sharing might help. For
example, the armed services suffered difficulties in
trying to create joint service options and actions for
decades. Frequently, each service tried to advance
its position to the exclusion of others or, when it was
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to its advantage, in combination with others. This
situation was highlighted by problems concerning
the 1980 attempted rescue of hostages in Iran, and
the 1983 combat operations in Grenada.32 Duplicative
and rival systems, programs, and activities created
conditions where agents had motivation not to share
information or cooperate with each other. Roles,
missions, budgets, and institutional survival were at
stake when policy decisions were discussed and made;
much like agents face in the interagency. Poor military
performance in Iran and Grenada and other serious
concerns forced the Congress to pass the GoldwaterNichols Act in 1986 that, arguably, ensured changes
in organization, education, personnel, and operations
to break “stovepipes” among the military services.
This created the impetus to restructure the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and armed services to increase
the sharing of information among organizations.
Although not solving all joint activity issues, the
seemingly impossible task of fusing divergent agents
with differing levels of information was made possible.
Perhaps the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was
due to the limitation of the Act primarily to a single
department, the common realization that the lack of
cooperation and information among services was a
serious matter, increased congressional oversight, or
the nature of military personnel who implemented the
law. However, the relative success of forced “jointness”
is apparent and could be used as an example of
improved interagency action. Hidebound service
bureaucracies changed to improve action between one
another. Individual actions were modified to create
motivation to become more “joint” through forcing
promotions, budgets, and increased control of activities
to comply with the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions.
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In this case, incentives were introduced for agents to
embrace cooperation and information sharing to make
joint actions work.
Adverse selection solutions are more difficult to
combat. Moral hazard situations occur when agents
have varying degrees of information. Principals
confront a different problem in an adverse selection
situation. They deal with agents that have differing
abilities, but do not tell the principal what type of agent
they are relative to others. In this case, some agents
may represent agencies that have a great capability to
conduct actions successfully while others may not, but
want the opportunity to do so. How can one determine
whether we selected the effective agent?
The emphasis of solving the adverse selection
problem revolves around determining if the agent
selected has offered a proper policy option or is capable
of conducting the option. The interagency could use an
independent organization to review the agent’s option
or performance. This process is time consuming, but an
independent review could discover how effective the
agent appears in initial and any subsequent reviews
throughout the process. In the commercial world,
agents offer warranties or promises to guarantee their
work. In the NSC interagency, agent commitment
for cost and performance may be difficult to enforce
due to the dynamic state of nature. The agent does
have to work on a continual basis with the same set
of agents and a principal for subsequent interagency
business. Reputation and an agency’s guarantee can
mean everything when bureaucratic politics rely on
the integrity of the agent. A small pool of agents with
repeated interagency contact where agents know each
other could help a principal put added social pressure
to force revelation of information.
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CONCLUSION
The scope, complexity, and size of national security
decision making have increased exponentially since the
NSC’s formation after World War II and the evolution
of the NSC system. The range of diplomatic, economic,
and military problems in the national security arena has
increased since the Cold War. During the Cold War, the
main focus was on the Soviet Union. Today, we face the
problems of terrorism, drug smuggling, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, trade issues, and
other concerns that demand better integration of the
instruments of national power. These concerns have
also placed more importance on the interagency
process. The actions of the interagency actors have
become key elements of planning and selecting policy
options in the international and domestic arenas.
The NSC’s basic foundation is set in law. Although
administrations can change the emphasis and number
of subordinate committees in this system or rearrange
the structure of the NSC staff, one of the fundamental
problems facing national security decisions is the diverse, sometimes contradictory, positions that competing agencies hold and take to the interagency. Much
confusion about positions and motivations revolves
around the sharing or possession of information among
participants. Without a full accounting for positions,
capabilities, threats, and other issues, a national
security decisionmaker might not arrive at an optimal
solution. Instead, agents in the process can take actions,
like moral hazard concerns, that could reduce policy
effectiveness. Conversely, hiding information could
lead to selecting an inappropriate agent to implement
action.
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A game theoretic approach, especially using the
principal-agent model, is one of many ways to help
expand the discussion of problems in the interagency.
It may not, in itself, explain all of the problems that
can occur. However, it can provide a background
to uncover the motivations, behavior, actions, and
possible impacts on interagency activities. Information
sharing is a vital consideration in dealing with any
multiparty activity. Inherent in the NSC system is the
challenge of trying to not only work through individual
agents, but also through a complex structure that
involves several committees and departments that
are blended into permanent and ad hoc organizations
subject to principal-agent problems. It is for this reason
that organizational restructuring is not the solution to
better development and implementation of national
security policy.
One of the issues facing future national security
decisionmakers involves the complexity and speed
of decisions required in today’s vibrant environment
of information technology. Perhaps this capability
will aid in revelation of the information. Still, the
exposure of information and the interpretation of
that information that results in deeds are reliant on
individuals. Those individuals can ignore repeated
requests for openness or hold deep-rooted desires to
ensure selected information stays private. However,
recognizing these problems is at least a first step to
thinking about the implication of the principal-agent
problem, and potentially designing ways other than
structural change to ameliorate its effects.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION:
THE NORMAL ACCIDENT OR THE ESSENCE
OF INDECISION
William J. Olson
I have come across men of letters who have written history
without taking part in public affairs, and politicians
who have concerned themselves with producing events
without thinking about them.
Alexis de Tocqueville

In April, 1994, two U.S. Air Force F-15s shot down
two U.S. Army U-60 Black Hawk helicopters carrying
a high-level delegation in northern Iraq. The incident
occurred in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq, airspace
wholly dominated by U.S. forces. All of the U.S. panoply
of sophisticated air control technology was deployed
in the area, and there were established procedures
well-understood, long-practiced, and solidly in place
to govern all U.S. and other air movement in the area,
in part to preclude accidental shoot downs.
Both the F-15s and the UH-60s belonged to the
same well-established Combined Task Force that
had operated without incident for over 3 years. This
same organization had successfully commanded
and controlled over 27,000 fixed-wing and 1,400 U.S.
helicopter flights since its inception in 1991. Dozens of
coordinating mechanisms, including weekly meetings,
daily flight schedules, operations orders, intelligence
briefings, and liaison officers provided redundant
layers of cross-checks and communications.1
It was a bright, sunny morning. Nevertheless, at
approximately 10:30 a.m., an Advanced Medium215

Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) from the lead
fighter and an AIM-9 Sidewinder from his wingman
took down the two Army helicopters, killing all 26
souls onboard.
The obvious question is how could such a thing have
happened when everything was designed to keep such
a thing from happening? And next, what lessons can we
learn so we do not do this again? As Scott Snook notes in
the most thoughtful study on the incident, after 2 years
of investigations with every resource made available,
no single cause was identified.2 There was no smoking
gun, no one to blame—though the prejudice in such
circumstances is to seek someone to blame—no bad
guys, no equipment failure, no institutional foul ups,
nothing to fix; no failure of interagency coordination.
Everyone did what they were supposed to do, trained
to do, were experienced at doing. No useful lessons to
learn.3 However, 26 people died.
Snook’s answer as to why is both sophisticated and
intricate and draws significantly on the work of Charles
Perrow on the “normal accident” and on the literature
on organizational behavior. In essence, this argument
holds, that in complex, highly interrelated systems—
or complex organizations with many different, but
intricately interlaced components—accidents are
bound to happen as a natural consequence of the
system—or organization—operating as it is intended
to do. In this sense, “normal” does not mean frequent
but “an inherent property of the system to occasionally
experience this interaction,” that is, a series of
unfortunate events.4 Perrow’s starting point was the
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, where the accident happened because
everyone involved did what they were supposed to do,
which under the conditions was precisely what made
things worse.
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It is rarely the case on those occasions requiring
interagency coordination that everyone did what they
were supposed to do, but the operative assumption in
much of the discussion on the problems confronting
U.S. policy in an age of conflict without borders is that
those problems arise from the lack of something, namely
sufficient coordination by various interagency players
to accomplish a shared, desired outcome. This failure
produces unintended consequences or results opposite
of what is intended, or, at best, increases the cost and
friction of success. What is generally not included in
this analysis is a hard look at the assumption, namely
that the culprit is the lack of coordination for which
there are knowable, reasonable, ready fixes. It is an
approach that also does not take a hard enough look
at the nature of the subject under discussion, the
interagency process, for which a diagnosis is called
for and a prescription provided. It is a case in which
the desire assumes the outcome it wants: The need for
better coordination will produce better coordination
because the problem is the lack of coordination, or
of sufficient coordination, and the solution is better
coordination.
The need for answers on how to address the problem
of coordination is immediate because the issues are of
great pith and moment affecting the fate of nations
and the lives of many. Analysis and prescription of the
dilemma of failure to coordinate go well beyond that
presented by Snook and Perrow, although their views
need to be factored in. The literature abounds with
analysis. It ranges from the sublime to the subliminal.
There is a theoretical framework to suit every taste
and presidential commissions, think tank reports,
congressionally mandated studies, punditry solutions,
and bureaucratic teams swarming with analysis
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and proposals. For each analysis, there is a stable of
proposed solutions or fixes, thus there is no want of
studying the problems and no lack of answers as to
how to make things work better. In addition, there
have been several attempts to reform the government
to improve coordination and a host of departmental
or interagency initiatives to address the recurrent
conundrum.
The single largest reorganization of the national
security architecture since the Constitution came
with the National Security Act of 1947 creating the
Department of Defense (DoD), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council
(NSC). This reorganization preceded the Cold War. It
followed immediately after the United States had just
won the greatest war in human history. Despite the
success, the mood was that more needed to be done to
ensure the integration and coordination of the national
security system. There have been a number of less
major reorganizations, including the DoD GoldwaterNichols reform in 1988. Yet, the question of what to
do to improve interagency coordination is a hardy
perennial. But the interesting question goes begging.
The question is not what we need to know and what to
do with it, what needs changing; but why is it, given
all that we know, that the things we do don’t work.5
What follows is a discussion of the limits of
coordination, what might be termed the “bureaucratic
uncertainty” principle. This is not a theoretical exercise
but one based on a life of experience in both the practice
of interagency coordination and efforts to affect the
process or improve it. The inherent assumption of the
argument is that in the operation of any large, complex
system—especially one as diverse and inherently
rococo as the U.S. Government and the processes it
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employs to make and affect decisions—there are inbuilt limitations on just how far efforts to coordinate
can go. There is a tax levied on any effort to improve
the process that keeps it from achieving the outcome
that logic seems to call for and promise, what might
be called the operation of friction, to borrow from
Clausewitz. This “fog of bureaucracy” means an
inevitable gap between desire and outcome, theory
and practice. This produces a further complication:
There will always be glitches in the system, which,
in turn, will continually persuade people that there
are problems, which there are; and that these can be
known, which is only partially true; and that they
can be fixed, which is an unexamined assumption;
by their particular prescriptions, which often fail to
understand the problem and thus create new problems
while merely shifting the locus of current issues,
meaning a familiar surprise in unexpected ways from
unanticipated directions. As H. L. Mencken quipped:
“For every complex problem, there is a solution: neat,
plausible, and wrong.” If the views that follow are
correct, then they will have no theoretical significance
and no practical utility.
THE NEED IS ACCEPTED
Interagency coordination is a much sought after
objective. Most agency players recognize the need
for and value of practicable coordination with other
agencies and components. While a worthwhile goal
in normal circumstances, complex contingencies
and crisis situations make such coordination an
imperative. What many such contingencies and crises
have demonstrated, however, is that coordination is
a concept often more honored in the breach than in
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practice. This reality has led to a corresponding effort
to seek conceptual approaches that will improve the
possibility of coordination and the development of
institutional practices that will implement better
interagency coordination.
The creation of the whole NSC structure and DoD
following World War II was one of the first major
attempts to improve national-level coordination of
security policy formation and implementation. Waves
of DoD reform since 1947, indeed, the whole emphasis
on “jointness” in recent years, has grown from
recognition of the need for more and better coordination
among the uniformed services. Various national
security directives aimed at interagency coordination
in general point up the continuing awareness of the
need for improvements in interoperability among all
U.S. Government agencies.
The growth of complex environments for U.S.
international engagements—the growth of a host of
multinational, international, and nongovernment
actors—have only made implementing U.S. national
strategic goals more difficult, necessitating even broader
coordination efforts going beyond U.S. agencies. There
is no diminution of the need for coordination, of the
institutional awareness of its importance, or of efforts
to effect it.
At a macro level, the Clinton administration, no
stranger to episodes that created unwelcome situations
in Somalia and Haiti and elsewhere, embarked on a
major reassessment of how the interagency process
worked, or failed to work, and produced a national
security decision document for the President’s signature
that would have codified changes within the national
security architecture designed to address shortcomings
in interagency coordination. It was not signed before
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the Bush administration came in and largely sidelined
the effort, only to face a series of problems of its own,
which have resulted in a relook at the earlier effort and
some steps to implement its findings.
Of course, following the attacks in New York and
Washington in 2001, the 9/11 Commission and House
and Senate investigations on intelligence failures
also produced tremendous reform pressures most of
them designed to address perceived shortcomings
in interagency coordination, whether in intelligence
collection and analysis or in policy formulation and
execution. The creation of the Department of Homeland
Security was also intended in part as a bringing together
of disparate agencies in order to improve coordination
on matters of domestic security and preparedness.
More recently there have been a number of studies
and legislative initiatives to develop reorganization
initiatives that go beyond Goldwater-Nichols to reform
not just DoD but the government more broadly.
At a more micro level, the events of September 11,
2001 (9/11), and now the continuing war in Iraq have
only stepped up the demand for better methodologies
to enhance interagency coordination. In one such
response, the NSC directed the interagency community
to pursue improvements in coordination. The result has
been a number of efforts, particularly the creation of a
new office in the Department of State for Construction
and Stabilization to improve coordination between
State and Defense in future conflicts and in post-conflict
environments.
Separately, DoD also acted on its own. As a result of
NSC direction, DoD instructed combatant commands
to establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
(JIACG) to effect that objective. The various combatant
commands created JIACGs with the intent of
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improving interagency coordination. While all of these
iterations share this common history, the individual
efforts evolved in very different directions, reflecting
local realities and prejudices of the commands or their
leaders. As a result, in this single case involving DoD
and components directly under its authority, thinking
about how to organize these efforts, how to harmonize
them, and how to improve overall interagency
coordination through the use of JIACGs moved off
in different directions at tangents to one another. It
became apparent that the coordination effort needed
to be coordinated. In response, U.S. Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) stepped in to help harmonize the
various efforts and make them more consistent and
then reach beyond DoD to work with the interagency
community.
As part of the effort to improve the functioning of
JIACGs, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
JFCOM signed a memorandum of understanding to
use SOUTHCOM’s JIACG as a prototype for designing
and structuring interagency coordination efforts. What
this rapid but only cursory overview illustrates is that
there is considerable agreement on the need to improve
interagency coordination. Indeed, there has never been
any argument against it, not recently and not since 1947
when the modern adventure began.
LIMITS TO COORDINATION
While recognizing the need for coordination, it is
important to understand that there are some inherent
limits to the ability to coordinate and a number of
recurring, systemic obstacles that make it difficult when
it is not impossible. Coordination is an important goal,
but it is an unnatural act and it is fraught with troubles
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that the act of coordination itself can create or make
worse. In addition, any sufficiently complex system,
especially one based on interactions among diverse
and highly articulated organizations, will be prone to
paradox and dilemma as part of its natural habitat.
DESIGNED TO FAIL
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not want an
efficient government. They wanted a better government
than that provided by the Articles of Confederation, but
they feared for the future of liberty in any too strong
concentration of power. They thus deliberately and
with intent set about to create a divided government,
one in which power was both separate and shared in
order to inhibit coordination. Thus, at the beginning
and at the very core of the U.S. concept of government
are deeply embedded obstacles to coordination that
can only be overcome at a significant constitutional
and therefore political price.6
Over the course of some 220 years of constitutional
government, giving practical meaning to the Designers’
intent, this has meant the adumbration of restraints
and constraints in mysterious and unrecognized ways
that permeate operations and are integral to its success,
as conceived by the Framers. At the outset, then,
preceding any modern drive for efficiency and unity of
effort lies original intent. Its operation in any particular
circumstance is likely to be obscured by long use but
it works in mysterious ways its blunders to perform.
While specific examples are hard to pin down, what
follows is a partial catalogue of some of the obstacles.7
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Bureaucracy 101.
The iron rule of bureaucracy is that to divide
is to disorganize. Modern government relies upon
bureaucratic structures to accomplish important,
complex tasks. Given the diversity of those tasks and
the interests involved, there must be differentiation in
government structures to respond. Thus, underlying
the essence of modern government is the need to
divide and subdivide work in order to do work. The
consequence, however, is to undermine unity of effort
by this device. Once having so sundered the tasks, the
need immediately arises to put things back together
again. But the bureaucratic Humpty Dumpty resists
such efforts.
The modern U.S. Government is a maze of
bureaucratic
structures,
overlapping
agency
responsibilities, redundant assignments, conflicting
authorities, and institutional objectives. These have
grown over time in response, perhaps, to parochial
logic and immediate need but rarely in response to
one another or in a consistent logic that applies across
the breadth of government. This piecemeal evolution
means piecemeal execution and a welter of activities
resistant to logical analysis or coherent coordination.
What was not arrived at by a logical process is likely to
resist logical solutions. Limits on logical analysis and
on human cognition also mean that the complexity will
escape understanding, and thus any solutions will only
be partial. Since many of the formulas for interagency
coordination seek to encompass realms beyond the
U.S. Government, to include foreign governments—
not to mention U.S. state governments—and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the playing
field is even more of a dodecahedron.
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The Coordination Fallacy.
Everyone wants coordination, but no one wants to
be coordinated. Whatever the value of coordination,
which is generally recognized as a good thing, it
means giving up some degree of autonomy to others,
which also generally involves limits on what one can
do unilaterally—that is, coordination can reduce the
efficiency of an individual agency to carry out taskspecific, agency-specific objectives.
There is in geography a noted principle that holds
that near things are closer than far things, which is
one reason why people will shop close to home rather
than going long distances even if some items are less
expensive further away. This applies in bureaucratic
terms as well. One’s agency and its requirements are
closer to where one lives than some distant, esoteric
value such as the putative benefits of coordination.
Coordination also imposes costs, real in terms of
money and manpower, and institutional in terms
of unanticipated demands. Further, coordination
generally engages the “lead agency” concept, which
means having some other agency in charge of, or
having some directive authority over, another agency’s
assets and capabilities. Together, these raise esoteric
“turf” issues as well as more concrete concerns over
conflicting legal authorities, mission capabilities, and
career objectives. These issues remain uncoordinated
or unreconciled even as coordination efforts proceed.
The failure of law enforcement and intelligence
communities to share information across agency
boundaries is a familiar tale; and although some of that
can be explained by legal bars on the flow of information,
which can be addressed, there are institutional habits
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that mean that something will always be withheld. Law
enforcement officers share sources only reluctantly
among themselves much less with outsiders; and the
importance of protecting sources and methods within
the intelligence community means that there are limits
on how far any intelligence organization will go to
share data, especially since coordination requirements
increase the scope of who must be included on a
logic of their own—with foreign governments, for
example—that runs counter to the mandate to protect
sources and methods. There is no hard and fast rule
than can change this reality, although changes can shift
or obscure awareness of its existence.
Coordination Paranoia.
In the minds of many agency players is the
conviction that coordination is a cover for control.
Turf is an inescapable fact of interagency life, and one
of the most persistent elements of that environment
is the belief that one agency’s desire to coordinate is
merely an effort to control another agency’s resources
and agenda. In some circumstances, this means that
“coordination” is an exercise in discovering the hidden
agenda and in constraining what another agency can
do.
In the current environment, for example, constant
DoD calls for more and better coordination begin to
look like demands that other agencies conform to
DoD imperatives and business practices. At the same
time, other agencies’ demands for coordination look to
DoD like efforts to lay claim to deep pockets of money
and manpower. This problem is made no easier by
a significant imbalance in the relative institutional
weight of DoD. In comparison to other agencies, DoD is
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outsized and overstaffed—the 800-pound gorilla. It has
resources that dwarf all other agencies in the national
security mix combined. This leads to disproportionality
in bureaucratic infighting and outcomes. Some of
the constant claims for more and better coordination
are artifacts not of necessity but of DoD imperatives
not shared or recognized by other. Even so, there are
institutional limits on the feasibility of coordination.
Institutional imperatives outlast individuals and
collective efforts to reorganize or reform. Most reforms
do not address how institutions learn and raise up
their inmates to institutional values. They ignore the
incentive structures and the long-term perpetuation
skills that characterize institutions. At some point in
the life of an institution, its goals, its perpetuation,
become more important than the mission, certainly
more important than any transient value that conflicts
with long-term, well-understood institutional selfawareness. Outlasting current enthusiasm is an
institutional art form.
Coordination and Policy.
Coordination cannot make bad policy good. There
seems to be a working assumption that failure is the
result of poor coordination, and that if everyone were
better integrated and efforts more coherent, then bad
things would not happen to good intentions. This is an
often ignored assumption.
A political decision to engage in unwinnable
situations or environments that are not subject to
political solutions currently available cannot be made
viable by interagency coordination or its lack. Poor
coordination, however, is likely to mask the policy
failure, making it difficult to understand where the
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problem lies. Indeed, it is often easier to blame trouble
on coordination failures than to single out policy
failures in politically charged environments. Since it is
inherently hard to separate analysis of policy failure
from political partisanship, especially in the midst of a
controversial situation, there is even less of a tendency
to examine “root causes” which may take their signals
from facts not in evidence.
Coordination Lag Time.
Not every problem can be anticipated. Individual
situations are likely to present unanticipated challenges,
or the New York Times, CNN, or Washington Post are
likely to publish something that excites policymakers,
short-circuiting established procedures. It takes time
to decipher the exact nature of the challenge and
then to figure out what type of response is necessary
and appropriate. Unfortunately, problems occur at
the speed of light, analysis of problems occurs at the
speed of sound, and responses occur at the speed of
bureaucracy.
In addition, different parts of the coordination
environment, embassies, for example, may have a very
different sense of policy urgency and policy reality
than does Washington, or some critical component
thereof. Reporting up and down the chain takes time,
decisions on courses of action take time, bringing
together capabilities to respond, should action be called
for, takes time. Circumstances may not be forgiving of
these needs—all of which are inherent in the need to
coordinate, and more and better coordination is likely
to increase the lag time.
Since the demands such situations levy are
situation-specific, there are real limits to what more
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and better coordination can do to improve things
and, given the timing problem, those very efforts
may make matters worse. Better coordination may
place unwanted constraints on the independence of
action needed by local responders in demanding,
changing circumstances. It is difficult to create robust
coordination mechanisms and maintain flexibility of
action from top to bottom.
There are also different coordination needs at
different levels, and these are not necessarily fungible
or mutually supportive. Needs higher up the food
chain can create problems for on-sight response and
vice versa. Better coordination is not necessarily helpful
in this context.
BACKGROUND NOISE
Coordination occurs in a context that is different
for each agency or involved player. Different
agencies have different missions, decisionmaking
cycles, organizational structures, cultures, habits and
practices, incentive structures, and legal constraints
and imperatives. This institutional environment limits
what agencies can do, but those limits are different
for different agencies and can come into play in
unpredictable ways.
If true for different agencies within a single
government, these environmental issues are even more
significant in multilateral situations, yet more complex
in cases involving international players, and even
more tangled if one adds in nongovernment actors.
The challenge facing the Department of Homeland
Security in working with 50 states and thousands of
local governments across the country is a coordination
opportunity of poignant proportions that illustrates
the labyrinthine nature of the environment.
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Coordination vs. Harmony.
While harmonization of interagency efforts is a goal,
it can never be more than partially successful. If this
were not so, it would not be necessary to have distinct
agencies with differentiated goals and objectives, it
would not be necessary to coordinate.
Coordination Cannot Print Money.
If coordination cannot make up for bad policy,
it also cannot make up for limited resources or legal
authority to accomplish assigned tasks adequately. It
also cannot make up for the fact that various parties
necessarily involved in accomplishing goals that
require coordination come with different resource
capabilities and constraints that cannot be changed in
a timely way.
The Congress is the only branch of government
authorized to appropriate funds. Its processes and the
considerations that move them are inherently different
from those in the executive branch. The timing for
approving money works on a schedule that is only
partly amenable to interagency coordination or even
to the demands of a crisis. No demands for more and
better coordination can escape this wild card factor.
Coordination Asymmetry.
Coordination is not pursued for its own sake but
for some other desired goal. Since agencies have
different missions and organizational imperatives,
those goals do not necessarily align between and
among very different agencies, and desired outcomes
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may be similarly mismatched. For example, there are
many activities law enforcement agencies may become
involved with in a particular combatant command’s
area of responsibility (AOR) that require little, if any,
coordination with DoD, but the reverse is not true.
Indeed, while most agencies in a given AOR may have
a whole range of unilateral mission possibilities, there
is virtually no mission possibility for a combatant
command that does not require coordination with
others. Thus, the relative imperatives for coordination
can vary dramatically over time and in specific
situations.
Routine vs. Complex Coordination.
Coordination in routine circumstances does
not necessarily support coordination in complex
contingency or crisis situations and vice versa. The
same agencies may be involved, but the agency
players may be very different at levels above routine
engagement. Crisis also tends to foreshorten many of
the normal processes that take time to effect in routine
environments.8
The combatant commands all are charged
with developing complex contingency plans for
emergencies. The need for these plans is a routine
requirement that has produced large and complex
staffs and complicated procedures devoted solely to
their formulation and maintenance. Yet, the operative
assumption is that no plan survives contact with the
event planned for. Nor do most other agencies that
DoD must coordinate with have similar plans or habits
for dealing with contingencies. Their habit or business
practice is more ad hoc, if not more flexible. There are,
thus, significant differences in operational styles that
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produce real differences in response. These exist well
before the imperative of coordination arrives on the
scene.
Coordination Doesn’t.
Not everything that needs coordination in theory
can be coordinated in practice. In some cases, this may
be the result of irreconcilable differences in goals, as
between partner nations, or between the executive
branch and Congress. In such circumstances, options
or efforts may have to be foregone or radically limited
because the players cannot agree on a course of action.
In some cases, it may be a function of too little time
available to reconcile major differences between
players who face a common problem—the problem
moves faster than decisionmaking or coordination
capabilities.
In almost every effort to improve interagency
coordination the “mission-creep” moment arrives.
That is the point at which realization comes that
coordination, to work, is an ever expanding circle.
It must extend to include all relevant players. In the
current environment, the play list is increasingly large
and diverse. Thus, more and more must be brought
within the ambit of coordination. Doing so, however,
increases the friction working against success.
Lessons Learned Seldom Are.
Lessons are more often identified than learned and
incorporated for the future. There are two inherent
problems involved in lessons learned exercises. The first
problem is an artifact of the analytical process. Afteraction reporting aimed at deriving lessons learned
begins with the assumption that there are problems
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that can be identified and from which lessons can be
learned. Given the systemic realities cited above, this
is an assumption that is rarely disappointed.
Whether the lessons learned process can, however,
dissociate inherent limitations from correctable
shortcomings is problematic, and in itself is one of the
inherent limitations. It is also difficult for any lessons
learned effort to distinguish situationally unique
shortcomings, that is, failures in one endeavor that are
not necessarily transferable to other situations. In other
words, some situations may have nothing to teach.
The second problem with learning lessons is that it is
generally poorly understood how institutions learn
lessons. We know how to teach and train individuals,
but it is far harder to make the same lessons understood
by the organizations that rely on such individuals.
Unfortunately, people move on and the lessons and
training move with them. Thus, lessons are not always
incorporated as part of the institutional repertoire.
The When of Coordination.
If different agencies have different cultures and
missions, they also proceed to deal with problems
in very different ways. They think about problems
differently, and they plan for situations differently.
Some have very ad hoc methodologies, some have
very complex and articulated systems. This history of
thinking and planning, the different ways that they
are done, accompany any effort in which a particular
agency is subsequently called upon to coordinate with
another. When, then, should coordination take place?
At what phase of interagency life should the virtue of
coordination be realized? At the thinking stage? At the
planning stage?
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In the past, coordination considerations have tended
to occur not at the thinking and planning stages unique
to individual organizations, but in circumstances when
actions among agencies must actually be carried out. For
example, there is very little interagency involvement
in DoD decisions on force structure, doctrine, training,
equipment, or manpower needs. There is very little
contribution from the interagency community in
DoD’s planning for complex contingencies, at least
not in the sense that coordination often demands.
The reverse is generally the case. The Department of
Justice, for example, pays little heed to other agencies
imperatives or needs when it comes to training or the
cases it pursues.
This means that individuals charged with
coordinating activities in particular situations, at
higher policy levels, must deal with a range of decisions
affecting their ability to coordinate that were made by
other people, in other circumstances removed from
the immediate situation and responding to a very
different set of priorities, incentives, and requirements.
To expect agencies—not to mention international and
nongovernment players—to coordinate much earlier
in the cycle of dealing with complex contingencies
or crises raises considerably the stakes involved in
coordination and makes it more difficult to accomplish,
to make relevant to particular situations, or to sustain
meaningfully over time. Coordination does not age
well. It is labor intensive and time consuming; absent
immediate peril it tends to senesce.
The Where of Coordination.
Coordination must happen at different levels, but
coordination at those various levels is not fungible.
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Coordination at one level does not necessarily translate
to other levels. The combatant commands, for example,
already engage in a host of coordination activities
up and down the chain of command. Most of these
happen daily and are fairly robust. They are, however,
appropriate to the time and place that they occur and
may be of no use in complex contingencies or crises,
which may call up coordination needs that supersede
the routine ones or call into play individuals much
higher up in the respective organizations, who had
little need to know one another before the demands of
the crisis.
In many cases, action officers coordinate routinely,
whereas it is at general officer, ambassadorial, and
assistant secretary levels that policy coordination takes
place. These later players quite often have not worked
together closely before an event requires it. These
players may have no familiarity with the lower-level
coordination or see it as unhelpful in the situation at
hand. In addition, agencies—their subcomponents—
do not necessarily align and, while interagency
connectivity may exist, it may not be lashed up at the
appropriate points in ways that work, especially in
nonroutine environments that put sudden stresses on
relationships.
Agencies, for example, often have compatibility
problems in their communications capabilities. That
fact alone represents the result of a history of different
acquisition strategies and situational needs that existed
before a crisis required coordination. This type of
compatibility problem is not limited to communications
gear but replicates up and down the chain in complex
organizations that have institutional lives and needs
that pre-exist the requirement for coordination beyond
its boundaries.
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THE PARADOX OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
If coordination is an unnatural act, one that
circumstances may require but conditions make
difficult to achieve, then what is the incentive to
coordinate at all? In most cases, the imperative to
coordinate generally arises when routine efforts to deal
with complex situations fail or prove insufficient. It is
crisis or complex contingency situations that expose
the limits of individual agency efforts and force an
awareness of the need for collective action.
The worst time, however, to develop the necessary
coordination efforts and mechanisms is in the middle
of a crisis when circumstances are not very forgiving
of business as usual. But if it is crisis that provides
the incentive, then it is hard to get the players to play
together when that very incentive is lacking. The
solution would appear to be routinizing coordination
for crisis. And various mechanisms for exactly this
purpose exist, the NSC system being the best overt
example. The dilemma is that routinization tends to
rob the process of the kind of incentive that endures
the mere routine. Over time, routine robs the effort
of its sense of urgency, and normal practice reasserts
itself.
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
The literature abounds with explanations of how and
why governments do dumb things, take decisions that
upon reflection were clearly wrong and wrongheaded.
It is common in the analysis of information-processing
procedures of governments to find the following key
concepts:
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• Cognitive consistency: People tend to relate
unfamiliar events or facts to what they already
know, thus ignoring key inconsistencies that are
critical to understanding the problem at hand
and solutions that might work.
• Evoked set: People tend to look for the familiar,
the known, and overlook the new and different,
thus tending to make decisions that are familiar
but not necessarily situationally astute.
• Mirror image: People tend to see the bad in
others and the good in themselves, assuming
the worst in intentions in others and the best of
motives in their own efforts.
• Group think: People in groups tend to fall in
line with the common outlook or emerging
consensus,
overlooking
contradictory
information or approaches that go against the
grain.
• Satisficing: People often stop with “good
enough” solutions, going for what is at hand
or is familiar and not examining possibilities in
more depth.
Taken together, these concepts explain why people in
groups often decide to do things that individually they
know to be dumb. Various prescriptions for how to
avoid these minefields abound. Yet, the problem is that
for every cliché, there is an equal and opposite cliché;
that each of these negative realities is matched by a set
of positive ones:
• Cognitive consistency: Learning advances by
relating the unknown to the known, by seeing
linkages and connectivity that produce deeper
insights.
• Evoked set: Every situation is not unique; if it
were, theory would be impossible.
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• Mirror image: Moral judgment, determining
right and wrong, is essential to justifying policy,
and this often requires seeing bad actors for
what they are.
• Group think: No decision is possible without
consensus; indeed, interagency coordination is
predicated on the notion of arriving at a common
approach. Thus, at some point, everyone must
fall in line.
• Satisficing: The better is the enemy of the good;
at some point, discussion must stop and a
decision be reached.
There is no formulaic solution to resolve this
dissonance. It is inherent to institutions and the people
within them. It will come into play to inform bad decisions and good ones depending upon circumstances
and personalities. No improvements in the mechanism
for coordination will obviate the operation of these
factors. It may increase their role, making failure a
distinct possibility for reasons not attributable to a lack
of coordination. Coordination, after all, dramatically
expands the circle for group think, which is the goal.
BUREAUCRATIC OUTLIERS
The interagency process is, by its nature, an
essentially bureaucratic exercise. For all its good
intentions, the interagency process lives in a world in
which two of the most critical components of its life
exist outside its control, and to which it must respond
despite whatever logic may suggest itself. These
are the Presidency and Congress, and through them
the constitutional realities and public concerns that
pervade the U.S. political system.
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No matter the logic of interagency coordination,
individual presidents, acting out of their own sense
of priority and purpose, will take decisions or pursue
courses of action contrary to the best bureaucratic
advice or need. There is a story told about President
Eisenhower that at a press conference he took a line
that ran counter to what his administration had hitherto
been maintaining. Two correspondents covering the
conference wondered what it meant. One of them
concluded that the only explanation the government
would be able to offer was that, “The President does
not speak for the administration.” Whatever else
may happen, while presidents may insist upon better
coordination, they will remain outside the process and
exert an influence upon it, willy nilly. But forces within
administrations also exist to resist presidents.
One political wag once observed that the “cabinet
are the president’s natural enemies,” meaning that, even
though he appoints them and can fire them, they will,
nevertheless, come to represent issues in ways that are
likely to clash and ultimately to frustrate presidents,
if not directly thwart them. Cabinet members, to a
certain degree, also exist outside formal coordination
mechanisms and can make decisions, based on their own
understandings, that run counter to other imperatives.
Thus, at the very heart of the coordination process lie
forces independent of it that may operate against it. If
this is true within administrations, it is even more the
case when it comes to Congress.
The role of Congress in the interagency process is
infinitely complex and mostly misunderstood. It exists
at virtually every level, and at many of those it works
contrary to the possibility of interagency coordination.
Formally this comes into play in the authorizing and
appropriating roles of Congress in which 535 members
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and the public they represent exert authority over the
executive branch in all its myriad parts. The fate of
the president’s budget in recent Congresses, generally
and generously described as “dead upon arrival,” is
indicative of a larger fact: that the president proposes
and Congress disposes. Although actual results follow
from a rich Kabuki dance of give and take, pressure and
wooing, the budget as it finally emerges is not a logical
product but a practical one, arrived at by compromise
and barter. But the process does not stop here.
The long history of interrelationships between
Congress and various executive branch agencies means
a host of informal contacts and associations that defy
easy description or analysis but that influence outcomes
nevertheless. One of the underlying assumptions
of many calls for interagency coordination is that
coordination claims are policy neutral and politically
uncontroversial. This is rarely the case. All such
claims threaten existing interests and long-established
relationships for which protective mechanisms exist.
Individual components within agencies can use
congressional contacts to frustrate the policies of their
agencies and sometimes even of presidents. Executive
Branch agencies have learned to play Congress and
the administration off against one another much as
children learn to play their parents. When money and
careers are on the line, higher purpose is likely to come
in a distant third.
These are the normal circumstances. Everything
compounds when there are significant policy
differences between Congress and the president. When
these exist, then a heavy tax is levied against the ability
of the government to function, much less function
efficiently. On key issues of national security, it is
rare that Congress can override a strong, determined
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president, but it can significantly increase the cost
of doing business and warp any efforts to produce
coordinated results. There is no way to predict how
this will play out in particular circumstances, but it is a
wild card that will always come into play.
The interplay of these various inherent features
of the coordination environment makes actual coordination a bigger challenge that it appears at a glance. It
helps to look at these general points in a more specific
context.
THINKING ABOUT JOINT INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION
The need for interagency or intergovernmental
coordination is not new. Awareness of that need and
efforts to effect better coordination are not new. The
landscape is populated with studies to this effect,
with laws and executive orders directing it, a variety
of institutional arrangements seeking it, and a growth
industry in analyzing it. Failures to achieve it are
biblical in their proportions. No one is opposed to
interagency coordination—in principle. Everyone
wants it—in principle. It’s a fine idea whose time has
come—in principle.
So why don’t we have it? Why do we continue to
seek it? Why is effecting it so elusive and difficult? As
noted earlier, part of the problem lies in the fact that
not everything can be fixed, not everything can be
coordinated, and that, while many things are fine in
principle, they are a problem in practice for the agencies
and people who must make silk out of the sow’s ear.
Part of the problem also lies in the fact that the
fine ideas and sentiments upon which coordination
are founded often do not get at basic questions, as in,
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“What’s in it for me?” What is the incentive for coordination for the individuals involved and their agencies?
In many cases, the incentives, in fact, are negatives one.
There are a lot of reasons not to coordinate, or at least
not to do so beyond a certain point.
Incentives.
To repeat the lesson from geography, near things
are closer than far things. Institutional rewards and
incentives, values and sentiments are near things.
Coordination is a distant virtue, fine in principle but
risky in practice. Coordination, in some situations,
means compromise. Not just both parties giving up
some of what they want separately so that they can
accomplish a common purpose, but one party having
to surrender an important institutional value for an
immediate but temporary gain whose value is not
recognized by the institution. Compromise under these
circumstances is not likely to be rewarded. There are not
many agencies that have a career track for individuals
who make a practice of compromising away the
agency’s core values. Punishment will continue until
morale improves and reason is restored.
Real coordination—that called for by nonroutine
situations—tends to take place under the pressure of
circumstance, of overwhelming need in the face of
demanding situations. Real coordination is almost
always ad hoc. Thinking about coordination tends to
take place in the shade, in a more relaxed atmosphere.
It has the time to reflect, but it also lacks the sort of
imperatives that make real coordination necessary
and thus powerful enough to overcome the natural
inertia inherent to bureaucratic engagement requiring
nonroutine coordination. It is almost always post hoc,
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if not propter hoc. The effort surrounding the JIACG
concept is a case in point.
Although directed by the NSC Deputies Committee
as an idea consonant with the needs arising from
9/11, the current evolution of the JIACG concept has
a longer heritage, in part linked to the coordination
problems and efforts to find solutions for them raised
in a number of U.S. international involvements since
Somalia. The current situation in Afghanistan and
now Iraq add piquancy to the search for coordination,
having surfaced their own versions of the perennial
problem. The present JIACG effort is now a three-track
process rapidly becoming four. These tracks are not
necessarily complementary.
The first track is the directive to create a JIACG with
a counter terror focus at the combatant commands. The
second is the standing up of JIACGs at the commands
with very different structures and goals. The third track,
following behind and playing catch-up, is the effort to
analyze interagency coordination needs through the
JIACG prism. The fourth is the effort to harmonize
the various different iterations of the JIACGs and
relate this analysis to practice, with the interagency
community in general and with the specific iterations
of JIACGs at combatant commands as they evolved in
response to the initial directive, in particular to meet
broad interagency as well as international coordination
goals.
Common to all four tracks is the notion that there is
a need for interagency coordination that is not currently
being met; and the corollary to this that there is some
sort of institutional solution; that is, there is some type
of organizational structure that can be put in place to
meet the need. The first track contemplated no specific
solution. The second has a number of specific responses
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unique to local thinking. The third is alive with ideas,
not all of which are pulling in the same direction. There
is a considerable lack of coordination in the efforts to
coordinate. The fourth, the effort to connect ideas to
practice, is in parts unknown. As noted above in the
discussion on disconnects, it is unclear whether there is
any crosswalk between theory and practice, at least in
the short term. There is simply no imperative to settle
coordination problems in the abstract. Also common
to all the current efforts is that the project is almost
wholly a DoD conceived and driven exercise with little
or no interagency input or stake.
There is, thus, considerable diversity in the
JIACG’s background and make-up but little in it that
offers real-world incentives to individuals or their
institutions beyond the generally shared sentiment
that coordination is a good thing.
Now vs. Not Now.
Most of the thinking concerning JIACGs, as a
functioning body, envisions what the organization
would do and what it should look like based on
findings about shortfalls in interagency coordination
in complex contingencies, crises, or similar situations.
The validation, limited though it is at this point, of the
JIACG concept is based on exercises in responses to
complex contingencies or crisis. Most of the effort to
establish a real-world organization, however, occurs
in a routine environment without a crisis imprimatur,
and that same effort contemplates the JIACG existing
day to day in just such a routine environment.
What this approach does not do is to make clear
just what a JIACG would do, can do, must do day
to day. In the resource-constrained environment
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of most combatant commands and interagency
players—not to mention international organizations
and nongovernment players—it is unclear what
value added a JIACG brings to daily operations that
is sufficient to justify its claim on limited resources,
especially since most of the routine coordination
needs are already being met. If they are not being met,
it is unclear where the shortfalls are in this routine
environment or how those shortfalls adversely affect
the command or interagency players to a degree that
makes heroic solutions advisable and acceptable.
This presents implementing the JIACG concept with
the rainy day syndrome: if it’s raining, you can’t fix the
roof; if it isn’t raining, you don’t need to fix the roof. The
need for a JIACG is most recognized in crises situations
when you don’t want to have coordination problems,
but it’s too late to avoid them; but implementing the
concept in noncrisis environments lacks the imperative
needed to make it possible. It is not clear at this point
that the JIACG concept has the horsepower to prove its
value added on its own.
There is also a serious disconnect between the
JIACG as it has evolved in practice at the combatant
commands and the JIACG concept as it has evolved
through discussions, white papers, meetings, and
exercises. The gap is growing. and bridging the gap is
becoming more problematic.
Marketing.
If you are going to sell refrigerators to Eskimos,
you’d better have one hell of an icemaker. At the
moment, the only link between JIACGs as directed and
established and JFCOM concepts of how they should
be formed, staffed, and employed is the money and
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the resources that JFCOM can put on the table. This is
table stakes money, however. It gets you in the game,
it does not keep you there. People and institutions—
the combatant commands and other agency players—
value interagency coordination but they like the JIACG
because it comes with “freebees.” The two things,
interagency coordination and JIACG, are not, therefore,
synonymous. It is not clear that the current concept can
be sold long term or is sustainable in practice.
The evolution of the JIACG concept highlights
some of the recurring realities of various efforts to
reform or improve the interagency process: There is at
this point no common definition of what interagency
coordination is. No common understanding of what
the goal of interagency coordination is. For example, is
the goal of the JIACG:
• to manage various interagency players and
their activities in order to achieve military
objectives?
• to orchestrate interagency activities to achieve
national objectives regardless of individual
agency objectives?
• to facilitate other agencies in realizing their
objectives?
• all of the above?
How these questions are answered influences
perspective on and perception of the effort.
It is also unclear at what level of engagement the
JIACG is meant to coordinate. Some see it as operating
at the strategic level. Some see it at the interface between
operations and strategy. Some see it at the operational
level. Coordination requirements run from top to
bottom. They are different at these different levels in
scale, importance, immediacy, and intensity. Is the
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JIACG meant to address and resolve problems at all
these levels?
While the tendency has been to graft the JIACG in
at the combatant command level, there is a parallel
tendency to create the impression that this single
institution will be able to address coordination issues
at multiple levels across a broad range of issues, in
routine matters and in crisis, from counterterrorism to
disaster relief, not only within the U.S. Government but
with various international players and NGOs, a fairly
large, not to say boundless task. This is a tall order, and
while appealing, the current concept does not have a
clear enough marketing strategy to sell the idea. Or, if
it can sell the idea, the production department cannot
meet the orders. The customer may be sold on the idea
of a refrigerator, but he wants to own a refrigerator,
not the concept of one. He also wants service after the
sale. It is not clear that the JIACG concept or its reality
can deliver.
If these problems trouble a solution in this small
set, efforts to reorganize or reform on a governmentwide or international scale face daunting problems. In
contemplating the needs of interagency coordination,
however, the gap between reality and desire is rarely
examined nor taken into consideration.
THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS
Somewhere near the beginning of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle’s handbook on the ethical life prepared
for his son, he makes the argument that, “We must be
content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such
premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline,
and in speaking about things which are only for the
most part true and with premises of the same kind to
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reach conclusions that are no better.” In human terms,
we must accept things that are for the most part true,
not absolutely so. The above discussion limns some
of the critical elements in why expectations, the hare,
sprint past outcomes, the turtle, in our tale. The limits
of coordination almost never receive attention and, if
they do, are quickly forgotten to get at the real business
of reform and reorganization. The argument, however,
is not meant to suggest that reform and reorganization
are never possible or are never accomplished on a
sound principle and have no hope of useful results.
Indeed, even though the reforms in 1947 never matched
the hopes for them, they achieved a great deal, as did
the Goldwater-Nichols reform.
The situation is too serious to despair. Despite all
the obstacles to interagency coordination in general and
to its evolution in individual agencies or at individual
combatant commands, the simple fact remains that
interagency coordination is everyone’s fate regardless
of their personal or their institutional feelings. While
coordination can never be perfect, it can be better or
worse.
It does work, although never as expected or wanted.
It works for several reasons.
The Olson Effect.
As much as I would like to lay claim to the idea,
the Olson in question is Mancur Olson, who argued,
contrary to received wisdom on minority rights and
majority control, that in public life or in the life of
organizations, small groups organize before big ones
and that it is the actions of these “minority” groups
that cause change or effect outcomes.9 As a general
rule, coordination works best when key individuals
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desire it and work to make it happen on a small scale
within discrete operations, for limited purposes, over
defined time frames, with clear lines of authority. Unity
of effort is simply not possible on a grand scale, but it is
achievable on more intimate terms.
The Hayek Effect.
Frederick Hayek, the 1974 Nobel Prize winner for
economics, argued for the concept of spontaneous
order, namely that in many human activities order can
emerge spontaneously as a result of human actions but
not as a result of human design.10 In large, complex
interactions, such as the marketplace, there are forces
of order that will emerge even though the overall
environment cannot be controlled. In more prosaic
terms, this is the story of the Little Engine that Could. In
large part, interagency coordination, while resistant to
grand designs and commissariat control, often occurs
because the people within organizations are dedicated
to outcomes that produce coordination, sometimes
against all odds. Again, this generally occurs on a small
scale where unity of effort is within reach.
The Pasteur Effect.
Louis Pasteur once observed that “chance favors
the prepared mind,” that is, luck may play a role in
outcomes but being prepared to take advantage of
what fate and fortune—and hard work—offer is more
likely if one is prepared to see advantage and use it.
In the marketplace of interagency coordination, better
outcomes are likely if people within the system are
empowered to act in ways that produce coordination.
The common factor in all of the above elements is
people; individuals, and the choices that they make.
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The issue is how best to prepare them for success and
to make choices that produce the best possibilities.
Incentive Structure.
One of the secrets of the success of GoldwaterNichols in forcing a reluctant bureaucracy against its
will and over its objections to move towards “jointness”
was the effort it devoted to changing the system of
rewards within the agency, in this case DoD. By the
simple act of making jointness a criterion for promotion
within the separate service branches, individuals
within the system began making choices, a la Hayek,
the combined effect of which was to produce more
jointness. Large scale reforms and reorganizations,
while never perfect, if well-conceived and aimed at the
right critical nodes can produce an approximation of
the goal. It is success on the margins, but that is where
profit lies.
The goal, therefore, is not to create the perfect
solution but a workable one, one that can be sold to
someone likely to buy. The buyers are out there. No one
who has ever experienced the problems arising from
dealing with complex contingencies or crises is immune
to wanting to see better coordination. The question
is how to channel that experience and desire into an
effort that can meet expectations without engaging
institutional sensitivities, to identify the incentives that
can operate over time to make coordination better, if
not perfect.
There are no magic solutions, but such solutions
as there are do not lie in piecemeal reorganizations
or bureaucratic reforms. Following World War II, the
United States engaged in a wholesale reorganization of
its national security apparatus to better cope with the
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emerging political realities. Ultimately, this process
rested upon a lengthy and difficult assessment of
America’s responsibilities in a new world order, one of
the principal features of which was a far more activist
and engaged United States. Even so, it took close to 40
years of working on the interagency process to tweak it
into a working model, with Goldwater-Nichols being
the capstone of the process in DoD that brought home
in one package changes on the margins that fulfilled
many of the promises for coordination.
Unfortunately, the United States did not engage in
any such in-depth reassessment, at least not a coherent
one, following the end of the Cold War. Instead, the
United States relied on institutional arrangements
and habits that had proved remarkably successful in
meeting the then challenges. What circumstances have
since revealed, however, is that these arrangements
do not necessarily posture us to respond to the
current environment. Lacking a consensus-building
reassessment, the response has been piecemeal reforms
and partial reorganizations. What is needed now is a
new National Security Reorganization Act, similar to
the 1947 effort, that contemplates a thorough-going
restructuring of how the United States responds to the
new world order in which the United States is the most
prominent player. It is likely that the cumulative result
will only be changes on the margins, never resolving
the bureaucratic uncertainty principle.
Even with such an effort, inherent constraints on
interagency coordination will keep the logically desired
outcome from becoming reality. What is logically
possible is not always practically possible and almost
never bureaucratically possible. Logic, to be logical,
must be coherent, consistent, and self-confirming. The
process of engaging interagency players and interests is
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none of these, nor can it be made so. A certain humility
is called for and greater patience.
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CHAPTER 6
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND STRATEGIC INTEGRATION:
HOW REINFORCING STATE AS AN
INSTITUTION WILL IMPROVE AMERICA’S
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD IN THE
21st CENTURY
Louis J. Nigro, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006
responds to a 21st century international environment
very different from previous eras. The main threats to
U.S. security will no longer come from other successful
and powerful competitor states, but from unsuccessful
failed and failing states whose very lack of power
permits them to be exploited by nonstate actors. One
implication is that it will require far better strategic
integration of all the elements of America’s national
power to ensure its security. The diplomatic, economic,
legal, informational, and psychological elements of
national power must be blended with military not only
to counter transnational threats but also to redress the
weakness of failing states.1
In order for diplomacy to play an effective role
in such integrated efforts, the United States will
need a more robust diplomatic establishment. This
means primarily more human resources. As the lead
diplomatic instrument, the Department of State needs
substantial redundancy in its work force, especially
those assigned overseas in embassies, consulates, and
other missions, in order to better educate and train the
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work force; in order to staff interagency mechanisms
to integrate U.S. Government efforts in planning and
preparing reconstruction and stabilization operations;
to provide a “surge capacity” to staff reconstruction and
stabilization operations when necessary; and to staff
the new American Presence Posts outside of capitals
as well as regional posts—two of the key elements of
Transformational Diplomacy.2
The international environment portrayed in the NSS
will require not only qualitatively different but also
quantitatively greater diplomatic resources to ensure
the achievement of foreign policy and security goals.
The NSS identifies a new menace in failed and failing
states; this does not mean that relations with stable
states can be ignored or deemphasized. Indeed, the
commitment to multilateralism implies that we need
to ensure that we have the diplomatic means to build
and maintain partnerships and coalitions with other
successful states to resolve problems associated with
unsuccessful ones. Enhanced multilateralism implies
that significant new diplomatic resources be added
to the totality of resources to implement foreign and
national security policy.3
Secretary of State Colin Powell foresaw the need to
reinforce the institution in its role as the indispensable
first step in adding to the diplomatic resources available
in the 21st century. The program of institutional
reform and reinforcement—the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative (DRI)—that Powell conceived and carried
out as Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005 achieved
substantial success in key areas: personnel resources,
information technology, diplomatic facilities, and
diplomatic security. This program should be continued,
amplified, and extended into the future to ensure that
the institution continues to be able to respond to threats
and challenges that will surely grow more complex.4
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Secretary Powell also foresaw the need for a new
mechanism to integrate the elements of national
power to conduct stability and reconstruction after
combat operations, which suddenly became essential
responsibilities in the aftermath of operations in Iraq.
In 2004, he created the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) to coordinate all
U.S. Government efforts in the areas of reconstruction
and stability in the aftermath of military operations.
Powell’s successor, Condoleezza Rice, foresaw that
continued reform and reinforcement of the diplomatic
institution would be necessary. In January 2006, Rice
announced the Transitional Diplomacy Initiative,
which aimed at “transformation of old diplomatic
institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes,” and
shaping the Department’s ability to respond to its
changed responsibilities in the new international
environment.5
This chapter provides an overview of the State
Department’s institutional capabilities, in terms of its
human resources, operational platforms, and budget. It
then describes the Powell and Rice initiatives to reinforce
and reform the Department of State—Powell’s DRI
and S/CRS and Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy. It
argues that the efficacy and success of all three depends
on the willingness to provide the resources necessary
to enable State to play an appropriately greater role in
engaging and shaping the world in accordance with
U.S. national interests.
A better resourced State Department should not
come at the expense of the budgets of other agencies.
Those budgets—including the Department of Defense’s
(DoD) much larger budget—should be determined
according to objective criteria, not in terms of
competition for scarce dollars. The budgets of all civilian
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agencies involved in America’s engagement with the
world in the 21st century—State, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps,
Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, Homeland Security
(DHS), and others—should be increased to meet the
growing importance of international engagement.6
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: CAPABILITIES
AND RESOURCES
A review of the resources that the Department of
State has to discharge its responsibilities is revealing,
because it shows the relatively limited investment that
America makes in the lead agency for engagement
with the world, especially in comparison with the
investments made in other agencies, like DoD, DHS,
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).7
People.
The State Department is staffed by employees
who fall into three personnel systems: foreign service
officers (FSOs) and foreign service specialists (FSSs)
who are committed to overseas service and worldwide
availability but who also serve in Washington, DC;
civil service employees who serve in Washington
and other locations in the United States; and locally
engaged staff (formerly known as Foreign Service
National employees) who are non-Americans hired
locally overseas to serve in our embassies, consulates,
and other missions.
There are about 11,250 Foreign Service personnel.
About half of these, some 6,400, are FSOs, while the rest
are FSSs. FSOs hold commissions from Congress and
are professionally specialized in the fields of consular
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affairs, economic affairs, political affairs, management,
and public diplomacy. FSSs provide important
technical, support, and administrative services in
seven major categories: Administration, Construction
Engineering, Information Technology, International
Information and English Language Programs, Medical
and Health, Office Management, and Security.
There are about 8,100 civil service personnel who,
like Foreign Service personnel, contribute to the mission
of supporting the foreign policy of the United States.
They do this in many areas of specialized professional
expertise: security, information management, office
management, administration, logistics, engineering,
legal affairs, budget and financial management,
accounting, and foreign affairs and international
policy and operations. State’s total American personnel
strength has not changed much since 1950. To put
State’s human resources in perspective, there are about
8,500 colonels and lieutenant colonels in the active U.S.
Army alone, and a total of 11,488 among Army and
Air Force colonels, as well as Navy captains. All active
duty military officers number about 200,000. Two
researchers estimate that “there are more musicians
playing in the military services’ bands than there are
Foreign Service Officers at State.”8
The Foreign Service is overwhelmingly “forwarddeployed.” About two-thirds of all FSOs and FSSs are
serving abroad at any given time. Two-thirds of the
posts in which they serve are classified as “hardship
posts” because of the difficulties of life and work in
those countries. Half of all FSOs and FSSs serving
overseas are in hardship posts.
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Defense.
The United States maintains formal diplomatic
relations with approximately 190 nations and
maintains embassies in 165 of their capitals. (The
United States does not maintain formal diplomatic
relations with Bhutan, Cuba, Iran, North Korea,
and Taiwan.) The United States has consulates in 63
cities and 16 other offices and missions, including
the United Nations in New York, the Organization
of American States in Washington, DC, international
organizations in Vienna, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in Brussels, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris,
the United Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, the United Nations
Office and other international organizations in Geneva,
and the European Union in Brussels.9
The State Department works with other agencies in
diplomacy, both at home and abroad. With very few
exceptions, U.S. diplomatic missions are interagency
organizations, with some 45 U.S. Government agencies
represented abroad, including USAID, DoD, DHS, the
departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, Energy,
Treasury, Veterans Affairs, and Health and Human
Services. The Peace Corps, Drug Enforcement Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Environmental
Protection Agency, Federal Aviation Administration,
and Internal Revenue Service have representatives in
some diplomatic missions. In most missions, American
State Department personnel are outnumbered by
interagency colleagues. In fact, State employees make
up just over one-third of the staff at U.S. Government
posts worldwide. The number of U.S. diplomatic
missions overseas (embassies and consulates) has
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changed from 322 (58 embassies, 264 consular posts) in
1940, to 265 (99 embassies, 166 consular posts) in 1960, to
243 (163 embassies, 80 consular and other posts) today.
Thus by virtue of working in an embassy country team,
FSOs are experienced interagency players, and so are
their colleagues from other departments.
Budget.
The FY2007 International Affairs Budget request
for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign
affairs agencies totaled $35.1 billion. Of that, $23.7
billion was for foreign operations, that is, foreign
aid and international assistance. That left about $10
billion for State Department operations, to include all
of State’s operating expenses, security, construction
and maintenance of embassies; contributions to
international organizations and peacekeeping; and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors and other programs.
That $10 billion represented .00115 percent of the total
Federal budget request of $870.7 billion. Under the 2007
budget request, resources devoted to the International
Affairs budget would fall from $35.7 billion to $35.1
billion. While the resources devoted to the foreign
operations portion (foreign aid and international
assistance) would grow from $23.4 billion to $23.7
billion, State’s operational budget fell from $10.7 billion
to $10.1 billion.10
Secretary Powell’s Reform and Revitalization
Program.
Colin Powell revitalized the State Department. He
came to State in 2001 at a critical moment in the history
of the oldest executive department. State seemed to
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have arrived at a nadir as an institution; its human
resources were declining in numbers and demoralized.
In 2000, more than 1,600 State employees signed a letter
that called the Department “a rusted-out diplomatic
hulk that [was] no longer seaworthy,” and pleaded
for “a long-term, bipartisan effort to modernize and
strengthen the Department of State.” A number of
compelling studies had analyzed the Department’s
decline and prescribed remedies, all of which included
an increase in resources. These included studies by the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, the Stimson Center,
McKinsey and Company, and the U.S. Commission on
National Security in the 21st Century (aka the HartRudman Commission). Powell took action on a reform
and revitalization program that had four main targets:
Human Resources, Information Technology, Overseas
Facilities, and Security.11
The precondition for Powell’s ability to implement
his reform and revitalization program was increased
budgetary resources. Powell’s reasoned appeals to
Congress and reorientation of State’s responsiveness
to congressional concerns and sensibilities resulted in
very substantial increase in funding. State’s operating
budget went from $6.6 billion in 2001 to $9.1 billion in
2004. These increases were to be “permanent parts of
the budget, not one-time catch-up costs.”12
Powell’s first priority was human resources,
the Department’s people. During the Clinton
administration, budget cuts at the Department produced
a staffing decline that severely limited effectiveness.
From 1994 to 1997, “State hired only enough people to
replace half the number of employees lost to retirement,
resignation, or death.” By 2001, State had a deficit of
400 mid-level FSOs, 300 mid-level FSSs, and more than
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600 Civil Service employees.13 In 2007 the department
needed 1,000 new hires (generalists and specialists) to
make the Foreign Service whole, allowing a meaningful
training flow and staffing vacant positions.
Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative was
aimed at increasing State’s personnel numbers over 3
years to “reestablish the State Department’s diplomatic
readiness by raising overall staff levels to full strength,
recruiting specialists with critical language and
technical skills, and improving personnel training.”
Adding staff would create a certain “personnel float”
in the work force that could be exploited to better
prepare State’s people through additional professional
training, provide a surge capacity to direct to key
issues or crises, and furnish more candidates for tours
of duty in other U.S. Government agencies to make
State a more effective partner in interagency efforts.14
The DRI was successful in terms of quantitative
improvement. Under the DRI, State’s aggressive
recruiting and retention efforts were rewarded by
the addition of 2,000 employees over and above
attrition from 2001 to 2004. Persons taking the Foreign
Service written examination went from 8,000 in 2000
to 20,000 in 2004. Recruiting was plussed up by webbased technology, a team of recruiters, diplomats in
residence at 15 colleges and universities, and new
hiring mechanisms. Minority recruitment went up
from 13 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2003.
As the quantitative side of the DRI removed
State’s staffing deficit, the qualitative side enhanced
professional training opportunities substantially: The
Department provided 40 percent more training in 2004
than in 2001. Leadership and management training
was made mandatory for mid-level Foreign Service
and civil service employees, and leadership training

263

opportunities for junior and senior employees were
expanded, reflecting Powell’s intention to instill a
culture of leadership throughout the Department’s
work force. Enrollment in foreign language training
increased by over 50 percent from 2001 to 2004. Arabic
language training grew by two-thirds.
Powell’s reform program also ensured that the
State work force was better equipped to carry out the
mission. The key area in this regard was Information
Technology (IT). State’s computer networks were
described as “close to system failure” and as being
“the worst in the U.S. Government.” A typical country
office in Washington had one or two computers with
Internet access for use by eight to ten desk officers and
office management specialists. In few embassies and
consulates did all employees have Internet access on
their desktops. Messages between Washington and
missions overseas were transmitted much as they
had been decades before. Powell’s program changed
all that. By mid-2003 State had deployed worldwide
a modernized unclassified IT system with Internet
access to 43,500 desk tops and a modernized classified
computing capability at 224 posts overseas. Both
systems will be updated on a 4-year cycle to maintain
their effectiveness. IT security was strengthened, and
530 specialists were hired while controlling attrition.15
Overseas facilities was the third priority target of
the Powell program. The 1998 terrorist bombings of
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led to closer scrutiny
of State’s security profile at overseas missions. Review
boards discovered that some 88 percent of embassies
did not meet minimum security standards. Observers
recorded that many missions were woefully incapable
of providing an adequate environment for living and
working to advance U.S. interests in foreign countries.
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Powell’s program, buttressed by a permanent line item
in the budget for embassy construction, maintenance,
and security, accelerated greatly the construction of
safe, secure, and functional embassies. In 2001, only
one new embassy was completed per year. In the
period 2001-04, 13 embassy building projects were
completed, 26 more were under construction, and 12
more in the planning stage, thanks to a Long Range
Overseas Building Plan that utilized flexible but
standard embassy designs, integrated design reviews,
and rigorous reconciliation of project scope and budget.
By mid-2004, some 99.8 percent of the 1,269 physical
security projects identified in 2002 were completed.16
Security was the fourth priority target of the Powell
reform program. Besides the achievements in physical
security of facilities, the Powell program reinforced
security in an array of State’s activities. In terms of the
institution, the DRI hired more diplomatic security
officers and contracted security-clearance operations
to the private sector, freeing up diplomatic security
officers and specialists for more specialized duties.17
SECRETARY POWELL’S RECONSTRUCTION
AND STABILIZATION INITIATIVE
In the wake of the lessons learned in the
reconstruction phase of military operations in Iraq,
Powell created in August 2004 the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/
CRS) to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S.
Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare
for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil
strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace,
democracy, and a market economy.”18 Since then, S/
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CRS developed into an interagency office adapted to
coordinate and harmonize U.S. Government efforts
in a world in which reconstruction and stabilization
operations (RSO) had become increasingly frequent.
Between 1990 and 2003, the United States conducted
seven major post-conflict RSOs—Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—and
contributed significant resources and capabilities to
many more, including Cambodia, Mozambique, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Colombia, and East Timor. The expectation is that the
United States will need to become more proficient in
conducting and contributing to RSOs in the future as
failed and failing states breed transnational threats.
S/CRS has developed operational models for
managing civilian deployments to aid in conflict
prevention and response. These could be integrated
either with the U.S. military or with international
peacekeeping missions. The Country Reconstruction
and Stabilization Group in Washington is an interagency senior-level group that would provide guidance
to the field and recommendations to policymakers
as courses of action regarding potential RSOs are
being considered. As the planning for post-conflict
operations develops, a Humanitarian Reconstruction
and Stabilization Team Group, which is a civilian
interagency group, would be embedded into the
combatant command as early as possible to work on
integrated planning as the military is called upon to
develop crisis action plans. Finally, Advance Civilian
Teams (ACT), teams of civilian experts drawn from
throughout the U.S. Government, would be deployed
to the field, either with or without the military. The
ACT, in different configurations and sizes, could be
deployed as far down the chain as the brigade level,
depending on the security situation on the ground.19
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S/CRS is an interagency office, staffed by employees
from many agencies of the U.S. Government. As for
State, in order to be effective in RSO operations, it will
have to draw on State Department human resources
in a surge mode. That means that State employees will
have to be educated and trained for RSO, including
being assigned to S/CRS for tours of duty. State will
need to be adequately resourced for RSOs before the
need arises for deployment. This means that State
will need to have at the ready resources and a cadre
of people with specialized skills who can respond
rapidly. Current employees trained in RSO would form
the Department’s Active Response Corps available for
future operations.
The Department has already begun training its first
Active Response Corps teams. As diplomats trained in
RSO retire or move to other employment, they could
form a Reserve Response Corps on “standby” status
that the Department could draw on as needs arise.
State’s surge capacity would be part of a larger surge
capacity, not only throughout the federal government
but also in state and local government and civil society
to tap into vast experience and skills. The Department
would need resources in being to conduct RSOs and its
current budget request includes funding for a Conflict
Response Fund to provide flexibility for rapid response
to crises, to jump-start programs, and to meet unforeseen gaps. State is creating a Global Skills Network and
operational database to track existing contracts and
programs for reconstruction and stabilization so that
the skills can be identified and augmented effectively.
The Department, moreover, has developed courses on
conflict transformation that are taught at the Foreign
Service Institute.20
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Unfortunately, S/CRS risks becoming a very good
idea that was not provided with adequate resources
to ensure its success. The administration has requested
only one-third of the funding that it needs—just $75
million of the $225 million necessary for its original
design to be implemented. Senator Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and a strong supporter of S/CRS, expressed in public
his frustration that the administration has not pursued
this with the appropriators in Congress. This could be
changing. As former Director General of the Foreign
Service, W. Robert Pearson said in a valedictory
interview, Transformational Diplomacy “is a new
departure because the Secretary [Rice] has highlighted
its critical importance with a major initiative and has
worked hard to create a plan to this end, including
finding the resources to move ahead.”21
Three events in November and December 2005
signaled the commitment of the United States to
reconstruction and stabilization operations as a key tool
of American foreign policy. On December 7, President
Bush issued a Presidential Directive giving the
Department of State the responsibility “to coordinate
and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involving
all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant
capabilities, to prepare, plan, and conduct stabilization
and reconstruction operations.” On November 28,
DoD issued Directive 3000.05, to establish DOD policy
governing U.S. military participation in reconstruction
and stability operations, stating that
stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that
the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct
and support. They shall be given priority comparable
to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and
integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine,
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organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel,
leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

On December 20, the United Nations announced
the establishment of a new body, the Peacebuilding
Commission, to marshal resources and develop
integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and
recovery, as well as to focus attention on post-conflict
reconstruction and institution-building efforts and to
improve coordination of effort within and outside the
United Nations regarding post conflict recovery. The
United States had strongly advocated the creation of
the Commission.22
SECRETARY RICE’S TRANSFORMATIONAL
DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced
her Transformational Diplomacy initiative in January
2006, stating that in the 21st century the United
States confronted a new and different international
environment. Therefore, “the greatest threats now
emerge more within states than between them” and
“the fundamental character of regimes now matters
more than the international distribution of power.” The
implications of this for foreign and security policy are
enormous and demand a greatly enhanced strategic
integration to engage the world. “In this world, it is
impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security
interests, our development efforts and our democratic
ideals,” Rice said. “American diplomacy must integrate
and advance all of these goals together.”23
Secretary Rice defined the objective of
Transformational Diplomacy as “working with our
many partners around the globe to build and sustain
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democratic, well-governed states that will respond
to the will of their people and conduct themselves
responsibly in the international system.” She called
for the “transformation of old diplomatic institutions
to serve new diplomatic purposes.” Rice asserted that
the United States had successfully pursued similar
initiatives in the past and cited America’s diplomatic
responses both to the onset of the Cold War and to
its end. Moreover, Rice praised her predecessor’s
“leadership of the men and women of American
diplomacy into the 21st century” by investing, not only
in modern technology and facilities, but by “investing
in our people” and creating and filling 2,000 new
positions in the Department.24
Transformational Diplomacy has five pillars: Global
Repositioning; enhancing regional focus; localization;
developing new skills; and working jointly with other
federal agencies. “Global Repositioning” will steadily
shift diplomatic personnel resources away from Europe
and Washington to other regions of the world, “the
new front lines of diplomacy.” Initially, 100 positions
were moved to Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the
Middle East. “Enhancing Regional Focus” will respond
to regional and transnational challenges by more
effectively “forward deploying” diplomats to regional
centers, such as for public diplomacy and infrastructure
management. “Localization” will move diplomats
out of capitals and into smaller posts, including onediplomat American Presence Posts in important
noncapital cities. “Meeting New Challenges with New
Skills” will seek to give diplomatic personnel more and
better professional education and training, enhance
multiregional expertise, require service in challenging
postings, and prepare diplomats “not only to analyze
policies and shape outcomes, but also to run programs.”
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“Empowering Diplomats to Work Jointly with Other
Federal Agencies” will prepare diplomats to work “at
the critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic
reconstruction, and military operations” especially
in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization; as Political Advisors (POLADs) to
military commands and other DOD offices; and in the
State-DOD Officer Exchange Program.25
Some of the elements of Transformational
Diplomacy, while useful and necessary, are not new.
Take “Global Repositioning,” for example. The State
Department shifted resources in a concerted way to
newly independent states after the breakup of the Soviet
Union, and State’s Strategic Planning Process regularly
realigns resources with responsibilities to achieve
objectives from region to region, within regions, and
from post to post according to a 5-year planning cycle.
Other elements are associated with traditional goals of
diplomacy: “Localization” and “Regional Focus,” for
instance, are the right things to do, but will founder
if enough new positions are not created to permit
implementing these pillars without reducing resources
in other areas. Similarly, “empowering” diplomats with
new skills and endowing them with more interagency
experience makes perfect sense, but will be extremely
difficult to achieve without allocating major additional
resources to the Department.26
The real problem with Transitional Diplomacy is
that it is not funded. If Transitional Diplomacy is to
make a major contribution to improving America’s
ability to respond successfully in foreign and national
security policy, it must have adequate resources. The
question of resources is as central to the success of
Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy Initiative
as it is to the prosperity of Secretary Powell’s earlier
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initiatives. The United States should have a diplomatic
establishment that is as adequately resourced to play
an effective role in America’s engagement with the
world as the U.S. military is adequately resourced to
play its role in that engagement. Transformational
Diplomacy’s “global repositioning” of diplomatic
personnel should imply the expansion of the human
resource base, so diplomatic resources devoted to
allies and friends in Europe, for instance, should not
be diminished to provide new resources for other
regions of the world. The “forward deployment” and
“localization” of diplomatic human resources should
not be accomplished by reducing diplomatic presence
in Washington and capitals. Providing diplomats and
other foreign affairs professionals more and better
professional education and training should not come
at the expense of current staffing. Finally, and most
clearly, empowering diplomats to work jointly with
other federal agencies will require more of them to
engage effectively with bigger and better-resourced
agencies like DoD and DHS.
The U.S. Government should not make the mistake
it made in the period after the breakup of the Soviet
Union. In the early 1990s, the Department of State
opened 22 new diplomatic missions in the newly
independent states formed out of former Soviet lands
and in the Balkans. These new missions required the
staffing of more than 215 positions. To meet these
needs, the Department of State was forced to move
positions and staff from other preexisting missions and
to reduce language and other training. This is the wrong
prescription for managing America’s engagement with
the world in the 21st century.27
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CONCLUSIONS
Secretary Powell’s DRI and S/CRS initiatives and
Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy initiative
were appropriate responses to correct assessments of
how the Department as an institution can best fulfill
its responsibilities in guiding America’s engagement
with the world in the 21st century. But the question
of resources will make or break the implementation
of all three initiatives. All three depend heavily on
maintaining the right amount of redundancy in
human resources and to a lesser extent on nonhuman
resources, like the funding for S/CRS’s Conflict
Response Fund and funding to expand both the Foreign
Service Institute’s specialized training for RSOs and
reinforcing its traditional training programs language
and other skills. It is therefore of serious concern that
the 2007 budget looks to be the end of the 5-year period
of growth in State’s funding.28
The Department of State’s human resources should
be reinforced in both quantity and quality. Some
measures that should be taken are:
• Expand the American direct-hire human
resource base by another 400 to 500 to permit the
Department to (a) increase staffing at emerging
priority nations without understaffing missions
to long-time allies and trading partners, (b)
create a “training float” to permit expanded
language and professional development, and (c)
maintain a “surge capacity” to respond to future
reconstruction and stabilization contingencies.
• Enable State to reemploy retired employees on
contracts.
• Extend careers of employees whose skills are
adapted to the key areas of strategic integration,
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such as the POLAD program, the State-DOD
Officer Exchange program, and S/CRS, all of
which should expand.
• Explore the possibility of “extreme flexibility
recruiting,” to find human resources for specific
future situations, including potential major
contingency operations.
• Expand opportunities for State employees
to take advantage of senior level education,
especially in interagency settings.
• Establish a senior-level educational institution
at State to educate State employees side by side
with employees of other agencies.
State needs greater workforce redundancy to recruit, educate, and train a work force that will accomplish the goals of Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy
initiative and that will be able to staff the Reconstruction and Stabilization coordination mechanism that
Powell created to coordinate U.S. Governmentwide efforts at reconstruction and stabilization.
Transformational Diplomacy’s goal of focusing more
resources on regions of concern and rising regional
powers should not have to come at the cost of reducing
resources to regions of stability and peace, because our
partners in promoting stability and peace in the former
category reside in the latter locations. Transformational
Diplomacy’s goal of focusing more closely on what is
happening inside countries than at what is happening
between countries appears to imply more and better
educated and equipped diplomats, not fewer who
are less well-prepared for understanding different
cultures. Recruiting and equipping more diplomatic
personnel with professional skills needed for effective
diplomacy in the 21st century is a sensible and relatively
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inexpensive investment. Like all investing, starting
earlier is always better than starting later.
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CHAPTER 7
INTEGRATING NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY
AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
THE ROLE OF STATE DEPARTMENT POLITICAL
ADVISORS
John D. Finney
and
Alphonse F. La Porta
Introduction: Back to the Future?
The commitment to “Transformational Diplomacy”
of the Department of State is a policy innovation
reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
issued in February 20061 and the National Security
Strategy (NSS) issued a month later.2 Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice vested the Department’s reputation,
organization, and policy priorities to shift personnel
from lower priority functions and countries to those in
which there are acute political-military challenges and
public diplomacy needs; and to promote democratic
ideals and the Bush administration’s democratization
objectives.3
Transformational Diplomacy in the politicalmilitary context—whether defined as the union of
traditional State Department diplomatic objectives with
national defense and security interests or as “working
the seam” between the traditional diplomatic and
military spheres—is further enshrined in the initiative
of Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs John
Hillen’s effort to enlarge the political advisor (POLAD)
function. Hillen projects a model for integration of
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political-military advice at military headquarters from
the combatant command (COCOM) level down to
operational units. He would also deploy experienced
career Foreign Service Officers as POLADs to joint
task forces and other task groups when they occur,
whether for peacekeeping, peacemaking or disaster
mitigation. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq are priority assignment
opportunities for Foreign Service Officers at the lowest
operational level.4
This evolution of the Political Advisor function has
echoes of the past, particularly in the Civil Operations
and Revolutionary (later Rural) Development and
Support (CORDS) program in the Vietnam conflict.5 It
also signals a major redeployment of effort to difficult
geographic regions and along the conflict continuum
(pre-combat, combat and post-combat). POLADS can
contribute in important operational ways to the conduct
of military operations, including deliberative planning,
crisis management, the development and oversight of
combat rules of engagement, and military operations at
each level of organization from low intensity warfare
to major combat. This operational role constitutes the
special “added value” of Foreign Service Officers,
including those of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and other disciplines.
Applying diplomatic experience to the interface
between military operations and the political aspects
of national security is instinctive and evolutionary. It
draws on the strengths of both integrative politicalmilitary and purely military responsibilities in wartime
and peacetime. But the success, or lack thereof, of
integrated diplomatic and military functions is highly
situational, personality-driven and skills-dependent.
Preparation for involvement in military planning and
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operations does not occur naturally in the Foreign
Service culture and the experience of most diplomats.
Individual experiential differences also apply to the
Department of State as a whole; as argued by journalist
Robert D. Kaplan, “for a worldwide fight against
terrorism to be effective, the State Department must
become not only as bureaucratically dynamic as the
American military, but also as fully integrated with it
down to the small unit level.”6
This article explores the POLAD function as it has
developed largely since World War II, the role of the
POLAD in an increasingly integrated national security
system, the increased role for civilian diplomats and
specialists in military operations, and the promise that
transfiguration and reinvigoration of this function can
hold for the future. To some, the greater involvement
of the Foreign Service as individuals and institutionally
represents a “premium” for the execution of United
States national security policy in terms of interagency
effectiveness.7
The Murphy Inception.
History provides widely mixed lessons regarding
relationships between diplomats and force commanders, revealing that true examples of the “diplomatwarrior” are few indeed. During the first foreign and
defense crisis of the new republic, the First Barbary
War of 1801-05, President James Madison appointed
James L. Cathcart as peace commissioner to Tripoli.
Following his expulsion by the ruling pasha, Cathcart
accompanied the U.S. Navy’s punitive squadron. The
four subsequent diplomats assigned to Mediterranean
naval squadrons had mixed success, but later Nicholas
Trist became the best known diplomatic agent for
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his exploits in Mexico with General Winfield Scott.
Ignoring Washington, Trist negotiated the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo that ceded California and New
Mexico to the United States.
Robert Murphy is credited with being the first
modern POLAD to a senior U.S. military commander.
His role with allied commander General Dwight D.
Eisenhower in French North Africa in 1942-43 and his
subsequent service in war-ravaged Europe maximized
Murphy’s personal experience as a diplomatic
practitioner, utilizing his formidable foreign language
ability, intercultural skills, and area knowledge.
Empowered personally by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Murphy bypassed the State Department
in fulfilling his mandate to provide “civil” diplomatic
advice to a combatant commander. As detailed in
Diplomat Among Warriors,8 he became the quintessential
diplomat-warrior in providing expertise relating to
military operations negotiations (for example, with
the Vichy government) that the commanders did not
possess. Later translated to the post-war situation as
advisor to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany,
Murphy provided local knowledge and language
acumen that could not be matched by the military.
The lessons drawn from Murphy’s service in World
War II were that “ground truth” took many forms,
including language fluency and political, diplomatic,
and economic knowledge. It was also clear that Murphy
earned the “trust and confidence” of Eisenhower and
his other uniformed superiors—a trait that remains
central to POLAD effectiveness.9
Beginning in the early 1950s, diplomatic advisors
gradually began to be assigned to major military
commands and expeditionary operations to provide
the unique skills typified by Murphy. Some of these

284

assignments were formal tours of duty, while others
were temporary “details” to the maturing defense
bureaucracy and occasionally to military commands.
There was recognition on the Washington policy level,
however, that the diplomatic and military interface
was an essential component of national security policy
implementation. Generally speaking, political advisors
to military commanders have been effective when
their roles and mandates have been clearly articulated,
and, most importantly, when diplomatic envoys and
commanders have been temperamentally able to coexist.10
In more contemporary examples, in 1964 President
Lyndon B. Johnson appointed General Maxwell D.
Taylor as U.S. Ambassador in Saigon. He was given
a role in command and control of the military effort.
Nevertheless, he and his successors, Ambassadors
Henry Cabot Lodge and Ellsworth Bunker, deferred to
General William Westmoreland as the resident military
commander on military matters. Because Bunker, in
particular, “saw his role strictly in diplomatic terms,
he tended to support, rather than direct the efforts of
the military commander.”11
Similar institutional lines were apparent in the 1989
Panama intervention when there was close engagement
of the State Department’s special representative
and later Ambassador Deane Hinton with Generals
Frederick Woerner and Maxwell Thurman. Less
conspicuous examples were Japan and Korea where,
despite the assignment of POLADs, General Douglas
MacArthur wielded supreme power; and in Laos (196573) where successive envoys, notably Ambassador
William Sullivan, energetically opposed military plans
and operations.12
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The sense of history in Foreign Service experience
is often lacking, as “lessons learned” often are not
conveyed or consciously translated into State’s
corporate knowledge. One exception was Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003-04 where a deliberate effort
was made by the Association of Diplomatic Studies
and Training to conduct oral history interviews of U.S.
civilian personnel returning from short tours of duty
in Baghdad.13 Of importance in the diplomatic-military
interface is the distinction between Foreign Service
Officers integrated into military commands, i.e., those
serving as advisors to or working in the headquarters of
a U.S. commander, and chiefs of mission (ambassadors)
who are in the civilian chain of command of the
Secretary of State in Washington. The latter often have
broader policy interests vis-à-vis the host country or
regional entities, including U.S. alliance relationships.
Nevertheless, the lesson remains that, when militarycivil relationships work well on the operational level,
U.S. national objectives can be achieved in a smoother
fashion and that outcomes, negotiated or otherwise,
more acceptable to Washington can be achieved.
POLADs in the National Security System.
POLADs are not a large cog in the wheel of the
national security system, nor are they officially
recognized in policy-level “wiring diagrams.”
However, as Robert D. Kaplan argues persuasively
in a recent book, the stepped-up tempo of military
operations since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001 (9/11), has brought the utility and experience
of diplomatic advisors into sharper focus.14 Indeed,
Kaplan and some other commentators foresee the
continued blending of military and civilian functions,
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especially in field operations in low intensity warfare
scenarios, as commissioned and noncommissioned
officers perform civilian-type roles in civil affairs,
humanitarian relief, and reconstruction. The debate
over the traditional military and civilian roles has been
the subject of sharp debate, but is now clarified at least
for the moment in the 2006 QDR that forecasts a greater
union of operational functions, not only in post-conflict
situations.15
Central to the effectiveness of a civilian POLAD
assigned to a military headquarters, combat command,
or lower echelon are the tiered relationships with his
or her commander within the headquarters in relation
to the J-staff directors and others such as the deputy
commander, legal advisor, or staff director; between
the POLAD and Washington agencies (valued as “reach
back” into the national security bureaucracy); with
higher echelons (for example, Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE] in Mons and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] secretariat in
Brussels); and among policy actors—whether U.S.,
allied, or multinational—in terms of shared issues
and interests. In other words, the challenge of the
individual POLAD is to be able to form and prosecute
relationships up and down the military and civilian
chains of commands as well as laterally with kindred
headquarters, diplomatic missions, international
organizations, and civilian entities, including
nongovernmental organizations.
Hence a principal POLAD contribution can be to promote integration and synergy by bringing diplomaticpolitical and military-security considerations together
for the consideration of the combatant commander
(COCOM) working with bureaucratic forces to ensure
all factors and avenues of approach are considered,
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suggesting new or revised courses of action, and
contributing advice and expertise regarding the
execution of military operations, sensitive intelligence,
and counterterrorist activities, as well as military
support for essentially civilian policy objectives.
Concomitantly, POLADs can assist a combatant
commander to achieve operational objectives and
shape military operations in a variety of ways. While
this is dependent on the character of and empowerment
by the commander, the POLAD can help translate the
local environment into operational ground truth and
can facilitate the conduct of operations on the ground
through negotiation, facilitating allied and indigenous
contacts, and providing access to local actors and
institutions. Examples of the operational effectiveness
of POLADs abound in the southern Balkans in the
1990s and the years following where they have been
central in the understanding by successive U.S. and
allied commands of the military and civil annexes of the
Dayton Accords of 1995, the complex operations of the
High Commission in Bosnia, the United Nations (UN)
role in Kosovo, and local government characteristics
in Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania. Diplomatic skills
thus have been integral to the conduct of U.S. and
NATO stability operations and, to a great degree, the
military support of U.S., European Union (EU), and UN
efforts to create viable governmental entities, security
structures, and political-economic development. The
different kinds of relationships that are integral to the
POLAD function follow in the next section.
The Military Actors.
Of critical importance is the significantly expanded
role of the regional combat command flowing from
the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of
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1986.16 Goldwater-Nichols shifted power and responsibilities from the military services to regional commands so that, it was argued, they could better
address regional contingencies. COCOMs (then titled
commanders-in-chief, or CINCs) were assigned the
majority of general purpose forces in the expectation
that most conflicts would be fought within regional
theaters and functional commands. The latter
included the Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which
controlled the Special Forces of all services. In most
cases, the specialized commands had narrowly
circumscribed roles.
Larger defense budgets, deeper staffs, increased
resources for engagement within and outside the
customary ambit of the Department of Defense (DoD),
including relations with the Congress, coupled with
the prestige of the CINCs as “supreme” regional
commanders, conferred on the combatant commanders
a natural proconsul role. The regional commander’s
ability to look across the region, the regional
headquarters’ capability for networking among
foreign military and civilian leaders—something only
Assistant Secretaries of State can do on the policy
level in Washington—endow the regional combatant
commanders with the tools needed to promote U.S.
cooperation with foreign powers on a regional and
subregional basis.
Regular command involvement in regional affairs
through conferences, contingency planning, theater
security cooperation, counterterrorism strategy,
counterproliferation measures, and increasingly
measures to combat transnational crime, have been
some of the tools used to pursue U.S. regional security
objectives beyond the application of military power.
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With their robust intelligence analysis, logistics, and
and communications assets not available to any other
regional actor, the regional commands exceed the
capabilities of any other U.S. military organization
and most other overseas agencies, except perhaps the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Beginning in 2002, the Bush administration and
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reemphasized civilian
control over the military and sought to diminish
“CINC-ness,” ostensibly to give the President and
Defense Secretary a greater range of military options
to respond to political, counterterrorism, and military
contingencies. New commands, including the Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), were created, and several
functional commands were strengthened, including
the Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). While the regional
focus of former “CINC-doms” was adjusted, others
were given responsibility for global missions that cut
across regional boundaries, thus altering the balance
between the military services as force providers and
the combatant commands as force employers.17
Insofar as the POLAD function was concerned,
these changes opened up additional opportunities,
especially since 9/11, for State Department personnel
to be assigned as advisors to functional and operational
commands. The market for political-military and
diplomatic skills has expanded. 18
The Civilian-Diplomatic Side.
U.S. Chiefs of Mission and Country Teams,
representing all agencies at a diplomatic post, are
bilaterally focused. It is difficult for most ambassadors
to exert influence regionally or outside the borders
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of the national state they are accredited to. Under
National Security Decision Directive 38 during the
Johnson administration, the Ambassador was given
the policy lead within her or his country as designated
by the President. The dramatic expansion of the U.S.
diplomatic and non-State Department presence abroad
has meant that this authority is less and less honored
as regional, cross-border, and transnational issues,
including those of DoD and the combatant commands,
increasingly predominate.19 Current defense planning
entailing the creation of a standing Interagency Task
Force (IATF) structure, Interagency Crisis Planning
Teams under National Security Council (NSC) aegis,
and increased formalization of task force operations in
crisis and combat areas would further militate against
country- and country-team centered consideration and
influence.20
State Department diplomatic missions and many
government agencies represented in Country Teams
often are underresourced. Damaging budget reductions during the Clinton administration resulted not only
in post closings (some of which were well-deserved),
but also in severe program reductions for development assistance, public diplomacy (exacerbated by the
absorption into State of the U.S. Information Agency
in 1996), and other assets for the conduct of foreign
relations. Prior to the Clinton administration’s and
Congress’ reaping of the “peace dividend” following
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the decline in
State Department resources and overseas staffing
had already begun when Secretary of State James
Baker decided that the resources for opening 13 new
diplomatic posts in the former Soviet Union would
come from existing resources, thus stretching already
thin staffs and budgets for the developing regions of
the world all the more thinly.
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Embassies often are meagerly staffed and lack
resources for adequate political and economic
coverage, significant or “surge” planning efforts,
and information technology and communications
technological capabilities. Consequently, Chiefs of
Mission have few tools and little discretion, other
than development aid and military assistance, to use
in gaining influence or promoting U.S. objectives.
Even in those areas where resources can be leveraged,
Chiefs of Mission must work through other agencies,
such as USAID, the regional military command, and
DoD, with their lengthy and complex bureaucratic and
congressional appropriations approval processes.
Ambassadors as a rule seek to maintain good relations with regional commanders. The letter of instruction from the President, coupled with NSDD 38, spells
out what Washington considers the proper relationship, including channels to resolve program issues
and policy disagreements. For many ambassadors, the
regional commanders and their staffs often are more
accessible than the State Department regional assistant
secretaries. Washington principals are consumed with
the headlines of the day and high profile issues, such as
China relations and North Korea in East Asia, that tend
to monopolize the time and attention of policy officials
and the upper echelon of the State Department. At the
same time, Country Team effectiveness depends on the
quality of the Chief of Mission’s leadership, whether
she or he has the inclination to use the Country Team
as the principal mechanism for coordinating policy
inputs and implementation, and whether a Country
Team is able to act as a cohesive group. The degree to
which external actors, whether in the regional military
commands or in Washington, are consulted and
involved in country matters is also largely dependent
on the inclination of the Chief of Mission.
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The circle of regional and extra-regional actors is also
expanding. Multilateral and regional organizations can
have an important impact on the regional commands as
well as on diplomatic missions and country programs.
In Europe, for example, NATO, EU, Organization of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
varying layers of top level consultative mechanisms,
such as the Group of 8 (G-8), increasingly impact on and
limit the scope of bilateral diplomatic missions. Regional
and global programs in the security realm, such as the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), operated from
Washington, also limit the policy scope and shape the
operational agendas of embassies, Country Teams, and
sometimes the combatant commands.
At the regional level, the establishment of Joint
Interagency Coordinating Groups (JIACGs) stemmed
from Secretary Rumsfeld’s tasking in December
2001 to four combatant commands and three
functional commands to develop campaign plans
in their respective areas of operation for post-9/11
counterterrorist actions that incorporated “all elements
of national power.” This concept of integration of
interagency effort, subsumed under the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT), was subsequently refined and
articulated in QDR doctrine in February 2006. It was
also DoD’s attempt to equip key commanders with
enhanced planning capabilities for the “long war”
against terrorism. As a new institutional actor, JIACG
performance has been mixed, often dependent upon
personality of those assigned to it and the willingness
of agencies, including the CIA and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) as well as the State Department,
to cooperate. Nevertheless, the JIACGs represent a
step forward in terms of integration of intelligence
and anti-terrorism effort against identifiable objectives
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and targets.21 Meanwhile, in the conventional law
enforcement field, the regional commands work
through the JIATF (Joint Interagency Task Force)
mechanism.
The downside of the creation of integrated regional
operational teams and task forces is that the interests
of diplomatic missions and Country Teams are further
subordinated to regional mechanisms in which Chiefs
of Mission do not participate as policy voices. In the
political-military realm, however, JIACGs should
complement work of POLADs at the joint staff level.
As POLADs serve their individual commanders,
they should also exercise general oversight over the
sensitive intelligence and counterterrorism matters
falling within JIACG responsibility in order to provide
a broad regional picture and to help in bridging U.S.
agency, regional, and multilateral interests. One
option, which could intrude on the fundamental
POLAD-Commander relationship, would be to
make the POLAD “operational” by making her/him
concurrently chief of the command’s JIACG.
POLADs within State.
The standing and treatment of POLADs within the
State Department since Murphy’s time has been uneven
at best and often neglectful. As in the case of POLAD
standing and influence in the regional commands,
the role and effectiveness of POLADs within State
has mostly depended on personalities and personal
relationships rather than their hierarchical placement or
policy functionality. In general, there is little awareness
within State at the assistant secretary level and above of
POLAD activities and their potential for improving the
operational interface with the combatant commanders
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and defense policymakers. Likewise, the role and
effectiveness of the POLAD “twins” in the politicalmilitary milieu—the State-Defense Exchange Officers
(SDEs) serving in DoD—have been underappreciated
and underutilized.
Part of this general climate of unawareness stems
from the failure to incorporate lessons learned from
past positive experiences and a general unconcern
for the Department’s own institutional history. For
example, the CORDS experience in Vietnam is only
dimly remembered and more as a name than as a body
of knowledge to be applied to today’s situation. One
consequence is that the State Department tends, like any
bureaucracy, to “reinvent” solutions and approaches
to apply in current conflict and post-conflict situations,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention Haiti and
elsewhere. The criticism is also correct that there is no
codified doctrine in the State Department bureaucracy
and culture pertaining to POLAD operations.
The responsibility for POLAD assignment and
support falls to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
(PM), although in some assignments to POLAD
positions the responsibility is “shared” depending
on which bureau “owns” the position. Either way as
a practical matter, both PM and the relevant regional
bureau have to agree on a POLAD assignment as well
as the terms and conditions, such as logistical support.
The question of where individual POLAD positions
are found in regional bureaus or PM staffing patterns
is not an incidental matter since occasionally POLAD
management becomes the object of “turf” battles between bureau fiefdoms. PM support, assignment, and
occasionally the effectiveness of individual POLADs
have been scrutinized in internal State Department
inspections and various reform studies of State’s role
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in the national security system. One such analysis,
the State 2000 report, at the beginning of the Clinton
administration in 1992 observed:
Future U.S. military action abroad is most likely to
involve relatively small local conflicts and to be in the
context of a UN or other multilateral peacekeeping
process. Consequently, political and diplomatic factors
are likely to be even more important than in the past in
U.S. military operations abroad, and the role of the State
Department political advisers (POLADs) assigned to the
military commands will be more critical. The Department
must be certain that it assigns outstanding officers as
POLADs.22

Meanwhile, diplomatic and political realities
increasingly have led the combatant commanders and
their policy backstops in the Joint Staff in Washington
into the unfamiliar and uncharted territory of
political-military relations. The thickening web of
policy interrelationships has been vividly described
by Pentagon analyst Thomas Barnett in two pointed
studies, The Pentagon’s New Map and Blueprint for
Action.23 Even more than in the immediate post-World
War II period, the interplay of military operations and
political forces has affected how regional commanders
view and use intelligence, develop integrated planning
processes, and adopt “transformational” innovations
such as consequence management, effects-based
planning, combined and joint operations doctrine, and
the like. Today’s complex demands require combatant
commanders, whether in domestic or overseas theaters,
to devote more attention to the political and diplomatic
dimensions of their command responsibilities and
to become more cognizant of the politico-economic
“landscape” in their areas of operations. The bottom
line, as reflected the current QDR24 and increasingly
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in public comment, is that the better commanders are
also better diplomats.25
Yet the operational demands and impacts on the
combatant commands are not fully appreciated in the
State Department bureaucracy. In some cases regional
command perspectives do not mesh with State’s
culture, which is almost exclusively more focused on
the civil-political-diplomatic side, both bilateral and
multilateral, than on uses of combined state power
entailing the integration of civil and military forces
and their underlying factors. This “cultural divide” has
tended to substantiate the view in the national security
bureaucracy that State is more focused on “national
interests” and diplomatic “hand holding” rather
than DoD’s priority of “national security.” Moreover,
repeated public accusations that the State Department
and Foreign Service are not focused on United States
national interests, as distinct from “getting along”
with overseas clients, testifies to this basic cultural
difference.
The State Department’s transformation toward the
integration of policy and state power is overdue. Many
important efforts at reform of the State Department
and foreign policy formulation have been stillborn26
or have been only been halfheartedly applied, such
as recommendations flowing from State 2000, cited
above, and the State Department’s response to the
Clinton administration’s “Reinventing Government”
initiative.27
In the 2006 environment, to become truly relevant
to national security policy demands through Secretary
Rice’s
Transformational
Diplomacy
initiative,
there must be unqualified support within the State
bureaucracy of the “long war” concept, the need
for integrated military-civil operations, a coherent
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approach toward post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction, and melding the instruments of “soft
power,” including humanitarian assistance, civil
society development, civil administration, the rule of
law, and community development, into as seamless an
operational approach as possible.
Essence of the POLAD Function.
Enter the diplomat-warrior. In a prescient article
published in 2003, retired Ambassador Howard K.
Walker, then vice president of the National Defense
University, wrote:
A new type of leader will be required to manage . . .
crises in the 21st century: I call these hybrids soldierdiplomats and diplomat-warriors. They are soldiers who
can also think like diplomats and diplomats who can
think like soldiers. It is important for soldier-diplomats
to understand why and how diplomacy operates to
win international support and how domestic political
considerations constrain the way force is used to achieve
military objectives. Diplomat-warriors will need to
understand and appreciate why and how the military
can be used to achieve diplomatic objectives and what
operational constraints the military faces in trying to
achieve those objectives.28

Although Walker’s prescription was to stress crosstraining for both military and Foreign Service officers,
the archetypal diplomat-warrior is the POLAD who has
the capacity to shape, on a daily and closely personal
basis, the interests, attitudes, and actions of a regional
combatant commander, or in the case of State-Defense
Exchange Officers, the senior Pentagon official whom
she or he advises. Moreover, according to Walker, “. . .
the military does a better job of educating senior military
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officers about the constraints on military operations,
than does State in educating senior diplomats about
military operations’ constraints on diplomatic courses
of action.”29
As observed earlier, the essence of the POLAD
function is the relationship between a commander and
his or her political-diplomatic advisor. Often POLADs
are the token civilians in a military command. They
are the most prominent and ordinarily the most senior
civilian, if they carry ambassadorial rank. Civilian
representatives of the CIA and other agencies found in
regional commands for the most part are barely overt
or obvious and lack the breadth and influence of a
POLAD. A POLAD’s effectiveness is not only a matter
of personality, rank, and agency affiliation, but also devolves on shared interests and the commander’s view
of the diplomatic function. A combatant commander,
who has good political instincts comes from a social
science background or has Washington policy
experience, quite often has a better record in dealing
with her or his POLAD and the interplay of political
and military forces than others with a more technocratic
or strictly warfighting background, although it is true
that command experience on whatever level is an
important equalizer.
Furthermore, staff organization and military
cultural factors also can play a part. Some commanders’
staffs are closed shops, rooted in tradition or daily
routines, leaving little daylight for POLAD interests,
concerns, and advice. Thus the POLAD’s personal
expertise and talents play a strong role. To the extent
that the depth and breadth of a POLAD’s experience
can shine through the weight of day-to-day operational
concerns, an individual diplomat-warrior can be highly
effective.
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Most important at the combatant command level,
including multinational headquarters, is rank. In a
strict hierarchy, ambassadorial rank denotes influence,
an identifiable place in the headquarters pecking
order, and entitlements like housing, transportation,
and security that come with a POLAD position. Some
Foreign Service Officers assigned as POLADs have used
the title of Minister, if they have not previously served
as a chief of mission; this is usually their personal title
under the Foreign Service’s “rank-in-man” concept
which confers rank descriptors on senior officers.
However, title and rank over time tend to become less
important than the immediate access a POLAD enjoys
to the commander, as personal competence, personality,
operational adeptness, and local knowledge become
main factors in an individual POLAD’s effectiveness.
Staffing is also important to POLAD effectiveness
in headquarters operations. In large commands,
including multinational headquarters, military officers
often are assigned to assist the POLAD, and there are
supporting staff, communications and information
systems support, and budgets for logistical and other
aspects of POLAD operations. This is not always the
case, however, in field commands or subordinate
headquarters where POLADs literally may find
themselves “on their own.” POLAD effectiveness
requires at least minimal support staff and preferably
the assistance of one or more staff officers who can
operate in the political-military interface.
Operational understanding and effectiveness are
determinants of success at all command levels. While
not allowing that some military officers may have
acquired “civilian” skills prior to or in relation to their
professional careers, Walker diagnoses the diplomatic
“skill sets” as follows:
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Unlike military men and women, diplomats are already
trained in the “social science” of international relations,
international conflicts, the framework of international
organizations, how international alliances and coalitions
operate, negotiating techniques and working in a
multicultural setting. They are versed in mastering the
art of the possible and accept that many international
problems can only be managed, never solved.30

A keen intellect, powerful analytical and negotiating
skills, good writing ability, regional and country
experience, and language facility are necessary for
POLADs. POLADs also have to be skillful bureaucratic
influencers, work with others to make things happen,
and immerse themselves in the work of the headquarters. In short, there is a demand for professionalism
of the best type that the State Department can provide. Moreover, in the thicket of military and command politics, POLADs must make their own way carefully and with tact and discretion. There is no room
for “kiss and tell,” violating confidences, or being
seen to be less than 100 percent supportive of one’s
commander.
Overall, the hackneyed phrase “trust and
confidence” sums up the positive commander-POLAD
relationship. The moral authority and influence of a
POLAD depends wholly on the value a commander
attaches to her or him on a personal level and to the
diplomatic advisory function.
Back Home and Out There.
External relationships are also instrumental in
POLAD effectiveness. A civilian diplomat has selfevident limitations: POLADs have no troops at their
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disposal and headquarters largess is sparingly doled
out and fought for. Moreover, military prerogatives
are jealously safeguarded against encroachment by
civilians or another agency. Fortunately the power
of persuasion is usually something Foreign Service
Officers are good at; arguably persuasion is a POLAD’s
most important weapon.
Add to this creativity and resourcefulness, getting a
few good staff people, adopting (not adapting) military
characteristics such as loyalty to their troops, and being
a strong advocate for his or her commander. POLAD
effectiveness also depends on professional performance: giving commanders and staffs the right insights, often determined through honed instinct; proving one’s utility through the written word and reporting privately to one’s commander (“gisting” is most
useful); serving as a conduit back to multiple agencies
and bureaus in Washington; the ability to quickly
reach out to ambassadors, embassies, and Washington
actors; and developing new sources of information
for the commander. Helping a commander to gain as
much “360 degree vision” as possible is important in
many commands, beyond the staple tasks of advising
on local customs and quirks, protocol, personalities,
and things that come naturally to most POLADs after
20 or so years of Foreign Service experience.
The ability to foster healthy relationships between
COCOMs, both on the commander’s personal level
and for their staffs, with diplomatic missions and
multinational-multilateral organizations is a positive
POLAD added value. Building confidence in two-way
communications and relationships is a quintessential
diplomatic attribute that tends to serve the interest
of most combatant commanders and senior Defense
Department officials.
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Equally significant are relationships “back home”
in terms of the military command’s access and
information-gathering. POLADs not only can provide
“grease” to make relationships work or to open
new doors, but also they can be useful conduits of
substantive information, analysis and policy actions.
The importance of Information (with a capital “I”)
cannot be underrated in the U.S. bureaucratic milieu.
The State Department’s Political-Military Bureau,
for example, stepped squarely into the interagency
information void by providing, as a service to POLADs
as well as Washington decisionmakers, twice-daily
briefs of all-source intelligence, policy decisions, and
weekly reports of the department’s political-military
bureaus (known as the “T family” presided over by the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security Affairs). This gave POLADs, their staffs,
and their commanders access to important policy
information and allowed them to track information and
implementing actions relating to post-9/11 operations.
Realizing the value of access to such high level and
often comprehensive information, a good POLAD
takes extra pains to keep her or his commander well
informed of the Washington policy and operational
drift from the standpoint of State Department actors.
Other aspects of Washington relations affecting
POLADs and integration of the political-military
functions have not been so fortuitous, however. Prior
to 9/11 in the opening year of the Bush administration,
bureaucratic warfare erupted between State and Defense over the desire of Secretary Rumsfeld to severely
limit the number of State Department officers serving
in the Pentagon and the number of military officers
serving in “civilian” roles in State, the National Security
Council staff, and elsewhere. Hard negotiations
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occurred over much of a year on a new State-DOD
agreement on POLAD and SDE assignments on a more
constrained basis. There is still room for improvement
in bilateral agency understanding on the terms and
conditions of such assignments.31
On the whole, however, Washington actors will
react positively if they think they have something to
gain by greater interaction with combatant commanders
in terms of operational information, trolling for
substantive ideas and options, or alternative ways of
getting information to or from a regional command.
State’s bureaucratic response (for reasons of “culture,”
it can be argued) has often been idiosyncratic and
fluctuating. During the first Bush administration, and
especially after 9/11, the value placed on the POLAD
function skyrocketed under PM Assistant Secretary
Lincoln Bloomfield and his principal deputy, Gregory
Suchan, who were strongly committed to improve
State’s performance in support of military operations
in Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider “Global War on
Terror.” Some innovations, such as the Political-Military
Action Team operational reporting effort noted above,
have survived, but POLAD support office operations
were downplayed under a subsequent deputy assistant
secretary.
On the downside, POLAD support normally
suffers when there is pressure on State Department
or PM bureau budgets. Unwillingness to adapt the
assignment system to give greater priority to POLAD
assignments, as well as to eliminate time-consuming
paperwork, has impaired State’s role in this aspect
of interagency operations. Moreover, State has had
no system of tracking officers who held politicalmilitary positions at home and abroad so that a pool of
experienced officers could be identified for upcoming
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POLAD and military task force assignments. And State
has not valued the POLAD function in the Foreign
Service promotion process. As Louise Crane, vice
president of the American Foreign Service Association
(AFSA), observed: “Don’t take any of those diplomat-in
residence slots, be an adviser to a military command, or
go on detail to the Hill or another government agency
(except to the National Security Council), because your
chances for performance pay for doing so were nil in
2004.”32
In short, there was a clear recognition within the
political-military community that, in light of post-9/11
demands and especially the post-conflict situation in
Iraq, not to mention continuing worldwide terrorist
threats, State was falling far short of the need for
improved policy and operational integration and had
to do a much better and more consistent job.
Diplomatic Transformation.
At the time Condoleezza Rice was named as
Secretary of State in December 2004, relations between
State and Defense had sunk to an all-time low because
of bitterness surrounding the control and conduct of
Iraq policy and operations. It was also evident that
diplomatic support of military operations had to be
improved in the national interest, not only as a matter
of bureaucratic willingness. To his credit, Secretary of
State Colin Powell had begun a budgetary and human
resource “build back” after disastrous reductions under
the Clinton administration. Over 700 positions were
restored to the Foreign Service, and new needs were
identified in support of the post-conflict situations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, which sought to some extent
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to emulate the CORDS experience in Vietnam. (For
additional details, see the Chapter 6 by Louis Nigro.)
Dr. John Hillen, incoming Assistant Secretary of
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in mid-2005
grasped the possibilities to create a new model for
State-Defense relations predicated on:
• blurring of the “political-military divide”
in policy formulation, military and civil
deployments, hostilities, and post conflict
situations;
• recognition that conflicts and national security
challenges generally are more political than
military, and nonmilitary capabilities often are
decisive;
• the need for integrating all elements of national
power by shifting from military combined
operations to “multiagency combined actions”;
and,
• a realization that civil actors not only include
State, but also USAID, domestic agencies (e.g.,
Treasury), and law enforcement agencies.33
The QDR of February 2006, furthermore, addresses
the urgency of defining models for integrated militarycivilian operations along a continuum of conflict
management, supported by the creation of a cadre of
National Security Officers (NSOs) of senior civilian and
military professionals to respond to higher national
security interests. Planning guidance henceforth would
establish priorities, stipulate roles and responsibilities,
and generate resources and personnel on an interagency
basis among the combatant commands, the Joint
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other
actors.34
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Hillen envisages an expansion, at least doubling,
of the current POLAD and State-Defense Exchange
positions to include not only combatant commands and
military services as at present, but also deployed joint
task forces (JTFs), numbered naval fleets, humanitarian
task forces, reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and in support of other military operations.
Meanwhile, the State Department’s Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS),
which arose in 2004 from the ashes of military-civilian
rivalry over Iraq reconstruction, primarily addresses
civilian planning and response to post-conflict
situations, as distinct from providing continuing advice
to and engagement with military commands, except
when its personnel are deployed in a conflict area.35
POLAD and other support to combatant commands,
and other military organizations as specified above,
continue to be the responsibility of the PM bureau
headed by Dr. Hillen. Hence there is a role for both
expert crisis intervention in pre-conflict planning and
post-conflict operations, but the diplomatic advisory
function with the combatant commanders remains
throughout.
As enunciated by Secretary Rice in early 2006 at
Georgetown University, effective change will have to
start with transformation of the State Department: more
streamlined ways of doing business, how personnel
assignments to political-military positions (including
POLADs, PRTs, and others) are made, the realignment
of budgetary priorities in support of military operations
and national security objectives, and acknowledgment
at top echelons of the Department of the need for
integrated political-diplomatic-security policy and
implementation. To the extent that these objectives
are also translated into the delivery of development
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assistance by USAID, public diplomacy programs, and
democracy-building, the transformation effort will be
successful.
Despite the initial successes of Powell’s Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative, State is hobbled in Congress—
and to some extent within the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB)—in competing for new budgetary
resources. The request for $250 million in fiscal
year 2006 support for S/CRS was zeroed out in the
appropriations process, but by executive decision DoD
will provide $100 million in stopgap funding for S/
CRS. Some State officials, including Dr. Hillen, point
to the need for State to obtain additional funding for
POLAD and other positions from Defense. However,
serious questions persist about State’s budget viability
and dependence on DoD for the funding of politicalmilitary positions.
In the security assistance field as well, DoD now
has independent funding for security assistance (the
so-called “Section 1206” provision) for developing
country military capabilities outside the foreign
military financing (FMF) and international military
education and training (IMET) appropriated to the
State Department under the Foreign Assistance Act.
Overall, however, the outlook is not favorable for
“meaningful levels” of additional funding “within the
constraints of a static to slightly expanding budget,”
despite the receptivity to transformation goals within
the Department of State.36
Internally within State, there should be serious and
sustained support of the POLAD function by PM and the
geographic bureaus which have policy oversight of the
regional commands and all U.S. policy and operational
matters within their areas of responsibility. Specific
measures to enhance State’s role as propounded by
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Secretary Rice and Dr. Hillen would include:
• More personnel resources under “Diplomatic
Transformation” to staff new POLAD positions.
• Identification and training of a cadre of politicalmilitary officers to staff new positions and meet
other requirements in addition to JIACG and
other integrated civil-military assignments.
• More expeditious and better matches in
assignments and reducing paperwork in the
nomination and assignment process for POLAD,
SDE, and other positions.
• Raising POLAD visibility among top State
decisionmakers to develop a constituency
for “seamless” joint interagency operations,
including post-conflict reconstruction.
• Priority recognition for service as POLADs in
the promotion precepts, the annual instructions
given to Foreign Service selection boards.
• Revising the restrictive State-Defense agreement
on the interagency exchange of personnel,
increasing the number of officers moving in each
direction, expanding training opportunities
for Foreign Service Officers in NDU and other
military schools, and clarifying support cost
arrangements.
• Establishing new POLAD positions in DoD
regional institutes, especially the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies (APCSS), the African
Strategic Studies Center, and the new Middle
East center, while reallocating some StateDefense Exchange positions to higher priority
operational areas within DoD and the Joint
Staff.
• Improved Political Advisor support to com-
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batant commands and other headquarters,
including the provision of administrative staff,
facilities and communications, by both military
commands and embassies.
• Creation of a data bank, increased utilization
of “short tours” which are defined in State
Department practice as less than a “full” tour of
2 or 3 years.
• The easing of hiring restrictions on experienced
retired officers, most importantly removing the
salary cap permanently for State Department
retirees.37
A key element of the expansion of POLAD
capabilities is training. Not only should specific
training courses be initiated for POLADs and politicalmilitary officers beyond the current 3-day “tradecraft”
orientation, a full-fledged training center should be
established within the Foreign Service Institute (FSI)
to train State Department, other civilians, and military
officers for the “long war” by providing language,
history, political, economic, and cultural instruction for
conflict and stability operations. The center’s course of
study should also include war games and simulations,
training in formulating military plans, and instruction
in multiagency operations and command relationships.
This center can become a repository of lessons learned
and best practices for the civilian side of government,
including USAID and others. Ambassador Howard
Walker advocates an increase in State senior officer
participation in the National Defense University’s
CAPSTONE seminars for rising flag officers “who
will soon hold key operations jobs. Some ‘operations
thinking’ would rub off, and invaluable personal
relationships and personal credibility would be
established.”38
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To enhance the integration of policy implementation through commands at all levels, better
and more uniform understanding of POLAD
functions and job requirements is required by State
Department decisionmakers, POLAD candidates,
military commanders, and their immediate staffs.
Job descriptions for POLADs should be codified, and
combatant commanders and senior Defense officials
should be encouraged to jointly agree with their
POLADs on performance objectives and benchmarks.
Criteria for the recruitment and assignment of
individual POLADs should also be developed within
State and to focus commanders on standard POLAD
qualifications and job priorities.
National Security Officers—An Opportunity?
Deserving examination within the POLAD context
is the concept of establishing a National Security
Officer corps as provided in QDR 2006.39 The concept
for the formation of a corps of dedicated experts in
multiagency security operations and post-conflict
situations, including diplomatic, law enforcement,
civil administration, democratization, and other
“nation building” skills, offers possibilities for both the
State Department and the POLAD function. POLADs
should be included as a recognized specialty within
the NSO corps, recognizing that the Foreign Service,
which encompasses USAID, Foreign Agricultural
Service, and Foreign Commercial Service officers as
well as State Department personnel, are, in fact, the
personification of what is sought in an NSO. It must
be recognized that foreign service skills are learned
through practical experience and training over the span
of a career. Varied diplomatic, country, and regional
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expertise is best learned and honed within a foreign
service career, not simply acquired through training or
from the outside looking in.
Resource availability for enlargement of the POLAD
function under the NSO umbrella would be an obvious
attraction in view of constrained State Department
budgets and lack of support for the State Department
in the congressional appropriations process. Funding,
however, should not be the sole factor driving State’s
response to the NSO initiative. State’s budget authority,
as perennially proposed in national security and State
Department reform initiatives, should be shifted to
the 050 National Security function rather than remain
in the so-called 150 Account with the Commerce and
Justice departments and the science agencies. State
has been resource-starved in many other respects, but
cogent arguments can be made that, through the NSO
program or in other ways, budgetary autonomy for
State’s contributions to integrated national security
operations, including the POLAD function, should be
ensured.
As part of State’s diplomatic transformation, the
NSO initiative and its relationship with the POLAD
function must become a joint responsibility of the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs (“P”) and the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security Affairs (“T”). The Under Secretary for
Political Affairs has the broad institutional perspective
for policy development and is normally involved in
top level national security decisionmaking, while the
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security oversees the Political-Military Bureau in
which the POLAD function is lodged as well as other
State elements for civil-diplomatic support of militarysecurity operations, including nuclear and other
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nonproliferation measures. An argument also can
be made for a greater role for the Under Secretary of
Political Affairs in the POLAD function, particularly
improving the assignment process to elevate the
integrative civil-military operational support role
in State’s policy structure and giving direction to
management and financial officials as well as the
Director-General of the Foreign Service who presides
over the Foreign and Civil Service personnel systems.
There are other far-reaching implications for the
Department of State flowing from the current QDR. In
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense
Reform for a New Strategic Era, Clark Murdock and
Michele Fluornoy propose that the National Security
Council take a direct role in policy coordination
overseas by convening regional “summits” of military,
diplomatic, and intelligence officials. These would
undoubtedly be seen as a move to further dilute State
Department and chief of mission authority.40 Similarly,
institution of an interagency task force (IATF) system
on the Washington level and under the combatant
commanders would further centralize intelligence,
law enforcement, and regional security policy
formulation—but again without a direct voice for the
State Department and diplomatic missions.
Formal reservations are emerging about expanded
authorities for DoD in antiterrorism, special military
operations, and regional security initiatives. According
to one defense commentator:
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated her
department’s concerns much more bluntly during a
videoconference linking Bush’s top aides in mid-January
[2006]. Letting the Pentagon operate outside the U.S.
ambassador’s control to roll up extremist networks
in foreign countries would make U.S. policy “almost
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exclusively kinetic”—that is, warlike—she argued, to
Rumsfeld’s discomfort, according to a briefing given to
colleagues by one official involved in the meeting.41

Whether such initiatives leading to a “militarization”
of diplomatic and civilian activity would be effective
in the long run is open to question, although shortterm gains could result in promoting policy synergy
and integrated operations in overseas environments.
There are also “spillover” impacts to be considered.
As the integration of U.S. civilian-diplomatic and military operations proceeds, whether in conflict situations or not, there is a case to be made for exporting the
model to allied countries. According to one commentator, “If we accept that modern security requirements
(read WOT) necessitate diplomatic transfiguration, . .
. it is but a short step to acknowledging that the WOT
is an international effort. . . . The U[nited] K[ingdom]
is a case in point, and the MOD [Ministry of Defense]
and FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] could
benefit from paying attention to the U.S. model. . . .
why not coordinate an approach from the outset?”42
Future Directions.
Optimal POLAD contributions to national security
policy implementation are to (a) promote integration on
the combatant command level, and (b) contribute to the
operational effectiveness of commands and institutions
in which POLADs serve. In the civil-political-diplomatic
world where imprecision and ambiguity often are the
norm, POLADs can facilitate important relationships
(for example, between commanders and diplomatic
missions), serve as a conduit for communications
among military and civilian U.S. Government

314

stakeholders, and help to craft more synergistic,
comprehensive, and nuanced approaches to influence
events, apply military resources, and achieve discrete
national security objectives.
Equally important are the roles of POLADs on the
operational level, and sometimes even the tactical level
and in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, to enhance
military effectiveness on the ground in stabilization,
post-conflict and contingency operations. There is no
substitute for diplomatic skill in pursuing the complex
operations being experienced and envisaged in the post9/ll environment, increasingly multi- (or non-) polar
world, and shifting balances in global “soft power,”
economics, natural resource utilization and trade. The
days of exclusive “military” and “civilian” spheres of
operation are over. Everything is interconnected under
the broad rubric of U.S. national security interests.
It is the view of the authors that the State
Department cannot fail to rise to the challenges of the
rapidly complex international environment and the
self-professed goals of Diplomatic Transformation.
Without top-level management drive, and most
importantly the resources to match capabilities to
rhetoric, it is difficult to see a change for the better in
the civil-military operational integration and closer
engagement with military commands and deployed
forces.
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CHAPTER 8
SEDUCED AND ABANDONED:
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL PROCESS
William P. Kiehl
Truth also needs propaganda.
—Karl Jaspers,
German philosopher

INTRODUCTION
Strategic information is a term that cries out for
definition. Strategic information is: (1) civilian public
diplomacy currently conducted principally by the U.S.
Department of State, and by other civilian agencies
in a supporting role, e.g., the Broadcasting Board of
Governors for international broadcasting, the Agency
for International Development (AID) in civil affairs
and developmental tasks (many AID programs in
democracy building and AID training programs
have an obvious public diplomacy link or provide
opportunities for public diplomacy); and (2) military
psychological operations and peacetime information
operations with aims and methodology compatible
with civilian public diplomacy, such as Civil Affairs,
the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program, and the expanded IMET (e-IMET)
program.
Strategic information may also have a clandestine
component and utilize grey or black propaganda where
the source of information is either masked or falsified.
This latter form is used by intelligence agencies but is
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not used by civilian public diplomacy or peacetime
military psychological operations.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DEFINED
Civilian public diplomacy has evolved from its first
use in 1965 by Dean Edward Gullion of the Fletcher
School at Tufts University, when he coined the term to
refer mainly to nongovernmental actions and peopleto-people programs or what is often now termed
“citizen diplomacy.” By the 1970s, however, public
diplomacy came to mean the U.S. Government’s
informational, educational and cultural exchange
activities abroad. The classic definition of public
diplomacy is attributed to the U.S. Information Agency
and is still the preferred definition in the United States.
Accordingly, “public diplomacy seeks to promote
the national interest and the national security of the
United States through understanding, informing, and
influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue
between American citizens and institutions and their
counterparts abroad.”1
Peacetime public diplomacy of this form was already
in use as early as 1938, when Nelson Rockefeller’s
Office of Inter-American Affairs embarked upon an
ambitious educational and cultural exchange program
with Latin America to blunt actual and potential Nazi
and fascist influence.2
World War II and the creation of the Office of
War Information (OWI), the Voice of America (VOA),
and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided
broad additional means for civilian-directed public
diplomacy. At the same time, the War Department
and the uniformed services honed under British
tutorage psychological operations and other military
information operations skills.
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THE TOYS OF WAR
Following the war, as is the U.S. custom, the “toys of
war” were put aside in peacetime. In a practical sense,
this meant the demobilization and deactivation of most
of the American civilian and military capability of
waging a “war of ideas.” The Office of War Information,
which also had significant domestic information
coordination functions as well as its more documented
foreign propaganda activities, was dismantled
immediately upon the conclusion of hostilities. The
remnants of OWI’s overseas operations were deposited
in the Department of State where they remained until
1953. The Voice of America was continued, albeit with
much reduced resources.3 The OSS evolved into the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and retained
a capability for clandestine influence measures and
black propaganda. The peacetime military placed
“psyops” and other information operations firmly on
the back burner.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The Beginning of the National Security Council
Process.
With the passage of the National Security Act and
the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) with
Public Law 80-253 of July 26, 1947, the national security
process began in the Harry Truman administration.4
Continuing the World War II interagency cooperation
and coordination begun by the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee established in 1944 at the
Assistant Secretary level and at the Secretary level in
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1945, the NSC attempted to give institutional stability
to national security policymaking. The NSC was
under the chairmanship of the President, with the
Secretaries of State and Defense as its key members.
Other original members included the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board. The President could
designate representatives of other executive agencies
to attend meetings. The CIA reported to the NSC, but
the Director of Central Intelligence was not a member;
he attended meetings as an observer and adviser. The
stated function of the NSC was to advise the President
on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
policies relating to national security and to facilitate
interagency cooperation. This vastly significant
legislation also created the position of Secretary of
Defense, the National Military Establishment, the CIA,
and the National Security Resources Board.5 Despite
the preponderance of military members, during the
Truman administration the NSC was dominated by
the Department of State. State’s Policy Planning Staff
drafted most NSC papers for discussion, approval, and
dissemination.6
From the beginning, strategic information was
reinvited to the table. An early National Security
Council document, NSC-4 entitled “Coordination of
Foreign Information Measures,” brought strategic
information in all of its forms to the forefront. The
document reads in part:
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NSC 4
Washington, December 17, 1947
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON
COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
The Problem
1. To determine what steps are required to strengthen and
coordinate all foreign information measures of the U.S. government
in furtherance of the attainment of U.S. national objectives.
Analysis
2. The USSR is conducting an intensive propaganda Campaign
directed primarily against the U.S. and is employing coordinated
psychological, political and economic measures designed to
undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. The
ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to undermine
the prestige of the U.S. and the effectiveness of its national policy
but to weaken and divide world public opinion to a point where
effective opposition to Soviet designs is no longer attainable by
political, economic or military means. . . .
3. The U.S. is not now employing strong, coordinated information
measures to counter this propaganda campaign or to further the
attainment of its national objectives.
4. None of the existing departments or agencies of the U.S.
Government is now charged with responsibility for coordinating
foreign information measures in furtherance of the attainment of
U.S. national objectives.
Conclusions
6. The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening
and coordination of all foreign information measures of the U.S.
Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries
in a direction favorable to the attainment of it objectives and to
counteract effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7
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The Memorandum goes on to charge the Secretary
of State with responsibility to formulate policies and
coordinate all information measures designed to
influence attitudes in foreign countries. The Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs was delegated to exercise
these functions for the Secretary, and he would be
assisted by an interagency staff.
In a separate Memorandum, NSC-4-A entitled
“Psychological Operations,” the NSC notes that there
are two related but separate purposes, i.e., (1) to ensure
that all overt foreign information activities are effectively
coordinated, and (2) to initiate steps looking toward
the conduct of covert psychological operations. NSC-4
dealt with overt methods and a separate document, a
directive to the Director of Central Intelligence, dealt
with the covert operations and established formal
institutionalization of covert operations.8 Perhaps the
most famous of these forays was CIA’s covert support
to The Congress for Cultural Freedom, established in
1950 which once had offices or representatives in some
35 countries.9
In 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board made up
of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence was
created to coordinate a U.S. response to unconventional
Soviet tactics. The Board worked closely with the NSC in
managing both overt and covert counteroperations.10
The U.S. Information Agency and the National
Security Council.
By 1953, psychological and influence operations
were considered sufficiently indispensable to the
conduct of foreign relations that a new entity was
created which assumed the mantle for civilian overseas
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information, and cultural and educational exchanges
activities authorized under the Information and
Cultural Exchanges Act (Public Law 402 of January
27, 1948), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. These
activities had previously been carried out by the
Department of State.11 In addition to these duties, the
new agency, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA),
was charged with responsibility for the Voice of
America, which eventually moved from its New York
studios to Washington, DC. The Dwight Eisenhower
administration, already well-disposed to what would
later come to be called “public diplomacy” as an
effective tool in the “war of ideas” against the Soviet
Union, not only brought the USIA into existence but
also codified the mission of the new agency in NSC
Document number 165/1.12 The Agency’s mission
remained virtually unchanged until its demise in
1999.
In recent years, there has been a belated recognition
that public diplomacy is an essential element in the
conduct of foreign relations. Essential it is, but it is not
the “silver bullet” or panacea that some pundits might
claim. Indeed, no one can claim that public diplomacy
in its many forms can solve America’s relationship
problems.
LOCALIZED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
A myth worth exploring is the notion that public
diplomacy works best when centrally planned and
focused on a single message or set of messages. Those
that believe this myth would have us believe that
nothing worthwhile in public diplomacy happens
without Washington’s direction.
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Anyone who has worked in public diplomacy
abroad—“in the field”—is aware of how important
on-the-ground experience and sensitivity to the local
milieu is to successful public diplomacy. Successful
public diplomacy campaigns are rarely “invented” in
Washington. Indeed, most of the “brilliant” ideas from
inside the Beltway are at best marginally successful
in an overseas context. They too often presuppose a
cookie cutter approach to the world with a one-sizefits-all policy line to which the hapless public diplomats
abroad are expected to tow.
If there is one concept that seems to elude the
political masters of the Washington bureaucracy, it is
that in public diplomacy it is all about context. Thus
a skilled practitioner of public diplomacy must find a
way to take the “flavor of the month” cooked up by
Washington and make it palatable to key contacts in
the host country. The public diplomacy officer must
find a way to place the message in a context that is both
understandable and reasonable (if not likeable) to the
target audience.
Three examples of localized public diplomacy
which, in the language of the old USIA was “field
driven” public diplomacy, illustrate what is meant
by “localized” public diplomacy. The examples are
illustrative of countless public diplomacy campaigns
over the past half century that originated in the field
rather than in the Washington bureaucracy, despite
the national security systems’ jealously guarded hold
on power.
The first takes place in communist Czechoslovakia
in the late 1970s and early 80s, the second in Finland
in the late 1980s, and the third in Thailand in the late
1990s. There is nothing inherently more profound about
these three choices versus the many other examples of
field-driven public diplomacy. They are all vignettes
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from this writer’s own public diplomacy career and
thus may be verified in their authenticity.13
Czechoslovakia.
In the waning days of World War II, as the Red
Army raced westward to Berlin and the Western allies
moved up the boot of Italy and across France to the
Rhine, Czechoslovakia, especially Bohemia, became
one of the last redoubts of the Nazis. Both the Russians
and the Americans moved to eliminate this potential
hold-out. General George Patton’s Third Army moved
aggressively into western Bohemia, and for a time it
appeared that he would be the first to enter Prague
and liberate that city. The communist-dominated
partisans in Prague called for the Red Army to liberate
the city, and thus Patton’s army slowed and met up
with the Red Army in the town of Rokycany just east
of Plzen (Pilsen). At the end of the war then, American
GIs occupied western and southern Bohemia, and the
Red Army occupied the remainder of the country.
As the Red Army was reluctant to leave, the GIs also
stayed on until there was a mutual withdrawal in
1946. During that interval, the American GIs and the
residents of western Bohemia seemed to have formed a
close friendship. After the war, dozens of monuments
were erected by local townspeople as tributes to their
American liberators.
Following the Communist Party coup of February
1948, the regime wished to create the myth that
it was the Red Army alone which liberated all of
Czechoslovakia from fascism. Honoring the GIs
was actively discouraged. After crushing the Prague
Spring with a Russian-led Warsaw Pact occupation
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the authorities took more
drastic measures. Ostensibly in “outrage” over
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the Vietnam War, local officials had many of the
monuments to American liberators removed and/or
destroyed. But the memory remained.
In part to look into the history of the American
liberation and in part as a cover for American military
attachés’ travel to border areas and districts of military
interest, the Defense Attaché’s Office at the American
Embassy in Prague in the late 1970s began a series of
automobile trips each May to the towns in western
Bohemia liberated by the United States. A similar series
of journeys was organized in November to visit crash
sites and monuments to fallen U.S. airmen in Slovakia.
Initially only Department of Defense (DoD) personnel
made the journeys but in the early 1980s, other personnel
from the Embassy, including U.S. Ambassador Jack
Matlock joined the small motorcade to Bohemia in
May each year. The visits to the sites where markers
once stood and to the small towns and villages was
very low key and attracted almost no notice, except for
the ubiquitous Statny Tanjy Bezpechnosti (STB or State
Secret Security) detail which shadowed the Americans.
Where a monument remained, a small wreath “from
the American people” was placed on the marker.
In May 1983, the newly arrived Public Affairs
Officer (PAO) joined the motor trips in May and
November and realized the potential that these
events might have for the United States to remind
the people of Czechoslovakia of the American role in
their liberation from the Nazis and also the enduring
interest and concern on the part of the United States
for the oppressed people of this communist state.
Beginning in 1984, the Embassy’s May and November
“wreath-layings”—as they came to be known—took
on a higher profile a and different character. All
embassy employees and their families were actively
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encouraged to join the motorcades which now grew
much larger, with up to two dozen vehicles moving
in tandem through the back roads and byways of
Bohemia. The dates and times of the “wreath-layings”
were announced through the Czechoslovak Service of
the Voice of America (VOA)—the most widely listenedto foreign radio station in Czechoslovakia, (known
euphemistically as “Prague Three” by most Czechs
who had two domestic networks). Radio Free Europe’s
(RFE) Czech and Slovak Services also announced
the events. The Public Affairs Office (aka The Press
and Cultural Service) was able to obtain thousands
of Czechoslovak-American crossed-flag lapel pins
from the U.S. émigré organization, the Czechoslovak
National Congress, VOA bumper stickers, lapel pins,
ballpoint pens, and other “souvenirs” for distribution
to well-wishers along the route.
By 1986, the Press and Cultural Service was
printing special commemorative postcards by the
thousands with a photo of GIs liberating Pilsen for mass
distribution to the by now thousands of Czechs lining
the route and participating in the ceremonies at each
site. Wreaths from “the American people” were placed
in each location where there had been a monument
whether removed or not, and American Ambassador
William Luers addressed large audiences in near-fluent
Czech recalling the friendship between Americans
and the people of Czechoslovakia. The STB observers
were beside themselves. The crowds were too large to
intimidate, and the secret police filming and taping the
events were hardly a secret but were largely ignored
by the crowds who often displayed American flags and
other expressions of support. Detailed reports of the
growing crowds and their enthusiasm were broadcast
back to Czechoslovakia by the VOA and RFE.
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This local initiative, from the early forays into the
Bohemian countryside in the late 1970s and especially
after 1984 brought the events to the level of a major
public diplomacy program, proved to be a huge
success. The program reinforced the belief among the
people of Czechoslovakia that the United States and
the West had not abandoned them and was actively
demonstrating that fact through the series of “wreathlayings” around the country. After the successful
Velvet Revolution in December 1989, which toppled
the communist government, the May Embassy
“wreath-layings” continued in 1990 and culminated
in an event in Pilsen at the newly restored Liberation
Monument in front of the city hall. More than 100,000
Czechs honored the American liberators of their city.
Finland.
In 1638 a small band of Swedish colonists (the
majority of whom happened to be Finns, then under
the rule of the Kingdom of Sweden) founded New
Sweden on the Delaware River, south of today’s
Philadelphia. Nearly 350 years later, a rather low-key
but well-organized effort commemorated this event
in both Sweden and Finland. The two countries and
the U.S. postal authorities had approved the issuance
of stamps to mark the occasion in 1988 and various
Swedish-American and Finish-American organization
were making plans to commemorate the event on both
sides of the Atlantic.
While studying the Finnish language and culture in
preparation for his assignment beginning in July 1987,
the future PAO learned about the 1988 anniversary,
and it triggered a series of ideas and plans to increase
the American profile in Finland and reinforce the
positive feelings for the United States that existed
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there. Recalling the slogan “America’s Bicentennial
Salute to Sri Lanka” from an earlier assignment, the
PAO recognized how successful it had been to bring
all public diplomacy programs—the routine ones as
well as those created just for the event—under a single
banner as the PAO had done in Sri Lanka in 1976.
Using this formula as a model, the incoming PAO,
in discussion with the Finnish Embassy in Washington
and the USIA and Department of State, began to
focus on 1988 as “The National Year of Friendship
with Finland.” Upon arrival in Finland, he was able
to convince Ambassador Rockwell Schnabel and
the Country Team of the value of using this event to
further U.S. public diplomacy goals in Finland. Within
a few months, an elaborate program of the National
Year of Friendship with Finland was announced and
underway. A logo for the Finnish-American Year of
Friendship was adopted by both the U.S. Embassy
and the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and soon this logo
was on everything from cultural presentations to
educational exchanges to publications and special
events. The U.S. Information Service alone listed
some 38 separate programs in honor of the “Year of
Friendship” which included an all-star program at the
prestigious Finlandia Hall featuring a video address to
the Finlandia audience (and the national TV audience)
by President Ronald Reagan on the importance of the
relationship between Finland and the United States
over the 350 years since the first Finn set foot in the
New World. The event also kicked off a 5-year $5
million dollar fund-raising campaign to increase the
number of Fulbright grantees between Finland and the
United States. The “Year of Friendship” culminated in
a visit to Finland by President Reagan, the first-ever by
a sitting U.S. president.

333

Among the benefits of this elaborate program in
cooperation with the Finnish Government was an
increased favorability rating for the United States
as a nation and for specific U.S. foreign policies as
measured by public opinion polls. The high level of
favorability proved to be important as Finland assumed
the Presidency of the Security Council just prior to the
Gulf War and played an important and positive role
which supported U.S. positions. Shortly thereafter
Finland bought its first-ever U.S. military aircraft when
a major contract was awarded for the F-16. This era of
good feeling between the United States and Finland
continued as the Baltic states gained their freedom from
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the
Soviet Union itself disintegrated shortly thereafter.
Thailand.
The Thai economy was one of the fastest growing
of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1990s. Construction
cranes (the national bird) were seen in every direction
in Bangkok, which went from a charmingly sleazy
backwater to New York on the Chao Priya River in
less than a decade. Wooden houses were replaced
by 60-story buildings, and tropical gardens in the
capital and similar scenes could be seen in other urban
centers throughout the country. Thailand became the
Detroit of Asia as dozens of automobile brands were
manufactured there for the Asian market and auto
parts makers proliferated. But this house of cards was
built on speculation and what came to be called “crony
capitalism” with loose banking practices, slip-shod
securities laws, and massive corruption; and it was all
about to come crashing down.
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The U.S.-Thai relationship has had its ups and
downs in the 156-year history of diplomatic relations.
Essentially, the relationship in Thai eyes was a classic
pi-non relationship, that is, an elder brother-younger
brother relationship with the United States as the pi
and Thailand as the non. It was the pi’s responsibility to
look out for the non, to assist when needed, to protect
and to guide the non. The non’s responsibility was to
be loyal to the pi and to follow the pi’s lead. This pinon relationship survived the military dictatorships
in Thailand’s post-war era, the Vietnam War, and
American withdrawal from Southeast Asia and seemed
unshakeable in July 1997.
Earlier in the year there had been “runs” on several
international currencies by hedge fund operators, the
most famous being George Soros’ run on the British
pound which netted him hundreds of millions of
dollars in profit. In July 1997 it became the Thai baht’s
turn to be attacked by currency traders, and it proved
to be the beginning of a cascade of economic troubles
that caused first the Thai baht to crumble, and then the
Thai financial system to crash, and eventually the Thai
economy to come tumbling down. A run on a country’s
currency can be overcome easily if the underlying
fundamentals of the economy are sound. But in
Thailand’s case, the fundamentals were in a shambles
thanks to the crony capitalism and corruption of the
banking and securities sectors.
Thailand became the first of the Asian Tigers to fall,
but it soon had company. Indonesia and then South
Korea followed in Thailand’s footsteps and for many
of the same reasons. When the dust had settled, the
Thai baht went from about 24 to the dollar to about
55 to the dollar. Thousands of workers in the financial
sector were suddenly without a job when their banks
and securities firms closed their doors.
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This is essentially an economic story, but it relates
to public diplomacy because at its heart is the pi-non
relationship. When Thailand’s economy crashed,
it looked to the United States for help. But the U.S.
Treasury Department, looking through the framework
of economics, not public diplomacy, looked at Thailand
and saw that it basically got what it deserved for
not having its house in order. The State Department
deferred to the Treasury in all things having to do
with economics and finance. So the United States did
nothing when Thailand’s crash came. Puzzled and
resentful, the Thai saw the United States as abandoning
Thailand, and renouncing the pi-non relationship when
the going got tough.
Newspaper editorials pointed to the United States
as the cause of Thailand’s woes. George Soros and
other western currency traders were vilified, and by
implication Western governments, especially the
United States, were seen as responsible for the collapse
throughout Asia. As if this was not bad enough, the
U.S. Government decided that things were beginning
to get out of hand in Asia and announced that it would
bail out Indonesia and South Korea with billions of
dollars in credit. This was like throwing gasoline on a
fire in Thailand. The Thai media and influential Thais
across the spectrum of society exploded in indignation.
The United States would not help Thailand but would
help Indonesia! Thailand was one of the five U.S. treaty
allies in the Pacific, it was a functioning democracy, it
was a loyal U.S. ally, and took its lead from the United
States. Indonesia was none of these things—not a
treaty ally nor even an informal ally, a dictatorship not
a democracy; and Indonesia, more often than not, was
at odds with the United States.
A major financial decision had been made in
Washington without input from two important
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sources—first, there was no consultation with regard
to the public diplomacy dimension of this decision in
any of the countries affected, and, second, there was
no consultation with the Embassy in Bangkok which
actually understood the situation in Thailand. Even
before this unfortunate decision was made, the PAO
had outlined a series of public diplomacy strategic and
tactical measures to explain U.S. policy to the Thai and
limit the damage to the relationship. Following the
announcement about aid for Indonesia, Ambassador
William Itoh and the Country Team met to develop an
overall strategy to cope with this near rupture of the
relationship.
Public diplomacy was a central part of the strategy,
which also included convincing State and Treasury to
reverse course and provide an aid package for Thailand
at least proportional to the aid package proposed for
other countries. DoD was called upon through the
Defense Attaché’s Office and the Joint U.S. Military
Assistance Group to cancel an outstanding contract for
F-16 aircraft and parts which would free up hundreds
of millions of dollars for the Thai Government.
The U.S. Information Service’s public diplomacy
strategy focused on several fronts. Because of the crash
of the Thai economy and currency, many of the 8,000
Thai students in American higher education were
suddenly without the financial means to continue
their education. For the United States, this meant wellpublicized and immediate assistance from public and
private sector sources to provide work-study and
loan opportunities for Thai and other Asian students,
and the Institute for International Education and
American higher educational institutions took the
lead. In addition, the Public Affairs Section proposed
to Washington that a special high profile scholarship
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program be established for 156 students selected
by the Thai Government to attend U.S. universities
for 3 years. The 156 was linked to the 156 years of
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and
the total funding for the scholarship program provided
through Economic Assistance Funds and administered
by AID came to about $3 million. This is a tiny sum
when compared to the $4 billion in loan guarantees
provided to Thailand or the nearly $1 billion in debt
cancelled by recalling the F-16 contract, but because it
involved people, not hardware or loans, it registered
with the Thai public as real help from America. Other
smaller exchange programs were augmented too, like
the Fulbright Program and other government-funded
internships; but the 156 scholarships made the biggest
headlines.
Determined to demonstrate that the United States
was interested in Thailand, the Embassy encouraged
as many high level visitors as possible to visit Bangkok.
For its part, the U.S. Information Service used each
of these cabinet level or equivalent visits to get the
message out that the United States was interested in
Thailand and would do whatever it could to ease the
burden during a difficult economic time. Every high
level visitor held a press conference and interviews with
Thai media, made highly visible public appearances,
and consistently expressed the deep concern of the
United States for Thailand and the Thai people. It was
a rare week in 1998 when a U.S. cabinet-level official,
congressional delegation, or senior military officer
did not visit Thailand with a full public diplomacy
program.
Recognizing that there was a reservoir of good will
in Thailand built up over many years and reinforced by
the visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1996, another
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key component of the public diplomacy strategy focused
on reaching out to the gatekeepers of information and
the “influencers” in the society to make the case for the
United States. The PAO arranged a series of lunches
with key editorial boards and influential columnists
to provide them with briefings on the complexities of
international finance and currency speculation. U.S.
Ambassador William Itoh, the fluent Thai-speaking
Deputy Chief of Mission Ralph Boyce, the Embassy’s
entire economic reporting section, and public
diplomacy officers were all mobilized to this effort. In
the end, it was Thai columnists, commentators, and
editorial writers who put the Asian financial debacle
in context and into the proper perspective for their
readers, listeners, and viewers.
The United States emerged not as the villain it
appeared to be when it ignored Thailand’s crisis but
rather as the prime mover in rectifying a corrupt
and mismanaged financial system in Thailand and
in other Asian countries. This was seen as an act of
responsibility worthy of the pi. Ironically, despite their
own best efforts in aiding Thailand, it was Japan that
was blamed for the instability in the Asian financial
world because it continually postponed reforms to its
own banking and financial sector. In opinion polling
following the resolution of the financial crisis, the U.S.
favorability level was nearly identical with the high
mark it had reached immediately after the Clinton visit
in 1996.
With this background on the reality of public
diplomacy as it works in the field, we can return to
the more complex battles for control of strategic
information within the Washington bureaucracy and
the National Security Council system.
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THE NSC AND INFORMATION
The NSC system evolved into the principal arm
of the president in forming and executing military,
international, and internal security polices in the
Eisenhower administration.14 President Eisenhower
was more comfortable with the NSC concept than was
Truman, and he created a highly structured system of
integrated policy review based on the Cutler Report.
This system was described as the “policy hill” process
wherein drafts from the agencies moved up from
the agency level through an NSC Planning Board
for review and refinement before reaching the NSC
for consideration. At that time, the NSC consisted of
five statutory members: the President, Vice President,
Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of
the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the
subject matter for discussion, other Cabinet members
and advisors including the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Director of Central Intelligence would participate.
The President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs was a facilitator of the decisionmaking system,
oversaw the recommendations coming up and down
“the hill,” and briefed and summarized discussions but
unlike National Security Advisors from the Kennedy
administration to the present, had no substantive role
in the process.
President Eisenhower created the Operations and
Coordinating Board (OCB) to make sure that decisions
taken by the NSC were followed-up. Meeting weekly
at the Department of State, the OCB was composed of
the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (chair),
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Directors of the
CIA and the new U.S. Information Agency, Special
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Assistants to the President for National Security
Affairs and Security Operations Coordination. Some
40 interagency working groups reported to the OCB
which had its own staff of 24 to support the working
groups.15
The Eisenhower NSC provided regular, fullystaffed, interagency reviews of major national security
issues which resulted in decisions at the highest level.
Eisenhower himself was fully committed to the process
and chaired 329 of the 366 NSC meetings that took
place in his 8 years as President. While the NSC was in
charge of the policy review process, the Department of
State continued to exercise, under the strong hand of
Secretary John Foster Dulles, full control over the dayto-day operations of foreign policy.16
The Eisenhower NSC system was sharply
criticized, however, notably in the hearings conducted
in 1960-61 by the Senate Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery (aka the Jackson Subcommittee),
for being inflexible, overstaffed, unable to anticipate
and react to immediate crises, and weighed down by
committees. President Kennedy strongly agreed with
the Jackson Subcommittee critique and immediately
moved to cut the NSC staff and to simplify the foreign
policymaking process, making it more intimate. The
OCB was abolished, and the NSC no longer was
required to monitor the implementation of policies.
President Kennedy also installed McGeorge Bundy as
the National Security Advisor, and the responsibilities
and authorities of the NSC Advisor grew throughout
the Kennedy years.17
In the realm of strategic information, this redefinition of the NSC and the abolition of the OCB took the
wind out of the sails of the new Director of the USIA,
the renowned CBS radio and TV newsman Edward R.

341

Murrow, who expected to wield considerable influence
in the new administration. Murrow was unaware of the
future diminished role of the NSC when he accepted
the USIA position and was soon outflanked by some of
his own subordinates with strong personal ties to the
White House.18
Murrow found himself and his agency marginalized
despite the fact that he was often invited to attend NSC
meetings. The real decisionmaking lay elsewhere,
leaving Murrow more visible but less influential that
his predecessors under Eisenhower.
The NSC met less and less frequently and some of
its activities were taken up by a more select body, the
“Standing Group.” By April 1963 the Standing Group
was reconstituted with McGeorge Bundy as its chairman and a membership that included the UnderSecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the
JCS, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Director
of USIA, and the Administrator of AID.19 Strategic
communications, in the form of USIA, was back at the
table at least at the operational level, but it was too late
for the seriously ill Murrow, and the Kennedy years
were nearing an end.
Lyndon Johnson had even less faith in the NSC
process than his predecessor. He considered the NSC
to be a “leaky sieve” and preferred small intimate
groups for decisionmaking. Johnson’s relationship with
USIA and military information operations—and thus
with strategic information—was defined and shaped
almost entirely by the Vietnam War. Illustrative of the
widened role for strategic information due to the war
was Johnson’s National Security Action Memorandum,
No. 32520 which responded to the USIA Director’s
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suggestions for an information strategy in Vietnam. It
reads in part:
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 325
TO: THE DIRECTOR, U. S. INFORMATION AGENCY
1. I have reviewed your memorandum of March 16 on the
informational and psychological warfare programs in South
Vietnam. With the exception noted in paragraph 5 [regarding Viet
Cong defectors], I hereby give my general approval to the rapid
and effective execution of the improvements you propose. This
approval is subject to review and concurrence by Ambassador
[Maxwell] Taylor . . . .
2. By copy of this memorandum I request the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence, and
the Administrator of the Agency for International Development
to give all possible support to an intensified information and
psychological warfare program along the lines developed in your
report.
3. By copy of this memorandum, I request the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget to review with you and as necessary with
other agencies the financial implications of such an intensified
program and to make his recommendation to me as to the best
way of meeting any additional costs.
4. Meanwhile you are directed to proceed with all necessary
actions on the firm understanding that it is my fixed policy that
any worthwhile undertaking shall not be inhibited or delayed
in any way by financial restrictions. We can and will find the
resources we need for all good programs in Vietnam. [Emphasis
added]

Rarely does the strategic information function find
itself in such an enviable position with the implication
at least that there is a blank check for information and
psychological operations.
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The Richard Nixon National Security Council
process was so dominated by Henry Kissinger, first
as National Security Advisor, then as the dual-hatted
NSC Advisor and Secretary of State, that strategic
communication was a top-down decision no less
than any other, and all decisions were made without
reference to the NSC process.21 The administration paid
less and less attention to overseas strategic information
and more and more attention to domestic information
management as the Watergate crisis mounted.
The Ford administration brought Kissinger’s deputy
Brent Scowcroft in to replace him as NSC Advisor,
bowing to congressional disapproval of having so
much foreign policy power in the hands of a single
individual. Kissinger continued as Secretary of State,
and Scowcroft managed a cordial relationship with
his former boss while instituting a more low-key NSC
coordination role.22 Strategic communication drifted as
though on auto-pilot.
INFORMATION BECOMES COMMUNICATION
President Jimmy Carter entered office with no
particular design for strategic information but with
the plan to merge the State Department’s Cultural
Exchanges Bureau (CU) into USIA and to soften the
hard edge of “information” in the process.23 Carter
eliminated the word “information” from the foreign
policy lexicon and replaced it with “communication.”
Thus, the USIA was augmented by the addition
of a reluctant partner (CU) to form the Educational
and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the newly named
International Communication Agency or USICA.
USIA, the propaganda agency, was no more. But in
field operations overseas, the USICA looked too much
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like the USCIA for many people, an unfortunate error
of judgment on Washington’s part that caused no
end of irritation for those implementing information,
cultural, and educational programs at U.S. embassies
and consulates overseas.
Jimmy Carter came into office determined to
eliminate the abuses of the NSC system under
Kissinger, and envisaged the role of the NSC to be
one of policy coordination and research. The structure
of the NSC was changed to ensure that the NSC
Advisor would be but one of many advisors. Carter
also reduced the staff by 50 percent, and reduced the
number of standing committees from eight to two: a
Policy Review Committee (PRC) usually chaired by
a department, most often the State Department and
the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC), always
chaired by the NSC Advisor.24
The Carter NSC has been criticized for failing to
monitor implementation of the President’s policies.
In addition, because there were no clearly developed
foreign policy principles other than arms control (the
prerogative of the SCC), the President frequently
changed his mind depending on who offered advice last.
Carter’s informality complicated the decisionmaking
process. Often no formal records of decisions were
made, leading to indecision and embarrassment.25
As an example of the scant regard the Carter
administration had for strategic information, when the
new President’s U.S. National Strategy was formulated
and disseminated, not so much as a carbon copy of the
document ever reached the USICA, but copies did go,
in addition to the Vice President and the Secretaries
of State and Defense, to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central
Intelligence. The Top Secret Presidential Directive/
NSC-18 set out the foreign policy priorities of the nation
and the means to achieve them.26 An examination of
the now mainly unclassified document [passages
relating to military strategy, policy, and practices are
still redacted] reveals that among the means to achieve
U.S. foreign policy priorities, there is no mention of
any method of strategic information overt or covert,
civilian or military. For Carter, strategic information
just did not exist—after all, he had eliminated the word
from the foreign policy lexicon in 1978.
ZENITH OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
If there is any certainty in the ways of Washington,
it is that the pendulum always swings back. And
the pendulum on strategic information swung back
dramatically with the beginning of the presidency
of Ronald Reagan. It is no exaggeration to state that
the Reagan administration was the zenith of strategic
communication. Reagan, “the great communicator”
himself, knew the business of persuasion very well
indeed. He chose as his Director of the USICA—hastily
renamed the U.S. Information Agency—Charles Z.
Wick, a close Hollywood confident and family friend
with constant and instant access to the President.27
A series of National Security Decision Directives
increased and institutionalized the access, the power,
and the scope of Wick’s agency and brought public
diplomacy not only to the table of the NSC but to the
very center of the foreign policy process. Five key NSC
documents trace the growth of strategic information
within the Reagan administration. They are NSDD 77,
NSDD 130, NSDD 186, NSDD 266, and NSDD 276. All
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five of the key documents have been declassified and
are available through the Reagan Library, Simi Valley,
California.28
In National Security Decision Directive Number 77
entitled “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative
to National Security,”29 the President states: “I have
determined that it is necessary to strengthen the
organization, planning, and coordination of the various
aspects of public diplomacy of the U.S. Government
relative to national security.” NSDD 77 established a
Special Planning Group (SPG) of the NSC under the
chairmanship of the NSC Advisor and consisting of
the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of
the USIA, the Director of AID and the Assistant to the
President for Communications. The role of the SPG was
“to be responsible for the overall planning, direction,
coordination, and monitoring of implementation of
public diplomacy activities.”30
Four interagency standing committees reporting to
the SPG were established by NSDD 77. The committees
would receive support from the NSC staff and periodic
guidance from the SPG which would review their
activities for proper implementation of policy and to
determine resource priorities. The committees were:
• The Public Affairs Committee: Co-chaired by the
Assistant to the President for Communications
and the Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The committee was
responsible for planning and coordinating U.S.
Government public affairs activities relative
to national security, e.g., major speeches on
national security and public appearances by
senior officials.
• The International Information Committee: Chaired
by a senior representative of USIA; vice
chaired by a senior representative of the State
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Department. The committee was responsible
for planning, coordinating, and implementing
international information activities in support
of U.S. policies and interests. The committee also
was empowered to make recommendations and,
as appropriate, direct the concerned agencies,
interagency groups, and working groups with
respect to information strategies in key policy
areas.
• The International Political Committee: Chaired by a
senior representative of the Department of State;
vice-chaired by a senior representative of USIA.
The committee was responsible for planning,
coordinating, and implementing international
political activities in support of U.S. policies
and interests, including aid, training, and
organizational support for foreign governments
and private groups to encourage the growth of
democratic political institutions and practices.
• The International Broadcasting Committee:
Chaired by a representative of the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs. The
committee was responsible for the planning
and coordination of international broadcasting
activities sponsored by the U. S. Government.
The next major addition to the institutional buildup of strategic information came with National
Security Decision Directive Number 130, “U.S.
International Information Policy.” The Directive31
calls international information an integral and vital
part of U.S. national security policy and strategy and,
along with other elements of public diplomacy, a key
strategic instrument for shaping fundamental political
and ideological trends. NSDD 130 cites a need for
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sustained commitment to improving the quality and
effectiveness of U.S. international information efforts,
the level of resources devoted to them, and their
coordination with other elements of national security
policy and strategy. Of interest, the document also
calls for a greater role for international information
considerations in formulating policies.
The document addresses in some detail an
international
information
strategy,
including
international radio broadcasting; other international
information instruments such as publications, new
technologies, cooperation with the private sector,
overcoming barriers to communication; strategically
targeted information and communications assistance
to other nations; psychological factors in maintaining
the confidence of allied governments and in deterring
military action; and the capability by the armed forces
to have an immediate and effective use of psychological
operations in crisis and in wartime. Revitalization and
full integration of psychological operations in military
operations is declared to be an important priority for
DoD. The NSDD concludes with a series of functional
requirements related to international information
and the approval of the establishment of the Foreign
Opinion Research Advisory Group. In National
Security Decision Directive 223, “Implementing the
Geneva Exchanges Initiative,” the “softer side” of
public diplomacy became the subject of presidential
attention. This directive,32 following on the heels of the
Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting in Geneva in 1986
and the Geneva Exchanges Initiative, was aimed at
enhancing bilateral cooperation at all levels; including
through educational and student exchanges, people-topeople programs, media, and information exchanges,
and consultations.
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The President noted that he attached “high
priority to the exchanges initiative” and requested all
relevant U.S. Government agencies to give it a high
priority also and “to render every possible assistance
to implementation.” A new Interagency Group on
the President’s Geneva Exchanges Initiatives was
established, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for
European and Soviet Affairs. A new Office of the
Coordinator for the President’s U.S.-Soviet Exchanges
Initiative was established at USIA to work with USIA
and other agencies and the private sector to develop
programs in the agreed areas and work on new
initiatives. The remainder of the NSDD 223 detailed
the duties and responsibilities of the coordinator and
his relationship to existing offices and programs.
THE SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
The President’s Special Review Board (or the
Tower Board chaired by Senator John Tower)
submitted its Report to the President on February 26,
1987. In a nationwide address on March 4, President
Reagan announced that he endorsed the Board’s
recommendations and intended to go beyond them in
rebuilding the NSC process to repair the damage done
by the Iran-Contra Affair.
NSDD 266 details specific steps in implementing the
Board’s recommendation and other reforms.33 Much
of the document goes beyond the scope of the current
discussion and addresses the statutory responsibilities
and membership of the NSC in some detail. The
document must be seen in the perspective of the IranContra hearings and the revelation of covert activities
undertaken by staff of the NSC. Much of the document
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addresses these issues. From the perspective of strategic
information, however, the following passage in Section
I. A., “Organizing for National Security,” is relevant:
The Directors of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and United States Information
Agency are special statutory advisors to the NSC.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency shall be the principal advisor to the President,
the Secretary of State and the NSC on arms control and
disarmament matters. The Director of the United States
Information Agency shall be the principal advisor to
the President, the Secretary of State, and the NSC on
international informational, educational, and cultural
matters. [Emphasis added]

The Directive goes on to spell out in detail the role
of the National Security Advisor, the NSC staff, the
NSC and the Interagency Process, including meetings,
the process, covert action, use of nongovernment
personnel, the intelligence process, and reporting.
Among the directives is a prohibition on conduct of
covert activities by NSC staff.
Continuing the damage control from the IranContra Scandal, NSDD 27634 provides additional
detailed guidance on the “National Security Council
Interagency Process.” The President defines five
groupings within the NSC process, defines their
authority, membership, and prerogatives. The five are:
(1) National Security Council, (2) National Security
Planning Group (NSPG), (3) Senior Review Group
(SRG), (4) The Policy Review Group (PRG), and (5)
Other Interagency Groups. According to NSDD 276:
Within their respective areas of authority as set forth
in NSDD 266, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
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of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the Director of the USIA may approve the continuation of
existing senior interagency groups to the extent necessary
or desirable to promote an effective NSC process; by June
30, 1987, the National Security Advisor shall be notified
of those interagency groups they have determined shall
continue to function.35

THE POST COLD WAR CHILL
In contrast to the Reagan years, President George
H. W. Bush’s NSC held itself aloof from strategic
communication. Unlike the rare Reagan-Wick personal
relationship, the President’s relationships with USIA
Director Gelb and later with Director Henry Catto were
more in the norm and not based on long-term family
friendships but on political relationships, and as such,
were more distant. Charles Wick was the last USIA
Director to enjoy instant access to the President.36
With a strong background in international affairs,
CIA Director, UN Ambassador, Ambassador to China,
and 8 years as Vice President, George H. W. Bush made
wholesale changes to the NSC, even following the
reforms in 1987.37 President Bush’s NSD-138 provided a
new charter for the NSC, the Policy Review Group was
enlarged to a Committee, the Deputy National Security
Advisor named as chair of the Deputies Committee
and a Principals Committee screened matters for the
NSC. Eight Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs)
were formed to absorb regional and functional
responsibilities.
Public Diplomacy was not shut out of the NSC
process as it had been under President Jimmy Carter
or marginalized to a lesser extent as in the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon administrations, but in contrast
to the Eisenhower years, and especially the Reagan

352

administration, the influence of strategic information
was weak.39
A blow to USIA came with the unexpected and
sudden dissolution of the USSR in 1991 after releasing its
grip on the Warsaw Pact with the end of the Berlin Wall
and the beginning of the Velvet Revolution in Prague.
The absence of “an enemy” created the absence of the
long-time rationale for American public diplomacy,
especially the robust public diplomacy of the Cold War
era. The George H. W. Bush administration decided to
take a “peace dividend” and cut the USIA budget in
each succeeding year.40
This lack of enthusiasm for public diplomacy was
adhered to and expanded upon by the new President.
The Clinton administration preserved some key public
diplomacy programs, notably the Fulbright Academic
Exchanges in a kind of posthumous salute to Bill
Clinton’s mentor and fellow Rhoads Scholar, Senator
J. William Fulbright. But the Clinton administration
continued the sharp cuts to the overall public diplomacy
budget, especially in international information
programs which suffered near catastrophic declines.41
By the beginning of the second Clinton term, the
indications that USIA’s days were numbered grew more
obvious. In 1998, there was an Executive-Legislative
agreement to “merge” USIA (and originally also
USAID) into the Department of State. The ostensible
rationale was that this would not only save money but
would bring public diplomacy closer to the center of
foreign policy formulation. In truth, the accommodation
worked out between Secretary Madeleine Albright
and Senator Jesse Helms was a compromise to achieve
funding for the current U.S. contribution and previous
year’s arrears to the United Nations (UN).
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The Clinton administration gained funding,
including the significant backlog in funding for the U.S.
contribution to the UN. In return, Senator Helms was
to have his long time wish fulfilled—the emasculation
of USAID‘s independence and influence in Congress
by being placed within the Department of State. USIA’s
dismemberment was simply a bonus. In the negotiations
that followed, USAID escaped confinement within
State and emerged a weakened but still independent
voice in the foreign policy establishment, but USIA,
already weakened by years of budget cuts after the Cold
War, was extinguished as an entity. (See the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. Public
Law 105-277.) On October 1, 1999, the Agency’s public
diplomacy personnel and functions were scattered
throughout the State Department bureaucracy, and
its largest component was shorn away entirely as the
Voice of America and the other broadcasting entities
were placed with the independent Broadcasting Board
of Governors (BBG).42
It takes no great imagination to realize that the
dismantling of the USIA, the dissolution of its personnel
and functions with the State Department bureaucracy,
and the creation of a BBG responsible to no one (not
the Secretary of State, not even the President) is a
compound and nearly fatal blow to the ability of the
United States to project a global information strategy.
We now examine the present situation in the years
following the reorganization of the foreign affairs
agencies and what future role that strategic information
may have in the National Security Council process.
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AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS AND REINVENTING
THE WHEEL
In the waning days of the existence of the USIA,
the Clinton National Security Council on April 30,
1999, issued a still classified Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 68 on International Public Information.
The directive, according to published media reports at
the time and the website of the Federation of American
Scientists, was issued to “address problems identified
during military missions in Kosovo and Haiti, when
no single U.S. agency was empowered to coordinate
U.S. efforts to sell its policies and to counteract bad
press abroad.”43 In addition, with the soon-to-beaccomplished “merger” of USIA into the Department
of State, the existing NSC Directive, NSDD 77 issued
in the Reagan administration would be inoperative,
and PDD-68 was seen as a replacement for the Reagan
document.
Senior officials of the Departments of State and
Defense, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, the CIA and
the FBI, according to public sources, were designated
as members of the International Public Information
(IPI) Core Group. The Core Group was to be chaired by
the soon-to-be-created position of Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Department. The IPI Core Group was to “assist efforts in defeating adversaries.” The U.S. intelligence community
would “play a crucial role . . . for identifying hostile
foreign propaganda and deception that targets the
U.S.” In addition, again according to public reports,
the IPI was designed to “influence foreign audiences”
in support of U.S. foreign policy and to counteract
propaganda by enemies of the United States.
Reportedly, the IPI Core Group Charter stated that:
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• IPI control over “international military
information” was intended to “influence the
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals.”
• “The objective of IPI is to synchronize the
informational objectives, themes, and messages
that will be projected overseas . . . to prevent
and mitigate crises and to influence foreign
audiences in ways favorable to the achievement
of U.S. foreign policy objectives.”
• Information distributed through IPI should be
designed not “to mislead foreign audiences” and
that information programs “must be truthful.”
• [Regarding the likelihood that foreign media
reports are reflected in American media,
information aimed at domestic audiences
should] “be coordinated, integrated, deconflicted and synchronized with the [IPI Core
Group] to achieve a synergistic effect for
strategic information activities.”44
One might term PDD 68 merely “reinventing the
wheel” but because the existing mechanism (NSDD77) was being “deconstructed” along with the USIA,
some means to coordinate strategic information had to
be found.
The PDD 68 system likely might have worked had
it become operational. However, because the incoming
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, Evelyn Lieberman, was reluctant to sit down at
the same table with the intelligence community, only
one meeting of the IPI Core Group occurred during
the Clinton administration. It was left to working level
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bureaucrats to attempt to coordinate their international
information activities in the absence of leadership from
above.
A NEW DIRECTION
The George W. Bush administration’s first National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-1) organized the
NSC process to the desires of the new administration.
NSPD-1 replaced the system of Presidential Decision
Directive and Presidential Review Directives as an
instrument for communicating presidential decisions
about national security policies. The document listed
the NSC attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory),
the role of the Vice President presiding in the absence
of the President, the strong agenda determining role
of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the NSC’s relationship with the National
Economic Council (NEC). The directive also continued
the role of the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)
and the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). NSPD-1
further set out the organization of the NSC process as
follows:
Management of the development and implementation
of national security policies by multiple agencies of the
United States Government shall usually be accomplished
by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/
PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day to day
fora for interagency coordination of national security
policy.45

Six regional NSC/PCCs, chaired by an official of Under
Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank as designated by
the Secretary of State, were established. In addition,
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“topical” or functional NSC/PCCs were established as
follows:
• Democracy, Human Rights and International
Operations
• International Development and Humanitarian
Assistance
• Global Environment
• International Finance
• Transnational Economic Issues
• Counterterrorism and National Preparedness
• Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and
Planning
• Arms Control
• Proliferation, Counter proliferation, and
Homeland Defense
• Intelligence and Counterintelligence
• Records Access and Information Security
There was no NSC/PCC designated for Strategic
Information, Public Diplomacy, or Foreign Information
Activities. The closest approximation was in the PCC
on Democracy, Human Rights, and International
Operations. NSPD 1 also abolished by March 1, 2001,
the existing system of Interagency Working Groups and
other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies,
and executive committees, except for those established
by statute.46 Of immediate practical concern in the
field of strategic information, the IPI Core Group was
among the casualties, and no replacement organization
or group was named. Strategic Information or Public
Diplomacy did not appear to be a high priority in the
early days of the new administration.
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11), the Bush administration found itself in need
of a strategic information policy and a structure to
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deal with the acknowledged crisis in American public
diplomacy. There was a general recognition that in
the absence of an agency like the USIA, there was no
central focus for public diplomacy, and the record of
the State Department in public diplomacy since the
“anschluss” which brought USIA into the Department
was generally recognized to have been a failure.47
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS
The solution might have been to resurrect the USIA
or create a similar agency either within or outside the
State Department as a number of reports and studies
recommended.48 Instead, the White House called forth
a White House solution by creating a new White House
Office of Global Communications (OGC) headed by
a Deputy Assistant to the President. According to
the Executive Order setting up the Office, the OGC’s
mission was
to advise the President, the heads of appropriate offices
within the Executive Office of the President and the heads
of executive departments and agencies on utilization of the
most effective means for the U.S. Government to ensure
consistency in messages that will promote the interests
of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding,
build support for and among coalition partners of the
United States, and inform international audiences.49

Among the functions of the new Office were:
• assessment of methods and strategies (except
for “special activities,” i.e., covert operations) to
deliver information to audiences abroad;
• development of a strategy for disseminating
truthful, accurate and effective messages about
the United States, its government and policies,
and the American people and culture;
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• coordination of the creation of temporary teams
of communicators for short-term placement in
areas of high global interest and media attention
(however no team could be deployed without
prior consultation with the Departments of
State and Defense and prior notification to the
NSC Advisor);
• encouragement of the use of state of the art
media and technology.
While on the surface, the Office of Global Communication appeared to be a solution of sorts for the lack of direction and leadership in the strategic communication/
public affairs arena, there were built-in flaws in the
system that would prevent the OGC from being very
effective in any of its functions. Chief among these
flaws was that the OGC was outside the NSC process
and the interagency system. The Executive Order itself
stated that “nothing in this order shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect any function assigned by law
or by the President to the National Security Council or
to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.” Further, the Executive Order noted that it
did not alter “existing authorities of any agency.”50
Given the inherent weaknesses in the structure and
authorities of the Office of Global Communications, it
surprised few observers to note the steady decline in
the OGC’s relevance and its eventual and unheralded
disappearance from the White House organization
chart in 2005.
FUSION
Just as in the Clinton administration, for most of the
Bush administration a rough form of coordination and
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cooperation among working level professionals from
the public diplomacy bureaus of the State Department
and elements of DoD, USAID, and other agencies held
the threads together while waiting for senior leaders to
decide what form an international information strategy
would take. The so-called “Fusion Team” which meets
in State Annex 44 (the former USIA Headquarters
Building) is the best example of keeping this flame alive.
While the Fusion Team has an important function no
doubt, it is no substitute for a top to bottom interagency
process on strategic information which has not been
evident since the end of the Reagan administration.
WHO’S IN CHARGE?
The Department of State inherited public
diplomacy from the USIA and would be expected to
lead the effort on strategic information. Regrettably,
for numerous reasons outlined in the nearly 30
reports and recommendations by public and private
organizations designed to rescue public diplomacy
from its current nadir, this State Department leadership
did not materialize.51 Without going into the details of
systemic failure to utilize properly the resources of
public diplomacy inherited by the Department in this
venue, one can point to the lack of long-term, unified,
and consistent leadership over public diplomacy as
one major cause.
A succession of short-term leaders has presided
over public diplomacy in the Department of State since
October 1999. Under Secretary Evelyn Lieberman’s
largely ineffective tenure ended with the Republican
victory in 2000. After a lengthy transition, advertising
executive Charlotte Beers was sworn in only a few
weeks after 9/11. Her tenure was tortured and brief,
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and when she departed “for personal reasons,” she
was succeeded by an interim replacement, Assistant
Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs Patricia
Harrison, until the administration was able to convince
Ambassador to Morocco Margaret Tutweiler to take
up the challenge. Within a few months, Tutweiler, who
arrived stating that she would stay only for a short
time, left for Wall Street and was replaced again on an
interim basis by Harrison. In a surprise appointment,
President Bush announced that his close confidant and
communications advisor, Karen Hughes, would take
up the post of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, but the new appointment would
not be taken up for nearly 5 months due to family
commitments. Even under the best of circumstances,
with this kind of revolving door in leadership, it is
hard to imagine an effective public diplomacy strategy
being undertaken.
To Ms. Hughes’ credit, she and her Deputy, Dina
Powell, “hit the ground running” with a series of
outreach encounters and listening tours at home and
abroad. Hughes appeared to recognize the most serious
flaw in the foreign affairs reorganization of 1998-99, i.e.,
that there is no unity of command or central authority
over public diplomacy in the Department of State. If
anything, there is even less unity in the interagency
process regarding strategic communication. Input
over assignments, resources, and administrative issues
can lead to input over policy and strategy, but in the
absence of any influence over officers in the field, an
Under Secretary is powerless to manage the program
responsibilities, and public diplomacy is a programintensive function. A number of alleged “fixes” were
made in the Department to strengthen Hughes’
position within the bureaucracy, including assigning
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one regional deputy assistant secretary in each regional
bureau to be in charge of public diplomacy and
giving (in theory at least) the Under Secretary shared
line authority over that position with the regional
assistant secretary. Evaluation, budgeting, and other
administrative functions for State Department public
diplomacy bureaus and offices reported to the Under
Secretary rather than to individual bureau heads,
thanks to Hughes’ insistence.
Other minor measures could be taken within
the authority of the Department to centralize the
Under Secretary’s role in public diplomacy. Still, as
numerous outside reports point out, only so much can
be done within the existing flawed structure. Hughes
apparently came to realize this and departed for the
greener pastures of the private sector in 2008. After a
lengthy Senate hold on his nomination, a new Under
Secretary, James Glassman, was sworn in with only a
few months left in the Bush administration. Glassman,
formerly with the BBG, has a keen understanding of
public diplomacy and has made an impressive start in
what is surely a lame duck role. There is little time for
the kind of dramatic change that is required to revitalize
public diplomacy no matter how valiant the effort on
Glassman’s part. Eventually perhaps, Congress will
tire of a band-aid approach to fixing public diplomacy
and decide to undo or redo the reorganization of the
foreign affairs agencies so badly botched in 1998-99. In
the meantime, America’s strategic information may be
neither strategic nor very informative.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The 2005 report by the Public Diplomacy Council,
A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy, made the case that
it may be impossible to turn back the clock and recreate
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the independent USIA, complete with responsibility
over international civilian broadcasting. The Council
called instead for a semi-independent agency lodged
within the State Department but with a unified chain of
command and control over overseas public diplomacy
operations.52 This would eliminate the serious flaw
which plagues the Under Secretary and would result
in a much improved performance. With the change
of administrations in Washington, however, there
may exist a brief period during which a reenergized
and independent agency for public diplomacy could
be created and be well-integrated into the national
security process as it was in the Reagan and Eisenhower
administrations.
Importantly, the crucial role of localized public
diplomacy must be recognized. Public diplomacy must
return to its “field-driven” roots, and public diplomacy
officers in the field must have greater latitude to create
strategies within the context of the societies and cultures
in which they operate. This presupposes that adequate
resources, too, must be directed to overseas operations
and the increased staffing required. The cleverest
strategy will fail if there are too few personnel and
financial resources available for its implementation.
It is critical to realize, as several studies have pointed
out in recent years, that the Department of State is
not the only important actor in public diplomacy or
strategic information in the U.S. Government.53 In order
to coordinate and manage the breadth of international
information and exchange programs conducted by any
new agency, State, Defense, USAID, and the more than
60 offices, bureaus, and executive departments that
already report international exchanges, training, or
information programs, the NSC or interagency process
on strategic information must be reconstituted. Indeed,
nearly half of all of the reports and studies on public
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diplomacy undertaken in the past 3 years have pointed
to interagency coordination as a serious problem
that must be addressed.54 Solutions vary and include
structures within the NSC and outside it, but there is
broad agreement that the current interagency process
requires strengthening.
Based on the history of American experimentation
with strategic information in the NSC process, there
are two periods which emerge as worthy exemplars—
the Eisenhower administration and the Reagan
administration. Both administrations had elaborate,
and perhaps to some overly bureaucratized, systems of
advice, analysis, monitoring, and execution of strategic
information programs at multiple levels from the
working level to the senior leader level. Yet, for the most
part, they worked, and for that reason alone are worth
a careful look. The criticisms of both the Eisenhower
and the Reagan NSC processes over the passage of time
seem to be not very cogent. Eisenhower’s NSC process
was not too slow and unwieldy, and if it proved to
be so—as in a period of crisis—it was by-passed. The
Reagan NSC system is too often seen through the
prism of the Iran-Contra Affair; that situation was an
aberration, not the norm, and the reforms instituted by
the Tower Board set the system straight.
The conclusion is inescapable. Congress and the
Executive should relook at the organization of public
diplomacy/strategic communication and alter the
current flawed design to create unity of command and
clear lines of authority whether that is in a separate
agency, an agency within the State Department,
or some third variant. Because “localized public
diplomacy” has been shown to be more effective than
world-wide strategies designed inside the Beltway,
public diplomacy should be field-driven. In addition,
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the Executive Branch should return to a more elaborate
and tested formula for an interagency process that
worked in both the Eisenhower and the Reagan NSCs.
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CHAPTER 9
A FRONT-LINE VIEW OF “THE” INTERAGENCY:
THE PRACTICE OF POLICY COORDINATION
INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT
Dennis E. Skocz
INTRODUCTION
A friend and interlocutor in many an interagency
meeting never tired of protesting the use of the term
“interagency” as a noun, as in, “the interagency has
done this or that or decided so and so” and as used in
this volume. I would suggest that the use of term as
a noun is not accidental or entirely a matter of style.
There is more than abbreviation at work here. The usage
reflects a readiness to make the interagency process into
a thing, more precisely, into a thing standing over and
against those who deal with it and in it. It reflects an
adversarial notion of the process—the interagency as the
enemy. In one and the same usage we reify the process
and separate ourselves from it. Perhaps we should say
that “we have met the interagency and it is us.” To be
sure, usage reflects a perceived truth with a basis in the
reality of interagency process. The interagency is often
a scene of contestation—and, it should be; the success
of the interagency process depends in large measure
on an honest and full airing of differences. What is
objectionable in the usage (“the interagency”) is more
the tendency, reflected in the phrase, to pretend that
any of us who play in the interagency “arena” are not
responsible for its policy outcomes—or for the way the
process unfolds.
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The focus of this chapter is process. An individual
participant in the process is concerned with surviving
and prospering in interagency dealings. In a broader
perspective, as citizens, we are all concerned about
a good process, defined as one that supports good
policymaking and, in the end, good policy. In this
reflection, I hope to offer the lessons learned from a
career-length involvement in “the interagency”—
lessons as they apply to individual actors in the process
and to the system as whole.
The chapter will draw heavily (though not
exclusively) on lessons-learned from interagency
planning for post-conflict Kosovo operations, i.e., the
civil-military mission that began in June 1999, after
the Allied bombing campaign in Kosovo and Serbia,
and continues to the time of the writing of this chapter.
(For those unfamiliar with the Kosovo operation, a
review of Appendix I to this chapter could be useful.)
Interagency planning for that particular mission, began
in March and concluded in May. At the time, I was
Director of the Office of Contingency Planning and
Peacekeeping in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau
of the State Department. In that role, I participated
in meetings of the Executive Committee (ExComm)
set up to drive the planning effort. My particular task
was to head up the working-level effort to coordinate
the production of the functionally specific plans that
would go together to form the “41-pager”—an overall
concept of operations or “pol-mil plan” for the postconflict mission in Kosovo.
Not all interagency process is as complex, urgent,
and compressed as planning for a stabilization and
reconstruction effort following a military operation.
The high-stakes challenge of such an interagency
undertaking, however, will clearly, indeed starkly,
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expose the difficulties of coordinating policy across a
range of issues (and agencies) and at various levels.
The idea of using an example like this one is that if
we find an approach that wins acceptance by those
involved—specifically, one that is found useful in
such a demanding scenario—it should prove its
practicality in the day-to-day work of coordinating
policy, programs, and operations across agencies. So
Kosovo will serve as a backdrop for the lessons learned
about interagency process offered in this chapter. As
intimated above, I will analyze the process at two
levels: systemic and individual. For any given aspect
of interagency process, we will consider, first, how
the system can be better served and then, second,
how individual government officials operating in the
interagency “arena” can enhance their contributions to
effective policymaking while advancing their agencies’
equities.
As background, let me offer a gist of the Kosovo
planning process in five stages: (a) mobilization, (b)
engagement, (c) mopping up, (d) coalition thinking,
and (e) hand off.
Mobilization.
Ideally a carefully orchestrated interagency
planning process should precede a “complex
contingency operation” involving many different
agency players. Reality often gets in the way, however,
and we are forced to settle for less. In the press of
events, improvisation and “doing it the way we did the
last time” may substitute for a more disciplined and
formalized process that promises a long, hard slog to
agreement and a plan. It helps when, early enough in
the game, all realize that a plan will be needed and that
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resting on precedent will not work. This, I suggest, is
what happened with respect to Kosovo planning. Until
the collapse in early spring of 1999 of the Rambouillet
negotiations between the Kosovars and the Serbians,
one following the process could reasonably expect
that agreements that might be reached between the
parties at Rambouillet would provide a blueprint for
governance, public security, repatriation of displaced
persons, and administration of justice—all the issues
that emerged in the conflict.1 It was only after the
effort to come to agreement failed that all involved in
the interagency coordination of policy regarding the
Kosovo crisis realized that some kind of plan would
be needed, and that planning would need to start from
“scratch.” The question of public order and security
offers an example of an issue that had to be addressed
anew. If a condition for the end of bombing was that
all Serbian security forces vacate Kosovo (military and
police),2 then the questions that arise are: Who or what
will provide for security? Likewise, if Serbian officials
quit their posts in Kosovo, how will the administration
of Kosovo be provided for? With questions like these
not finding an answer within a negotiation process, the
need for a plan becomes evident.3
Engagement.
Bismark, I believe, compared making policy to
making sausage—not a pretty sight. I will confess to
hyperbole in invoking the sausage-making metaphor.
Indeed, I would argue that interagency collaboration
in Kosovo set a high standard. Nonetheless, coming to
agreement across a large number of agencies on short
notice and with a close deadline creates pressures. In
such a scenario, one should expect debate, stalemate
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and frustration, impatience with the pace of progress,
and others’ apparent inability to appreciate one’s own
critical insights. It should not be thought that the object
of meeting and planning together is a “feel good,” but
only apparent resolution of differences. Once planning
for Kosovo post-conflict operations began, debate
was necessary and a good sign that the process was
working. Issues come up, and it is unrealistic to think
that they can be answered—and answered well—
without debate. “Who would do what and how?” This
is a question applicable to every aspect of societal life
from policing to revenue raising.4 Logisticians pride
themselves on planning, and rightfully so. But the
kind of interagency planning that took place re Kosovo
began with a debate, which, to its credit, did not reach
ready understandings on issues. We will return to
this later; for now I observe that those involved in the
ExComm, set up to meet almost daily for planning,
seemed to share the premise that it was better that they
debated and settled issues at the planning table before
an operation was launched than that those charged
with implementation find themselves lacking guidance
and forced to debate responsibilities in the field.
Mopping Up.
Some 40 officials comprising about a dozen agencies
labored at the 41-page tick-and-bullet plan that laid out
the concept of operations for the post-conflict operation
in Kosovo as envisioned by the United States. The
worker bees in this effort operated under an ExComm
at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, a group of some
12 to 15, under the direction of the Deputies Committee
(the Deputy Secretaries of cabinet-level agencies—DC).
Debates at the ExComm level produced options for DC
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decision. DC decisions were translated into operational
terms in draft plans covering various mission areas by
multiagency subgroups of action officers (= worker
bees).5 “Mopping up” may be a bit figurative. The
expression is meant to refer to painstaking detail work
by the subgroups to ensure that each piece in the plan
offered a concrete realization of a policy directive, and
that it fit with other related aspects of the plan. “What
happens if . . . ?” “Who does . . .?” “Where do your
agency’s responsibilities end and mine begin?” At this
stage of the process, most of the basic issues have been
resolved but in formulating specific taskings—going
for greater granularity—problems surface which need
to be “bumped up” to higher levels for resolution. If the
virtue of the Engagement phase is reaching agreement
on fundamentals of approach, then the Mopping Up
phase performs a reality check on concepts already
vetted at a higher policy level. Its premise is that the devil
is in the details; its virtue is a finicky pragmatism.
Coalition Thinking.
An interagency policy, plan, or program is, by
definition, “Made in the USA.” If it hopes to serve as
guidance for a multinational or multilateral effort, then
it must win “buy in” from a variety of collaborators in
a mission. Kosovo interagency planning was continuously linked to diplomatic consultations regarding the
post-conflict situation, so this aspect of the planning
effort is not really a phase.6 Two-way communication
between planners and diplomats worked to promote
diplomacy informed by a sense of what was practically
possible and planning influenced by an understanding
of “politics as the art of the possible.” “Coalition
Thinking” is meant to rule out the idea that interagency
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planning of the kind described here can be conducted
in a vacuum. ”Buy in” or agreement on a plan—or
better, approach—will come when it reflects thinking
from “outside” the U.S. Government—from potential
partners in implementation. It may be useful to think
of the plan meant here as a document that begins as a
U.S. proposal and develops toward an agreement by
operators on how to go about a task.
Hand Off.
It is wrong to think that a plan like the 41-pager
ends up a field guide for every soldier and aid worker
deployed to the field. As one involved closely in the
Kosovo plan, I had little reason to read it after work on
it came to an end. To be sure, copies were used by other
planners in the field as a template for more refined
and tactical-level planning. The success of this plan
and any such plan consists in its internalization. An
inclusive planning process that reaches out beyond the
group charged to pull a plan together will achieve wide
understanding and support. Its solutions may not seem
imaginative or daring, but they will be understood and
accepted by implementers as reasonable and practical.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Kosovo Forces (KFOR) took to the field in June 1999. A
small United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK) contingent was there as well.
The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU) would soon
establish their presence in Kosovo. The launch was
not without surprises and problems. Implementation
would meet up with ethnic and political challenges.
The “final chapter” is yet to be written regarding
Kosovo. The launch of a plan is nonetheless its end as
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an integral and finished document. What follows in
the field is often a series of mutations and adaptations
which depart from the original outline. In the case of
Kosovo, UNMIK and the leaders of KFOR collaborated
in an ongoing planning process concerned with
implementation.7 In many cases, however, a single
document called “the” plan may cease to exist and
planning will tend to merge with implementing. None
of this is necessarily a bad thing. The successor to a
plan might well be coherent adjustments to a changing
situation carried out under the aegis of a strategy that is
understood by all involved and periodically validated
on an interagency basis.
And so this capsule history of interagency planning
for Kosovo post-conflict operations ends here, and now
I hope to offer some lessons-learned not only from
the Kosovo effort but from the process of interagency
coordination in various other forms it takes.
INCLUSIVENESS
It may be—as sometimes joked—that to ensure
full representation at an interagency meeting, the
host agency should let it seem to slip out that a very
restricted group will gather to address a problem.
No one will want to be left out and all will insist
on being at the table. The first concern in bringing
together an interagency group for planning or other
policy shaping task must, of course, be effectiveness—
bringing together the right number of right agencies to
ensure that all stakeholders and potential contributors
can have a say and share in the work. Leaning to
more rather than fewer agencies may seem to work
against effective decisionmaking. After all, the odds of
achieving consensus in a larger group would seem to
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be less than doing so in a smaller group. Pressed for
time, the argument for a small group seems even more
compelling. To be sure, more is not necessarily better,
and the criterion for success is not “how many” but
“which” agencies are represented. If the end result of
the interagency process is an operation to be carried
out, it will be essential to include all who have a role
in implementing that operation. Agencies which have
a role in shaping the product—whether a plan or set
of policies determining the result—will be more likely
to execute with understanding, commitment, and
success. Conversely, a plan put together by a small
group in Washington with little input from agencies
charged with implementation will seem like an alien
imposition and invite questions, second-guessing, and
improvization.
Inclusiveness recognizes the variety of intraagency
actors with a stake in policy and its outcome. In my
judgment, the strength of the Kosovo ExComm consisted in that several State Department bureaus with equities in post-conflict planning were represented at the
table. Not only the regional bureau—European Affairs
(EUR)—but others like International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INL), International Organizations
(IO), and Political-Military Affairs (PM) regularly
participated. Likewise, the Defense Department was
represented by regional and functional elements from
the Joint Staff (JS) and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD). In fact, around the table sat many
intraagency actors from the interagency group that
had assembled. At higher policymaking levels (the
DC, for example), each cabinet-level agency has one
spokesperson. This is appropriate for the “big picture”
decisions that need to be made at those levels. In
shaping policy and in planning operations or program
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initiatives, however, a different logic must prevail.
Here one wants to capture all viable options, critique
possible approaches from various angles, and scope out
potential pitfalls that might be missed if participation
in the process is kept restricted. It is less important if
disagreements arise, so long as clearly framed options
for higher-level decisionmakers are formulated and
advanced.
An inclusive approach raises the odds that pertinent
experience and expertise will enter into the evaluation
of policy, operations, and programs.8 Although it
might take more time to gather and take account of
more views, it can speed assessments by establishing
the facts by reference to those who know. The system
is spared having to backtrack when it learns later what
it had left out of consideration earlier. While a regional
bureau, for example, may have the knowledge of
internal and regional politics in the geographic area
under discussion, it cannot be expected to know, for
example, what programs are available to train and
equip a police force, how long it might take to achieve a
certain level of competence, and what kind of personnel
and resources will be required for the task. These are
the kinds of issues a bureau like INL is experienced
in addressing. For its part, INL does not work in
isolation. Not only must it cooperate with regional
bureaus within State, but in the example given, it must
reach out to entities like the International Criminal
Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
within other agencies like the Justice Department.
ICITAP has an implementing function with respect to
the training of police in foreign countries. Programs
designed, coordinated, and funded in INL are carried
out through ICITAP. Such programs may complement
international programs, requiring the IO bureau to
exercise a liaison role with UN agencies, for example.
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The key to well-informed and expeditious
decisionmaking at the Kosovo ExComm was
uninhibited cross-talk around the table, irrespective
of agency stove-pipes. The reader will appreciate how
such discussion promotes the expeditious handling
of issues. Having everyone together at one time and
in one place to hear what is said enhances a coherent
understanding of facts and positions and helps to
build consensus and commitment when it comes time
to resolve an issue.
Such cross-talk works best when an inclusive group
of players has been gathered into the process. In an
inclusive setting with a horizontal or flat information
flow, a subject-matter expert in INL speaking about a
public security issue with a Joint Staff colonel would
not “clear” his or her position up through the State
Department. The flow of discussion on a given issue
would make ad hoc allies of functional experts from
different agencies who would join to argue for or
against a position that regional experts in State and
OSD might have agreed upon going into the discussion.
In exploring options, it is important that participants
in the meeting operate under a rubric very much like
the “not for attribution” rule that often applies to
conferences or the ad referendum rule that applies to
diplomatic discussions in multilateral organizations
like NATO or the Organization of American States
(OAS). In the latter case, diplomats offer their views
with the understanding of their interlocutors, that
they are speaking provisionally, i.e, pending guidance
addressing the specifics of that day’s meeting. I am not
suggesting that clearing positions with one’s hierarchy
is dispensable; only that problem-solving requires that
obtaining clearances be deferred until a freer exchange
conducted on a problem-solving basis has resulted in
joint position that can be bumped up.
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In the Kosovo planning effort, the emphasis had to
be on problem-solving, coming up with new approaches
to deal with issues which would materialize in as a little
as a couple of months. The point was not to stand pat
in the defense of existing agency positions on already
well defined issues. There were no “already existing
positions.” The issues were emergent or in the offing.
Positions were to be determined. To be sure, in such
settings each agency brings its equities, predispositions,
capabilities and lacks, resources and expertise, and
“red lines” into the fray. These were not out of play—
nor should they have been—in the Kosovo process. I
will underscore later the importance of a true debate of
issues within any interagency process. For now, I only
want to observe that a problem-solving approach is
not incompatible with a full and frank airing of issues.
The issue of “who” or “what agency”—local, U.S.,
or international; civilian or military—would provide
public order and security in Kosovo immediately
after the departure of Serbian military and police
was unavoidable; the cessation of Allied bombing
was predicated on both Serbian police and military
vacating Kosovo.9 The issue was not one on which
agencies had well-defined positions; indeed, it was an
unprecedented issue in the history of other international
operations where international police could assume
the existence of local police. In other missions, debate
addressed issues about how the international forces
would be deployed, whether local police met human
rights norms, and how their policing of local police
could be controlled and improved.
Although public order and security issues in
Kosovo were without precedent, different agencies
with a stake in the outcome could be expected to have
different perspectives to bring to the discussion. Often,
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these were based in what they could and could not
deliver. In such cases, the military legitimately makes
the point that soldiers are not police. In the Kosovo case,
information operations (IO) educated all to the reality
that there is not a standing force of international police,
and mission-specific groups of international police had
never been empowered to carry out police functions,
only to observe and mentor local police. Others around
the table insisted on the urgency of coming up with some
game plan for addressing the public security function.10
The compromise reached—reflected in UN Resolution
1244—called for forces on the ground to provide public
security until civilian police could be deployed to take
on the task.11 Additionally, we undertook to urge quick
action to deploy an international police force with
authority to perform police functions and to expedite
programs to train and deploy local police as soon as
possible.
One might reasonably think that the peculiar
nature of the Kosovo process described here limits the
applicability of any lesson learned to the “normal case”:
interagency review of discrete issues that come before
offices and action-officers on a day-to-day basis. Often
such issues have a familiar look, numerous precedents
predate a specific issue, agency positions can seem
cast in concrete; all in all, the opportunity for problemsolving does not present itself, and the scope of agencies
involved in the evaluation of the issue seems fixed as
well. I would like to suggest that inclusiveness (and
all that goes with it, like a problem-solving attitude)
not only has application in such cases but may be
the way out of the bind that so frequently arises, i.e.,
stalemate and hurriedly bumping up the matter to
policy bosses. In the day-to-day setting, reaching out
to agencies with subject-matter expertise not usually
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tapped with respect to an issue can give something
like a disinterested third-party perspective to an issue
on which there is deadlock. Frank acknowledgement
of differing interests and recasting the question to
“How can the outcome accomplish your basic interest
and ours?” is another approach that applies what we
learned in the pressure-cooker of putting together an
interagency pol-mil plan for Kosovo. For the individual
action officer participating in an interagency review of
a policy, program, or operation, the questions to ask
are: How can I better understand the core interests
of my interlocutors? Can I reach out to others in the
interagency community who might be able to bring
fresh perspective to a deadlocked issue? How can I make
common cause with others outside my “stovepipe” or
hierarchy—without misrepresenting the established
positions of my agency? 12
VERTICAL COORDINATION AND “RIGHTLEVELING”
Interagency coordination has a horizontal and
vertical dimension.13 It occurs not only across agencies
and but up and down levels of authority as well.
Many issues can be resolved at the working-level
with a quick “OK” from office directors and their
counterparts. Other issues make their way to the top
of the chain and may require decisionmaking by the
Deputies Committee or even the Principals Committee
(cabinet-level agency heads, e.g., the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense).
From a systemic point of view, the process of policy,
program, and operations review should play out at the
right level. But what is the right level?
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I have always thought that one of the successes
of the Kosovo planning process was to have situated
itself at the right level. The ExComm was nominally
an Assistant Secretary-level group. Normally, Deputy
Assistant Secretaries and Office Directors participated.
This put its participants close enough to policymakers to
understand their big picture policy concerns, and close
enough to implementers to put ExComm members in
touch with ground truth and what was likely to prove
doable or not. The task of planning for an operation of
the kind that would unfold in Kosovo made this logic
compelling.
Another kind of task—i.e., other than that of
planning for a stability operation—might locate the
right level for interagency interaction higher or lower
on the scale. For almost any kind of issue that enters into
the interagency process, action will not be limited to the
level where most of the work will take place. Agreement
at the working-level, for example, will need to find
endorsement at one or two levels above. Disagreement
at that level will drive the process higher. Framing
broad strategy will not initially engage working-level
officers in various agencies. Policy planning shops in
various agencies along with their Directors and staff
will work such issues with select Assistant Secretaries
(depending on the subject matter), J-5 chiefs and staffs
(for the military), and possibly even outside groups
connected with a new administration (for initiatives
gestated before a new administration comes to power).
When the broad outlines of a strategy or new initiative
are agreed on and laid out, the process percolates
downward with a view to working out subordinate
strategies and implementation.
Failure to address interagency issues at the right
level can produce unworkable policies or technically
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well-crafted programs or operations which make no
policy sense and may indeed run counter to one or more
policy objectives. Success in locating the interagency
work at the right level, on the other hand, will work
towards ensuring that new policies are implemented
well and that ongoing programs and operations
continue to work with evolving policy over time and
through various administrations.
“Right-Leveling” needs to take into consideration
the nature of the interagency policy action. Is it how
to flesh out a new initiative? A bottom-up review of
a long-established program? Funding an operation
without the prospect of new money? Negotiating
agency responsibilities for oversight of a temporary
overseas mission? Evaluating a license for the transfer
of a weapons-system technology? Putting together
an interagency team for an international conference?
Assessing the political and legal implications of a
Status of Forces agreement? Reaching agreement or
taking the right action on questions like these requires
determining not only a good “horizontal” mix of
actors from across the interagency community, but
determining as well the level at which most decisions
will be reached and when action either needs to be
raised to a higher level or can be pushed downward
and/or out to the field.
Those with some responsibility for shaping the
interagency process will want to look to examples of
success for guidance as to how to structure a process
for an interagency task under consideration. They
should look to at the lessons taught for policymaking
by processes that did not work well.
Those operating within an already existing process
and without the ability to reshape it still need to
consider the question of conducting themselves in
a vertical dimension, i.e., in an interagency process
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that operates not only across agencies but also up and
down a hierarchy. It is, I would suggest, a universal
rule implicitly understood, if not always explicitly
formulated, that action officers should try to work
out agreement with their counterparts in others
agencies without raising the matter to their bosses to
resolve. It neither enhances one’s career nor does it
contribute to efficiency in policymaking or shaping or
implementation to raise an issue to a higher level at the
first sign of resistance from another agency.
“Verticality,” however, can be invoked to press to a
conclusion at the working level. Many learn soon that
raising the prospect of referring a matter up one’s own
agency hierarchy can elicit greater willingness from
one’s other-agency counterpart to strike a deal. In such
a situation, one’s counterparts might figure that they
have more leverage to influence an outcome if they
press on with you, as someone at the working level for
example, than having you come back to them to deliver
a “decision” from your hierarchy. Such a decision, of
course, does not end the interagency discussion, but it
requires your counterparts to raise the matter upward
within their hierarchy, a move that often reflects poorly
on them and reduces the efficiency of the process.
Verticality works in two directions. Another
approach is to look down the chain, to appeal to facts
on the ground as a way to elicit agreement across
the interagency process. Officers need not limit
themselves to the experience of implementers in their
own agencies. Arguably, appealing to the experience
of operators in the agencies of one’s counterparts
might have more weight in their considerations. Let
me offer a hypothetical example. Suppose you are
in the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and want to gain the support of OSD and
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Joint Staff counterparts for resettlement allowances
for demilitarized combatants in a stabilization and
reconstruction operation. You might argue that U.S.
military in the field will benefit from the reduction
in armed adversaries that your demobilization and
resettlement project will bring about.
The individual action officer also learns that there
are agency-specific hierarchies and an interagency
hierarchy. Everyone will invoke the decisions of a DC
to settle disputes at their (lower) levels. Of course,
standing DC decisions may not offer pat solutions to
emergent issues—ones that vary just enough from
guidance a DC may have delivered earlier to require
debate and resolution. At this point, interagency
disputants at the sub-DC level will need to agree on
the interpretation of earlier guidance or, at the very
least, frame the issue clearly for DC consideration so
that new guidance is forthcoming, and it does not
invite differing interpretations.14
It is bad form and bad process to blame
policymakers for ambiguous guidance. It is precisely
the function of those presenting options up the chain
to frame the options so that policymakers understand
the full operational or programmatic implications
of the choices and those seeking guidance obtain the
guidance they need. If there is the back-and-forth of
debate across the interagency spectrum, there is also
an up-an-down movement of seeking and obtaining
guidance. The common interest of different agencies
in obtaining unambiguous guidance needs to prevail
over parochial agency-specific concerns that might
tempt one to stack the deck in framing options. The
latter practice will only create unnecessary up-anddown movement. This weakens the process, delays
decisions, and can undermine the implementation
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of U.S. policy. Excessive vertical movement also
undermines the confidence of policymakers in those—
most of the readers of this—charged to advise on and
implement policies.
“DUKE IT OUT”
If it seems that much of the interagency process is
best described as a negotiation, that is not accidental. It
is. One should understand, however, that negotiation
does not obviate debate. In fact, vigorous debate
is essential to good interagency process.15 Nothing
is gained by ready agreement to vaguely worded
conclusions. The system is adversarial, and the results
are generally better if each agency weighs in with its
equities, interests, and red lines.16 The Kosovo process
suggests the value of insisting on clear formulations
and pressing agency-specific points. Let me give an
example. All of the various agencies with something
to gain or lose on the issue of public security might
have been ready to agree early on to description of the
military task of a post-conflict stabilization force as
being “creating a secure environment for . . . .” The
military could interpret this to mean that their responsibilities were limited to mopping up operations against
combatants and deterring attacks of a military nature
from one or another quarter. Those concerned with law
and order might interpret the language to mean that
military forces would assume police functions—from
crowd control to arrest and detention, to forceful action
against crime syndicates—until civilian police could
assume those functions. Those providing humanitarian
aid could read the phraseology to mean that they will
somehow be unobtrusively protected so that they can
carry on their work with minimal or reduced risk of
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harm and without compromise to their organizational
independence (i.e., without being identified with the
military or perceived as serving a political agenda).
An honest and concrete debate about the precise
role of the military forces, first on the scene, led to
very specific understandings of what they would and
would not do. This meant addressing highly focused
questions, hypothetical but concrete scenarios, and apt
precedents from recent past operations—all of these
provoking clarifications about the military’s role. What
reaction would forces take if rioting were to take place?
If it happened literally before their very eyes? Would
the military forces arrest and detain offenders? Seek
out and pursue criminals? Escort nongovernmental
organization (NGO) relief workers in high-risk areas?
In the debate over this issue, the military came to
understand that civilian police would not be on the
scene concurrently with a NATO force and that Rules
of Engagement as well as Mission Essential Tasks
would have to include actions to deal with a range of
public-order problems until the public order function
could pass to international civilian police and then
locally trained and deployed police. Absent a vigorous
debate, driven by pointed questions and concrete
scenarios, it is likely that forces would have deployed
to the scene with only vague guidance. Issues avoided
in Washington would have confronted the troops
and undermined the overall mission as commanders
would be forced to improvise solutions in the absence
of concrete guidance.17
Debate in the interagency process cannot go on
forever, and stonewalling is no virtue. Whenever
subject-matter expertise can answer a question, it
should be sought and respected. In the above example,
recent precedent known to experts clearly indicated that
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it would take more than a few weeks for international
civilian police to deploy. When issues need to be
raised to higher levels, a full, open, and honest debate
will help those who prepare an options paper to give
policymakers a choice of realistic alternatives and a
concrete sense of the pros and cons.
At the working level, there is an equal need for full
and frank debate. In my first assignment to Washington
and experience with both intraagency and interagency
clearance, I thought that quick agreement to a draft
cable or talking points was clearly the most desirable
outcome. I might have imagined that a vague term
served to bring about agreement from all concerned,
thus resolving an issue with dispatch. I soon learned
that a shortcut of this kind can become a long detour.
An issue dispatched without close examination and
full debate can come back again. Nothing is gained
and time is lost by coming to a hasty agreement that
leaves meanings vague and needed details unspecified.
The consequences of hasty review or conflict-adverse
agreement to language that only papers over differences
can be more serious, depending on the issue. At the
systemic level, we want a structure and process that
allow a full and unfettered airing of issues. At the
working level, the individual officer or official should
look out for vague language, unclear details, or gaps
in reasoning. Especially, as a deadline approaches
and pressure builds to come to agreement, the officer
must read drafts carefully and fully. In discussions,
any participant should feel free to visit or revisit an
issue. That same participant should expect to provoke
expressions of dissatisfaction from colleagues driven
by a sense of urgency and a dominating desire to
reach closure. This sort of problem can be minimized
by trying to anticipate and address issues early in
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the process. Flagging issues early on, even if only
generically, will help to avoid giving the impression
of being a spoiler with a habit of keeping colleagues
at work late on Friday night with last-minute scruples
about wording.
DIPLOMATIC CONNECTION
Kosovo interagency planning benefited greatly by
its tie in with ongoing diplomacy.18 The “planning” that
took place was for a mission that would be carried out
by a group of multilateral organizations (NATO, EU,
OSCE, and UN). The plan amounted to a U.S. proposal
as to how the international community should address
the task of post-conflict stability and reconstruction. The
plan—really a concept of operations—would have to
achieve concurrence from the organizations envisioned
to play a role in its realization and from the countries
which would influence deliberations and decisions
in those organizations. Ambassador James Dobbins,
a veteran of previous interagency efforts at planning
for post-conflict situations, played a key role in linking
planning to diplomacy, thereby aiding both. For their
part, interagency planners need a continuing real-time
sense of what is possible politically and diplomatically.
They can secure this from a diplomacy which explores
the thinking of potential partners in an operation. Ideas
that may make sense from an operational-technical
standpoint may not be workable politically. Diplomacy
can also validate ideas that emerge in the planning
process, reassuring planners that a concept which they
have developed will enjoy support; this frees them to
move on to other aspects of a draft plan that require
attention. Possibilities for resolving a problem can
emerge in diplomatic discussion—possibilities which
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may not occur to planners. The linking of diplomacy
and planning is a two-way communication. Ideas
vetted and scrubbed within an interagency process
focused on what is practically possible can inform
diplomatic-political discussions and favor realistic
deliberations and decisions at the coalition, multilateral, and international levels.
What are the lessons learned from the Kosovo
planning experience for day-to-day interagency process
which may not involve an international mission or
operation of the kind that was launched in Kosovo?
The example points to the need to look beyond the
interagency process itself in order to make that process
work at its best. Very often, the matters addressed in
interagency settings do have a diplomatic dimension
and interagency actors will want to keep themselves
apprised of other countries’ views of the issues in
play. It is difficult to think of an issue that comes up
in a political-military (State-DOD) context which
does not have a diplomatic dimension. Perhaps, it is
useful here to distinguish between factual information
related to the countries or regions involved in an issue
(for example, a foreign assistance issue needs to take
into account the per capita gross domestic product
[GDP] in a country) and the views and mind set of
foreign interlocutors about various alternatives under
discussion. Interagency players may be well-informed
about facts on the ground through public and classified
sources of information, but this is not the same as an
appreciation of country-actors’ perspectives derived
from the ongoing personal-professional contact and
dialogue that occurs in diplomacy.
State officers participating in the Washington
interagency process more often than not have come
to Washington from a foreign assignment and have
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diplomatic experience as described here. When it
is related to the country or area under discussion, it
should not be neglected. On the contrary, it should be
proactively sought and factored into deliberations. A
State Foreign Service Officer who has just completed
an assignment in South Asia might be just the person
to ask about Indian attitudes on a regional security
issue. A Defense Attache back from a posting in Central
Asia can provide valuable insights into cultural and
geographic factors bearing on regional stability. The
kind of understanding sought after here has a long shelf
life. It is more than the knowledge that comes from the
most current spot reporting of events on the ground.
Its consists in the appreciation of the motives, equities,
and outlooks that international actors bring to issues
which come to Washington as issues for interagency
review.19 What others might think about an issue from
their own cultural-political-ideological perspectives is
just as important and “real” as “incontestable facts”
that are available to interagency actors. Washington is
an information hub. There is no dearth of information
available to action officers and policymakers. The
volume and extent of information from every quarter
can seem at times a curse. Such an availability of
information can beguile one into thinking that one has
all the pertinent information one needs to deliberate—
and, if we take “information” to mean empirical data,
then perhaps the conclusion is warranted. Input in
the broadest sense, however, must include the more
perspectival and subjective understandings that come
from the interpersonal and cross-cultural domain of
diplomacy.
A “live” link up of the kind provided by Ambassador
Dobbins in the Kosovo case is probably the exception
rather than the rule when it comes to most interagency
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business. For the most part, reporting cables from
embassies in countries involved with the issue will be
a key source of input for the understandings described
here. Interagency officers should prize reports which
offer a vivid sense of the back and forth in a diplomatic
discussion of an issue to the degree that this reveals
basic attitudes of foreign interlocutors. Readers do
well to learn the clues and cues to others’ thinking
that the report of a diplomatic discussion or debate
offers. Very often, the report of a bilateral meeting or a
multilateral discussion will seem uninformative or dull
to a reader new to “diplomatese” or the worldviews
of the particular discussants whose conversation is
reported. The novice reader should persist in the task
of becoming a skilled interpreter of such language.
What is said repeatedly? What is said for the first time?
What is left unsaid and why? Is there a variation in
a stock formula? What is a speaker’s reaction when
presented with a difficult issue or a discrepancy in his
or her statements? Reading between the lines is the
“name of the game.”
The interagency process is not self-contained.
The preceding discussion of diplomacy illustrates
how interagency deliberation and decisionmaking
relates to diplomacy between nations. Closer to
home, interagency process finds it place within interBranch process. Congressional debate, budget making,
resolutions, and legislation goes toward forming the
context in which interagency process unfolds. As it
behooves interagency actors to develop a sensibility
for diplomacy and diplomatese, so it makes sense for
them to acquire comparable skills for interpreting the
sense of Congress.20 Officers working in Washington
should seek opportunities to attend congressional
hearings related to their work or join others briefing
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congressional staff. Think tanks, the National Defense
University, and the Foreign Service Institute often
invite legislators and their staff to conferences on issues
of foreign policy and national security, providing
an opportunity for officers to develop a first-hand
appreciation of the view from the Hill.
WORKING LEVEL OFFICIAL
I began this chapter with an emphasis on systemic
arrangements that favor good interagency process
on major undertakings like post-conflict planning for
Kosovo. I will conclude by concentrating on the dayto-day world of the working level official involved in
interagency processes. I will put forward suggestions
for that officer or official under the two remaining
subheadings below. One suggestion is to embrace the
interagency meeting as an opportunity to get things
done rather than a chore to get through. The other is
to take a mobile and “expeditionary” approach to the
work of relating to one’s counterparts before and after
meetings.
Meetings, You Got’a Love ‘Em.
Meetings have a bad reputation, and they deserve
much of it. They are, however, unavoidable and,
used well, they make for a good interagency process.
The convener and Chair, of course, has a special
responsibility for the conduct of a meeting, but all who
participate can shape the process in a way that makes
for a useful meeting and serves their special agencyspecific goals. Readers are invited at this point to
insert mentally all they may have learned about small
group process in professional-development offsites
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or management training courses or communications
classes in academe. My intent is not to describe the
skills needed for effective meetings but rather to put
meetings in a positive light, to offer thereby some
motivation for using and honing the skills which most
of us have been taught or learned on the job.
Meetings best facilitate the very thing which
interagency process is supposed to accomplish: They
collect or can collect everyone “with a dog in the fight,”
allowing all to bring their concerns to light, fully air
the pros and cons of various options, and work toward
a consensus in the U.S. Government’s interest. To be
sure, issues before “the” interagency do not all come
to a meeting table. Nor do they need to. E-mailing
and phone-calling, one-on-one conversations and
messages, and seriatim polling of concerned agencies
do the job well enough when the task is to review
issues that are already well-understood and clearly
articulated. Anyone who has tried to schedule a
meeting knows why we lean so much on asynchronic
media like e-mail to get messages back and forth. The
reply-all function helps to keep all players informed of
one’s input. Nevertheless, the scattered comments in
an e-mail thread and stop-and-start flow of discussion
can create gaps in the coverage that such a process gives
to an issue. Doubts about the collective meaning of the
approved document, or the draft proposal agreed to,
can readily arise when different individuals plug into
and out of the discussion with different comments on
limited aspects of the total issue.
By comparison, when everyone gathers at a
meeting to discuss and decide on something, all
comments are available to all participants at the same
time, offering the immediate opportunity for anyone
to seek a clarification, which all hear at the same
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time. All the visual and tonal cues that live face-toface communication offers work to expose problems
(doubt, skepticism, misunderstanding, etc.) that might
be missed in serial messages sent over a network with
varying distribution. “Side-bar” exchanges between
two individuals in a larger addressee list that could
have benefited the understanding of the addressees
as a whole unfold without visibility to the others
absent a meeting. Doubts that might have manifested
in a meeting can arise and dissipate in the mind of
an individual sitting before a computer work station
screen without ever surfacing for others, and thereby
working to clarify the matter which prompted the
doubt in the first place. In a meeting, the proximate,
real-time interaction of individuals around the table
can create momentum and consensus in ways that
episodic messages are far less suited to do. More than
that, meetings can create a sense of solidarity and
common purpose, important if the interagency players
responsible for reaching a decision are also involved
in implementing it or when it comes time to garner
the support of others in their various agencies for the
agreement they reached as a group. Interagency process
is often analogous to negotiating. Even planning for a
field operation like the one in Kosovo was more like
a negotiation than anything else. Conceived in this
way, one would want to have all the parties to the
“negotiation” together to ensure that all details were
covered, every angle considered, any possible doubts
exposed and resolved, and understanding by all parties
confirmed.
The “Shoe Leather Express.”
At one time, it was fashionable to talk about
Management by Walking Around (MBWA). The idea
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in management-science circles was that good managers
do their jobs best when they get out of their offices,
circulate among staff members, and communicate with
them directly and on site. The approach described as
MBWA applies to interagency process. Each player
in that process is an issue-manager and manages
issues best when he or she reaches out to counterparts
regularly to inform and be informed about the whole
set of issues whose management they share in common.
There is a penny-wise/pound-foolish approach which
limits communication to addressing discreet issues
when they come up. This approach seems to save time
because it “cuts to the chase” and limits itself to the
issue that is up for decision at any given time. Meeting
for coffee or in the office of a colleague to compare
notes when there are no deadlines driving decisions
can seem like a waste of time. I would suggest quite
the opposite.
“Down time” is a good time to explore the terrain
where issues will come up. Time invested in less
directed discussion can identify areas of agreement on
basics or clarify basic differences in approach. In either
case, each party is better for it, as is the system. Having
established in advance of a specific issue, broad areas
of agreement with counterparts, one can get down to
business and address ways and means when an issue
is up for decision. Or, knowing in advance where
differences lie, one can think ahead to compromises or
workarounds to bridge the differences. The interagency
process is an ongoing, seemingly “never-ending”
sequence of deliberation and decisionmaking. The cast
of characters who play parts in it is relatively invariant.
Today’s adversaries may be tomorrow’s allies. The
continuing character of the process puts a premium
on practices which enhance continuity and coherence.
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A process is not efficient when its participants seem
always to be starting from scratch when it comes to
taking up a new issue. What I call the “Shoe Leather
Express” carries interagency colleagues from one
decision to the next by keeping the conversation going
on shared areas of responsibility. It minimizes surprises
at meetings or as deadlines for decisions draw near. It
also promotes a problem-solving attitude toward issues
when interagency colleagues work the lulls between
crunch times by making each other smart about the
subjects they share in common. There is less chance
of misunderstanding when it comes time to formulate
positions on emergent issues insofar as interlocutors
have already come to terms by way of their ongoing
communication.
*****
With these last two comments on meetings and
ongoing one-on-one communication with colleagues
in the interagency community, I conclude my
observations. The common elements throughout
the paper are well-reflected in the last two points.
“Purposeful communication” might summarize the
thread that runs throughout the observations and
reflections in this chapter. Communication needs to be
inclusive and operate in many directions and at many
levels. It should be ongoing and preferably direct. At
the same time, it is not an end in itself. Communication
supports deliberation which leads to decisions.
Decisions should be grounded in our best collective
assessment of the facts and a seasoned appreciation
of worldviews and perspectives bearing on an issue.
At the same time, decisions must be answerable to
strategic policy goals.
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“The” interagency is neither a thing nor is it merely
a process if “process” signifies something routine and
bureaucratic. The adversarial view of interagency
interaction at least gives it credit for addressing issues
of import—ones that matter greatly not only to agencies
which participate in interagency deliberations but also
to the U.S. Government as a whole. Ultimately, the good
of the country is at issue and successful interagency
collaboration in Washington and elsewhere can do
much to promote the national interest.
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APPENDIX I
KOSOVO:
CONFLICT AND RESPONSE
A Brief Chronology
This brief chronology, derived from various sources,
highlights events and developments important for
understanding the armed conflict in Kosovo at the end
of the 1990s and international response to it, including
the start of peace support operations in Kosovo. The
chronology is meant to serve as background for the
discussion in this chapter of U.S. interagency planning
for that operation. The chronology does not extend
beyond 1999 and the beginning of the mission in
Kosovo since the focus of the chapter is the planning
process as a case study of interagency coordination
and not the Kosovo issue nor the particular plan for
Kosovo peace support as such.
1974

New constitution for Yugoslavia makes Kosovo
an autonomous province.

1987

Ethnic unrest (between Kosovar Albanians and
Serbs) results in the imposition of martial law
in Kosovo.

1988

Serbian Republican Assembly (Kosovo was
a province of the Serbian republic within the
federal structure of Yugoslavia) decides to
extend control over Kosovo. Miners in Kosovo
strike. Some 10,000 troops and 100 tanks are
sent into Kosovo.
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1989

Serb-dominated government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) dissolves the
Kosovo assembly. Ethnic Albanian legislators
in the province declare independence.

1992

Ethnic Albanians elect Ibrahim Rugova as
president of the self-proclaimed Republic of
Kosovo.

1996

Irregular force called the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) claims responsibility for a number
of bombings and attacks against Serbian police
officials.

1998

February: Fighting in Kosovo between Ethnic
Albanians and Serbian troops begins.
May: Serb security forces conduct raids
throughout Kosovo, destroying homes and
villages.
October: The OSCE signs an agreement with
the FRY, introducing a ground monitoring
presence of some 2,000 observers, the Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM), to verify a cease
fire and other terms of the agreement.

		
		

1999

		

		

January 15: The bodies of more than 40 ethnic
Albanians, apparently executed, are found
in the village of Raczak. The international
community condemns the massacre.
February 6: Peace talks between the parties
under the auspices of the Contact Group
(France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) begin in
Rambouillet, France.
March 18: Talks in Rambouillet end when Serbs
refuse to sign the draft agreement.
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March 24: NATO airstrikes against the FRY, to
include strikes against FRY forces in Kosovo,
begin under Operation ALLIED FORCE
(OAF).
June 9: FRY agrees to withdrawal all forces
(military and police) from Kosovo.
June 10: UN Security Council passes Resolution
1244 authorizing administration of the province
under the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and
enforcement by means of a NATO-deployed
Kosovo Force (KFOR) with other major
responsibilities delineated for the OSCE and
EU.
June 12: KFOR deploys to Kosovo.
July 25: UNMIK issues its first Regulation
establishing interim civil administration over
Kosovo.
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CHAPTER 10
THE INTERAGENCY ARENA AT THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL:
THE CASES NOW KNOWN AS STABILITY
OPERATIONS
John T. Fishel1
DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
In the early 1980s, the American military discovered
(or rediscovered) the intermediate level of war between
strategy and tactics—a level that Napoleon had called
“grand tactics.” The U.S. Army writers of doctrine
chose to describe that level of war, as did their Soviet
adversaries, as the operational level. And they chose,
again like the Soviets, to call the activities of that level
Operational Art. This chapter addresses interagency
operations at the operational level in the context of
what we now call, “stability operations.”2 Therefore,
we are faced with definitional tasks for both of these
terms. We will address stability operations in the next
section; here we will focus on the operational level.
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines the
operational level as being between the strategic and
the tactical and linking the two. It goes further to say
that this is the level where campaigns are planned to
achieve the objectives of strategy. This is fine as far as it
goes, but it hardly goes far enough, especially when we
are operating in an interagency context. For the United
States, the interagency operational level exists where
two or more separate federal agencies plan and conduct
operations to achieve strategic objectives. Domestically,
this may involve such activities as interdicting illicit
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drugs entering the United States. Internationally, it is
most commonly seen in the workings of the Country
Team in an American Embassy. When discussing
other states—especially those with unitary rather than
federal systems—we can substitute “national” for
federal agencies.
Another way of seeing the interagency operational
level is in terms of task forces designed to conduct
activities that are generally independent of other
governmental activities. That is, these activities are
relatively self-contained but designed to achieve larger
strategic ends. As such, they are the mid-level building
blocks of strategy. By way of contrast, the tactical level
focuses on the highly interrelated tasks necessary to
achieve operational objectives. Tactical organizations
do not function independently or autonomously,
operational ones do.
THE NATURE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
Even though the entire history of the U.S. military
is replete with almost continuous “stability operations”
contrasting with less than a dozen “major wars,” the
military has yet to fully agree on what to call these
operations. And, although it has effective doctrine,3 it
rarely reads it and even more rarely understands and
remembers what it reads. In the early 20th century, these
operations were known as small wars.4 In fact, based
on the lessons of the small wars in Central America and
the Caribbean, the Marine Corps published its Small
Wars Manual in 1940 on the very eve of the biggest war
in history.
After World War II, the United States became
engaged in combating what the Soviets called wars of
national liberation and we called counterinsurgency.
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Counterinsurgency—or COIN—was the term of art/
choice until about 1973 when stability operations
entered the doctrine. By 1981 the U.S. Army had again
changed the name when it published Field Manual (FM)
100-20, Low Intensity Conflict.5 Low intensity conflict
(LIC) lasted as part of doctrine for only a decade,
and one new edition of FM 100-20, which, although
almost completely rewritten to incorporate both
formal research and formal lessons learned, retained
essentially the same name. One innovation was that it
was jointly published with the U.S. Air Force.6 LIC was
also enshrined in federal law with the passage of the
Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) in 1986.
Nevertheless, the shelf life of the term in doctrine
was relatively short. By 1993 LIC had been replaced
by Operations Other Than War (OOTW).7 Within
2 years of the appearance of OOTW, joint doctrine
had modified the term to read Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW).8 By 1997, the Army was
not happy with OOTW/MOOTW and had drafted a
new FM that returned to the term stability operations,
adding support operations to create the acronym,
SASO.
None of these terms is really quite accurate since
they all address situations where combat is either a
very real probability or a reality. As the facetious saying
went, “I never saw anyone killed by a low intensity
bullet!” Instead, what we are talking about are civilmilitary operations that are conducted in environments
where one or more potential adversaries operate in
asymmetric relationships with their adversaries.
In 1992, Max Manwaring and this writer published
an article in the journal, Small Wars and Insurgencies
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entitled, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Toward
a New Analytical Approach,” based on research
conducted since 1984.9 In that article we detailed
quantitative research that identified seven dimensions
that together determined the outcome of the 43
insurgencies that had involved Western powers since
the end of World War II. Those seven dimensions are:
1. Military Actions of the Intervening Power;
2. Support Actions of the Intervening Power;
3. Host Government Legitimacy;
4. Degree of Outside Support to Insurgents;
5. Actions versus Subversion;
6. Host Government Military Actions; and,
7. Unity of Effort.
Although not all dimensions were individually
statistically significant, the entire model correctly
explained the outcome in 88 percent of the cases (38
out of 43), with a multiple R square of 0.90 and a
significance level of <.001.10 Of the five outlying cases,
three were near statistical ties, while the remaining two
were explained by factors unique to those cases.
While the Unity of Effort dimension was not
individually statistically significant in the original
quantitative study, subsequent qualitative research
clearly demonstrated its importance. A study of nine
cases of peace operations clearly demonstrated that
Unity of Effort was one of two key dimensions about
which all others revolved.11 Unity of Effort, of course,
is the aim of all interagency coordination.
The significance of this body of research that spans
more than 2 decades is that the policymaker and/or
operator who ignores the dimensions of the model is
likely to fail in his efforts. Not that any one dimension
is necessarily, of itself, critical to success or failure in
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stability operations, but the side of the conflict that
better addresses those dimensions is the likely victor.
And, as was demonstrated by our research into peace
operations, Unity of Effort is, indeed, a key to success.
It is important to note here that the research that
produced the model has been incorporated into
U.S. Joint and Army doctrine.12 Despite this simple
fact, it appears highly probable that institutional
(institutionalized) learning has not really taken place.13
The result is that it has been necessary for the United
States to learn the same lessons again and again, as
if each new stability operation were a situation that
had never been encountered before. This chapter will
examine that phenomenon in a series of case studies of
interagency coordination in stability operations from
the late 1940s to the present.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CASES
Six cases are addressed; each attempts to show both
successful and unsuccessful aspects of interagency
coordination designed to achieve unity of effort.
The first case examines what came to be British
counterinsurgency practice born in the crucible of the
Malayan Emergency. The degree to which the British
approach is transferable is an open question. Vietnam,
the second case, is generally an example of a command
and control structure—both military and political—
that was doomed from the beginning. Nevertheless,
the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) structure showed what could be
accomplished in both political and military terms at
the operational level. Military and political veterans
of the Vietnam experience were the leaders of the U.S.
effort in El Salvador during the 1980s. Even without full
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unity of command, the several U.S. elements and their
Salvadoran allies crafted structures and procedures
that facilitated attaining unity of effort across the board.
Those lessons were not lost in the “drug war,” and the
premier institutions for monitoring and interdiction
of the drug flow to the United States through the
Caribbean air and sea routes is the highly innovative
Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). With all
these lessons learned (along with some others such as
Somalia) the United States leaped into Iraq and tried
to restore it to political, economic, and security health
with an authority structure little, if at all, better than
the one used in Vietnam. While the Iraq insurgency
was unfolding, the long-term insurgency in Colombia
was beginning to take a turn for the better. Following
a suggestion from U.S. Southern Command, President
Alfonso Uribe created the Coordinating Center for
Integrated Action (CCAI) and made it his vehicle
to achieve the required unity of effort to defeat the
insurgency. The lessons of these six cases—hard won,
and not without backsliding—lead to conclusions
about how and why governments learn or fail to learn
from their own past or the experiences of others.
The Malayan Emergency and British Practice.
Shortly after the end of World War II, the British
Empire, in particular, and European colonialism in
general, was challenged by a series of insurgencies.
One of the earliest and longest fought was the Malayan
Emergency which began in June 1948. Even though it
was a rebellion almost entirely of an ethnic Chinese
minority among a majority Malay population, the
insurgency lasted for 12 years until it finally ended
in 1960, 3 years after the new state of Malaya (now
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known as Malaysia) became independent. For the first
3 years of the rebellion, the outcome was as uncertain
as the structure used to fight it. In 1951, however,
the tide turned with the appointment of Lieutenant
General (Ret.) Sir Harold Briggs as the civilian Director
of Operations, working directly for the British High
Commissioner (also a civilian).14
Unfortunately, Briggs was not given “the clear-cut
authority that he needed if he was to pull things in
Malaya together successfully. . . .” He also knew that
“to some extent he would be in an anomalous position.
Crucially, he could not really give orders to anyone,
since although he was charged with bringing the police
and armed forces together in one unified command,”
the Chief of Police retained the right of appeal to the
High Commissioner, and both the military and police
leadership could go over the High Commissioner to
their own higher headquarters in London.15
Briggs moved swiftly and developed what came to
be known as the “Briggs Plan.” Although its substantive
objectives were largely tactical and operational rather
than strategic, the critical component of the plan was
its focus on detailed coordination and cooperation.
At the Federal level in Malaya, Briggs instituted two
committees with himself as the head. The first was
the Federal War Council which was comprised of all
the key security players, particularly the military and
police leaders and their deputies. This was designed
to be a flexible vehicle for policymaking and resource
allocation. The second committee was the State War
Executive Committee which was responsible for all
government administration and was designed to
interact and coordinate with the Federal War Council.
Below this level were Circle (police jurisdictions) and
District War Executive Committees. Generally, these

415

committees operated within the Police Circles and
the civil districts. Despite continuing bureaucratic
problems, the committee system worked relatively
well.16 “[A]t the local level, the improvement was
immense as the philosophy worked down through the
echelons of command, so that in practically all locations
Army and Police set up joint ops rooms, usually in the
local Police station, and gradually the officers involved
learnt the need to share intelligence first and fast at this
level.”17
As Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery had
succinctly written to British Colonial Secretary Oliver
Lyttelton in 1951:
Dear Lyttelton,
Malaya
We must have a plan.
Secondly, we must have a man.
When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not
otherwise.
Yours Sincerely,
Montgomery (F.M.)18

Although Briggs had given the British the plan, he
was not the man. Moreover, what was missing from
both Montgomery’s analysis and the Briggs Plan was
a strategic objective. Both failings were remedied
at the beginning of 1952 with the appointment of
active duty General Sir Gerald Templar as British
High Commissioner to Malaya. “His brief from the
Government began with the statement that ‘The policy
of Her Majesty’s Government in Great Britain is that
Malaya should in due course become a fully selfgoverning nation’.”19 Here, then, was the strategic
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objective: an independent Malaya (where, incidentally,
the majority Malays would be the dominant political
force thus further isolating the ethnic Chinese
communist rebels). Thus the first necessary (but
insufficient) condition for successful unity of effort
was fulfilled.
Templar’s instructions went even farther and fully
resolved one of the problems that had plagued Briggs—
the lack of necessary authority. “[N]ot only will you
fulfill the normal functions of the High Commissioner
but you will assume complete operational command
over all the Armed forces assigned to operations in the
Federation.”20 Thus Templar was, at the same time, High
Commissioner, Director of Operations, and General
Officer Commanding (GOC), centralizing civil and
military authority and achieving unity of command.
Three weeks after his arrival, he had already decided
to reorganize the headquarters of the counterterrorist
effort, merging “the functions of the Federal War
Council with those of the Federal Executive Council,
which will then become the sole instrument of the
expanded membership of the council.”21
With these actions, the British had a strategic
objective, a plan to achieve it, and a man in charge.
They had achieved effective interagency coordination
for unity of effort in the classical manner. In accordance
with the principle of war, they had attained unity of
command, giving the commander—Templar—the
authority he needed and holding him responsible for
his actions. As noted above, 5 years later the strategic
objective was achieved, and 3 years after that, the war
itself was over.
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Vietnam—Or How Generally Not to Conduct Stability
Operations But With One Bright and Shining Success
Story Now (Mostly) Forgotten.
The joke told shortly after the Vietnam War ended
was that the United States did not fight one 12-yearlong war; it fought 12 individual wars, each one a
year long! There was much truth in the joke. Among
the truths found, there is the lack of a single, clear,
political-military objective that could have provided
a necessary, if insufficient, condition for the unity of
effort required for victory. Indeed, the late Colonel
Harry Summers, author of On Strategy, stated in a 1996
interview that he had counted some 22 different U.S.
strategic objectives in Vietnam, some of which were
clearly mutually exclusive. Thus, if we didn’t know
what we were fighting for, how could we possibly
organize to achieve victory? How would we even
know what victory looked like?
There is little wonder, then, that the American
organization to fight the war in Vietnam was
convoluted, at best. In no way was the principle of
unity of command even approached, let alone attained.
Consider, first, the military command structure. The
U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)
was nominally in command of the entire American
military effort. However, the United States had nonVietnamese allies who went by the name of Free
World Forces. These were loosely integrated under the
leadership of the MACV commander (COMUSMACV).
Then there were the South Vietnamese military under
the independent command of the Republic of Vietnam
(RVN) president and the Joint General Staff. They
“coordinated” with MACV. Under MACV were I and
II Field Force, into which some of the Free World Forces
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allies were integrated as were the U.S. Marines. The
latter, however, clearly had their own operational area
largely in I Corps Tactical Zone, where the Marines
followed an entirely different strategy from the Army.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard (USCG)
operated in the rivers and littoral waters of Vietnam
“in support of” MACV. Both the Navy and Air Force
operated under the command of the U.S. Commander
in Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) in Hawaii. To top this
off, U.S. military advisors to the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN) operated directly under MACV
command and control but not under the two Field
Forces.
Additional military complications came from
Washington where “. . . there were micromanaged
efforts from the Oval Office, including selection and
approval of bombing targets in North Vietnam.”22
To these were added the fact that American civilian
policy in Vietnam, including the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), were
implemented by the American Embassy under the
nominal authority of the ambassador. Exactly how
much control the ambassador had over the CIA station
chief, however, is anybody’s guess, but based on much
reporting and a large literature, it is safe to say that
it was not much. Thus, civilian and military efforts in
Vietnam were connected only very loosely as were
military actions with the Army and Marines pursuing
entirely different operational concepts, while the Air
Force and the Navy did not operate under the command
of MACV. As Sam Sarkesian succinctly puts it, “The
CIA, Marines, and the U.S. ambassadorial complex all
had their own view of the proper strategy.”23
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Although the Vietnam War generally provides
negative lessons regarding interagency coordination
at both the strategic and operational levels, one aspect
of how the war was conducted is not only positive but
provides an organizational model that can be adapted
widely. This was the organization known as Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support,
called by its acronym—CORDS.
CORDS was the creation of Ambassador Robert
Komer who became the first Deputy COMUSMACVCORDS. Komer took all the existing pacification and
development programs and pulled them together
under MACV control. On May 1, 1967, CORDS came
into being, with Komer reporting directly to General
William Westmoreland, COMUSMACV. “CORDS was
a dramatic change from business as usual, incorporating
personnel from the CIA, the U.S. Information Agency
(USIA), USAID, the State Department, the White House,
and all of the military services.” In addition to Komer,
“. . . each of the four American corps commanders had
a deputy for pacification; the ‘cutting edge’ of CORDS,
however, was the unified civil-military advisory teams
in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.”24
As former CIA Director William Colby (who had
led the Phoenix Program, a major component under
CORDS) wrote later:
President [Nguyen Van] Thieu quickly understood that
a major strategy of pacification required the kind of
unified management structure the Americans had finally
produced in the CORDS machinery. In response, he set
up a Central Pacification and Development Council to
direct the campaign and the work of all the Ministries and
agencies of the government involved in it. . . . All of the
government ministries, including Defense plus the Joint
General Staff, were represented in the council, so that
its directives were specific and binding on all the local
organs involved in the pacification campaign.25
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The success of CORDS was to achieve unity of effort
by creating interagency unity of command at the
operational level for the American involvement in
the pacification campaign. President Thieu’s parallel
action achieved unity of command on the Vietnamese
side and the parallel organizations worked effectively
together to achieve a significant degree of unity of
effort.
Even though CORDS is well remembered in the
Special Operations community and those who have
thought seriously about stability operations and despite
its mention in both Joint and Army doctrine, the lesson
has never been internalized by either the conventional
military or by the civil bureaucracy. As both Richard
Downie and John Nagl point out, the Army has great
difficulty becoming a true learning organization—
even when all the necessary mechanisms are in place.
American civil bureaucracy has even greater difficulty
since it has no built in “lessons learned” functions
or procedures. Thus, there has been no effort within
the civil government to formally capture the lessons
of CORDS and, therefore, unlike the military, there
is no institutional memory of what it was or what it
accomplished.
El Salvador—Or How to Get it Right.
El Salvador, from 1982 until January 1992 with the
signing of the Peace Accords, provides a particularly
good example of a mostly institutionalized interagency
coordination process at the operational level. The
adverb “mostly” is employed because the effective
leadership provided by the American ambassadors
and military group (USMILGP) commanders cannot be
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guaranteed either by structure or national direction. In
El Salvador, both the United States and El Salvador were
fortunate that three consummate senior diplomats—
Ambassadors Dean Hinton, Thomas Pickering, and
Edwin Corr—led the embassy from 1982 through 1988.
They were ably supported by USMILGP commanders,
Colonels John Waghelstein, Joseph Stringham, Jim
Steele, and John Ellerson. Because of this leadership,
and the direction and structures in place, the Country
Team concept effectively organized the American
war effort and prodded, pushed, and hauled the
Salvadorans to achieve a political victory.
Ever since the presidency of John F. Kennedy, each
American ambassador has been armed with a letter of
appointment from the President that charges him with
authority over all U.S. Government agencies operating
in the country to which he is accredited, and holds
him responsible for their actions. The only exception
to this authority occurs when major U.S. military
operations are being conducted in the country. This
exception does not apply to military exercises or even
to expanded security assistance as was undertaken
in El Salvador. During the war in El Salvador, this
ambassadorial authority was never challenged by any
of the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) at U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM), the nominal superiors of
the MILGP commanders. Generals Wallace Nutting,
Paul Gorman, John Galvin, Frederick Woerner, Jr., and
Maxwell Thurman all recognized the primacy of the
ambassador and that their role was one of support.
Early on, several elements coalesced to increase the
unity of the American support effort. As in Malaya,
the first such element was a plan. This was the famous
Woerner Report, drafted by a team led by then Brigadier
General Woerner, which provided the blueprint for
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U.S. military support to the El Salvador Armed Forces
(ESAF) from late 1981 until the end of the war. Second,
was the man, Ambassador Dean Hinton—and his two
immediate successors, four successive subordinate
MILGP commanders, and supporting CINCs—who
successfully orchestrated the American interagency
effort. Third, again as in Malaya, was the clear
articulation of the political objectives to be achieved.
These were the survival and success of democratic
government in El Salvador and the subordination of
the ESAF to legitimate civilian government control.
The other side of the Salvadoran equation was the
Government of El Salvador and the ESAF. Not only
were they the object of the U.S. support effort but
they were critical participants in achieving unity of
effort. Three Salvadoran presidents—Alvaro Magaña,
Jose Napoleón Duarte, and Alfredo Cristiani—played
key leadership roles. So, too, did Defense Minister
General Eugenio Vides Casanova and a number of his
subordinates, including future generals Rene Emilio
Ponce and Mauricio Vargas. In addition, Vice Minister
of Public Security Colonel Reynaldo Lopez Nuila led
the effort to move the police from the defense ministry
to the interior ministry.
The fact that the Salvadoran war was one in which
the United States did not control the ally it was trying
to assist makes it, to some degree, analogous with
Vietnam. El Salvador, however, was faced with a war
that was almost entirely internal, having at most a very
small conventional component. It also had the good
fortune to have addressed the real structural grievances
of the opposition (both violent and nonviolent) even
before armed combat broke out. These facts did not
make for a problem with easy solutions but they did
contribute to the ultimate success of the government of
El Salvador (GOES) and the United States.
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John Waghelstein, who commanded the USMILGP
while Dean Hinton was the ambassador, refers
to himself and his Country Team colleagues as
“Hintonistas.”26 The term clearly suggests the close
working relationship among the interagency players
in the embassy. One incident related by Waghelstein
clearly illustrates just how that relationship worked.
For the 1982 elections the ESAF was tasked to provide
security and established a number of ad hoc “Special
Intelligence” units. Unfortunately, these were not
returned to their primary missions after the election:
One signals unit had a particularly unsavory reputation
but the ESAF headquarters, as was too often the case,
proved unable or unwilling to get it under control.
Salvadoran law proscribed ESAF from operating out of
uniform but as long as this unit operated out of uniform
there was little chance of catching them and making a
case. . . . What the Embassy needed was some irrefutable
evidence that would give us the leverage needed to shut
them down. Eventually the Salvadorans’ penchant for
excess gave it to us.
We received word that this unit’s nightriders had, on
suspicion of subversive activities, arrested four teenagers
including the son of a retired Salvadoran National
Guardsman. The former Guardsman, who worked for the
U.S. Embassy Security Office, recognized the arresting
officer and reported the incident to the Embassy. The
resulting confrontation is instructive regarding the
connection between human rights and security assistance
and the influence the latter provides. In this case, it was
more like a club than a lever. Within 2 hours of receiving
the information, the ambassador called the minister of
defense and sent me to speak with the [Army] chief of
staff and my U.S. Army signal advisor was dispatched
to speak to the commander of the unit involved. Our
message was clear and brief:
•

Put the kids back on the street immediately;
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•
•

End all clandestine law enforcement operations;
Disband the unit and reassign its members.

All three of us explicitly linked a current, million-dollar
signal upgrade project to compliance with our demands.
Within the hour the teenagers were released and that
particular group of nightriders went out of business.27

The incident demonstrates that the Country Team
had a solid set of procedures to react to a situation
and coordinate interagency action to deal with it, all
within the parameters of unity of command under the
ambassador.
Another aspect of interagency coordination in the
Country Team was the continuing development of the
National Plan. Waghelstein notes that Ambassador
Hinton took great pains to push the idea of a national
plan that involved the Salvadoran interagency
community. Hinton used the occasion of official
visitors to support this idea which was adopted by
the GOES. One result was the establishment of the
National Commission for Reconstruction (CONARA)
which worked with the Ministries of Health, Public
Works, Agriculture, Planning, and Education to
coordinate reconstruction.28 CONARA, however, was
plagued by corruption and inefficiency; as a result,
President Duarte gave a larger role to the ESAF while
at the same time expanding the National Plan to all
14 departments.29 This expansion was a “bridge too
far,” and lack of resources, coupled with the effects of
the 1986 earthquake that leveled parts of the capital
and diverted reconstruction funds from the rural
departments, caused this expansion to be less than
wholly successful. Nevertheless, USMILGP worked
closely with USAID to coordinate American support to
the project. This included the assignment of a Special
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Forces captain to USAID as the liaison officer to make
the coordination happen.30
The most successful version of the National Plan was
also the simplest. Ambassador Edwin Corr encouraged
President Duarte to put reconstruction funds directly
into the hands of the mayors of the municipalities of
the 14 departments on the theory that local people
knew what they needed better than the national
bureaucracy.31 It also had the effect of “cutting out all
the sticky-fingered middlemen. This solution also put
the . . . [U.S. military advisors] and the USAID people
in direct contact with the projects, thereby increasing
U.S. oversight and plan efficiency.”32
What El Salvador clearly demonstrates is that the
Country Team concept can work effectively where
the United States is supporting host nation stability
operations. What made it so successful here, was that
the three ambassadors representing the U.S. President
took their role—as defined in their letter of appointment—seriously and acted as “commanders” of all the
U.S. Government agencies operating in El Salvador.
At no time was there any doubt among the Americans
or the Salvadorans that there was only one U.S. voice,
and that was the voice of the ambassador. The Country
Team concept works when it is seen as the incarnation
of unity of command. Interagency coordination, then,
takes place to implement the policies articulated by the
ambassador.
JIATF-SOUTH: A Story of Evolutionary Innovation.
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued a National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) in which he
declared that narcotrafficking was a national security
threat. It also authorized the Secretary of Defense
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to take measures that would “enable U. S. military
forces to support counternarcotics efforts more
actively. . . .”33 In August 1989, President George H.
W. Bush issued National Security Directive (NSD)-18
which reiterated President Reagan’s declaration and
gave DoD the authority to “expand support of U.S.
counternarcotics efforts and to permit DoD personnel
to conduct training for host government personnel and
operational support activities anywhere in the Andean
Region.”34 Out of these brief policy statements, and
the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 which made
DoD the lead agency for air and sea drug interdiction,
came a greatly expanded role for DoD in counterdrug
operations. In the process, several new organizations
were established.
On the West coast of the United States, Joint
Task Force 5 (JTF-5) was established, while its sister
organization, JTF-4, began to operate out of Key
West, Florida. Later, JTF-6 was created at Fort Bliss,
Texas. JTF-South was established at Headquarters
USSOUTHCOM in Panama. Each of these JTFs played
a key role in what was being called the drug war.
JTFs 4 and 5 were responsible primarily for seaborne
interdiction in the Caribbean and coastal Pacific waters,
respectively. JTF-6 supported federal, state, and local
law enforcement on the Mexican border. JTF-South
was responsible for monitoring drug movements
from South America into the areas of responsibility
of JTFs 4 and 5, and providing operational support to
counterdrug activities in the Andean Ridge.
Each JTF consisted of multiservice U.S. military
forces operating under the command relationships
established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
This gave each JTF commander Operational Control
over the forces assigned to him and meant that he
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had the authority to direct those forces and to task
organize them. In other words, he could attach an
Army element to a Navy or Air Force command, and
direct the joint force to carry out a mission. He also had
the authority to relieve a nonperforming commander.
Logistical support for the JTF could be tasked to an
individual service component by the unified command
commander in whose area of responsibility the JTF was
operating. In short, the JTFs operated with effective
unity of command—a result of Goldwater-Nichols
implementation.
There was, however, an interagency component to
the JTFs. JTF-South, in particular, had liaison officers
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
Customs serving with it in Panama. There were Coast
Guard liaison officers as well. Moreover, JTF-4 was
commanded by a USCG Vice Admiral from February
1989 until April 1991. After that, however, JTF-4 went
under U.S. Navy command where it remained through
the transition to a new status as Joint Interagency Task
Force—East (JIATF-E) on April 7, 1994. On this same
date, JTFs 5 and South were also converted to JIATFs.
In January 1996, a USCG admiral became the Director
of JIATF-E, and on March 1, 1999, JIATF-S merged
with JIATF-E at the Key West location. The newly
merged organization took the name, JIATF-S, and
has continued to the present to operate with a USCG
admiral as its Director.
JIATF-S is a true interagency organization operating
with unity of command under its Director. It has Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard components
from the military services (and two departments—DoD
and the Department of Homeland Security [DHS])
along with other DoD and DHS elements including the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Naval Criminal
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Investigative Service, National Security Agency, and
U.S. Customs Service. DEA and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) from the Department of Justice are
both represented. It is understood that the Director has
Operational Control of all of these elements. JIATF-S
reports to the Commander, U.S. Southern Command
who exercises Combatant Command over it.
JIATF-S is also a multinational organization.
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
(UK) provide aircraft, ships, and liaison officers to the
JIATF, while the flag officer of the Netherlands Forces
Caribbean commands a JIATF task group. In addition,
there are liaison officers assigned from Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation states
that, “The JIATF South succeeds because it does
something the federal government rarely does well, if
at all: it plays well with others.”35 Carafano argues that
JIATF-S works because the agencies involved have
little choice. But here this writer takes issue with him.
The real reason JIATF-S works is that it is structurally
an organization that has unity of command. The
Director is a commander with the authority to hire and
fire, as well as to task organize and direct actions. As a
result, JIATF-S has a full range of standard operating
procedures that are practiced on a regular basis. And,
with regard to the participating European navies, it is
worth noting that they are all NATO countries with a
56-year history of operating together under common
standard operating procedures and command
relationships that closely approximate the American
version of Operational Control.
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Iraq—Or What Happens When We Forget What We
Have Learned and Have to “Reinvent the Wheel.”
The search for unity of effort in Iraq is, unfortunately,
reminiscent of the problems of Vietnam.36 On the
positive side, this does not apply to the command
and direction of military forces. In Iraq, there is unity
of military command both with U.S. and coalition
forces. Goldwater-Nichols has been institutionalized
and internalized by American military leaders at all
levels. American military practice tends to carry over
to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
and non-NATO coalition members whose leaders
have gone to U.S. military courses and have led their
troops in combined exercises with the Americans over
a relatively long period. The most difficult problems of
military unity of effort revolved around the fact that for
much of 2004, American military leadership was shared
among three 3-star Army generals under the command
of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander
General John Abizaid. Although Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez was the commander of U.S. ground
forces in Iraq, having two other commanders of equal
rank ostensibly subordinate to him made for a degree
of confusion. The problem was remedied when General
George Casey (with his 4-stars) replaced Sanchez as
commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.
Neither has the problem been one of command,
control, or coordination with the Iraqi forces since we
have been in the process of creating them, equipping
them, and training them. Rather, the problems with
those forces have more to do with the dimension of
legitimacy than with that of unity of effort. No, the
problems of unity of effort do not have much relation to
military or even security force command and control.
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The central problem of unity of effort for the United
States and the Coalition has been that no one American
is in charge of the American effort. This was true from
the initial planning for the war through the moment
that Ambassador Paul (Jerry) Bremer took charge of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to December
2005.
Although General Tommy Franks makes a strong
case that post-conflict reconstruction was included in
the planning process for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,
he does not dispel the conclusion that it was not solidly
embedded in his war plans.37 Rather, as a 2002 British
memorandum to Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, “A
post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted
and costly nation-building exercise. . . . As already
made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent
on this point.”38
Before the CPA was established, post-conflict
planning and execution was in the hands of the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)
under the direction of retired Army Lieutenant General
Jay Garner. ORHA was a DoD dependency and was
caught in the middle of some highly publicized fights
within the Bush Administration about the nature of
the reconstruction process. ORHA, however, was not
subordinate to CENTCOM during the planning period
which made coordination within DoD problematic.
When Garner and the office moved to the theater, they
did come under CENTCOM but not directly under the
commander. Instead, they were subordinated to the
Land Component Commander (one of three 3-stars).
As a result, Garner had much difficulty getting a
hearing for the things he felt were important. The
positive aspect of this command relationship was that
ORHA was structurally part of CENTCOM which
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made unity of command possible even if the command
was focused away from what was quickly becoming
the central problem of the war.
At that point, the picture shifted. The CPA under
Ambassador Bremer replaced ORHA. The CPA was
an odd duck of an organization. It belonged to DoD;
Bremer was subordinate to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld. However, the CPA was not part
of CENTCOM, and Bremer was not subordinate to
General Abizaid. Equally important was that neither
Abizaid nor his principal subordinates like Lieutenant
General Sanchez who commanded all U.S. military
forces in Iraq, were subordinate to Bremer. Yet, Bremer
was responsible for the reconstruction—political,
economic, and physical—of Iraq, a mission that it
was impossible to carry out without the full support
of Coalition military forces. As in Vietnam, there was
no unity of command within the theater. So, even
though there was little or no conflict reported between
Bremer and Sanchez, there is little evidence that any
kind of effective unity of effort was achieved. Indeed,
the creation of the CPA as an independent entity was
clearly a regression from the relatively clear command
relationship between CENTCOM and ORHA.
The demise of the CPA following the creation
of the Iraqi interim authority at the end of June 2004
only further complicated the interagency coordination
picture. The senior American civilian was now the U.S.
ambassador (initially John Negroponte—very senior,
very tough, very competent) but without any authority
over U.S. and Coalition military forces. The ambassador
was, and remains, equal to the commander of forces
in Iraq whether that was Lieutenant General Sanchez
or General George Casey. The additional complication
was due to the fact that whereas under the CPA civil-
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military conflicts could be adjudicated by the Secretary
of Defense, since the departure of the CPA the only
person who could adjudicate those conflicts became
the President. The consequences of this remain unclear,
but they are certainly less than optimal.
Another problem for interagency coordination is
that, unlike Vietnam, there has not been any American
agency comparable to CORDS. Thus there have been
no simple means of creating task organizations to
undertake combined security and reconstruction
missions. Civilian agencies from non-DoD departments
did not work for General Casey, and military forces
did not work for the U.S. ambassador. At the same
time, the Iraqi government has had no incentive to
create the kind of CORDS parallel structure established
by Vietnamese President Thieu. The outcome of all
of this has been a structure that makes interagency
coordination more difficult than it needs to be resulting
in very questionable unity of effort.39
Colombia—CCAI: How President Uribe Took a U.S.
Initiative and Made it his Own.
The final case harkens back to El Salvador in terms
of the American structure for interagency coordination
but enters new territory with the host nation response.
In Colombia, the American ambassador—as per his letter of appointment—is responsible for all actions of the
U.S. Government (and U.S. Government contractors)
operating in country. This includes a very much
expanded USMILGP, the CIA station, the narcotics
assistance section (NAS), and the DEA, among others.
Included in the USMILGP is a Civil Affairs team from
SOUTHCOM.
The Colombian insurgency has bedeviled that
country for more than 40 years (60+ if one includes
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the early stages of the Violencia). In that time, multiple
governments have sought to deal with it in a variety
of ways ranging from suppression to accommodation
to addressing “root causes.” The last effort at
accommodation was that of the administration of
President Andrés Pastrana who ceded a huge zone
of the country to the guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). At the end of his
term, President Pastrana recognized the failure of this
policy of appeasement and turned to suppression.
Concurrent with these efforts was the attempt to
address the “root causes” of Colombia’s insurgency.
Called Plan Colombia, this was a multiyear, $7.5
billion program, $4.9 billion of which was to be
financed by Colombia and $2.6 billion by international
donors. The U.S. share was $1.3 billion, about $1
billion in military assistance and the remaining $300
million in development assistance. At least $1 billion
in development assistance was to come from the
European Union (EU). While the United States and
Colombia have more than met their commitments,
the EU has been less forthcoming. Unfortunately, Plan
Colombia during the Pastrana administration was
tied to the failed policy of accommodation, hence its
results had little impact on either the insurgency or
narcotrafficking.
The election of Alvaro Uribe as President in May
2002 changed the nature of the counterinsurgency in
Colombia. President Uribe maintained Plan Colombia
but tied it to a new military plan called Plan Patriota,
designed to defeat the FARC. The military plan was
to take back from the guerrillas areas of the country
that had either been ceded to them as part of Pastrana’s
negotiating strategy or that they had simply occupied.
Some of these areas were under the control of the other
insurgent group, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN),
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while others were controlled by illegal Autodefensas
(the so-called paramilitaries or AUI). With regard to
the latter, Uribe began an apparently successful effort
to negotiate their disbanding.
As all these strategic moves were taking place, the
Civil Affairs section of the SOUTHCOM operations
directorate proposed an initiative to establish a
Colombian interagency organization “capable of
synchronizing national level efforts to reestablish
governance” in areas that had been under FARC,
ELN, or AUI control.40 Civil Affairs officers attached
to the MILGP in Colombia presented the concept to
the Minister of Defense who liked it and made it the
basis for his proposal to President Uribe in February
2004. Needless to say, the concept had been fully
vetted in SOUTHCOM and the embassy, and both the
commander and the ambassador totally supported the
concept.
President Uribe accepted the proposal and
established the Coordination Center for Integrated
Action (CCAI) with one of his senior advisors and
closest associates, Luis Alfonso Hoyos, as its Director.
Members of the Board of Directors include Vice
Minister of Defense Andres Peñate, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Freddy Padilla, and 12
other senior level representatives of key government
ministries. The Board meets weekly, reporting directly
to the President.41
CCAI is staffed full time by representatives of 13
government ministries and five supporting agencies,
including both defense ministry personnel and military
officers. The American embassy is also represented at
CCAI by a USAID official and a Civil Affairs officer
assigned to the USMILGP. CCAI’s first major planning
activity was a senior leader seminar and planning
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session held from May 8-10, 2004, which developed
an economic, social development, and security plan
to reestablish long-term governance in southern
Colombia. In addition to the President, seminar
participants included four ministers (including the
Minister of Defense), four other cabinet level civilians,
both Vice Ministers of Defense, the Commander of
the Colombian Armed Forces, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the three
military services and the National Police. Among the
U.S. participants were Ambassador William Wood and
General James T. Hill, Commander of U.S. Southern
Command.42
Implementation of this plan was sufficiently
successful that planning was expanded to address a
full seven conflictive zones throughout the country.
This plan was addressed at an off-site planning session
in Washington at the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies from March 28-31, 2005.
As President Uribe has developed CCAI, it is the
ideal operational instrument for winning the peace
in Colombia’s counterinsurgency. First, it is a vehicle
designed to achieve a specific strategic objective, that
of reestablishing legitimate governance over zones
formerly controlled by insurgents or the AUI. Second,
its Director, Luis Alfonso Hoyos, has the authority he
requires to direct the ministries and agencies involved
to carry out the plan. For this, the president holds him
accountable. And, third, CCAI brings together all the
relevant stakeholders to participate in the planning
process thereby ensuring “buy in”; this includes the
American embassy, firmly under the direction of the
ambassador, with the full support of U.S. Southern
Command.
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CONCLUSION
When this project began, it did not include any
formal hypotheses. Rather, it was developed around
six cases that could illustrate the range of issues for
interagency coordination and unity of effort at the
operational level. The cases were selected largely in
terms of their success or failure in achieving unity
of effort and not so much in terms of their degree of
success in terms of the overall strategic objective. By
these criteria, JIATF-S is highly successful in achieving
operational unity of effort regardless of its ability to
affect the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.
Prior explorations of the unity of effort dimension
suggested that, if it were possible, it was desirable to
have that particular subset of unity of effort called unity
of command. However, there obviously were many
instances where unity of command was not possible,
and, therefore, one would often have to settle for unity
of effort brought about by various mechanisms of
interagency coordination. In addition, especially with
respect to stability operations, there is most often a
multinational aspect that complicates the achievement
of unity of effort regardless of whether or not there is
unity of command at any level.
The examination of these six cases results in
one obvious conclusion. Where there was unity of
command, there was unity of effort and effective
interagency coordination, not otherwise. Unity of
command on the U.S. side of a multinational stability
operation also made multinational unity of effort more
likely and easier to achieve.
The Malayan Emergency clearly demonstrates the
importance of unity of command but it also shows the
criticality of the concept of the objective. Without a
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strategic objective, the best operational plan had little
likelihood of mission success. Nor would General
Templar have accomplished his mission or achieved
so high a degree of unity of effort without the strategic
objective of an independent Malaya. Given that
objective, the Briggs Plan to coordinate operations and
tactical actions, and Templar with full authority, the
Malayan Emergency ended well.
Vietnam, by contrast, demonstrates that the lack of
a clear objective, confused and overlapping chains of
command, and lack of authority on the ground make
it difficult at best to attain unity of effort within the
American government let alone with our allies. The
establishment of CORDS shows what can be done to
effect solid interagency coordination when a position of
authority is created and the several involved agencies
understand who is the boss. When Ambassador
Robert Komer and his successors spoke, they knew
they would be backed up by COMUSMACV. That fact
made it easier for the Vietnamese to construct a parallel
organization with similar authority, and meant that the
Deputy Commander for CORDS only had to coordinate
with his Vietnamese counterpart to achieve unity of
effort for the pacification program. Unfortunately, the
U.S. Government has never internalized the lessons of
CORDS—neither in the military as a whole nor in the
State Department.
Ambassador David Passage characterizes interagency coordination in both the Country Team and
in Washington as “a mess,”43 despite the fact that
as Chargé d’Affaires of the American embassy in
El Salvador between the departure of Ambassador
Thomas Pickering and the arrival of Ambassador
Edwin Corr, he filled the commander role brilliantly.
Thus, the El Salvador and Colombia cases demonstrate
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the effectiveness of the ambassadorial appointment
letter and Country Team concept for achieving unity
of command among American agencies. Given
ambassadors who take their role of directing all U.S.
Government activity in the country to which they are
accredited seriously, then the authority provided by the
appointment letter and the Country Team mechanism
serves well to bring about unity of action to achieve a
defined strategic objective.
The evolution of JIATF-S suggests that the Joint
Interagency Task Force, whose Director is, in fact,
a commander, is an appropriate organization to
coordinate the activity of many interagency players. It
is of note that so far, at least, all JIATF directors have
been military—either Navy or Coast Guard. But there
is no reason that the next director of a JIATF, either
already in existence or to be created for some future
purpose, could not be drawn from a civilian agency or
department having the requisite expertise needed for
the mission.
Iraq suggests that much of what we should have
learned over the last half-century, or more, simply went
unlearned. While we have done quite well in learning
what has been called elsewhere “the joint game,” Iraq
demonstrates how far we still have to go in learning
the “interagency game.” Why, with all the experience
we have had with stability operations, are we unable,
or unwilling, to simply designate one American
official—civilian or military—where there is a large
and ongoing military operation as being in charge of all
U.S. Government activity? Specifically, during the CPA
period, why was not Ambassador Bremer, or General
Abizaid, or Lieutenant General Sanchez simply given
the authority to conduct all U.S. Government activity
in Iraq and then held accountable? Since the CPA went
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out of business, why has neither General Casey nor the
American ambassador been given that responsibility
and the requisite authority? In the words of the King of
Siam, “It is a puzzlement.”
Finally, the case of CCAI in Colombia shows both
how the American supporting effort can be enhanced
by effective unity of command under the ambassador,
and how an effective leader like President Uribe can
take somebody else’s good idea, make it his own, and
create an effective national structure with unity of
command to achieve unity of effort. What makes CCAI
both unique and exciting is that it retains the principle
of unity of command, while at the same time making
certain that all the critical institutional stakeholders
have voice and vote. Thus, CCAI is, perhaps, a
model for the future organization of operational level
interagency actions.
POSTSCRIPT—U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Recently, the State Department has created an
Office of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stability
Operations, and the National Security Council, Policy
Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Reconstruction
and Stabilization (R&S) has developed an action plan
for interagency management of reconstruction and
stabilization operations.44 Two of the three model
organizations proposed in this action plan are relevant
to the subject of this chapter. One is the planning cell
called a Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization
Team (HRST) that will be deployed on request of the
regional combatant commander to the combatant
command to augment his Plans Division with
civilian R&S planning capability. The other proposed
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organization is an Advanced Civilian Team (ACT) for
field management and coordination.
It is expected that multiple ACTs would deploy to
various provinces or geographic sectors in a country.
Under a combat scenario, the ACTs provide immediate
civilian presence to work with military commanders,
conduct assessments, engage local authorities, coordinate
with international programs, initiate programs in the
field, and prepare for longer-term civilian programs.
Under a non-combat scenario, the ACTs provide similar
functions, advising an Ambassador or Chief of Mission
and supporting a headquarters ACT staff that augments
Embassy operations and coordinates provincial level
ACTs.45

Although these organizations are highly relevant to
the success of stability operations—in much the same
manner as the Briggs committees were in Malaya—they
do not directly address the main point of this chapter:
unity of command.
In the case of the HRST, unity of command is not
an issue. It works for the combatant commander as an
augmentation of his Plans Division. Neither is unity
of command an issue with respect to the noncombat
scenario ACT. It works for the Ambassador/Chief of
Mission. Unity of command is an issue in the combat
scenario ACT which works with military commanders.
The issue is clearly, “Who is in charge?” If this is not
spelled out, then the achievement of unity of effort at
the operational level is likely to be less than optimal, as
the case studies of this chapter have pointed out.
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CHAPTER 11
EDUCATING NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERS
FOR WORKING
IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
Michael Welken
With Contributions from the
Interagency Transformation and Education Analysis
(ITEA) Staff
of the National Defense University
Introduction.
This chapter highlights the efforts underway
to educate statesmen in interagency collaboration,
planning, and integration. Interagency education
should produce “strategic artisans” who have the
intellectual breadth and competencies to perform in an
increasingly post-Westphelian globe where domestic
and international domains of policy are hardly
distinguishable.
It is imperative that we quench the thirst for understanding how the many actors involved in national
security deal with matters that cross functional and
departmental boundaries. For example, within specific
communities involved in intelligence and homeland
security, “learning” professionals are attempting to
integrate education and rotation opportunities for
employees to create an intraagency “joint” culture.
Similarly, as agencies once serving on the periphery of
national security affairs move to the forefront, there is
a larger impetus to educate others on their specific role
in policy integration.
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The concept of interagency education arose out
of the compelling lessons learned in the activities
America conducted abroad. Establishing a direction
and structure for military operations other than war
in the 1990s required understanding the capabilities
that could not be left to ad hocery and trial and error.
The evolution of Presidential Decision Directive-56
(PDD-56) on Complex Contingency Operations in 1997
during the Clinton administration (discussed later) as
a vehicle to provide interagency integration resulted in
the establishment of formal organizations to analyze
how to bring together the elements of national power
into a functional structure. To this day, the landmark
legacy of PDD-56 continues to drive and define how
interagency education is developed and delivered to
audiences throughout the government.
It is apparent that interagency education does not
reach enough people. The nature of the personnel
policies and reward systems among the departments
and agencies limits opportunities for education for
civilian employees because most departments and
agencies do not have an adequate training “float.” The
latter term refers to sufficient redundancy in personnel
so as to have more people in place to allow a certain
percentage to be in training or education programs,
or in case the government needs to surge personnel in
crisis situations. For example, for very good reasons
the Department of Defense (DoD) had an 11 percent
float, while the Department of State (DOS) in late
2007 had a negative 3 percent, and those diplomats
available for professional development programs were
focused on predeployment training, such as foreign
language preparation. Gaps in interagency education
contribute to disjointed planning in areas such as
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, strategic
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communications, and domestic preparedness. Among
the many hurdles are the multiplicity of organizational
cultures and subcultures, severe personnel and resource
limitations and asymmetries, differential career benefits
to individuals and agencies and departments, as well
as diverse ways of planning and implementing.
Interagency education heightens awareness of
the limited flexibility within government to adapt
to the changing strategic landscape. The best, and
most effective way, to build the capability to address
emerging challenges is to create a government–wide
education system that values career-long learning for
employees. Better coordination across the interagency
community may not happen immediately because of
improved education; it will have to be a cumulative
effort sustained over time, bearing fruit in the midterm future.
Interagency Education.
As the sun rises on the 21st century, the keys
to national security will not necessarily be stored
within the confines of the traditional guardians of
the national interests: DoD, DOS, and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11), the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina,
and a variety of commitments of lesser scale, were
unscheduled wakeup calls about the need to adapt the
way the government is organized to deal with the new
threats. Additionally, new concerns continue to arise
in the areas of pandemic influenza, environmental
degradation, international organized crime, corruption,
weak to failing states, and global economic health.
None of these challenges can be addressed purely by
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traditional diplomacy or military power. Statesmen
must be prepared to seamlessly integrate a diversity
of expertise, resources, and institutional cultures. The
following pages highlight programs that have brought
interagency partners into the classroom.
General and Topical Strategic Interagency
Education.
The six programs of interagency education are
at the National War College (NWC) and Industrial
College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), the School for
National Security Executive Education (SNSEE), the
Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), the U.S. Army War
College (USAWC), and the Interagency Education,
Transformation & Analysis (ITEA) program. Over the
last decade, the brick and mortar institutions at the
top of DoD’s Joint Professional Military Education
(JPME) system have increasingly recruited students
and faculty members from the greater interagency
community outside of DoD to enrich the education of
senior military and civilian leaders. This, in turn, has
educated students in strategic planning and regional
affairs, as well as foreign and defense policy. Students
acquire a greater understanding of the uses of military
power and the competencies of military officers, which
will radiate among their departments and agencies.
Students from beyond the military also convey the
competencies, missions, cultures, and constraints of
their home departments. Collectively, all students
develop a valuable network of personal contacts from
the interagency community. Even though the number
of slots for non-DoD students at the NWC/ICAF/JFSC
has increased over the years, the primary goal of these
institutions is to educate senior military leaders. It will
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never be their responsibility to carry the burden of
educating all senior leaders.
In conjunction with the traditional JPME educational components at NDU, the ITEA and SNSEE programs offer flexible courses. The ITEA program, housed
within the NDU’s Institute for National Strategic
Studies, offers an alternative to the traditional resident
programs that are typical of a university structure. The
ITEA program began in 1997 with a focus on promoting
interagency education within the “Beltway” and for the
Regional Combatant Commands (COCOMs), and later
their Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).
ITEA hosts educational programs for COCOMs and
quarterly Interagency Coordination Symposia for
the entire Washington community. These courses
provide an overview of current initiatives involving
coordination, highlight best practices, and bring
together multiple departments and agencies so that
participants can understand the capabilities and cultures of government components. ITEA provides
courses that are free of charge, but is only able to offer
courses on a quarterly basis with limited capacity.
Finally, ITEA has developed distance learning
curriculum through DoD’s Joint Knowledge
Development and Distribution Capability and
continues to build curriculum that can be delivered
electronically to students.
SNSEE, also housed at NDU, offers graduatelevel courses. Its corps of adjunct faculty and guest
speakers allow students to delve deeply into national
security. SNSEE offers courses during the evenings and
weekends, which is attractive to busy professionals.
SNSEE operates in a manner similar to a traditional
graduate school where tuition is paid on a per course
basis. In addition to providing counterterrorism
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education, SNSEE is developing concentrations for the
Master’s program that focus on areas such as conflict
management (security, stabilization, transition, and
reconstruction operations) and domestic preparedness.
The success of both programs shows that education
for the interagency community demands flexibility in
curriculum design and delivery.
Since 2005, the USAWC has developed the most
robust education program. Called the National Security
Policy Program (NSPP) and underwritten by the U.S.
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, the venture
reaches a select set of 15 students who are primed for
future interagency work. Taught over two semesters,
the NSPP curriculum requires courses in policymaking
and implementation, national security public policy,
and regional studies. Additionally NSPP offers elective
coursework ranging from the military and the media,
to Congress and the military, civil-military relations,
national level intelligence, and crisis action planning.
A central feature of the program is a 2-week internship
in the Washington policy-strategy community, as well
as extensive consultations with the DOS, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the National
Security Council staff, the Intelligence Community (IC),
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
program also seeks to assist graduates find onward
assignments in appropriate interagency jobs.
Other opportunities exist. However, outside
of those educational components at NDU and the
JPME system, even less capacity exists within the
U.S. Government regarding general strategic and
integrative education for civilian employees. That
said, over the last few years more and more individual
topical courses catering to an interagency audience
have sprung up throughout government on an ad-hoc
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and demand-driven basis. A few examples include the
courses offered at the National Intelligence University
(formerly the Sherman Kent School) on topics relating
to intelligence analysis, proliferation, and regional
concerns. Courses on economic development,
stabilization and reconstruction, rule of law, and
peace operations are offered through the Center for
Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP)
at NDU, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP),
the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization, the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the USAWC, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and
the Department of Energy (DOE). Other opportunities
come from the Office of Personnel Management’s
Federal Executive Institute, as well at the DOS Foreign
Service Institute, on a wide range of topics.
Intra-agency Education.
After the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was passed, DoD
underwent (and is still undergoing) radical changes
to improve the operational coordination between and
among the four services. The concept of “jointness”
was advanced by creating an educational system and
military personnel system that tied joint education to
career promotion. Because of these factors, as well as
the commitment to professional officer education and
training within the U.S. military, DoD has been able to
develop and increase educational offerings. The result
of this improved intraagency coordination has been
greater operational effectiveness and a more common
military culture.
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Other
agencies
are
undergoing
similar
transformations. Most notable are the intelligence
community, now headed by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (created in 2006),
and the DHS (2002). Both examples show how, in an
effort to build greater synergy among components,
education promotes collaboration. Efforts at improved
coordination through interagency education begin
with improvements in individual agencies and
departments (or the intraagency communities). Cadres
of professionals in the intelligence and homeland
security communities are able to speak more effectively
to concerns of an entire component of national security
instead of a single office. Intraagency education
remains in its infancy, but the discussion of intraagency
education is reminiscent of initial discussions for
creating jointness within the military in the 1980s and
1990s.
Throughout the intelligence community (IC), there
are initiatives to streamline education for entry-level
staff as well as increase the opportunities for staff
in both the analytical and operational directorates.
Additionally, with the formation of the National
Intelligence University, intelligence professionals are
able to gain a much better understanding of how the IC
operates as a whole. Education is a tool to break down
the cultural barriers between intelligence specialties
and organizations by encouraging entry and midlevel professionals to interact more frequently than
ever before. In this case, education is supplemented
with rotational assignments, which vary from the
physical location of individuals in another component
to temporary assignments on issue-based working
groups with individuals from the IC. The results of
this change mean that in the future an analyst in an
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interagency setting will be able to represent more
adequately the views of an entire community. This is a
dramatic improvement from the way the IC operated
in the late 1990s.
DHS has taken a different approach to intraagency
education. Since DHS components represent a great
span of individual functional responsibilities, its
approach to intraagency education involves much
more than centralizing education and providing
rotations. DHS educational requirements include
equities that fall far outside the federal government:
state and local governments as well as the private
sector. To accomplish these challenging tasks, DHS
has appointed a Chief Learning Officer and has begun
developing a professional education that may result
in a Homeland Security University system. The goal
is a DHS organizational culture that is able to stretch
across the entire Department by creating a professional
cadre which understands the component parts of DHS
and how their labors can develop and execute strategic
plans. Alternative to this, DHS has also worked to
build a Homeland Security and Defense Education
Consortium (www.hsdec.org) where employees can
attend courses in the private sector or with state and
local partners on topics of mutual interest. This effort
will ultimately create small cadres of professionals who
are familiar with the component capabilities that can be
brought to bear on certain needs. The DHS educational
mission brings together individuals at the top of the
organization to focus on departmental strategic issues
as well as professionals in specific functional areas to
improve coordination with players who are not in the
federal government.
These examples build on the common theme that
education improves the ability of an organization to
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work collaboratively with other entities. The IC and
DHS have some advantages over education writ large
across the entire government. Since the CIA University
(Sherman Kent School) had already been operating for
years and had an education mission, it was easier for
the IC to expand capabilities. DHS, as a new player
in national security, can bring education to the table
under the mandate of building up organizational
capacity. Other departments are involved in national
security (Department of Health and Human Services,
Department of Treasury, Department of Agriculture,
DOE, to name a few) but have even fewer resources.
In-house learning opportunities, such as the Treasury
Executive Institute, are increasing, but such programs
face organizational culture, mandate and resource
constraints.
Evolution of Interagency Education.
Understanding the evolution of interagency
education is essential in determining how to educate
the strategic leaders of tomorrow. It is not a new
phenomenon. Since the institution of Professional
Military Education (PME), select DOS employees
and others from the Federal Government interagency
community have attended the NWC, the ICAF, and
the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air War Colleges.
The formalization of interagency education, though,
did not occur until 1997 with the signing of PDD-56,
the document that sanctified planning for managing
complex contingency operations. During the initial
days of the George W. Bush administration in 2001
following the signing of National Security Presidential
Directive 1 (NSPD-1), the structure of coordination and
responsibilities in the field of interagency collaboration
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were to be formalized in a subsequent “process based”
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD).
Regrettably, this never occurred, in part because of
institutional infighting. The proposed NSPD, informally referred to as NSPD-XX, was never completed.
In the mid-1990s, experts in at the War Gaming and
Simulation Center (now the National Strategic Gaming
Center) of NDU, the Senior Seminar Division (now the
Senior Policy Seminars Division) of the DOS, and the
Foreign Service Institute undertook the development of
strategic exercises to map out how the United States fit
into the new international security paradigm. Findings
from these exercises showed significant gaps in how
the DOS and DoD interacted. Specifically, stovepipes
had developed that did not allow for communication,
let alone collaboration. With complex situations in
the real world at the same time (Bangladesh, Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia), the exercise results reaffirmed the
many challenges developing over the new strategic
landscape. From the perspectives of DoD and the DOS,
top-level direction in the area of coordination was
required to address the emerging security challenges.
PDD-56 intended to bring some clarity to the task of
coordination, with one component being interagency
education.
During this same period, globalization pushed both
the private sector and departments and agencies that
traditionally did not operate overseas into more active
roles. Additionally, the concept of national security
began to evolve away from the traditional military and
diplomatic instruments of national power. For example,
during this period, agencies such as the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Justice (primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
the Department of Commerce (beyond the Foreign
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Commercial Service), and the Department of Treasury
began developing outward-looking and international
strategic plans to support evolving national security
strategies. Congress funded new initiatives because of
the growing need for the application of resources in
areas beyond the traditional military and diplomatic
spheres. Globalization affected two factors relating
to coordination: (1) more agencies were becoming
involved in the business of national security, and (2)
traditional departments (primarily DoD) began to
adapt to the environment by balancing the kinetic
warfighting model with soft power.
The landscape shifted in both size and scope as more
players attempted to navigate the waters of national
security. This created overlapping missions among
organizations. Yet there was no governing strategy
document which required coordination beyond the
National Security Council system. Throughout the
1990s, departments and offices working on national
security grew without matching growth in governance
structures to facilitate coordination and cooperation.
As the decade drew to a close and budgets began to
decrease, territorialism between and among the policy
communities began to rise. The issue of organizational
sovereignty became much more apparent in the national
security community as departments and agencies were
placed in positions to purposefully avoid coordination
in order to preserve their autonomy.
The problems of the 1990s in the area of coordination
were painfully realized in the beginning of the 21st
century with the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 (9/11), the challenges of stabilization and
reconstruction of Iraq, and the inadequate and far
from seamless response to Hurricane Katrina. With the
creation of DHS and the organization of the IC under
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the Director of National Intelligence, structural progress
has alleviated some of the coordination challenges.
However, transnational issues led departments that
traditionally looked at international security to delve
into domestic security. Today the borders between
the two have blurred and the definition of “national
security” encompasses both domestic and international
concerns. The two most prominent examples of this new
reality are the establishment of U.S. NORTHCOM by
DoD and the matter of domestic surveillance by the IC.
These new directions for traditional national security
organizations added another layer to the challenge of
coordination. Budgets for offices working on national
security increased, not simply because of globalization,
but because of demand for improved responses to the
challenges. Despite the impetus for increasing response
capabilities, little guidance has been delivered from the
topmost level of government regarding coordination,
creating more need for clarification in classroom
instruction.
Interagency Education for Integration
and Coordination.
The transformation of the strategic landscape
included an awareness of a need for change within
the academic community. Coincidentally, the concept
of interagency education began not because of a lack
of understanding in the interagency community, but
through the work of a few individuals who saw the
link between education and coordination. Interagency
education has been transformed into a popular
strategy to break down stovepipes in government.
Today, the interagency education community faces its
own challenge in coordinating course offerings, while
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defining topics, learning areas, objectives, standards,
and audiences.
Interagency education developed largely out of
the recognition that there was a less than complete
understanding of the multiple and often complex
roles, missions, and functions of departments and
agencies. For example, with the emergence of new
threats and conflicts in the 1990s, DoD realized that
military personnel were consistently required to work
with other government departments. When Pentagon
leaders asked other agencies to provide them with
“strategic planning guidance” or an “OPLAN,” many
in the military community could not understand that
civilian departments and agencies do not develop
plans in the same fashion as the planning shops in the
Joint Staff, commands, or services. Thus, the purpose of
interagency education from the innocent military point
of view was (1) to allow the military to understand why
members of “the interagency” (or “interagencies”—
note that interagency is not a noun) operate the way
they do, and (2) to educate “the interagencies” (again,
in as much as it is not an entity, pluralizing the term
only magnifies the opportunity for misunderstanding
and confusion) on how to plan.
With the changing landscape, multiple Pentagon
meetings focused on such topics as how to “spin
the interagency up” on national security, and a few
select individuals were tasked to find counterparts
to Pentagon officials, such as the Deputy Director of
Strategic Plans in the Strategic Planning Division of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Few could come to terms with the
fact that the interagency community outside of DoD
was stretched thin, and many times there existed no
direct counterparts. Interagency education took root
from awareness of the profound misunderstandings
and ignorance about how the government functions.
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During this time, senior officials in DoD and the
DOS saw the effect of the lack of coordination on the
implementation of national security strategy. Since DoD
possessed a strong history in education for national
security and maintained its JPME system, small, yet
significant transformations began to occur. At the
same time, officials in the DOS began to recognize the
need to develop its Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and
complement the training received at the Department’s
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) with integrative
education. The decision to address it led to a dramatic
increase in the number of students outside of the
military who attended the NWC, the ICAF, and other
senior service schools in the JPME system. “Dramatic”
in this context does not presuppose “adequate” for
the expanding needs of the government; rather a
sustained student population from DOS was ensured,
and DoD assured that sufficient quotas were reserved
for students from outside the military ranks.
Additionally, this period saw the birth and growth
of programs such as the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping
Institute (now the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute or PKSOI) to look at coordination in
post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The ITEA program at NDU, in a complementary initiative, began to promote a general understanding of the players and processes involved in interagency complex operations. As these programs were
promoting interagency collaboration, 9/11 proved
that communication, cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration within the U.S. Government were more
important than ever.
The education community began to evaluate
the need to address interagency coordination in its
programs. The second problem resulting from the

461

absence of the authority from NSPD-XX was that there
was no national level document for organizations
to draw from in creating standard curriculum and
no top-level support for budgetary authority. The
majority of interagency education mechanisms that
were developed came from DoD, and because of this,
the curriculum, student ratio, and program focus had
to demonstrate a direct benefit to JPME and military
operations. For instance, the ITEA program at NDU was
the primary point of contact for providing education to
the newly formed JIACGs, even though a larger ITEA
focus was to provide generalist education to not only
those working and serving at a COCOM, but also those
civilians of the federal executive branch agencies who
must work with interagency colleagues. In addition,
the SNSEE program at NDU was originally touted as a
program to provide functional interagency education
on counterterrorism. SNSEE faculty and program
managers maintained that counterterrorism education
also required students to understand the functions,
and missions of government departments.
Lacking the budgets to sustain the daunting task of
educating, those who viewed this lack of coordination
as a continual problem (NDU-ITEA, USAEC, USIP, and
others) began to build a support network. Additionally,
academic institutions, think tanks, and the business
community joined in (George Mason University and
the Institute for Defense Analysis). These informal
networks of coinciding interests began analyzing the
demand for interagency education and the type of
curriculum that would be needed.
Without NSPD-XX, agencies did not have the
top-level support or funding to develop independent
education programs. When the strategic landscape
shifted and the education capability did not, DoD was
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the only department with an established curriculum.
The ensuing problem was that those institutions which
offered interagency education remained under the DoD
umbrella and had a mission of primarily supporting
the development of Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs).
The matter of governance over the content and process
becomes essential because the educational delivery
mechanism must be viewed as an honest broker
among various players. This is a continual challenge
that developed directly from the lack of NSPD-XX and
other top-level guidance.
In short, there emerged a great motivation to
revolutionize the way in which government was to
operate. The transformation of operating principles
also required a transformation in how individuals are to
be educated throughout government. Without the toplevel guidance in how the interagency community was
to coordinate and operate, the educational systems for
promoting such learning remained tied to the interests
of parent organizations. On one hand, the capacity
for delivering interagency education to audiences
increased tremendously over a short period, but on
the other, no interagency education program had the
resource and policy backing to offer a standardized
curriculum to a large audience. Note that the USAWC
program reaches 15 people each year, and that if one
was to total the educational output of all programs
noted, vast deficiencies in the number of individuals
educated persist.
Continuing Gaps.
Educating national security leaders in how the
interagency functions was a goal of many programs
that began operating in the late 1990s. Despite this,
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answering the questions that surrounded the term
“the interagency” remained much more difficult than
anyone anticipated. Without specific and significant
budgetary authority and guidance from Congress or
the President, standardizing interagency curricular
guidelines and course offerings remained impossible.
Programs expanded on the basis of what funding
could be gathered in departmental and office budgets,
creating a fragmented effort. Despite possessing the
mission of improving coordination, these programs
often found it difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate
their own educational offerings.
Disjointed Educational Offerings.
Everyone in the field of interagency education had
properly begun to identify the needs regarding the
coordination of strategic plans to address complex
operations. One only had to look a few years earlier
to the lessons learned from Hurricane Mitch, Somalia,
Haiti, and Bosnia—as well as the terrorist attacks in
the 1990s—to realize that a major failing of plans was
the inability to adequately understand the capabilities
of other U.S. Government institutions and to close the
seams between them. The lifeblood of interagency
education programs were topical issues, for instance,
examining peacekeeping specifically and other issues
of interagency concern. The widening gap between
educational programs did not allow for curriculum
standardization and created ad hoc solutions.
One new initiative was promoted by NWC and
ICAF. NWC and ICAF have been touted as the
pinnacle of strategic education within the government,
and their approach was to recruit more students from
the interagency community, as well as create faculty
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chairs for previously unrepresented populations of the
interagency. Additionally, the hiring process began
to bring in faculty members with new ideas, whose
research and scholarly interests examined relevant
emerging concepts. NWC and ICAF brought in new
students. But the mission of NDU and other JPME
institutions was not to be a hub for education; it was
to educate warriors for strategic military leadership.
NWC and ICAF succeeded in their mission to provide
greater interagency exposure to their students.
Educational programs also began to bring
professionals together to learn how to resolve specific
problems. Many of these programs were tasked to
examine a single subject, such as terrorism, and brought
in students with diverse interagency experience. The
best example of this is SNSEE. Its student population
includes representation from various departments
and agencies as well as considerable international
participation, but even though the curriculum has
widened, education focused on counterterrorism.
During class discussions, students speak often of
their office’s capabilities to respond in the area of
counterterrorism, but these discussions do not meet
the level of interagency education that is required. The
primary mission of SNSEE and other organizations
like it is to provide education on topics relating to
national security, not to increase the understanding
of individual departmental capabilities to coordinate,
conduct and carry out plans, and operate in a complex
environment in concert with other agencies.
Generalist education in interagency affairs emerged
around the same time. The ITEA program originally
took off as an educational initiative for JIACGs. The
curriculum offerings of ITEA attempted to orient
participants to the different organizational structures,
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cultures, and planning mechanisms of interagency
community members. This program has since
expanded to offer educational programs to the broader
Washington community. Though valuable, the ITEA
curriculum on the many segments of the government
has been hampered by small staff, a relatively modest
budget, and dependence on outside speakers. As such,
ITEA has been unable to address the eager needs of the
interagency community. Nevertheless, ITEA continues
to serve as a hub for those in the business of interagency
education, providing a forum to share information on
upcoming courses. The ITEA staff conducts outreach to
keep up-to-date on the current status of policy affecting
interagency collaboration. This unfortunately is not
enough to address the need, demand, or requirement
for strategic-level interagency education.
More and more players are entering interagency
education. Even though these programs are adding to
the substance of education available for government
civilians, little work has been done in cross-analyzing
what competencies are built through these courses,
and how the courses build on each other to produce
an educated individual who is able to manage a wide
array of challenges in the new strategic landscape.
Lacking Incentives.
One of the most important gaps in interagency
education is the authority and budget to allow
departments and agencies to send their personnel
to courses. In addition, no department or agency is
specifically tasked with providing education as part of
its primary mission, which means that as the budgetary
process goes forward, learning—both education and
training—is the first section of a budget to be cut. This
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also means that the likelihood of a department offering
stand-alone education is low. The lack of authority
cannot be easily addressed.
With the exception of those in military uniform and a
limited number of Foreign Service Officers, there is little
education available to general civilians throughout the
government. One of the roots of this problem comes in
the philosophy and regulations of hiring procedures,
whereby an individual who is hired for any given
position is expected to already possess the education,
experience, and background for the job. Professional
development in positions supposedly comes through
time-in-grade, on-the-job training, and the completion
of limited training. Because of this, often education that
betters the individual and the organization only takes
place through either employees personally pursuing
courses in the evenings and weekends or through
back-office begging and brokering. Even at the close
of a beneficial educational engagement, personnel do
not reap rewards within their personnel systems; their
careers can at some times even be hurt by “time away.”
There are limited mechanisms in the government
personnel system to keep track of education (outside
of degrees) or to translate education into incentives.
Individual development plans are rarely used or
implemented in a consistent or robust fashion. In many
cases, personnel can only seek out new opportunities
through a new position with a higher grade. Education
can also be detrimental to a career, with managers
believing that time away from the office is harmful
to the organization. Thus, employees who obtain
education during office hours are not rewarded.
From the organizational perspective, the budget
line item for employee education either does not exist
or is at a miniscule level. Also, with many agencies
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operating with uncertain budget futures and a finite
team of employees, any loss of one employee to even
a 3-day course means that someone’s job is not getting
accomplished for 3 days. With hardly any “training
float” for education in civilian agencies, there is no
guarantee that representatives from departments and
agencies will even be able to attend courses that are
developed and offered—no matter how beneficial
a particular course would be to the department, the
government, and the individual. Even when offices
are able to allow personnel to attend a course, there
is no direct link that shows employers what is being
brought back to the office. Education is currently
not cumulative or standardized for building new
recognized skills and aptitudes, which means that the
direct benefit of allowing employees to attend courses
is limited severely.
The question of authority is not one that can be
answered by anyone other than those serving within the
highest echelons of power. Transforming departmental
missions to include education, building meaning in
education, and creating a float of personnel to attend to
their educational development will require legislation,
some of it on par with the National Security Act of 1947
or the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986.
The Way Forward.
At this point, the U.S. Government lacks authority
and budget priority for promoting interagency
education. Despite these limitations, one only has to
look at the issues on the strategic horizon to know
that integration and collaboration will be essential in
maintaining the national security of the United States.
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The mission of improving coordination through
education is being accepted throughout government.
The perennial conundrum is the creation of education that (1) means something to employees in terms of
career growth, (2) contributes to the departmental and
agency mission, and (3) coincides with broad budget
and personnel limitations throughout the government.
These limitations, however vexing, provide great
insight into what the future of interagency education
could look like. One idea, requiring presidential and/or
congressional support, is building a university system
focused on education. Another more likely scenario is
bringing together educational instruments throughout
the government into a national security educational
consortium.
National Security University.
The concept of a National Security University
(NSU), where a singular brick and mortar institution
would educate mid- and senior-level government
personnel on topics relating to the new strategic
landscape, is not a new one. This idea has been put
forth in loose terms in research projects ranging from
the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Project” (of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies), to more
formal government reports examining lessons learned
in Hurricane Katrina and Iraq. In addition, the NSU
concept appeared in DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review and the subsequent implementation roadmap
on Building Partnership Capacity.
In its initial framing, the NSU centered on transforming NDU and increasing its capacity to educate
personnel in the interagency community outside of the
military. Multiple levels of working groups were formed
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from NDU, other DoD components, and the broader
interagency community to discuss the development
of an NSU concept that would not interfere with the
successes of JPME, while being accessible to a greater
number of people through short courses and distance
learning. Throughout the conversations, the largest
stumbling blocks remained (1) governance, (2) the lack
of a personnel float in civilian agencies, (3) the absence
of agreement on competencies and learning objectives
(or even a mechanism to reach such agreement), and
(4) the uncertain contribution of a completed course to
advancing a person’s career.
Lamentably, these hurdles were insurmountable,
lacking presidential or congressional support. In
addition, since the initiative was fueled by a DoD
planning document, garnering the support of the
interagency community remained problematic. The
small cadre of contributors was unable to address
the larger challenges of coordination that remained
ingrained in the interagency process that was built to
address the landscape of a bipolar Cold War world.
This said, the working groups were able to identify (1)
national competencies required for strategic leaders in
the 21st century, (2) further issues regarding personnel,
and (3) opportunities regarding the educational
offerings already existing throughout government.
In these discussions, competencies and curriculum
were discussed and generally agreed upon to include
the development of leaders who are (1) “managers of
change,” adaptive to uncertainty and strategic change;
(2) culturally aware, understanding the operations
and capabilities of other players in the strategic
arena; (3) technologically astute, understanding the
national capabilities relating to information systems
and enabling systems such as budgeting, contracting,
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and legal authorities; (4) operationally skilled, able to
form and execute interagency plans; and, (5) creative
thinkers, able to build effective lessons learned and
approach strategy development with long-term
vision.
National Security Education Consortium.
Another idea that entered the discussion is the
National Security Education Consortium (NSEC). This
proposal is a continuation towards the goal of the original NSU concept, but eliminates many of the impediments associated with developing a new “brick and
mortar” institution. Challenges persist and ultimately
the NSEC idea may be replaced with alternatives, but
in mid-2007, the consortium concept remained the best
solution to the demand for interagency education.
On its face, the NSEC concept would allow for
greater accessibility to education for personnel throughout the government. Initially the consortium intends to
focus on bringing together the educational communities at NDU, the Foreign Service Institute, National
Intelligence University, and the current educational
component being developed at DHS. Instead of
centralizing education through one university, courses
will likely remain decentralized, allowing the experts
who already teach topical and functional courses at
each of the institutions to continue doing so. In addition,
NDU intends to start with a pilot certificate program
in academic year 2007-08, to combine and add to
existing programs to create an opportunity to educate
a wide array of students without disturbing the JPME
successes modeled at NWC, ICAF, and JFSC.
In creating the NSEC, questions persist regarding
its value to participants and management. Working
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from another concept that was introduced in the
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, participants who
meet the core and specialty course requirements of
the consortium would receive a special designation
(national security officer/specialist). In the short
term, this title is unlikely to create major professional
incentives, but in the long term, the hope is that
departments and agencies will create the requirement
for applicants to possess the designation to have at
least a hiring and promotion preference over those
who do not. Conceptually, “national security officers/
specialists” would be individuals who could effectively
develop, execute, and evaluate interagency plans and
serve as interagency agents within their departments
and agencies.
Management of the courses and personnel involved
in such a program remains integral to its success.
Obviously some courses that exist throughout the
consortium’s components do not fill the competencies
required by a national security officer. Management
of education must meet multiple requirements to be
effective: (1) determining how to “grandfather” current
government personnel who possess the competencies
that could automatically deem them to be national
security officers, (2) determining standards for courses
throughout the consortium to be considered for
credit, (3) analyzing curriculum gaps in the system
and making recommendations for courses to address
them, (4) managing the status of students regarding
their personnel records, (5) negotiating the transfer of
funds between agencies for students to take courses at
the different institutions, and, (6) continuing to build
relationships outside of the existing consortium in
hopes of broadening the participation of contributing
institutions in the future. This will not be easy,
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but success in creating a meaningful interagency
educational program will only come through effective
and centralized management.
Within the world of DoD, the NSEC concept may
include the creation of a “College for National Security
Studies” (CNSS) to be housed at NDU. Being the newest
partner in an eventual consortium, CNSS would most
likely be the location where the majority of the core
courses are offered under a nontraditional (nonresident
and short courses) Master’s of National Security. In
addition, CNSS could also serve in a development
capacity for short courses and symposia offered
through the NSEC curriculum. The hope is that CNSS
would educate the majority of nonmilitary interagency
students, and the creation of CNSS would have little
effect on Joint Professional Military Education.
The NSEC concept leverages existing educational
capacity throughout the national security community,
yet allows institutions to remain focused on their
primary mission of educating individuals within a
certain community (i.e., FSO education at the Foreign
Service Institute). In addition, the NSEC hopes to
leverage the curriculum development and course
experimentation resources at NDU, instead of starting
the process from scratch. Problems regarding personnel
floats cannot be addressed in this system save for
course offerings that could be managed on a part-time,
multiyear basis. Another determination that has to be
made is the top-level leadership for NSEC, with ideas
being discussed ranging from a board of directors,
composed of the leaders of educational institutions in
the consortium, to a subpolicy coordination committee
for education in the NSC structure, to an appointed
chancellor to be confirmed by Congress and reporting
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to a Board of Visitors. These challenges will persist,
but with little cost to the government, the NSEC could
begin test courses within the next few years.
Conclusion.
Some claim that the interagency process is broken,
but many more state emphatically that the process
for interagency collaboration never truly existed. In
the NSC system, top level officials in the interagency
community are able to eliminate conflicts over largescale problems at the macro level, but when managing
day-to-day operations in a crisis environment or on
issues that never reach the NSC agenda, leaders rely
on their personal contacts for immediate coordination.
Managing national security cannot be left to personality
and connections alone. Absent a formalized process
for collaboration between departments and agencies,
interagency education serves as a tool to build greater
understanding and outreach for those who manage
mandates that cross agencies.
Two ideas emerging, an NSU and NSEC, effectively
begin to address the problem that persists throughout
government. The largest challenge of the 21st century
will not be terrorism or natural disasters; it will be
creative management of national security capabilities
housed within departments and agencies to respond to
crises effectively and collaboratively.
Serious progress may be at hand. In May 2007,
President George W. Bush signed an executive order
establishing the program for “National Security
Professional
Development.”
This
remarkable
achievement bore fruit 2 months later in the form of
a “National Strategy for the Development of National
Security Professionals.” The document states:
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This Strategy initiates a formal national effort to attain
a robust and integrated national security development
program through access to education, training, and
professional opportunities that enhance national security
professionals’ mission-related knowledge, skills, abilities,
and experience. The successful performance of missions
within each phase or function of defense, prevention,
protection, response, and recovery—both military and
civilian—are inextricably linked, and depends upon
heightened collaboration and a mutual understanding
of authorities, mission requirements, capabilities, and
operations across the Federal Government.1

Let us hope that these excellent sentiments mobilize
action to allow all departments and agencies to better
leverage their greatest assets: people.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11
1. “National Strategy for the Development of National
Security Professionals,” Washington, DC: July 2007. See also
Executive Order 13434, “National Security Professional Development,” dated May 17, 2007, Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 98,
published May 22, 2007.
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APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED ACRONYMS
AID (or USAID)

U.S. Agency for International
Development
APHS/CT
Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism
APNSA (or NSA) Assistant to the President/National
Security Advisor
ARB
Accountability Review Board
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM
Regional Combatant Commander
DAP
Deputy Assistant to the President
DC
Deputies Committee
DCI (or DCIA)
Director of Central Intelligence
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI
Director of National Intelligence
DNSA
Deputy National Security Advisor
DRI
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
FSO
Foreign Service Officer
HSC
Homeland Security Council
HSPD
Homeland Security Policy
Directive
IMET
International Military Education
and Training Program
IWG
Interagency Working Group
JIACG
Joint Interagency Coordination
Group
JIATF
Joint Interagency Coordination
Task Force
NCTC
National Counterterrorism Center
NEC
National Economic Council
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NGO
NIC
NIE
NIP
NME
NSA

NSC
NSD
NSDD
NSPD
NSRB
NSS
ODNI
OSCE
PC
PCC
PDD
PM
POLAD
PRG
QDR
RSO
SAP
S/CRS

Nongovernmental Organization
National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Estimate
National Intelligence Program
National Military Establishment
National Security Act or National
Security Advisor (or Assistant to
the President/National Security
Advisor (AP/NSA)
National Security Council
National Security Directive
National Security Decision
Directive
National Security Presidential
Directive
National Security Resources Board
National Security Strategy
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
Principals Committee
Policy Coordinating Committee
Presidential Decision Directive
State Department Bureau of
Political-Military Affairs
Political Advisor to Military
Commands
Policy Review Group
Quadrennial Defense Review
Reconstruction and Stabilization
Operations
Special Assistant to the President
State Department Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization
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SVTS
SWNCC
USAID (or AID)
USIA
USMILGP

Secure Video Teleconferencing
State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee
U.S. Agency for International
Development
U.S. Information Agency
U.S. Military Group
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